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**GENDER VARIABILITY OF MODALITY: LEXICAL AND PROSODIC
MEANS**

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INTRODUCTION

In today's society the existence of female's voice is undeniable. Gender linguistics is a constantly developing branch and raises interest not only in scientific circles. Common people seek for the explanations of differences between men's and women's speech in order to understand each other better. That is why such works as *Men are from Mars. Women are from Venus. A practical guide for improving communication and getting what you want in your relationships* (1992) by John Gray, or Jennifer Coate's *Woman Talk* (1996) and *Men Talk* (2003) have found their broad audience. These pieces focus predominantly on discommunication matters in day-to-day life. The more scientific research on how the genders talk and differ in their discourse analyzes the forms of speech, topics, intonation or grammatical features, realizing through the means of modality, which make the language of men and women distinct.

Thus, the **relevance** of gender research is connected not only with the novelty of its thesaurus, but primarily with the importance of gender phenomenon in an individual's life and society.

It is hard to delineate the notion of modality in a simple way despite it is considered to be the 'golden oldies' among the basic notions in the semantic analysis of language (Nuyts J, 2005:5). In fact, as Bybee and Perkins put it, "it may be impossible to come up with a succinct characterization of the notional domain of modality" (Bybee & Perkins, 1994:176). There are several reasons which lead to this kind of conclusion. Firstly, there is no unanimity concerning the nature of modality in a sense that some scholars tend to emphasize subjective nature,

others consider objective and subjective side of it equally. Secondly, it is due to the blurred boundary of the modality. There is still no agreement among scholars what to include in the domain of modality what not to. Last but not the least, modality is understood as a united meaning of its subcategories which are still under scrutiny and new concepts are being offered which make difficult to stabilize the semantics of modality. It is not once noted that “the number of modalities one decide upon is to some extent a matter of different ways of slicing the same cake” (Perkins, 1983:10). Thus, the **aim** of this paper is to make general claims about the architecture of the notion of modality addressing the gender issues, suggest classification of modality and sum up the main modal means, characterizing their use by women and men.

The **novelty** of the research of gender variability of modality is concerned with the absence of the data in the scientific field. This linguistic phenomenon remains blank and unstudied. Moreover, the question of classification of modality is rather controversial.

The **object** of the research is gender variability of speech, the **subject** – modal means which men and women resort to in everyday communication.

The **theoretical value** consists in the contribution to the development of the notion ‘variability modality’ in the gender discourse; introduction of various features of modality use by men and women; implementation of different means of expressing modality in everyday conversation.

The **practical value** is proved by the possibility to the use findings of the paper in teaching courses of theoretical grammar, optional courses ‘gender

variability of modality’, ‘differences in men’s and women’s speech’, ‘the modality features’, ‘contrastive linguistics’ in the methodology of teaching native and foreign languages during the teaching of reading and interpretation of different texts with respect to the realization of modality.

The following **methods** have been applied during the investigation: the comparative, text and discourse analysis, the elements of structural analysis, the method of vocabulary definitions, and also the general scientific methods of intendance, generalization and description.

The paper consists of the introduction, two chapters, conclusion. The first chapter is dedicated to relation of gender and modal meaning in speech, namely to gender speech variability, gender specificity of differences in emotional expression by language means, psycholinguistic background of modal meanings in men and women speech. The second chapter represents gender specific linguistic means of modality, in particular gender specific lexical means and syntactic structure of modality and gender specific prosodic means of modality.

CHAPTER I. RELATION OF GENDER AND MODAL MEANING IN SPEECH

1.1. Gender speech variability

Gender differentiation is one of the common phenomenon under the study of all sciences, one way or another. It deals with all the spheres of human knowledge and culture. Gender linguistics focuses on speech, topics, intonation or grammatical features, etc., that make the language of men and women distinct (Senta Trömmel-Plötz (1997), Anthony Mulac (1999), Robin Lakoff (2004)).

Noam Chomsky assumes that all people have a basic sense of language, or rather of grammar, in them: Generative grammar (Chomsky: 1966). Is it possible that we also have a pattern of language usage engraved in us, depending on whether we are male or female?

When men and women talk, their utterances differ in terms of semantics, syntax, and implicatures. It is possible that the differences in speech behavior are perceived to be much stronger than they actually are. Therefore, alongside natural gender differences in speech, stereotypes also serve to create and perform gender.

Gender differentiation is one of the common phenomenon under the study of all sciences, one way or another. It deals with all the spheres of human knowledge and culture. However, before the Woman's Liberation movement in the 1960s, which was aimed at raising questions about disadvantageous women position in society, there was no certain focus on the gender differentiation in a scientific field. Linguistics was not an exception and only with the rise of feminist

movement the gender linguistics has become a serious discipline. The recent studies have created a great background for research on female's and male's speech and behavior. However, there are still controversial and unanswered questions.

In today's society the existence of female's voice is undeniable. Gender linguistics is a constantly developing branch and raises interest not only in scientific circles. Common people seek for the explanations of differences between men's and women's speech in order to understand each other better. That is why such works as *Men are from Mars. Women are from Venus. A practical guide for improving communication and getting what you want in your relationships* (1992) by John Gray, or Jennifer Coate's *Woman Talk* (1996) and *Men Talk* (2003) have found their broad audience. These pieces focus predominantly on discommunication matters in day-to-day life. The more scientific research on how the genders talk and differ in their discourse analyzes the forms of speech, topics, intonation or grammatical features which make the language of men and women distinct. Examples of this would be Senta Trömmel-Plötz (1997), Anthony Mulac (1999), Robin Lakoff (2004).

The relevance of gender research is connected not only with the novelty of its thesaurus, but primarily with the importance of gender phenomenon in an individual's life and society.

One of the earliest works on gender differences in speech was the article *The Woman* (1990) by Otto Jespersen, whose analysis dates from 1925 and according to which the female's discourse is rather deficient in comparison to the

male's. We may suggest that the linguist has made his conclusion for the reason of absence of adequate data and researches on both gender's speech in comparable conditions. Moreover, the spirit of that period could imprint his judgements and, as a result of being a part of highly stereotypical, patriarchal society, the work has a completely evaluative slant. Whatever the reason is, *The Woman* is counted as one of the first studies contributing to the gender linguistics.

A half of a century later, a set of a gender features was established by Robin Lakoff in her book entitled *Language and Woman's Place*. The analysis provided in the book is based on her personal observations and introspection that is why we cannot perceive this data as the one which represents the reality of women's and men's discourse. For example, Lakoff claims that sweet-sounding swear words such as "goodness" are characteristic to female speech, while strong "damn" is primarily used by males. In addition, women are said to enrich their speech with adjectives which evoke levity, triviality and frivolity. In her work Lakoff provides her assumptions concerned with the criteria which mark female language and makes contribution to linguistic studies by characterizing some features inherent in speech of women. According to her research, women:

- Hedge: using phrases like "sort of", "kind of", "it seems like" etc.
- Use (super) polite forms: "Would you mind...", "I'd appreciate it if...", "...if you don't mind".
- Use tag questions: "You're going to dinner, aren't you?"

- Speak in italics: intonational emphasis equal to underlining words – so, very, quite.
- Use empty adjectives: divine, lovely, adorable etc.
- Use hypercorrect grammar and pronunciation: English prestige grammar and clear enunciation.
- Use direct quotation: men paraphrase more often.
- Have a special lexicon: women use more words for things like colors, men for sports.
- Use question intonation in declarative statements: women make declarative statements into questions by raising the pitch of their voice at the end of a statement, expressing uncertainty. For example, “What school do you attend? Eton College?”.
- Use “wh-” imperatives: (such as, “Why don't you open the door?”).
- Speak less frequently.
- Overuse qualifiers: (for example, “I think that...”).
- Apologize more: (for instance, “I'm sorry, but I think that...”).
- Use modal constructions: (such as can, would, should, ought – “Should we turn up the heat?”)
- Avoid coarse language or expletives.
- Use indirect commands and requests: (for example, “My, isn't it cold in here?” – implied request to turn the heat on or close a window).
- Use more intensifiers: especially so and very (for instance, “I am so glad you came!”).

- Lack a sense of humor: women do not tell jokes well and often don't understand the punch line of jokes [4, 5].

As a result, Lakoff's publication gave a start to other researches in the field and arose debates in scientific circles. For instance, the two key claims of her work – that man and women communicate differently and these differences are caused (and sustain) by male dominance – have become a matter of discussion. In the course of time these two claims have developed into two paradigms, which are applied in today's linguistic study on gender use of language – difference and dominance approaches. In addition, there is the third approach developed – the deficit one.

It seems that Lakoff's statements on female language traits have few in common with today's real nature of gender speech and possibly are the representation of stereotypical way of thinking based on existing common imagery in the second half of 20th century. However, in 1980 O'Barr and Atkins have analyzed courtroom cases and witnesses' speech. The result of their study challenges Lakoff's viewpoint on female language use. They have concluded that the quoted speech patterns were neither characteristic of all women nor limited only to women. Therefore, the women who used the lowest frequency of women's language traits had an unusually high status (according to the researchers). They were well-educated professionals with middle class backgrounds. A corresponding pattern was noted among the men who spoke with a low frequency of women's language traits. O'Barr and Atkins tried to emphasize that a powerful position might derive from either social standing in

the larger society and/or status accorded by the court [4, 7] and have an impact on what and how much we talk.

According to Cameron and Coates (1985), the amount we talk is influenced by who we are with and what we are doing. They also add that if we aggregate a large number of studies, it will be observed that there is little difference between the amount men and women talk. On the one hand, in the study by Dr. Brizendine (1994) is stated that women talk three times as much as men. On the other hand, Drass (1986), in an experiment on gender identity in conversation dyads found that men speak more than women.

As we have previously mentioned, studies in the area of gender and language use are often based on three paradigms – *the dominance, difference and deficit approaches also referred to as frameworks*. The first can be seen in the works of Don Zimmerman and Candace West (1975), Pamela Fishman (1980), Pamela Fishman (1980). The second is associated with Maltz and Borker (1982) and Deborah Tannen (1984), the third one – with Cameron (1990).

The deficit framework suggests that women's ways of speaking are, whether by nature or nurture, deficient in comparison to men's (Cameron, 1990: 14). Robin Lakoff supports this view of gendered female language. Sometimes, women who feel that their way of speaking is deficient and that they lack something (e.g. credibility or power) due to their language usage go to classes offering such subjects as assertiveness training, which basically teach them to "talk like man". In the documentary *Venus Boyz*, Diane Torr teaches aspiring drag kings how to talk, move and behave like males in order to gain respect,

power and credibility. Like the assertiveness training for women, her course confirms the notion of the deficit framework: Women lack something that men have.

Applying the dominance approach, in 1975 Don Zimmerman and Candance West have studied a small sample of recorded conversations between women and men. The subjects of the analysis were white, middle class and under 35. According to the result of their investigation, men are more likely to interrupt their interlocutors than women. In suggested evidence of 31 segments of mixed-sex conversations, men used 46 interruptions, while women only two. As a result, Zimmerman and West made a conclusion as follows: men are dominating if they interrupt more often.

In contrast, anthropologists Maltz and Borker, who are the creators of the difference framework, compared sex differences to culture differences, and in those two “cultures,” boys and girls “learn to do different things with words in a conversation”. Proponents of this framework (e.g. Maltz and Borker, 1982 or Deborah Tannen, 1990) often base their research on data from interaction between and among same sex groups only. When criticized for ignoring the factor of dominance or power imbalance between the sexes, they claim that this factor may exist on the locutionary level, but it is not intended by the speaker. Knowing that their research does not consider the interaction of mixed sex groups, it is not surprising that they do not find an intended dominant linguistic behavior of males over females (Uchida, 1990: 285-287) [6, 8].

However, Deborah Tannen shows us an interesting research – the difference approach, in her book *You just don't understand* (1990) she summarized six contrast series of male and female discourse:

Status vs. support. This claims that men grow up in a world in which conversation is competitive – they seek to achieve the upper hand or to prevent others from dominating them. For women, however, talking is often a way to gain confirmation and support for their ideas. Men see the world as a place where people try to gain status and keep it. Women see the world as “a network of connections seeking support and consensus”.

Independence vs. intimacy. In general, women often think in terms of closeness and support, and struggle to preserve intimacy. Men, concerned with status, tend to focus more on independence. These traits can lead women and men to starkly different views of the same situation.

Advice vs. understanding. Deborah Tannen claims that, to many men a complaint is a challenge to find a solution: “When my mother tells my father she doesn't feel well, he invariably offers to take her to the doctor. Invariably, she is disappointed with his reaction. Like many men, he is focused on what he can do, whereas she wants sympathy.”

Information vs. feelings. Culturally and historically speaking, men's concerns were seen as more important than those of women, but today this situation may be reversed so that the giving of information and brevity of speech are considered of less value than sharing of emotions and elaboration.

Orders vs. proposals. It is claimed that women often suggest that people do things in indirect ways – “let's”, “why don't we?” or “wouldn't it be good, if we...?” Men may use, and prefer to hear, a direct imperative.

Conflict vs. compromise. This situation can be clearly observed in work-situations where a management decision seems unattractive – men will often resist it vocally, while women may appear to accede, but complain subsequently. In fact, this is a broad generalization – and for every one of Deborah Tannen's oppositions, we will know of men and women who are exceptions to the norm [2, 5].

The frequent use of questions, tag questions and hedges in women's speech is often interpreted as insecurity, weakness or confirmation-seeking. In her article *Conversational Insecurity*, Pamela Fishman advocates another interpretation of those same linguistic features (Fishman, 1990: 255-256). In the case of the questions and tag questions, she argues that an interrogative helps to sustain a back and forth in a conversation, thus contributing to a cooperative conversational style (Fishman, 1990:255). She also maintains that asking a question is a request or demand for the other to talk, and thus does not necessarily have to be rooted in a power imbalance but stands for a “female way” of expressing demands (Fishman, 1990: 255). Fishman also considers hedging to derive from women's cooperative style of conversation. “‘You know’ displays conversational trouble, but is often an attempt to solve the trouble as well. ‘You know’ is an attention-getting device, a way to check with one's interactional partner to see if they are listening [...]”. Thus, according to her, questions, tag

questions and hedges present a compensation for men's failure to cooperate in conversations.

Deborah Tannen presents a contradictory interpretation of the indirectness of female speech (Tannen, 1990: 268f). She claims that being indirect does not necessarily reside in perceived powerlessness or a lower position in hierarchy, but may be just the contrary. In her judgment, indirectness is ambiguous and polysemous, because "indirectness [...] is not in itself a strategy of subordination. Rather, it can be used either by the powerful or the powerless" (Tannen, 1990: 268).

In 1998 Talbot suggested that both dominance and difference frameworks lack specificity and are to be reconsidered. As far as the dominance theory is concerned, she argues that not all women are dominated by men: "This male dominance business is a load of rubbish, because my mother/grandmother/aunt bosses about my father/grandfather/uncle". Moreover, Talbot calls for being more specific as in relation to different cultures, spheres of work, places and languages the dominating factors vary.

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According to Talbot, difference model also lacks conclusiveness. Studies in the area will certainly show different results in relation to these aspects [5, 9] due to the fact that power and social position are usually neglected.

Tannen offers reinterpretations of what has been identified elsewhere as dominating behavior (if one can't get a word in, he's not dominating the conversation. It's just happens to have a competitive style...) [5, 10].

We have stated that the work by Lakoff has influenced the linguistic field, arose many discussions and become a landmark in the study of language use by women and men. Contemporary researches made by Belorussian scientists Poplevko and Nadolskaya have some common features with their forerunners' studies and show some differences.

They state that features of the speech style of men and women is manifested in two levels: speech behavior and speech [3, 6]. For example, men are more likely to interrupt, more categorical, strive to control the subject of a dialogue. It's significant that, unlike the popular belief, men speak more than women. Men's sentences are usually shorter than women's. Men in general are much more likely to use abstract nouns, while women use specific nouns (including proper names). Men use more often nouns (mostly specific) and adjectives, while women use more verbs. Men use more relative adjectives, and women – quality. Men often use perfect tenses in the active voice.

Female speech involves a lot of emotionally evaluative vocabulary, and male's evaluative vocabulary is more often stylistically neutral. Often women are prone to intensify primarily positive evaluation. Men resort to the frequent use

of negative evaluation, including stylistically reduced swear words and invectives, slang words and phrases, as well as non-literary vocabulary [3, 7].

Kirillina and Tomskaya in their article “Linguistic gender studies” have distinguished characteristics of male and female written speech. Men in written language:

1. Use army and prison slang;
2. frequently use introductory words, especially with a notion of statement: obviously, undoubtedly, of course etc;
3. use a large number of abstract nouns;
4. use words with the least emotional indexing while communicating in a highly emotional state or to evaluate the subject or phenomenon;
5. resort to sameness of lexical devices in emotional situations;
6. employ combinations of officially and emotionally marked vocabulary when referring to family and friends;
7. use newspaper and journalistic cliches;
8. use obscene words as introductory ones (Любовь, *****, нашел);
9. resort to sameness of obscene words used, as well as prevalence of obscene invective and constructions denoting actions and processes, as well as the predominance of active verbs;
10. employ inappropriate punctuation in emotionally intense cases.

As far as female written speech is concerned, Poplevko and Nadolskaya have distinguished the following characteristics:

1. The common use of introductory words, definitions, adverbs, adjectives, pronouns and modal constructions expressing varying degrees of uncertainty, suspicion, hesitation. For example, maybe, in my opinion, apparently;

2. propensity to use “prestigious”, stylistically elevated forms, clichés, bookish vocabulary (felt disgust; sharp conversation; silhouettes of adolescents);

3. the use of connotatively neutral words and phrases, euphemisms (to express obscenely instead to swear; insobriety instead of to be drunk);

4. the use of evaluative statements (words and phrases) with deictic lexemes instead of naming person by name (this bastard; these scum);

5. great figurativeness of speech when describing feelings, diversity of invectives and their accentuation with a help of reinforcing particles, adverbs and adjectives.

As we have observed, the linguistic behavior of women in relation to that of men can be looked at from different angles. Depending on the viewpoint, the social role of the genders varies. Interpreting female speech with the deficit framework theory, we can see that women are deficient in relation to men. Women represent the inferior gender which lacks something the other gender has or can do. The theory of the dominance framework also implies that women are inferior to men, but the difference between the two frameworks is that the dominance variant shows them not to be inferior due to something they lack but portrays their inferiority as rooted in passive or active subordination. The theory of the difference framework is the least judgmental. It simply accounts for the fact that the genders do have different roles and a different status in society, and

that this variation in upbringing or training is the explanation for the differences in their speech behavior.

1.2. Gender specificity of differences in emotional expression by language means

There is a common assumption that has transpired over the years with regard to women being more emotionally expressive than men. Many studies have been conducted, examining emotional expressiveness in males and females and there is a fairly substantial body of research demonstrating that women are the more emotionally expressive gender (Kring & Gordon 1998). In addition to this there are certain emotions that have been stereotypically linked to each gender. Emotions of happiness, sadness and fear are believed to be more characteristic of women, whereas men are believed to be more characteristically angry (Kelly & Hutson-Comeaux 1999).

We conceptualize emotion as having multiple components, including a behavioral or expressive component, an experiential or verbal component, and a physiological component, which is consistent with a number of emotion theorists and researchers (e.g., Buck, 1994; Ekman, 1992; Gross & Muiloz, 1995; Izard 1977; Lang, 1995; Levenson, 1994; Leventhal, 1984; Plutchik, 1993). In our view, emotional expressivity reflects the extent to which individuals outwardly display their emotions, which is similar to Gross and John's (1997) conceptualization: "the behavioral changes (e.g., facial, postural) that typically accompany emotion" [26, p. 435]; it is also similar to Halberstadt and colleagues' definition: "a persistent pattern or style in exhibiting nonverbal and verbal expressions that often but not always appear to be emotion related" [27, p. 93]. The degree to

which the expressive, experiential, and physiological emotion components correspond to one another varies depending on a number of social, cultural, and situational factors.

The literature on emotional response in men and women is replete with studies examining one or two of these components of emotion, however, few studies assess all three. Some studies explicitly examine sex' differences in emotional response, whereas others report sex differences secondary to other findings. Not surprisingly, a number of different measures of expression (e.g., facial electromyography (EMG), observational coding by trained raters, judgments by naive raters, self-report) and physiology (e.g., skin conductance, heart rate, finger pulse amplitude) have been used. And although the experiential component is typically assessed by means of self-report, the types of measures vary greatly. Despite these methodological differences, a number of consistent findings emerge across studies assessing the expressive component of emotion. Findings on sex differences in the experiential and psychophysiological domains, however, are less clear and consistent.

The expressive component of emotion has been the most widely studied, and, with few exceptions, results indicate that women are more emotionally expressive than men. At this point, it is important to note that a number of emotion theories and recent empirical studies suggest that both men and women's expressive behavior is particularly susceptible to modification by various social factors (e.g., Buck, Losow, Murphy, & Costanzo, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Ekman et al., 1982; Fridlund, 1994; Frijda, 1993; Gross & John,

1997; Halberstadt et al., 1995; Kraut & Johnson, 1979; Levenson, 1994). Indeed, expressivity serves both informative and evocative functions in the social environment (Keltner, 1996). In particular, expressive behavior in social situations is believed to be influenced by socially and culturally determined display rules, that is, social and cultural standards about how and when to express emotion (e.g., Buck et al., 1992; Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Ekman et al., 1982). The majority of the studies on sex differences in expressivity reviewed above involved presentation of an emotional stimulus to an individual participant, which by most accounts is a minimally social situation (but see Fridlund, 1990, 1994). However, more recent studies have demonstrated that the presence of another person can modify expressive behavior [25, p. 687]. For example, positive expressivity appears to be facilitated in the presence of familiar others (e.g., Buck et al., 1992; Fridlund, 1990; Kring, Ranieri, & Eberhardt, 1995), whereas negative expressivity appears to be attenuated or inhibited in the presence of unfamiliar others.

Ekman (1994) suggested that individuals may have different thresholds for the expressive, experiential and physiological components of emotion, and demonstrated that emotional expression and experience congruence varies with the intensity of emotional events. With respect to sex differences, this notion suggests that men may have a lower threshold for experienced emotion than they do for facial expression. According to Brody (1985), boys and girls learn different rules for the expression of emotions, however, not necessarily for the experience of emotions.

Unfortunately, a number of researches investigating to differences in expression do not analyze or include reports of experienced emotions, as well as those, which find no differences.

Gender differences in emotional expressiveness is not a new area of study by any means. There are many different studies which analyze the way in which males and females are seen to express different levels of emotion and how each possesses some stereotypical emotions which are deemed socially acceptable for males and females to display. These socially acceptable displays of emotion, with regard to gender, are usually instilled in the members of a culture from early childhood [7, p. 46].

Researchers such as Birnbaum, Nosanchuk and Croll (1980) have found in their studies that these gender-specific stereotypes are observed in children as early as preschool age (Kelly&Hutson-Comeaux 2002). This instilment of socially acceptable displayable emotions from early childhood will become more sophisticated as children mature. Ideally, they will continue to express their emotions 'correctly' to illustrate their social competence. This is done because subconsciously we are aware that the way we express or manage our emotions has a significant influence on the initiation, facilitation and maintenance of social relationships (Campos, Mumme, Kermoian & Campos 1994). This early shaping of our views on emotional expressivity results in women being more emotionally expressive than men. It is important to note that it is concerned with the expression of experiences and not the actual experience itself; the external rather than the internal. Studies such as Fabes and Martin (1991) show that women are

perceived to express emotions more than men but that there was little difference in the perception of men and women's emotional experience. "Therefore, it appears that the consistent gender differences in the emotion stereotype literature are based on beliefs about the expression of emotion more than they are on beliefs about the emotional experience." (Kelly & Huston-Comeaux 2002).

Despite substantial efforts in gender differences in emotional responses over the past several decades, no consensus as to whether women are more emotional than men have been reached. Gard et al. stated that researchers should consider both emotional experience and emotional expressivity when investigating gender differences in emotional responses [8]. Emotional experience refers primarily to an individual's physiological arousal evoked by external stimuli, and emotional expressivity is the external expression of subjective experience. Kret et al. agreed with this notion and further noted the importance of addressing specific types of emotion when investigating gender differences in emotional responses [9].

It remains unclear whether gender differences exist in emotional experience. Numerous studies have shown that, compared with men, women usually experience more frequent and stronger negative emotions [10, p. 11]. This may explain why women are more prone to mood disorders [12, p. 89]. Gohier et al. adopted a priming paradigm and found that negative stimuli reduce the priming effects on women [13, 76]. They explained that women are more sensitive to negative stimuli, and this heightened sensitivity interferes with their processing of negative stimuli.

Electrophysiological studies have shown that women exhibit greater galvanic skin response and an elevated heart rate (HR) when watching movies that induce feelings of sadness, and their HR is also elevated in response to movies that induce feelings of disgust [10, 73]. Bradley et al. studied startle reflex reactions and revealed that women exhibit a stronger response to negative stimuli [11]. However, an increasing number of studies have shown that men exhibit more intense emotional reactions, particularly to stimuli that are perceived to be threatening [14] or erotic [15].

In addition, many studies have suggested there are no gender differences in emotional experience [16, 17, 18]. Electrophysiological studies have shown that HR is lower when people view emotion-inducing pictures, but this variance in HR does not differ between genders [17]. The same finding has been reported by studies investigating emotional responses to movies [18]. Another two studies on startle reflex reactions have found that no gender differences exist when the participants watched negative stimuli [16, 19]. Similarly, Fischer and Manstead stated that despite the large number of studies that have confirmed gender differences in emotional experience, these differences were smaller than expected, with almost no differences being reflected in the observed behaviors of participants [20, 91].

Regarding gender differences in emotional expressivity, no consensus has been reached. Many studies have used subjective evaluations as indicators of emotional expressivity, finding that women often report a more intense emotional response regardless of valence. For example, one study found that,

compared with men, women rated negative stimuli with higher arousal and rated neutral stimuli more positively [24]. Other studies have also shown that women rated dynamic anger and pleasure emotions as more intense than static emotions, but men rated only anger as more intense [21, 92]. Furthermore, a series of results indicated that compared to men, women had a greater degree of differentiation in emotional expressivity on both positive and negative emotions [24]. However, several studies have also shown that there were no gender differences existed in subjective evaluations when the participants viewed pictures, faces, or movies [18] that induced emotional responses.

The recent study conducted by Chinese researches Yaling Deng, Lei Chang, Meng Yang, Meng Huo, Renlai Zhou in 2016 shows that gender differences depend on the emotion type. Women show relatively stronger emotional expressivity, whereas men have stronger emotional experiences with angry and positive stimuli.

First, for the negative emotions, gender differences were observed in horror and disgust. However, although men and women had the same emotional experience, women had stronger emotional expressivity, as evidenced by their lower valence scores, higher arousal, and stronger avoidance motivation. This finding is consistent with Codispoti et al. [17]. For the anger emotion, the researchers have found that men had stronger emotional experiences, whereas women had stronger emotional expressivity (e.g., higher reported arousal). Second, for the positive emotions, the results show that men have a larger decline

in HR while watching amusement- and pleasure-inducing videos, whereas women have higher levels of arousal.

According to the results, this study does not support the widely accepted notion that women are more emotional than men [20] or that women are more easily affected by emotions. However, the results support that women often report more intense feelings. The researchers suggest that gender differences in emotional responses should be considered according to different types of emotion, and there should be a distinction between the emotional experience and emotional expressivity.

Recent meta-analyses strongly suggest that gender differences are very small or even non-existent and have decreased over time as an effect of socio-cultural factors changing (Hyde & Mertz, 2009). In the area of emotional competence, on the other hand, female superiority has been advocated, with much to draw from popular concepts such as “female intuition”. In contrast to literature on cognitive skills, female superiority for many emotional skills was still suggested in recent studies. However, effect sizes are comparably small, heterogeneity exists and mediating factors are still not clear.

An important aspect of emotional competence is the ability to recognize emotions from facial expressions. The early literature is inconsistent whether females actually recognize facially expressed emotions better [28, 278].

Hall conducted a series of extensive and methodically sound meta-analyses finding that 80% of studies show female advantage (Hall, 1978, 1984; Hall et al., 2000). Other studies showed no gender differences in the recognition of facially

expressed emotions (e.g., Erwin et al., 1992; Grimshaw, Bulman-Fleming, & Ngo, 2004; Rahman, Wilson, & Abrahams, 2004). The difference between studies might be explained by differences in the nature of stimuli. Studies using prototypical emotional expressions of high intensity showed fewer differences between male and female decoders than those using subtle expressions with less intensity.

Given the difficulty obtaining objective information on originally used stimuli and comparing the intensity of facial expressions across various studies, Holger Hoffmann, Henrik Kessler, Tobias Eppel, Stefanie Rukavina, Harald C. Traue from University Clinic for Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy decided to test this hypothesis empirically by conducting two experiments presenting standardized emotional faces of varying intensity to subjects. In the first experiment recognition accuracy between female and male decoders was compared when emotional faces were shown with full-blown (high intensity, 100%) and subtle (low intensity, 50%) expressiveness.

The main hypothesis of this study was confirmed: Women recognize subtle emotional expressions better than men, whereas there are no significant gender differences when full-blown emotions are shown. Recognition accuracy increases with ascending expression intensity when comparing 50% vs. 100% expressions as well as when obtaining detailed scores in 10% steps. This holds true for men and women, although men show a steeper drop in accuracy with de-creasing intensity than women giving the latter the advantage in decoding subtle emotional cues [28, 282].

All of these findings on emotional expressivity have largely been based on experiments involving face-to-face observation and reactions. However, as society becomes more technologically advanced, it has seen the rise in social networking sites as a common means of communication. Many people believe that this rise in online communication and the change in communication patterns that it has brought with it through changing technologies (Trevino, Webster & Stein, 2000) may contribute to breaking down the stereotype that sees women as the more emotionally expressive of the genders, due to the relative anonymity that comes with online communication [25, 47]. For this reason, we think it is crucial to suggest another viewpoint concerning the gender differences in emotional expression and recognition through the prism of online social networking communication.

There have been few studies conducted on how emotional expressiveness is marked within online discourse and how different genders use emotional markers. In a research conducted by Roisin Parkins the 50 participants were chosen at random from social networking sites, in particular from Facebook and Twitter. Status updates, wall posts, comments and tweets were collected for analysis from the participants' Facebook or Twitter accounts.

Once the fifty participants had been chosen, the process was explained to them and permission was gained to examine their Facebook and Twitter accounts for different types of emotional expression markers. Through examining the participants' Facebook and Twitter accounts it was observed that there were six

common techniques that were used to express emotion. The emotion markers analysed were:

1. the extensive use of punctuation markers (such as !! and ??);
2. the use of extensive full stops used within a speech sample (e.g.); only three or more were considered to be extensive use, as two could merely be a typing error;
3. the use of capitalized text;
4. the addition of the same letter within a word (e.g. yeeeeeees);
5. the general use of emotions (e.g. ☺, ☹);
6. the different means of expressing laughter (e.g. lol, hehe, haha).

Each participant's Facebook and/or Twitter account was examined over a two-week period. Each day the researcher recorded how many times each expression marker was used. In addition, as a point of interest, the researcher also recorded the frequency at which the emotional expression markers were used between males and males, males and females, females and males, and females and females, to see if there was a gender-to-gender preference [25, 48].

As the analyzed data has shown, women had a higher frequency of use than men in every category of emotional expression.

In summary, although there is some disagreement in the literature as to whether women are more expressive of all emotions or just a subset, the majority of studies have found that women appear to be more expressive of most emotions compared with men. It also remains to some extent unclear whether men and women differ in other domains of emotional response. According to recent

studies, women have an advantageous recognition of facial cues subtle in nature as compared to men. However, on a general level, there is no distinct gender differences, as far as the emotional recognition is concerned. It has also been found that the emotions of happiness, sadness and fear are believed to be more characteristic of women, whereas men are believed to be more characteristically angry. These stereotypes have provided a basis for society to deem what is and is not socially acceptable for males and females in displaying emotions.

Gender differences in emotional experience and emotional expressivity depended on specific types of emotion and are situational. Sociality of a situation influences expressive behavior because the presence of another person serves as an additional eliciting stimulus. That is, in a setting where an emotional stimulus is presented in the presence of another, the combination of these stimuli influences the expressive behavior of an individual.

1.3. Psycholinguistic background of modal meanings in men and women speech

The concept of "modality" first appeared in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (he singled out three leading modal concepts: necessity, possibility and reality) [1], later this distribution passed into classical philosophical systems. Various judgments about modality are found in works of Theophrastus, Eudemus Rhodes, medieval scholastics. In modern philosophy, the division of Kant's judgments has become traditional and there is a division on assertive (judgments about reality), problematic (judgments about possibility), apodictic (judgments about necessity), reliable and

credible judgments [15]. M.N. Epstein in his book "A Philosophy of the Possible" summarizes approaches to the study of modalities in various areas of humanitarian thinking. He relates the concept of modalities to the basic ones and builds his theory of the possible, based on three basic modalities of existence: reality, possibility and necessity. He singles out modality of possibility as the most significant, because it determines the other two modalities.

In philosophy, there is an ontological modality, which is the means of existence of an object or phenomenon, and epistemological (logical) modality, which is a means of understanding, judging an object, phenomenon or event [13].

Modality in logic is a characteristic of judgment by the "power" of the statement& According to it, judgment can be necessary, possible, accidental, impossible, etc. [11, 46].

In linguistics, modal words and phrases are considered one of the most contradictory lexico-grammatical categories of words that attract special attention scientists from the second half of XX century. But they still have not received a full review due to their versatility, specialty of language expression and functionality features.

Scientific research in linguistics in recent years is focused on the discursive existence of the subject, which allows us to rethink modern communication as an environment of speech interaction in which person is able to independently shape their social reality. Linguistically, with subjective positioning closely intertwines the category of modality. In modern studios the scope of the concept of "modality" is quite broad and covers not only mental (cognitive, epistemic, perceptual, emotional), but also any communicative mode – subjective expression of views and assessments, discursive position of the subject, etc.

The genesis of the category of modality originates in modal logic, namely the theory of possible worlds (D. Lewis), propositional logic and three-digit logic of statements (J. Lukasevich), deontic modalities logic (G. Vrikt), axiological (O. Ivin) and epistemic logic (J. Hintikka).

The first description of the general principles of differentiation of modal meanings in linguistics is developed from classical formal logic. The latter came from the philosophical teachings of Aristotle, the developer of modal syllogistics, according to which inferences can be not only categorical, but also modal.

The concept of modality was introduced into logic by Aristotle to distinguish between ontological judgments (the way a certain phenomenon occurs or the way a certain object exists) and epistemological (a way of understanding a judgment about an object, phenomenon, or event). In modern modal logic (G. von Wrikt, O. Ivin, J. Hintikka) within the category of modality there are distinguished alethic (refer to statements or predicates) and deontic (refer to words that denote actions) subcategories, and on the other hand – to absolute and relative subcategories. In the semantic field modality often includes the concepts of "true" and "false", as well as "what can be proved", "what can not be proved" and "something that can be refuted" [31, p. 381].

In their attempts to explain the whole set of modal relations that the individual expresses in cognitive-discursive activity, scientists have gone far beyond the traditional classification, developed by G.H. von Wriptom [52], in which he singled out alethic, epistemic, deontic and existential modes. Traditionally in modern linguistics the definition of modality is seen as purely

linguistic category [13; 29; 48; 49]. However, there is no unanimity among the representatives of such approach, as far as the determining of the categorical status and range of modal values is concerned.

For a long time, in domestic linguistics dominated interpretation of modality as a grammatical category of a wide semantic range, suggested by V.V. Vinogradova [10;11], according to which modality was considered as every integral expression of thought, feeling, intention etc., which reflects the reality in a particular statement, is embodied by intonation language and expresses certain grammatical meanings. Within this approach, modality is interpreted as a category that states the subjective attitude of the speaker to the expressed opinion in terms of reality, unreality or possibility. According to this, among the modal meanings there are distinguished "narrative", "desirability", "opportunity", "questionability", "motivation" and "hypothetical".

Modality was first introduced as a semantic category of communication by S. Balli (1932) [5]. The scientist identified two logical constituents of the communicative process: the objective semantic constant (dictum) that forms the sentence, and subjective component (modus) as a manifestation of will and feelings of an individual. Modus correlates with dictum and, depending on the speaker's understanding of the sentence, acquires corresponding modal values. This concept laid the foundation for modern interpretation modalities as categories of discourse [3; 48; 49etc.], which combines four main components of communication: two speakers, the content of the statement and discursive reality. O.I. Belyaeva and A.V. Bondarko [6; 7; 9] consider modality as a

functional-semantic category that has common categorical meaning, an appropriate set of constituents and a clearly defined core and periphery.

The most common [3; 5; 25] is an understanding of modality as complex of meanings, which, from the position of the speaker, characterize the relationship of the propositional basis of the content of statements to reality on the dominant grounds of reality/unreality.

Within this approach, modality is considered [1; 18; 29] as *communicative category* related to the content of the message, which is determined by the speaker in accordance with communicative intention.

The semantico-syntactic approach characterizes modality as a category that, from the one hand, indicates the relationship of the content of the sentence to the reality with which the understanding is associated as real (only stated by the speaker) or unreal (possible, desirable, necessary, etc.), and on the other – indicates the attitude of the speaker to the expressed opinion. The last modal meaning can be determined on the basis of determinants functioning as communicative constructions with appropriate semantic coloring. Thus, modality reflects the attitude of the speaker to the sentence, which expresses epistemic (truth, faith, confidence, provability, etc.) and evaluative (desirability, intention, possibility, obligation, manipulation, etc.) relations.

In *linguo-cultural* [3; 6; 7; 13; 17; 24; 25; 29; 51] field the category of modality firstly most correlates with the concept of cultural specificity. The content plan of the modality category is characterized by national and cultural specifics inherent in a particular society, and the plan of expression – by a

complex of linguistic and extralinguistic means with a certain cultural and semantic color. Cultural specificity of modality as well as the linguistic and pragmatic factors is determined by socio-cultural and mental parameters that allows us to speak of it as a discursive category constructed by the speaker-representative of a certain linguistic and cultural paradigm. It is fair to assume that the world around us is reflected in modality of the subject, so the assumption that a concrete expression of modality is the real "state of affairs" – is false, and is the speaker's view of reality. Thus, the proposal is the result of nomination and semantic structure that denotes the situation as seen by the speaker.

The most common [3; 5; 25] is an understanding of modality as complex of meanings, which, from the position of the speaker, characterize the relationship of the propositional basis of the content of statements to reality on the dominant grounds of reality/unreality.

Conceptual origins of the **psycholinguistic approach** to the study of the category of modality presented in the works of R. Fowler [37] and F. Palmer [48; 49], in which modality is interpreted as a complex linguistic construct that expresses the relationship of the statement to reality and subjective assessment by the speaker, reflected mainly in the dichotomies reality/unreality, objectivity/subjectivity, logic/emotion.

Representatives of modalities, as part of a more complex image that constructs human consciousness, are models of modal meanings. These models arise and function in the process of studying and getting proficient in language in ontogenesis. They also provide expression of language/speech modality and in

discursive interaction are transmitted from one communicator to another within a certain linguistic culture.

In general, the authors of the psycholinguistic studies agree that modality belongs to the number of categories of language and is a language universal, and expresses different relations of expression to reality, as well as different types of qualification/interpretation of the content of what is said by the speaker.

The obligatory feature of the statement is an objective modality, which expresses the relation of what is said in terms of reality/unreality. Subjective modality, in its turn, reflects the speaker's attitude to the utterance and is its optional feature. However, the semantic dimension of the subjective modality is much broader than objective. The semantic basis of subjective modality is the concept of evaluation in its broadest sense, which includes not only logical qualification (rational component) of the utterances, but also different types of emotional reaction of the speaker. Subjective modality covers the whole range of methods available in language to assess the content of what is said, the means of expression of which function as modifiers of the basic modal qualification.

In his “Modality and English modals” (1990), the scholar revises his views on the subtypes of modality and recognizes epistemic, deontic and dynamic modalities. He relates three of them in terms of possibility and necessity as the extremes of the modality scale. He makes binary distinction within epistemic, deontic and dynamic modalities: epistemic possibility and necessity, deontic possibility and necessity, dynamic possibility and necessity (Palmer, 1990), as for instance:

Din may be there now (epistemic possibility).

It is possible for Din is there (deontic possibility).

Din must be there now (epistemic necessity).

It is necessary for Din to be there (deontic necessity).

The next scientist who groups deontic and dynamic modalities under one umbrella is Coates J. But she suggests another term for it: root modality. She distinguishes epistemic and root modalities. The tradition to study dynamic and deontic as root has its own longstanding history which will not be discussed here to avoid exhaustive description (Hofmann, 1976; Jenkins, 1972:25; Huddleston, 1976:85; Sweester, 1982:484).

Coates studies the domain of modality from the perspective of English modal verbs' meanings. She accounts for their meanings using "fussy set theory", the main idea of which is that the semantics of each modal form a gradience line from strong to weak epistemic or root modality and objective or subjective root or epistemic modalities, where strong or subjective modality comprising core of the set while objective and weak modalities belong to the periphery of the set. Moreover, there is semantic area between core and periphery which is called 'skirt' (Coates, 1983:13). For instance, "may" in its root reading is gradient from 'permission' to general 'possibility', the meaning of "must" makes a line of strong obligation to weaker sense of necessity (Coates, 1986, p.15). She concludes that the semantics of modal verbs are interrelated and form a continuum which is inappropriate to cut as Palmer does (Coates, 1983, pp. 20-21). Although the study leans on rich empirical data, the author does not define modality at all and it

gives an impression that modality is made up by the meanings of English modal verbs.

Studying the issues of modality from functional perspective Halliday (1970) introduces and accounts for the difference between 'modality' and so called 'modulation', the former of which is connected with interpersonal function of the language "whereby the speaker enters into communication process in its social and personal aspect" (Halliday, 1970:325), while the latter is linked with ideational function of the language, the function with the 'element of content' (Halliday, 1970:326). Thus, according to Halliday modality is "... the speaker's assessment of probability and predictability. It is external to the content, being a part of the attitude taken up by the speaker: his attitude, in this case, towards his own speech role as 'declarer'." (Halliday, 1970:349). Modality as such only covers what we call epistemic modality.

Modulation is defined as a kind of quasi-modality which is intrinsic to the content, which deals with "a characterization of the relation of the participant to the process" (Halliday, 1970:349). It includes what is known as dynamic modality: ability and willingness of the participant and deontic modality.

Defining modality and modulation as a part of a single network, Halliday accounts for the distinctive characteristics of each of them. According to Halliday, modality and modulation in addition to their different functions, differs also in their relation with tense, polarity, voice and in the ways of realization in speech. Modality being extrinsic to the proposition is as well as outside the domain of tense, polarity and voice whereas the modulation is subject to

modification by tense and negation but Ability is inherently active, while Permission/Obligation are inherently passive. Both modality and modulation is realized in speech verbally and non-verbally. Moreover, verbal and non-verbal forms can co-occur but the result of it is different in modality and modulation. In the case of modality verbal and non-verbal forms are in a concord relation while in modulation they are in a cumulative relation. Along with fundamental distinctions Halliday mentions ambiguities and blends which occur between modality and modulation. The ambiguity of one type arises due to the common forms which express both modality and modulation. He states that in case of (i) occurs ambiguity therefore the hearer should select either modality or modulation reading, while in case of (ii) and (iii) occurs blend, i.e. it is not necessary to choose between modality and modulation reading as they are overlapped:

- (i) non-oblique modal + simple infinitive (e.g. must do);
- (ii) oblique modal + simple infinitive (e.g. should do);
- (iii) oblique modal + past infinitive (e.g. should have done).

However, Lyons also states that in everyday speech we do not make this kind of calculation to back up our opinion. That is why we think that it is more the subject of modal logic, rather than linguistic issue. Moreover, Nuyts states that what Lyons treats as objective epistemic modality is in fact belongs to the realm of evidentially since “(epistemic) modal qualification always involve a speaker’s estimation of the chances of a state of affairs occurring in the world or not” (Nuyts, 1992:82) but not involve the evidence to support the judgement.

CHAPTER II. GENDER SPECIFIC LINGUISTIC MEANS OF MODALITY

2.1. Gender specific lexical means and syntactic structure of modality

It is quite easy to make the claim that men and women differ in their linguistic behavior. Assumed gender roles are contrastive, with men often thought as dominant speakers, while women are placed in a subordinate role during the conversation process. Important to realize in this issue, however, is the different perspectives the two sexes have in casual speech. 'If women speak and hear a language of connection and intimacy,' a clash of conversation styles can occur, when confronted with a men's language concerned with status and independence. (Tannen 1990). Misinterpretation of the use of linguistic functions, thus, often arises.

Modality in English can be realized in various linguistic units as follows. **Modal Verbs.** The unmarked type of modality is expressed in such overt modal operators as must, can, could, may, might, will, would, shall, should, ought and the semi modals need and dare. The meaning they carry may vary depending on the context.

Students must abide by the regulations of the university. (obligation)

At midnight he must have been sleeping soundly. (Probability)

It is raining now; the teacher might not come today. (Probability)

Nobody can lift such a heavy box. (Ability)

You can go with your mother to visit your grandma. (Permission)

Modal Adjunct. Modality may also be expressed by adjuncts such as certainly, definitely, probably, possibly, perhaps, maybe, surely, always, usually, obviously, etc.

Probably, he comes to her house today.

Certainly, the examination will be held next week.

Possibly, the earthquake happens again today.

Lexical Verbs. Some lexical verbs may also express modality such as allow, beg, believe, command, forbid, guarantee, guess, promise, suggest, warn, wonder, wish, think, suppose, etc.

The Principal warned that the students submit their assignment soon.

I think he can solve the problem himself.

We suppose that all the students' works are fair.

Lexico-Modal Auxiliaries. Modality may also be expressed by lexico-modal auxiliaries such as be able to, be about to, be apt to, be bound to, be certain to, be due to, be going to, be liable to, be sure to, be to, be likely to, be meant to, be supposed to, have to, have got to, had better, would rather, would sooner, etc.

Many small children nowadays are able to browse the internet.

Websites are bound to abide by the law of the respective country.

Web world is likely to arrive at an uncontrollable condition.

Clause with Adjective. Modality in English can be realized in a clause with an adjective and followed by either an infinitive or a that-clause. The common adjectives which are used to express modality are sure, certain, likely, possible, probable, willing, etc.

Budy is certain to pursue higher studies in UK.

It is certain that Budy will pursue higher studies in UK.

Palestine is probable to get its independence next year.

It is probable that Palestine gets its independence next year.

Clause with Past Participle. Modality can also be realized in a clause with a past participle and followed by either an infinitive or a that-clause. The common past participle verbs used to express modality are allowed, determined, confirmed, obliged, required, supposed, etc.

Indonesia is required to be provided with more sophisticated warfare.

It is required that Indonesia be provided with more sophisticated warfare.

Foreign citizens are obliged to abide by the regulations of the country of residence.

It is obliged that foreign citizens abide by the regulations of the country of residence.

Clause with Noun. Another possibility of the realization of modality is in the form of a clause beginning with either an impersonal it or an existential there followed by a noun and a that-clause. The nouns commonly used to express modality are must, chance, certainty, likelihood, possibility, probability, determination, etc.

It is a must that every Master's student conduct a field research.

It is an obligation that Muslims observe prayers five times a day.

There is a possibility that this earth be burned by the sun one day.

There is a certainty that this earth will perish one day.

Conditional Clause. Conditional clauses may carry the meaning of modality to express probability. If a condition is fulfilled it is possible, probable or certain that another condition will take place.

If it does not rain, the class will be going on. (Possibility)

Unless you put enough spices, this food will not be delicious. (Probability)

If green is mixed with yellow, it will become blue. (Certainty)

Combination of Modal and Adjunct. Modality can be expressed on the combination of a modal operator and an adjunct.

According to a John, the doomsday will definitely happen on Friday.

An unknown creature might possibly exist in the old building.

The Rector must always be ready to meet the demonstrators.

The alligators can sometimes stay on land.

According to Lakoff's 10 features of women's language, we may suggest, that the majority of means of realization of modality are used in everyday communication mostly by females and are characteristic of women's speech. For example, consistent in Lakoff's list of linguistic features is their function in expressing lack of confidence, which is realized through modal verbs such as may, might, could; modal adjuncts such as probably, possibly, perhaps, maybe; lexical verbs such as believe, guess, promise, suggest, wonder, suppose and correspondent lexico-modal auxiliaries. The common adjectives which are used to express modality and express lack of confidence in women's speech are likely, possible, probable etc.

According to Lakoff, both hedging and boosting modifiers show a women's lack of power in a mixed-sex interaction. While the hedges' lack of assertiveness is apparent, boosters, she claims, intensify the force of a statement with the assumption that a women would not be taken seriously otherwise.

For Lakoff, there is a great concordance between femininity and unassertive speech she defines as 'women's speech.' According to her, in a male-dominated society women are pressured to show the feminine qualities of weakness and subordination toward men, which is usually realized in speech though the means of modality.

Men's language as put by Lakoff is assertive, adult, and direct, while women's language is immature, hyper-formal or hyperpolite and non-assertive. Both sides employ modality means in order to express their emotions and thoughts towards reality/irreality.

Rather than assuming speech differences among men and women are related to power and status, the more recently emerging difference, or dual-culture, approach views sex differences as attributable to contrasting orientations toward relations (Montgomery 1995:168). For men the focus is on sharing information, while women value the interaction process. Men and women possess different interactive styles, as they typically acquired their communicative competence at an early age in same-sex groups.

According to Maltz and Borker (1982), who introduced this view which values women's interactional styles as different, yet equal to men's, "American men and women come from different sociolinguistic subcultures, having learned

to do different things with words in a conversation.” (cited in Freeman and McElhinny1996:239). They cite as an example the different interpretations of minimal responses, such as nods and short comments like umhm and yes. For men, these comments mean ‘I agree with you’, while for women they mean ‘I’m listening to you- please continue.’ Rather than a women’s style being deficient, as Lakoff would believe, it is simply different. Inherent in this position is that cross-cultural misunderstanding often occurs in mixed-sex conversation, as ‘individuals wrongly interpret cues according to their own rules’.

Tannen (1986,1990,1994) provides much research on the concept of misunderstanding in the dual-culture approach. According to her, the language of women is primarily ‘rapport-talk’, where establishing connections and promoting sameness is emphasized. Men, on the other hand, use language described as ‘report-talk,’ as a way of preserving independence while exhibiting knowledge and skill. (1990:77). The contrasting views of relationships are apparent: negotiating with a desire for solidarity in women, maintaining status and hierarchical order in men. The frustration that occurs between women and men in conversation can be better understood ‘by reference to systematic differences in how women and men tend to signal meaning in conversation. (1994:7). When these meaning signals are misunderstood, communication breakdown occurs.

We have analyzed the gender specific lexical features using a sample of natural, spoken conversation among three native speakers of English. Of special interest are several relevant linguistic features, many of which were first

provided by Lakoff, and their use in controlling or facilitating the interaction of the speakers. The participants, two men and one woman, are co-workers of equal status in a casual conversation over lunch. While examining the linguistic features of this conversation sample, specifically those of the female's, we comment on what approach they tend to suggest. Does the woman's use of key features stem from deficiencies in her language, as the dominance approach suggests, or is her speech usage simply different, caused from a different interactional style?

Indirectness: women's use of questions. The function of a command can be described as an utterance designed to get someone else to do something (Montgomery 1995). Several studies (Goodwin 1980; Cameron, McAlinden and O'Leary 1989; Tannen 1990, 1994; Holmes 2001) have commented on the different ways men and women phrase commands. Men tend to use simple, direct statements, whereas women rely on 'couching their commands as inclusive suggestions for action.' (Montgomery 1995:160). Consider the following two examples, taken from analyzed conversation sample:

Jody: Mmm...home phone.

Andy: What home?

Jody: My home. What's my phone number? Are you gonna plug it in?

Jody: Mmm...How many? Do you want it small?

Andy: Smallish.

Ian: I like this stuff.

Jody: Like that?

Andy: Mmm...even smaller.

Jody: Smaller? Do you want to put it here? Why don't you just bite it?

Jody has chosen to couch her commands in the form of questions. Rather than stating the bald commands, 'Here's my phone number. Plug it in,' and 'Put it here. Bite it,' she opted for a more indirect approach.

Lakoff (cited in Tannen 1994) describes two benefits of indirectness: defensiveness and rapport. Defensiveness 'refers to the speaker's preference not to go on record with an idea in order to be able to disclaim, rescind, or modify it if it does not meet with a positive response.' (p. 32). Rapport refers to getting one's way not by demanding it, but because the listener is working toward the same end, indirectly encouraging the common goal.

It can be argued that defensiveness can be a feature of women's powerless language, and that women's tendency to be indirect is proof of an unauthorization for command usage, as set by society's standards. (Conley, O'Barr, and Lind 1979). However, we believe a different and more valid interpretation is that Jody, however entitled, chooses not to make direct commands. Rather, the solidarity she creates with her command/question usage gives the benefit of rapport. This, according to Tannen, can be considered a sign of power rather than the lack of it. However, this ambiguity, often viewed with men's language as the norm, has a tendency to be labeled as powerless. As Tannen states, "Because they are not struggling to be one-up, women often find themselves framed as one-down." (1990:225).

Tag Questions. The tag question, similarly, can be interpreted as a hedging device which weakens women's speech. Of all the linguistic forms originally listed by Lakoff, the tag has come to hold the position of archetypal women's language feature (Coates 1989:67). However, researchers since Lakoff have included context as a deciding factor in determining a tag's usage, with an association toward conversational role rather than gender. There are three instances in my sample which I consider function as tag questions, two by the woman and one by a man:

Andy: You don't have a phone right now...do you? (falling intonation)

Jody: Mmhm.

Jody: Looks good...huh? (falling intonation)

Andy: Mmm.

Jody: You didn't get scissors, eh? (rising intonation)

Ian: It's like talking to a machine. She obviously had this spiel...

Holmes (2001) describes four different functions of tag questions, three of which do not follow Lakoff's original proposal of tags expressing tentativeness. They are expressing uncertainty, facilitative, softening, and confrontational.

The first example can be labeled as softening. Considering the falling intonation, its function is affective, or addressee-oriented. It is not seen as expressing uncertainty, but rather softening an informative out of concern for the addressee. (Holmes 1984).

The second example, 'Looks good...huh?' we include as a tag form, taking in account the casual context of the recorded conversation. An equivalent tag would be, 'Looks good...doesn't it?' It follows the classic facilitative strategy of providing a way into the discourse for the addressee, thus creating solidarity with the speaker. It is an expression of personal opinion, generally by someone in a leadership role (Holmes 2001), in which confirmation is not required, but is elicited. This can, however, be interpreted as a method of 'fishing for approval or verification.' (Tannen 1986:39).

Cameron, McAlinden and O'Leary, in their article 'Lakoff in context: the social and linguistic functions of tag questions' (1989), state that although facilitative tags contain no informational function, their interactional function of including others is important. That the woman in my conversation sample provides the only facilitative tag device may support the claim that women are more attentive at keeping a conversation going (see also *The Function of Minimal Responses*, section 3.3), being 'co-operative conversationalist who express frequent concern for other participants in talk.' (Cameron, et al:83).

The third tag example we have categorized as confrontational, although the function of this tag is not as clear-cut as the other two. According to Holmes, the function of a confrontational tag is not to hedge but rather to 'strengthen the negative force' of an utterance. Unlike the other two examples, which are affective, this one is modal, in that it is requesting information or confirmation of information. With the rising intonation, the 'ehh?' can be translated into 'did you?', as in 'You didn't get scissors, did you?'. If falling intonation had been used,

the criticizing force would have been more powerfully signaled. However, with the rising intonation, it is difficult to determine, and she may simply be questioning whether the addressee is in possession of scissors. Holmes acknowledges this ambiguity, stating ‘a primary function is often identifiable, but not always. Different functions often overlap and classification into different types is not always straightforward.’ (2001:310)

It is interesting to note that in tag examples one and two, both of which are addressee-orientated and act as positive politeness devices, the addressee chooses to respond to the question, in these cases with the minimal response ‘mmm.’ In doing so, the interactional process is strengthened. The confrontational tag in example three, however, goes ignored, possibly because the addressee has noticed an accusatory tone in the remark and wants to avoid further criticism. The tag question, however, still lessens the accusation and allows the current speaker to hold his turn.

Women and standard language. Sociological studies have shown that women are more likely to use linguistic forms thought to be ‘better’ or more ‘correct’ than those used by men. Trudgill (1983) provides two reasons for this. Firstly, women in our society are generally more status-conscious than men, and therefore more sensitive to linguistic norms- an idea known as hyper-correction. Secondly, “working-class speech...has connotations of or associations with masculinity, which may lead men to be more favorably disposed to non-standard linguistic forms than women.” (p. 87). This lower-class, non-standard linguistic variety has been defined by sociolinguist W. Labov as covert prestige. Linked to

social class, the differences in how men and women gain, or attempt to gain status through opposing speech patterns is noticeable.

In analyzed sample, we find two cases in which the woman has self-corrected herself as a show of sensitivity toward standard speech, while the men show no such effort. According to Montgomery, self-correction can be defined as the various ways *utterances are reworked in the process of uttering them*.

Jody: Ummm. I have to do gas...uh...call Mira and get them to do the gas...uhh...electricity...water... What else is there? I don't know.

Jody: Telephone. Everything has to be about six. I mean...I get six bills every month...so I guess all the bills have to be...

Studies in hyper-correction and covert prestige are generally concerned with sex in relation to social class. (For example, Trudgill 1972, 1983; Macaulay 1977; Milroy 1980; Nichols 1983). In our sample, however, the three participants are of equal social status, all working at the same positions. Therefore it is excluded to make the claim that Jody's self-corrections are a reflection of being status-conscious.

A more likely explanation is that her standard language use stems from the social roles that are expected from men and women, and the behavior patterns that fit those assumptions. As Trudgill states, women's language is not only different, it is 'better,' and is a 'reflection of the fact that, generally speaking, more 'correct' social behavior is expected of women.' (1983:88).

Minimal responses. Minimal responses (also known as back-channel speech, positive feedback and assent terms) can be defined as the brief, supportive

comments provided by listeners during the conversation interaction. They are a feature of jointly produced text, and show the listener's active participation in the conversation. (Coates 1989). Common examples include mmm, uh huh, yes, yea and right.

Usage in our data is abundant, with both men and woman producing examples:

Ian: It's laying on my mind

Jody: Mmm.

Ian: So I think if I do it now and get it over and done with I can relax.

Jody: Yea...I have to 45. Ian: pay ever after the phone.

Jody: Mmm.

Andy: High energy... You probably know him...Australian.

Ian: Mmm.

Andy: Is he a national hero or...does anyone really care?

Ian: Uhmm...He was for awhile but...I dunno. I think he's more popular outside Australia now.

Andy: Mmm...an export.

Ian: Yea.

Jody: How do you think about this now? Do you think it's ready?

Ian: It probably is ready and its beef so...

Jody: Yea.

Several researchers have found that, in casual conversation, it is women who take on the role as facilitator. (Zimmerman and West 1975; Fishman 1980; Holmes 2001; Tannen 1990). Men, it has been demonstrated, are less sensitive to the interactional process. One study which Holmes recounts found that women gave over four times as much of this kind of positive feedback as men (Holmes 2001:297). For women, then, 'talk is for interaction.' (Tannen 1990:81).

In examining analyzed data, however, contrasting results were discovered. Jody, in 59 utterances, provided 11 instances of minimal responses, for an 18.6% rate. Andy, in 39 utterances, gave 3 minimal responses, for a 7.7% rate. Ian, the second male, however, in 47 utterances provided 15 instances, thus giving some form of minimal response 31.9% of the time.

What conclusions can be drawn from this data? One interpretation is that Ian goes against the norms of male speech strategies by being more supportive and less competitive in the discourse process.

A deeper analysis of this view, however, should consider the influence of context. Being a small group conversation in a casual context, the goals of this conversation sample are most likely focused on group solidarity (rather than control), which follows women's strategy of being cooperative conversationalists.

According to Holmes, 'the norms for women's talk may be the norms for small group interaction in private contexts, where the goals of the interaction are solidarity stressing maintaining good social relations. Agreement is sought and disagreement avoided.' (2001:297-298). However, more research into Ian's high

percentage of supportive minimal responses would have to be done for any conclusive results to be reached.

2.1. Gender specific prosodic means of modality

As mentioned above, prosodic means are very important and have an essential role in expressing modality. The linguistic meaning of an utterance can be determined not just by what is said (the content) but also how it is said (its prosody). To express prosody, talkers manipulate the acoustic features of an utterance, such as pitch, loudness, and duration. For example, talkers can raise pitch at the end of a sentence to indicate a question, and lower pitch for a statement [1]. Detecting changes in these acoustic properties is important for successful communication and difficulties in such processing can result in noticeable communication problems

Different modal meanings are expressed with the help of prosody. In academic literature the prosodic means of expressing modality have not been studied enough, though some scholars paid special attention to this area. Coates' investigations (1986) show that intonation and other prosodic features can be considered as modality in semantic sense. Palmer concludes that the different patterns of stress express different types of modality. Intonation is the only generally valid means of expressing modality. It is a prosodic element that gives information about the content of the utterances such as imperatives, declaratives and exclamations, besides, intonation gives information about the speaker's personality.

The expression of modality by modals and adverbs, individually or in combination relates to the linguistic category of prosody. In case of epistemic modality, intonation pattern and modal expression correlate.

e.g. “Well I think it should be quite *good, actually*, I mean it’s a *terrific* thing.

Coates’ suggests that stress patterns and individual modal forms which express epistemic meanings (could, may, might, must) receive some kind of stress that is associated with intonation.

Modal prosody represents the highest level of semantic organization which can be reached by intonation. It took quite a while for speech melody to become a marker of modal categories. Modal intonation, for example interrogative intonation patterns denote interrogative modality the content of which is the meaning of request.

The prosody of the utterance performs 3 basic functions: constitutive, distinctive and identificatory.

1. The constitutive function of prosody is to form utterances as communicative units. Prosody unifies words into utterances. A succession of words arranged syntactically is not a communicative unit until a certain prosodic pattern is attached to it. It forms all communicative types of utterances (statements, questions, imperatives, exclamations and modal types) e.g. categoric statements, non-categoric, perfunctory statements, quizzical statements, certainty & uncertainty questions, insistent questions, etc. Prosody at the same time performs the segmentative & delimitative function. It segments connected

discourse into utterances and intonation groups and simultaneously delimits them one from another, showing relations between them: Cf. “We can if we want to and “we can if we want to”. It also signals the semantic nucleus and other semantically important words of an utterance (or an intonation group). Prosody also constitutes phonetic styles of speech.

2. The distinctive function of prosody manifests itself in several particular functions, depending on the meanings which are differentiated. These are communicative-distinctive, modal-distinctive, culminative (“theme-rheme”) distinctive, syntactical–distinctive and stylistic–distinctive function.

Our interest is the modal-distinctive function, as it realizes different modal meanings with a help of prosody.

The modal-distinctive function of prosody manifests itself in differentiating modal meanings of utterances, i.e. the speaker’s attitudes and emotions, e.g. antagonistic versus friendly attitude and so on.

This function is often defined as expressive or emotional, attitudinal.

As we have already stated, various modal meanings can also be expressed and differentiated by lexical and grammatical means, e.g. such modal words as “sure”, “undoubtful”, “definitely”, “perhaps”, “may be”, “probably” and modal verbs “may”, “might” and so on.

Usually, the speaker’s attitude corresponds to the contents of the words he chooses. But utterance prosody may disagree with word content and is, then, the crucial factor in determining the modal meaning of the utterance.

“He definitely ` promised” and “He definitely promised”.

In the first case the melodic contour agrees with the word content and the grammatical structure, whereas in the second case it does not. So, the first utterance sounds definite and categoric. The second utterance sounds indefinite and non-categoric.

In “` Thank you” the high falling tone is in harmony with the word content and expresses genuine gratitude.

In “^Thank you” the rising-falling tone adds an antagonistic note to the utterance. That is why in actual speech the listener is more interested in the speaker’s “tone” than in his words.

The role and meaning of intonation as far as modality is concerned, were also exemplified in 4.1 “Tag Questions”. The interest of investigations falls on such phonetic phenomena as simultaneous speech, as this area is not studied enough.

The turn-taking procedure enables conversation to continue without everyone talking at once, as studies by Sacks et al (1974) have shown. It is sometimes claimed, though, that women break the rules of the turn-taking procedure less frequently than men do, and conversely, are interrupted more than men are. Of importance, however, is to examine this claim in relation to the context of the conversation. Not all simultaneous speech is a fight for power, and overlaps can indeed create connections and solidarity between two speakers.

Interruptions. West and Zimmerman (1983) provide a widely accepted definition of interruption as ‘a device for exercising power and control in conversation’ and ‘violations of speakers’ turns at talk.’ (cited in Tannen 1994:

56). (Other researchers provide more detailed definitions based on location and function, such as Schegloff (1972), Bennet (1981), and Murray (1985). Rather than mistaking the first speaker's intention to relinquish a turn, for example, or enthusiastically overlapping in agreement with the first speaker, an interruption is an intended infringement on a person's right to speak.

In mixed-sex pairs, West and Zimmerman found that interruptions were much more likely to come from men. In one study, 96 percent of interruptions were made by the man; in another, 75 percent. (Tannen, p.55-56).

In analyzed conversation data, similar results were found. The woman was interrupted a total of eleven times, while a man was interrupted only once.

Andy: The Australian guy...ahh, man...that guy's a riot...that guy's //

Ian: // crazy... that's for sure.

In this example, many researchers would not consider this an interruption at all, but rather a sign of active listenership, and not threatening to the current speaker's turn. (Coates 1998:110). In the lengthy excerpt below, several examples are shown in which the woman is interrupted. Double slash marks indicating the interruption, while brackets indicate overlaps:

Jody: Umm...cancel your phone?

Ian: Yea.

Jody: I have to give //

Ian: // It's laying on my mind

Jody: [umm]

Ian: [so] I just think if I do it now and get it over and done with I can relax.

Jody: Yea...I have to //

Ian: // pay ever after the phone.

Jody: Mmm. I have to do gas...electricity...water. What else is there? I don't know.

Ian: Cable TV. Do you [have cable TV?]

Jody: [cable.] I've gotta get cable transferred //

Ian: // cause they've to come and pick up the box.

Jody: Mmm.

Despite being interrupted three times in this excerpt (following the 'interruption as violation' definition provided by West and Zimmerman), Jody provides three minimal responses to support Ian's speech turns. Thus, rather than fight to maintain her speaking turn, she relinquishes it when Ian cuts in and, in turn, supports his topic.

This, according to Tannen, should not be considered an issue of power control. For an interruption to occur, two speakers must act. One must start speaking, and the other must stop. If the first speaker does not stop, no interruption occurs. For Jody, therefore, the goal of group cohesiveness takes precedence over the desire to share her individual information and opinions, and her choice of relinquishing the floor shows sensitivity for this. For men, conversely, conversation can be likened to a contest, 'in which everyone competes for the floor...expecting women to compete for the floor like everyone else.' (Tannen 1990:212). The misunderstanding of these two different

conversational styles has often been misinterpreted as supporting men's speech dominance over women.

OVERLAPS. As shown in the section above, not all violations of a speaker's turn are disruptive. Overlapping speech – when two speakers speak at the same time – can be a sign of supportive interaction, much like the function of minimal responses (Schegloff argues that minimal responses are not interruptions, but rather 'demonstrations of continued coordinated hearership,' cited in Woods 1989: 143).

Conversational styles and cultural variations, for example, can affect turn-taking strategies, ranging from highly regulated turns on one hand, featuring long pauses and an avoidance of overlaps, to what Tannen calls a 'high-involvement' style (1994:63), in which a faster, overlapping pace is preferred. A mismatch of these styles can create misunderstanding among participants, even though good intentions are sought.

In analyzed data, many overlaps occur, as is natural in casual conversation. Coates (1989), in her article 'Gossip revisited,' classifies seven types of simultaneous speech, most of which do not represent an attempt to infringe the current speaker's right to a turn. (p.107). One common overlap form is when the second speaker self-selects at a TRP, or transition relevance place, i.e. the end of a clause or phrase. The first speaker continues, the second stops.

Jody: That's my hand phone. It doesn't work. [I don't have]

Andy: [But you don't have]

Jody: I don't have a hand phone.

Andy: Okay.

In this example, Andy's interruption fails, and Jody continues with her statement. Andy realizes his mistake and takes his turn when Jody is finished. This, according to Tannen, would be an example of the 'overlap-as-enthusiasm' strategy. Rather than wanting to cut her off, Andy is merely showing his active participation. Jody, in this example, prefers a more defined turn-taking system where one person speaks at a time.

However, the following example shows that Jody at times prefers a more interactive style, consistent of overlap strategy:

Andy: Trying to uhh...you know...It's like one of those nature programs...and he'll just wrestle crocodiles...he'll rescue crocodiles from [mud pits]

Jody: [So what was he doing on the show?]

Andy: and he was on Oprah bringing on animals.

Here we can see another common type of simultaneous speech. Even though Jody interjects a question during Andy's turn, its purpose is not disruptive, but rather a feature of 'active listenership,' giving him the right to acknowledge the question while continuing to hold the floor. (Coates 1989:109-110).

To say that women are less likely than men to break the rules of turn-taking is misguided, often coming from examinations of public speech in which turn-taking rules are closely followed. In this public domain, strategies consist of trying to gain and keep the floor for the purpose of information exchange. In a

casual context, however, linguistic features such as interruptions and overlaps can be choices used to create the preferred payoff of supportive, interactive conversation.

Through supporting evidence found in the recorded data, we have shown how women use key linguistic features and employ modality in a casual conversation context. In addition, we have argued that in many of these instances, the usage has been a conscious choice, supporting the difference approach in sex speech styles.

Rather than acknowledging an imbalance of power between the sexes, we have supported the claim that speech styles are different due to contrasting interaction purposes. For women this includes the payoff of connection and solidarity. Often evaluated with men's language as the norm, misunderstanding of women's speech intentions is common.

There are problems, however, with any research that attempts to define characteristics of men's or women's speech. First is the interpretation of differences. Associations that are found between specific feature use and women's language should not be assumed to take place in all situations or contexts. As seen in Ian's excessive minimal response use, for example, gender differences are not absolute. Secondly, many conversational features, such as tag questions and interruptions, do not have set functions. An interpretation of a particular feature, in addition to a speaker's intention, can only be done within the setting of the interaction.

Semantic values of most commonly used English modals *MAY*, *CAN*, *MUST*, and *SHOULD* undergo various pragmatic modifications encoded in numerous interpretations of propositions. For instance, *MAY* marks the **presence** or **absence** of a certain conditional **barrier**:

I told her, they MAY interrupt me as often as they need.

The value of **ability** is commonly prescribed to *CAN* as for example:

I CAN speak Spanish and Portuguese.

She CAN speak English at work, because everybody is going to understand her.

The value of **potentiality** delegated to *CAN* may be interpreted as a particular subject or object's property in the proposition, which implies some specific and broader factual considerations with respect to this property:

The task CAN be split into two parts.

This approach explains the relation between *CAN* and *BE ABLE TO*, where the latter encodes a natural ability/skill relevant or irrelevant to the individual's desires and wishes, as in the example below:

Din CAN/IS ABLE TO meet you, if he likes.

Next, we consider **suggestion** and **offer** as a recurrent modal value of *CAN*, as for instance:

We CAN meet on Friday.

I CAN help you.

Finally, *CAN* and *MAY* encode the deontic value of **permission**, as for example:

You MAY go home now.

typically, this interpretation grounds why *MAY* is considered to be a more polite form of permission unlike *CAN* as the former encodes greater involvement of the speaker himself.

Modal connotation of *MUST* can be rather clearly considered in the following propositional domain:

I MUST drop out.

The most logical interpretation of this utterance may be as follows: Monika sneezing is a natural reaction for being cold, given, for example, the low air temperature and physical condition caused by the factor:

To start a conference, all MUST join.

The modal *MUST* also conveys restrictive or circumstantial value, i.e. necessity, as follows:

I MUST try harder.

In the given case, *MUST* reveals **suggestions** or **offers**:

We MUST meet one day.

Unlike *MUST*, the modal verb *SHOULD* usually denotes an **obligation** or **rules**, such as:

So, she SHOULD do the washing up.

Hereby, we can claim that the semantic and pragmatic interpretation of the modal values can go beyond their traditional lexical ambiguity and polysemy, which points to the powerful illocutionary power of their semantics and pragmatics. Considering the propositional domain as a modal restrictor, we have identified its basic types as factual, regulatory, desirable, and idealistic. Modal domain as a context interpretive scope encodes a vast diversity of epistemic, deontic and dynamic values of English modal operators, namely possibility, ability, permission, intention, ordering, potentiality, necessity, etc.

CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, the linguistic behavior of women in relation to that of men can be looked at from different angles. Depending on the viewpoint, the social role of the genders varies. Interpreting female speech with the deficit framework theory, we can see that women are deficient in relation to men. Women represent the inferior gender which lacks something the other gender has or can do. The theory of the dominance framework also implies that women are inferior to men, but the difference between the two frameworks is that the dominance variant shows them not to be inferior due to something they lack but portrays their inferiority as rooted in passive or active subordination. The theory of the difference framework is the least judgmental. It simply accounts for the fact that the genders do have different roles and a different status in society, and that this variation in upbringing or training is the explanation for the differences in their speech behavior.

Although there is some disagreement in the literature as to whether women are more expressive of all emotions or just a subset, the majority of studies have found that women appear to be more expressive of most emotions compared with men. It also remains to some extent unclear whether men and women differ in other domains of emotional response. According to recent studies, women have an advantageous recognition of facial cues subtle in nature as compared to men. However, on a general level, there is no distinct gender differences, as far as the emotional recognition is concerned. It has also been found that the emotions of happiness, sadness and fear are believed to be more characteristic of

women, whereas men are believed to be more characteristically angry. These stereotypes have provided a basis for society to deem what is and is not socially acceptable for males and females in displaying emotions.

Gender differences in emotional experience and emotional expressivity depended on specific types of emotion and are situational. Sociality of a situation influences expressive behavior because the presence of another person serves as an additional eliciting stimulus. That is, in a setting where an emotional stimulus is presented in the presence of another, the combination of these stimuli influences the expressive behavior of an individual.

In linguistics, modal words and phrases are considered one of the most contradictory lexico-grammatical categories of words that attract special attention scientists from the second half of XX century. But they still have not received a full review due to their versatility, specialty of language expression and functionality features.

The most common [3; 5; 25] is an understanding of modality as complex of meanings, which, from the position of the speaker, characterize the relationship of the propositional basis of the content of statements to reality on the dominant grounds of reality/unreality.

The semantico-syntactic approach characterizes modality as a category that, from the one hand, indicates the relationship of the content of the sentence to the reality with which the understanding is associated as real (only stated by the speaker) or unreal (possible, desirable, necessary, etc.), and on the other – indicates the attitude of the speaker to the expressed opinion.

Conceptual origins of the **psycholinguistic approach** to the study of the category of modality presented in the works of R. Fowler [37] and F. Palmer [48; 49], in which modality is interpreted as a complex linguistic construct that expresses the relationship of the statement to reality and subjective assessment by the speaker, reflected mainly in the dichotomies reality/unreality, objectivity/subjectivity, logic/emotion.

Representatives of modalities, as part of a more complex image that constructs human consciousness, are models of modal meanings. These models arise and function in the process of studying and getting proficient in language in ontogenesis. They also provide expression of language/speech modality and in discursive interaction are transmitted from one communicator to another within a certain linguistic culture.

Modality is mostly understood as a hyper category with sets of specific notions or categories grouped together under modal umbrella. There is no consensus of opinion concerning the terms used to refer to these categories. It is common to use different labels to the same concepts or the single term describes concepts which differ from each other to some extent. For instance, in the works of western scholars modality is traditionally defined in terms of three concepts: dynamic, deontic and epistemic, while post-soviet countries' linguistics defines objective and subjective modality, then offers different categories under these broad concepts.

Epistemic modality and deontic modality are two types of modality which carry two different meanings. Epistemic modality refers to the use of modality

which is based on the speaker's evaluation and judgment in relation to the degree of confidence of the knowledge on the proposition. It functions to comment on and evaluate an interpretation of reality in carrying out speech functions; but deontic modality indicates the degree of the proposition expressed by a command whether it is obligatory, advisable or permissible according to some normative background.

The analysis has shown that women tend to use the standard language more than men do. We believe that females generally use speech to develop and maintain relationships. They use language to achieve intimacy. It is stated that women speak and hear a language of connection and intimacy, while men speak and hear a language of status and independence.

Through supporting evidence found in the recorded data, we have shown how women use key linguistic features and employ modality in a casual conversation context. In addition, we have argued that in many of these instances, the usage has been a conscious choice, supporting the difference approach in sex speech styles.

Rather than assuming speech differences in modality among men and women are related to power and status, the more recently emerging difference, or dual-culture, approach views sex differences as attributable to contrasting orientations toward relations. For men the focus is on sharing information, while women value the interaction process. Men and women possess different interactive styles, as they typically acquired their communicative competence at an early age in same-sex groups.

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