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**POPULISM AS A COMMUNICATIVE STRATEGY IN POLITICAL  
DISCOUSE**

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## INTRODUCTION

**Relevance of the topic.** Modern populism, having emerged as a "political trend" of the XXI century, is rapidly acquiring the features of "aggressive expansion", which proves the "political success" of populists in the United States, Eastern and Western Europe, Latin America, Australia, the Arab world, Africa - this significantly changes the relief of the global political landscape, provoking or deepening the "erosion of democracy". In analytical reports and predictive projections on international security and stability, moderators of modern socio-political discourse include populism in the gradation of future risks, along with military conflicts and terrorism, in particular, leading experts of the Atlantic Council - Matthew Burrows, Robert Manning and Owen Daniels - emphasize: "The growth of populism is a threatening phenomenon of modern world politics, which provokes or deepens political and socio-economic crises."

The reality of the XXI century is a source of unique phenomena and trends that have radically changed and continue to change world politics, economy, society, culture, and of course the phenomenon of "modern populism" belongs to them. The dominant features of modern populism are: "aggressive expansion" - (a set of specific characteristics: scale, turbulence, dynamism, radicalization, etc.), "paradoxical" - (representative democracy is the basic determinant of modern populism), "diversity" - etc. Trump (USA), G. Wilders (The Netherlands), A. Fujimori (Peru), V. Orban (Hungary), P. Henson (Australia), R. Erdogan (Turkey), R. Correa (Ecuador), J. Haider (Austria), R. Mugabe (Zimbabwe), "Five Star Movement" (Italy), "Podemos" (Spain), etc. - these problematic aspects are "open options" for the latest research cases. Accordingly, the imperative for the modern scientific community is to focus research reflection in the plane of theoretical and methodological explication of the concept of "populism".

**Analysis** of current research. The theoretical framework of the concept of "populism" was laid down in the works - M. Weber, K. Marx, R. Michels, G. Mosca, R. Owen, B. Pareto, K. Renner, A. Saint-Simon, Sh. Fourier et al.,

however, the content design of the theoretical and methodological construction of "populism" took place thanks to scientific developments - W. Altermatt, W. Beca, Z. Brzezinski, A. Valicki, K. Weyland, F. Venturi, E. Gellner, A. Grzimala-Busse, J. Germani, D. Ziblatta, G. Ionesca, R. Kenneth, M. Konovan, S. Lazarus, S. Levicki, D. McRae, J. F. Mancini, I. Menie, S. Moskovichi, F. Nadri, I. Sarel, P. Teggert, A. Torre, A. Touraine, P. Wiles, S. Fier, R. Hofstedter, E. Shils et al.

The problem of "populism" is represented by a wide range of works of domestic researchers - V. Andreychuk, V. Babykh, A. Bobruk, K. Vashchenko, O. Vinnichuk, D. Vydrina, M. Golovaty, M. Demyanenko, S. Denisyuk, I. Dzuba, O. Dubyna, I. Kiyanka, L. Kochubey, V. Krivoshein, G. Kuts, A. Leshchenko, M. Mikhalchenko, S. Myghal, O. Nechosina, V. Panchenko, B. Poltorak, T. Rad, N. Rezanova, M. Tomenko, Yu. Shcherbaka, I. Yukhnovsky, O. Yarosh et al.

The scientific community, despite the detailed discourse, has not developed a consolidated position on the essence of populism, and therefore, the proposed conceptual matrices allow to define "populism" as an ideology, doctrine, phenomenon, movement, and politics in general.

The **purpose** of the thesis is to consider modern populism as a political and cultural phenomenon of modern world politics.

In **accordance** with this goal the following tasks are set:

- to define the concept of "discourse" and "political discourse" in modern linguistic research;
- to identify populism as a product of political communication;
- to analyze modern political and cultural codes that determine the «rating» of populist politicians in the realities of modern politics;
- to identify populism in Western Europe in the late 20th and early 21st centuries;
- to research populism in political discourse of the US;
- to find out theoretical principles and problems of studying the phenomenon of populism in Ukraine.

The **object** of research is populism in political discourse.

The **subject** of the research is modern populism as a political and cultural phenomenon of modern world politics.

**Structure of the work.** The thesis consists of an introduction, two parts, conclusions and list of references.

## **CHAPTER 1. POLITICAL DISCOURSE AS AN OBJECT OF LINGUISTIC RESEARCH**

### **1.1. The concept of "discourse" and "political discourse" in modern linguistic research**

Over the years, the definition of discourse has been one of the problems in linguistics. Discourse as a linguistic category is a complex and multi-valued object of study. This difficulty lies in the fact that discourse is an intermediate phenomenon between speech and communication, language behavior, on the one hand, and fixed text, on the other hand.

Many terms used in speech linguistics, pragmalinguistics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and linguocultural studies are interpreted ambiguously. These include the concept of discourse.

In modern linguistics, there are many definitions of discourse. The first term "discourse" was introduced into linguistics by E. Benvenist. He defines discourse as speech assigned by the speaker, as opposed to a narrative that unfolds without the explicit intervention of the subject of the utterance [11: 129].

There are a huge number of definitions of this term. Dutch scientist T.A. Van Dake suggests understanding discourse in a wide and narrow sense [81: 7-37]. In a wide sense, discourse (as a complex communicative event) is a communicative event that occurs between the speaker, listener (observer, etc.) in the process of communicative action in a specific temporal and spatial context [68: 243]. This communicative action can be verbal, written, have verbal and non-verbal components. Typical examples are an ordinary conversation with a friend, a dialogue between a doctor and a patient, reading a newspaper [49].

Discourse in the narrow sense (like text or conversation) is the verbal component of a communicative action, which is referred to as a "text" or "conversation". In this sense, the term discourse refers to the completed or ongoing "product" of a communicative action, its written or verbal result, which is interpreted by the recipients [69: 7]. That is, discourse in the most common sense

is a written or verbal product of a communicative action [22: 37].

In linguistic science, the term "discourse" today is one of the most common and at the same time one of the most ambiguous.

1. The discourse corresponds with the concept of text, with the form of the text, with an arbitrary fragment of the text (V.Z. Demyankov). T.A. van Dake calls the discourse as an "actual pronounced text" [22: 169]. The terms speech and text as two aspects of discourse will be specific in relation to the generic term discourse uniting them. Discourse is understood widely - as everything that is said and written, in other words, as speech activity, which is "at the same time a linguistic material" [60, p.29], moreover, in any of its representations - sound or graphic.

2. The discourse is related to the concept of utterance, with a group of utterances, a whole speech product, in connection with this Deborah Shifrin [76: 86] identifies three main approaches to the interpretation of the designated concept: the first approach is carried out from the standpoint of formally or structurally oriented linguistics and defines discourse as "a language above the level of a sentence or phrase"; the second approach is associated with the functional definition of discourse as any "use of language" in a broad sociocultural context; the third version of the definition is based on a synthesis of the above definitions - it emphasizes the interaction of form and function - "discourse as a statement", that is, discourse is not a primitive set of isolated units of the linguistic structure "more than a sentence", but an entire set of functionally organized, contextualized units of language use.

3. Discourse relates to the concept of style. Discourse is a way of speaking, individual language (J. Derrida, A. Greymas, Yu. Kristeva, M. Pesce, M. Foucault) [16: 139].

4. Discourse is understood as speech immersed in life (N.D. Arutyunova), speech inscribed in the communicative situation (Z. Harris), the process and result of speech activity (S.V. Guseva).

5. Discourse is considered as a type of activity that reflects all the wealth of the real situation, that is, the personality of the communicants, their motives,



intentions, social statuses.

Discourse is the central moment of human life "in the language" of the fact that B.M. Gasparov calls linguistic existence: "Every act of using a language - be it a work of high value or a fleeting remark in dialogue - is a particle of a continuously moving stream of human experience. In this capacity, he absorbs and reflects a unique combination of circumstances in which and for which he was created." These circumstances include: 1) communicative intentions of the author; 2) the relationship of the author and recipients; 3) all kinds of "circumstances", significant and random; 4) general ideological features and stylistic climate of the era as a whole and of that particular environment and specific personalities to whom the message is directly or indirectly addressed, in particular; 5) genre and style features of both the message itself and the communicative situation in which it is included; 6) many associations with previous experience that somehow fell into the orbit of a given linguistic action [17: 11].

Summing up the various understandings of discourse, M.L. Makarov shows the main coordinates by which the discourse is determined: formal, functional, situational interpretation. A formal interpretation is an understanding of discourse as education above the sentence level or supra-phrase unity, a complex syntactic whole, expressed as a paragraph or tuple of remarks in a dialogue. A connector system is highlighted here to ensure the integrity of this entity. Functional interpretation is the understanding of discourse as a use of language, i.e. speech in all its varieties. A narrower version of the functional understanding of discourse is to establish a correlation between "text and sentence" - "discourse and utterance", i.e. understanding of discourse as an integral totality of functionally organized, contextualized units of language use [2: 53].

An ambiguous approach to the definition of discourse is noted by P. Serio, he identifies eight meanings of the term "discourse":

1. The equivalent of the concept of "speech" [54], i.e. any specific statement;
2. A unit that exceeds the phrase in size;
3. The impact of the statement on its recipient, taking into account the

situation of the statement;

4. Conversation as the main type of utterance;
5. Speech from the position of the speaker as opposed to a narrative that does not take such a position into account [11: 108];
6. Use of language units, its speech actualization;
7. Socially or ideologically limited type of utterance, for example, feminist discourse;
8. A theoretical construct designed to study the conditions of text production.

M. Stubbs identifies three main characteristics of the discourse: 1) in formal terms, it is a unit of language that exceeds the volume of the sentence, 2) in terms of content, discourse is associated with the use of language in a social context, 3) in its organization, the discourse is interactive, i.e. dialogical [79: 15].

More specific differences between varieties of discourse are described using the concept of a genre, for example: “news discourse”, “political discourse”, “scientific discourse”, since discourse, including and political, is a process of speech activity and is built according to the laws of the genre, having a certain structure:

- 1) intentional plan;
- 2) current plan (practical implementation of a communication project in a living activity);
- 3) virtual plan (mental mechanisms of transmission and perception of semantic units of communication, including value orientations, methods of identification, interpretation and other mental operations);
- 4) contextual plan (expansion of the semantic field based on sociocultural, historical and other contexts);
- 5) The psychological plan of discourse, which permeates all his other plans, acting as their emotionally charged component.

The main intention of political communication - the struggle for power - determines the place of a particular genre of political discourse in the field

structure of the genre space. Prototypical genres, from this point of view, are parliamentary debates, public speech, politics, slogan and voting. Peripheral genres are characterized by the interweaving of the function of the struggle for power with the functions of other types of discourse [59: 268].

Genre is: “a gender, type of speech, determined by the given conditions of the situation and the purpose of use” [3: 148]

The speech genre is understood as the linguistic design of typical situations of social-speech interaction of people [29: 107].

Currently, the concept of "genre" is used in discursive analysis. The genre is seen as a unit of discourse, although an exhaustive classification of genres does not exist. Genres have some stable characteristics, but the problems of the linguistic specificity of genres are not yet sufficiently developed [22: 40].

T.A. van Dake believes that political discourse is a genre limited by the social sphere, namely politics [22]. At the same time, he notes that political discourse is a form of institutional discourse. This means that the discourses of politicians are those discourses that are produced in such an institutional environment as a government meeting, a parliamentary session, or a congress of a political party.

A study by the American linguist J. Byber reveals that for many genres it is very difficult to identify stable formal characteristics. Further, J. Bayber proposes to consider genres as cultural concepts devoid of stable linguistic characteristics, and additionally distinguish types of discourse based on empirically observable and quantitatively measurable parameters - such as the use of past tense forms, participles, personal pronouns [67: 3-43].

A detailed classification of political discourse genres was first proposed by E.I. Sheigal, who understands political discourse as “any speech formations, the contents of which belong to the sphere of politics” [59: 23]. In her opinion, genres can be differentiated: according to the institutional / official parameter; on subject-to-address relationships; according to the options of political socio-lectures; by event localization; by the degree of centrality or marginality of a particular genre in

the field of political discourse; by the nature of the leading intention.)

E.I. Sheigal [59: 22-29] delimits the following varieties of political discourse:

1) institutional political discourse, in the framework of which only texts directly created by politicians and used in political communication are used (parliamentary transcripts, political documents, public speeches and interviews of political leaders, etc.);

2) mass media (media) political discourse, in the framework of which texts created by journalists and distributed through the press, television, radio, the Internet are used;

3) official-business political discourse related to hardware communication, in the framework of which texts are created intended for employees of the state apparatus;

4) texts created by “ordinary citizens” who, while not being professional politicians or journalists, occasionally participate in political communication. This can be all sorts of letters and appeals addressed to politicians or government agencies, letters to the media, etc.;

5) “political detective stories”, “political poetry” and texts of political memoirs that are very common in recent years;

6) political texts on scientific communication.

The borders between the six named varieties of political discourse are not quite distinct, often it is necessary to observe its mutual intersection.

The political discourse from the point of view of linguists (R. Jakobson [64: 193–230], V.Z. Demyankov [24: 19], G. Seidel [77: 43–60]) has numerous functions. However, the most successful classification of functions in our opinion is applied by E.I. Sheigal [59: 36]:

1) the function of social control is regulatory (the creation of prerequisites for the unification of the behavior, thoughts, feelings and desires of a large number of individuals, i.e., manipulation of public consciousness);

2) the function of legitimizing power (explanation and justification of

decisions regarding the distribution of power and public resources);

3) the function of reproduction of power (strengthening of commitment to the system, in particular, through the ritual use of symbols);

4) orientation (through the formulation of goals and problems, the formation of a picture of political reality in the minds of society);

5) the function of social solidarity (integration within the whole society or individual social groups);

6) the function of social differentiation (alienation of social groups);

7) agonal function (initiation and resolution of a social conflict, expression of disagreement and protest against the actions of the authorities);

8) the share function (conducting policies through mobilization or “narcotization” of the population: mobilization consists in activating and organizing supporters, while narcotization means the process of appeasement and distraction, the euthanization of vigilance) [59: 36].

Considering the variety of functions of discourse, it can be concluded that they all have an ideology of political correctness and are aimed at achieving political goals by manipulating the public’s consciousness, including in the struggle for power.

Taking into account the classification of various authors, O.V. Epstein identifies the most general semantic-pragmatic categories, i.e. inherent features in political discourse [63]:

1) The image of the author.

2) Addressability.

3) Informativeness (this category to a greater or lesser extent characterizes any act of communication, but nevertheless directly depends on the communicative goals of the discourse. The purpose of political discourse and its social purpose is to instill in the addressees the need for politically correct actions.

4) Intentionality.

5) Evaluation (the formation in society of a certain attitude to a political event and such an assessment that is necessary for this subject) is being carried out.

6) Conventionality (cliched, terminological, ritual (i.e., stereotyping of behavior)).

7) Emotivity / expressivity.

8) Modality (attitude to reality in the speaker's view).

9) Intertextuality (relations between social and linguistic structures, realized in a universal text, a collection of general and private properties of texts, construction of statements at the content level).

10) Sociocultural contextuality (involvement in the process of perception of sociocultural contexts).

A special form of political discourse is the inaugural discourse, which fully reflects the basic concept of political communication in general - persuasiveness (pragmatic-verbal influence with the aim of convincing in the communication process) and suggestiveness (impact on the cognitive system of the addressee: the process of influencing the psyche of the addressee, on his feelings, will and reason) [63].

Considering the inaugural discourse as a special form of political discourse, I.A. Dyachenko draws attention to his main genre characteristics and functions [27: 6]:

1. Multifunctionality. The following functions are characteristic of the inaugural discourse genre: the fatal is the main function of political discourse as a speech genre of institutional political communication. Its purpose is to establish and maintain contact with students. Affecting - to exert emotional pressure on voters. Inspirational - to inspire the nation for great things to come. Propaganda - to introduce the ideology chosen by a politician into the consciousness of listeners. Informational - to inform the nation about political actions, intentions and position of a politician [31: 12].

2. The communicative goal. The communicative goal is to thank the population for the choice and trust, support for the elected president.

3. Addressing. The inaugural discourse does not have a direct addressee - the specific person to whom the message is addressed (moderator, opponent,

journalist). The analysis of inaugural speeches is interesting in that they are internationally targeted. From a pragmatic point of view, the inaugural speech of the newly elected president should be aimed at convincing everyone that he is able to successfully play the symbolic role of the leader of the nation. In order to influence the addressee, the following tactics are distinguished in the inaugural discourse: unification of the sender and recipient of the message, appeal to national values.

4. Values. The values of the inaugural discourse are concentrated in the key concepts of American society - "power", "democracy", "freedom", "prosperity".

5. Theme. The main global topics of the inaugural discourse that concern the American people are the problems of the economy, inflation, unemployment, taxation, the security of the American population, and foreign policy.

6. Agonality. This term goes back to the Greek "agon" and refers to the struggle. Agonism is achieved by creating your own positive image, the speaker challenges existing problems, competing with predecessors in finding ways to solve them.

7. Mythology. Mythology is the source of the collective unconscious. The most popular myths of political discourse are such myths as myths about the "American dream", about the "wise leader", about the "partnership", etc.

8. Availability. Inaugural discourse is a kind of political discourse, characterized by the same functions, similar communicative goals and themes. Like political discourse, it is inherent in all the main pragmatic features of general political discourse, such as the semantic opposition "friends and foes", euphemization of exposition, tactics of promises and proposals of decisions, agonality, mythology, accessibility [14: 10].

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that discourse is one of the basic concepts in communicative linguistics and allows many scientific interpretations. Political discourse, as institutional discourse, turns out to be an extremely broad concept encompassing the language system, speech activity and text.

## 1.2. Pragmalinguistic aspect of political discourse study

A discourse is political when it accompanies a political act in a political setting. It possesses both general linguistic functions and those characteristic only of political discourse. The most important can be considered the functions of social control and legitimization of power, since they are that have a manipulative effect on the public, thereby achieving the main goal of political discourse - the possession of power and the management of society.

The consideration of political discourse as a speech activity makes it possible to correlate it with the genre of public political speech, with its intentional orientation and speech acts.

Intention is the preverbal conscious cognitive intention of speech, affecting the propositional component of the internal speech program, the choice of style, method of implementation of the program, the general outline of the text. J. Searle [51: 170-194.] in the intent saw "the main component of consciousness and that property of many mental states and events, through which they are directed to objects and state of affairs of the external world."

A speech act is a purposeful speech action performed in accordance with the principles and rules of speech behavior adopted in a given society; unit of normative socio-speech behavior, considered in the framework of a pragmatic situation. The main features of speech act are: intent (intentionality), determination and conventionality. The sequence of speech acts creates a discourse [1: 59]

Speech act is the minimum unit of verbal communication; the production of a specific proposal under certain conditions, performed in accordance with sets of constitutive rules [52: 194].

In linguistics, some researchers relate the concept of "speech genre" to the term "theory of speech act" of the theory of speech acts, considering them to be analogues [61: 33-41].

Comparing the speech genre and speech act, M.N. Kozhina notes that "the starting position and the definition of the unit being studied as a unit of verbal



communication are common” [33: 52-61]. The principle of studying is also common when considering the speech genre and speech act - in the context of extra-linguistic factors (the speaker, the listener, their relationship, the transmitted content, the conditions and circumstances of the production of the speech act and the speech genre, the purpose of communication (intentions and intentions of the speaker), the situation of communication).

The dynamic aspect of the analysis of the speech genre and speech act as units of communication and speech activity is also one. Differences in the concepts of M.N. Kozhina connects with the originality of the scientific and philosophical interests of scientists: in the analysis of speech genres [33: 52-61]. M.M. Bakhtin stands on sociological positions, emphasizing the stylistic aspect of the consideration of speech genres [9: 227-244]. The theory of speech acts, developed by J.L. Austin and J.R. Searle is psychological in its foundation.

Referring to the work of A. Vezhbitskaya [15: 99-111] M.N. Kozhina is trying to distinguish between the concepts of the speech genre and speech act. “A speech act is (an action) a separate replica in a dialogue endowed with a certain illocutionary force and causing, suggesting a certain perlocutionary effect. In other words, this is an elementary unit of speech” [33: 52-61]. According to the researcher, “the speech genre is a more detailed and complex speech structure, consisting of several speech acts” [33: 58-59]. Summing up the preliminary results of a comparative analysis of speech genres and speech acts, the linguist comes to the conclusion that “the provision that the speech genre is a domestic analogue of a speech act is only somewhat true” [33: 52-61].

By the nature of the leading intention, E.I. Sheigal delimits [59: 280]:

- ritual / epidemiological genres (inaugural speech, jubilee speech, traditional radio address), which are dominated by the phatics of integration;
- orientation genres, which are texts of informational and prescriptive nature (party program, constitution, message from the president on the situation in the country, report, decree, agreement);
- agonal genres (slogan, advertising speech, election debate, parliamentary

debate).

Classification of E.I. Sheigal is based on a wide material of not only Russian, but also American political discourse, but without taking into account the specifics of oral or written communication.

It should be noted that the function of a speech act and the intention of a speech political discourse are not identical concepts. The function is more correlated with the impact exerted on the recipient, while the intention is more correlated with the subject of speech, his mentality and the tasks facing him [59: 55].

In this regard, the analysis of the intentional orientation of speech discourse requires careful study of all its aspects.

Performing a speech act means: pronouncing articulate sounds belonging to a generally understood language code; to construct a statement from the words of a given language according to the rules of its grammar; equip the statement with meaning (i.e., correlate it with reality) by making a speech (*Locution*); to give the speech focus (*Illocution*); to affect the consciousness or behavior of the addressee, cause the desired consequences (*Perlocution*).

J. Austin distinguishes, therefore, three types of speech acts:

1. Locationary is an act of speaking in itself, an act of stating. For example, "He told me: shoot her."

2. Illocutionary expresses the intention to another person, outlines the goal. In fact, this kind of act is an expression of a communicative goal. For example, "He encouraged me to shoot her."

3. Perlocutionary causes a deliberate effect and expresses the effect on the behavior of another person. The purpose of such an act is to bring about the desired consequences. For example, "He persuaded me to shoot her" [40: 22-130].

4. J. R. Searle singles out in a speech act: utterance act; a propositional act that carries out reference (selection of an object) and predication (attribution of a sign); illocutionary act that implements the speaker's goal-setting (request, promise, message) [51: 170-194].

The following main classes of speech acts are distinguished:

- 1) informative - messages (representations): “The train has arrived”;
- 2) acts of inducement (directives, prescriptions): “Go away!”, Including the demand for information: “What time is it?”;
- 3) acts of acceptance of obligations (commissions): “I promise to arrive on time”;
- 4) acts expressing the emotional state (expressives), including formulas of social etiquette: “Sorry for the anxiety”;
- 5) acts of establishment (declarations, verdicts, operatives), such as appointments, assignment of names and titles, sentencing, etc.

Thus, J. Searle comes to the conclusion that there is a parallelism between the intentional mental states of the subject and speech acts. Those and others are united by intentionality, focus on the outside world. Intentional states can be faith, fear, hope, desire, contempt, disappointment, etc. Both mental intentional states and speech acts represent the outside world, represent it in terms of their feasibility, which is why they both have logical properties. Intentional states are conditions for the sincerity of a speech act. The action is a speech act. The intentional aspect of the meaning of the utterance used to perform a speech action found expression in the concept of the illocutionary goal proposed by J. Searle. According to J. Searle, the main thing that distinguishes one illocutionary act from another is the intention with which the speaker makes the corresponding statement. For example, when making an act of promise, the speaker undertakes to commit some action. This parameter was put by J. Serle at the basis of his classification of illocutionary acts. An illocutionary goal is the installation of a certain recipient's response, which is communicated to him in a statement [52: 195].

When classifying speech acts, the illocutionary goal, the psychological state of the speaker, the direction of the relationship between the propositional content of the speech act and the state of affairs in the world (reference), attitude to the interests of the speaker and the addressee, etc. are taken into account.

The concept of illocution is related to the communicative intention of the

speaker. So, saying *I will come*, we can simply state the fact planned in the future, promise, threaten, warn, i.e. pronounce the same sentence with different illocutionary powers. Each illocutionary force consists in an ordered sequence of certain elements. So, the illocutionary power of a statement differs from the illocutionary power of a question by the following criteria:

An illocutionary goal (communication of information / request for information), a way to achieve this goal (various modes of utterances and sentences), by the recipient's attitude to the propositional content of the utterance (confidence, doubt or ignorance) and so on.

*"Susan," He sighed, "I really can't go into it now, they've got a car waiting. I'll call you from the plane and explain everything."*

*"Plane?" she repeated. "What's going on?" (Brown)*

By definition of E.I. Sheigal political discourse is characterized by such speech acts as political performances are statements whose utterance is a political action, a form of political participation, the implementation of which (i.e., pronouncing or writing them) in the appropriate institutional context is a form of political participation that can lead to quite real political consequences [29: 285-303]. The most significant political performances include performatives of trust and distrust, support, choice, demand, and promise.

In addition, she proposes to consider speech acts through the prism of the basic semiotic triad of political discourse "integration - orientation - agonality".

1. The speech acts of integration are used to express unity, solidarity, and rallying "of their". Examples include speech acts such as a toast, a call for unity, or a statement of unity, as well as performative and quasi-performance support. (*Long live the King! We are, and always will be, the United States of Auencia. Together we are stronger. We Are Strong, We Are Independent, We Are The United States Of America*).

2. Speech acts of orientation are slogan asserts and declaratives denoting a program position or acting as a program statement, as well as speech acts such as reflexives that help relieve cognitive stress, exposing lies and exposing

euphemism, and forecasting. The flip side of orientation is the opposite direction of the process - disorientation, which is the essence of political manipulation. This role is played by speech acts that contribute to the creation and maintenance of semantic uncertainty: assumptions, hints, references to rumors, evasion of the answer to a question.

The speech act of forecasting, is, along with the assumption, a specific means of orientation related to the analysis of the future, and not the present or past in the world of politics.

The main features of the forecast are:

- a) intention - to speculate on the likely course of events;
- b) specific linguistic markers: future tense or subjunctive mood, indicators of probability modality;
- c) optional components: a link to the source of information, an indication of the motives for the possible actions of the politician.

Forecast speech acts have the following typology:

1. The degree of categorization. The contrast on this basis is determined by the degree of validity of the assumptions made (comp. definitions according to Ozhegov's dictionary: an assumption is a guess, a preliminary thought (a guess is an assumption not based on sufficient data); a forecast is a conclusion, a conclusion about the upcoming development and outcome of something based on any data).

Strengthening the categoricity of the forecast is carried out due to the markers of the modality of confidence and time indicators: *And where we are met with cynicism and doubts and those who tell us that we can't, we will surely respond with that timeless creed that sums up the spirit of a people: Yes, we can. (Obama's campaign speech in Chicago).*

*Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America. (Obama's inaugural speech).*

The categorization of the forecast is reduced by using indicators of probabilistic modality (may be, likely, unlikely, probably, apparently, etc.): *It's*

*hardly the first time that Washington politicians have gotten involved in sports. Indeed, sometimes it's hard to tell where the politics ends and the sports begins. (Playing Sports and Politics www.usnews.com).*

2. Temporary reference. The forecast is usually associated with the text category of the prospectus; forecast retrospection is much less common as a hypothetical reconstruction of the possible course of events of the past.

In the following example, forecast-retrospection is used as an analytical technique for comparing political leaders: *North Korea's new leader, Kim Jong-un, has been in place for the month since the death of his father was announced. In that time, the country's tightly-controlled media machine has lavished him with praise, calling him a "genius" and a "brilliant" military strategist. But amid all the titles and the propaganda, what can we learn about North Korea's future direction under its new leader?(Will North Korea change under Kim Jong-un? www.bbc.co.uk)*

3. The degree of relevance. According to this criterion, forecast-reasoning, which is limited to mental action, is contrasted: *This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. (Lincoln's inaugural speech).*

As well as a forecast-regulatory with an additional intention of motivation to action. A forecast-regulatory is characterized by the presence of such a structural component as a statement of the condition, the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of which will lead to predictable consequences: *If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with His eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people. (Lincoln's inaugural speech)*

4. Estimated focus. The forecasted object can be neutral, positive and negative. However, in the vast majority of cases, negative consequences are predicted - thereby the politician tries to prevent the impending danger, and the

forecast-fear performs the function of a social warning.

5. Speech acts of agonism include, first of all, behavioral regulations (calls and demands) that stimulate political agents to commit political actions. This category also includes argumentative acts, which are a civilized way of waging political struggle through controversy. Unfortunately, modern politicians resort not only to peaceful and civilized methods of warfare. In this regard, the study of speech acts of verbal aggression is of particular interest to the linguist.

Aggression involves targeted destructive behavior that is harmful to the objects of attack or causing negative experiences. The threat is the intention not only to harm the interests of the other side, but also to force the opponent to act in accordance with the requirements. Consequently, in political communication, the threat is used as a tactical technique for manipulating the enemy in situations with different goals: the struggle for power and negotiations.

In case of negotiations, i.e. to find a compromise, the conditions for implementing the threat are detailed, a list of various requirements is included, the time factor (fulfillment of the requirements for a certain period) is taken into account, etc.

Situations when the addressee allows himself to resort to threats in political discourse are mainly distinguished by certain topics: military conflict with the use of force, sociocultural and politico-diplomatic international relations and their breakdown, the struggle of applicants for real power.

Based on the functional approach to the language, the threat speech act (menasive speech act) can be defined as a communicative-pragmatic class of utterances with the semantic dominant of the threat. The dichotomy of the communicative-pragmatic meaning of this type of utterance includes an implicit prescription with a darkened prescription and an explicit prescription in the form of a transformable model. For a clearer understanding of the explicitness and implicitness of the instructions of the threat speech act, we turn to the concepts of direct and indirect speech act.

The problem of direct and indirect speech acts has occupied the minds of

linguists for many years. A speech act with an explicit intention, when “the speaker means exactly and literally what it says,” in the theory of speech acts is called a direct speech act. If in a speech act the speaker “has in mind both the direct meaning and, in addition, something more” [52: 195], such a speech act is characterized as an indirect act. J. Searle, describing indirect speech acts, notes that “in such cases, a sentence containing indicators of the illocutionary force for one type of illocutionary act can be pronounced for the implementation of another type of illocutionary act.”

So, the division of speech acts into direct and indirect is carried out depending on the degree of explication of the illocutionary power of the speech act. A means of expressing the illocutionary nature of direct speech acts is the performative formula, which shows a one-to-one correspondence between the illocutionary function and the performative verb that nominates it. In this case, the content of the illocutionary act can be verbally explicated, and the performative verb corresponds to the illocutionary act, for example: *I dedare, I promise, I order, etc.*

The implicit content of the statement, as a rule, does not have special means for its expression and is derived from the content of the statement, the general speech situation or the general background knowledge of the participants in communication [26: 40].

The most convenient form, specifying the illocutionary nature of the statement, is an explicit performative formula. The speech unit in the performative function simultaneously designates the action of the speech act and is equivalent to the implementation of this action at the time of speaking.

The lexical specification of the representation of the menasive intention in the English language of politics is carried out within a number of functional performative verbs by type:

1. The threat-promise (promise): *promise, vow, swear*;
2. Threat-caution (directives): *warn*;
3. Threat-intention (commission): *intend, seek, assure*.



Thus, the intentionality of political discourse and its social mission is to instill in the addressees - citizens of the community - the need for "politically correct" actions and assessments. In other words, the goal of political discourse is not to describe, but to convince, by awakening intentions in the addressee, to provide ground for conviction and to induce action. This manipulative orientation of political discourse is manifested in the speech acts of integration, orientation and aggression.

### **1.3. Populism as a product of political communication**

Through the mass media communication, we are all somehow in a certain information field. Due to our own priorities, we can moderate the structure and configuration, but its constant component is always a certain political rhetoric. These are usually views, judgments, ideas that we share/don't share, and very rarely positions that are our own. This raises the question of how objective they can be, if at all it is advisable to talk about some general obligation, and how can discrepancies be avoided in the process of political communication?

This is the circumstance that causes the manipulative and speculative nature of communication practices in politics, since the result of their discussion will always be determined by the context of the subject's interpretation. No one, perhaps with the exception of information experts, can claim that there is a consistent probability or order of characters in a language. That is why any product of speech in politics will always be formed on the principle of a random number generator.

In the plane of consideration of the phenomenon of populism, the rhetorical question formed above is reduced to the problem of finding a criterion for its identification. This refers to the possibility of differentiating the "product" of the populist from the non-populist. In this regard, it would be considered the fact that populism is constantly subjected to ethical assessment, while the moral and ethical approach is not able to distinguish it from other socio-political phenomena. In this case, populism as a form of implementation of mass policy should be considered

much more broadly than the idea of educating the masses. At the same time, demagoguery is simply a negative form of manifestation of this process in the interests of an individual subject.

The concept of "communication" is considered in a broad sense as a set of various – verbal, nonverbal, contextual, tonal, etc. – messages that arise during interaction. We adhere to the statement of Paul Vaclavik that "no one can not communicate" [13], which is an axiom of pragmatic communication between people.

At first glance, the complexity of everyday understanding of populism is losing its relevance in the framework of scientific analysis. It comes down to clarifying the prehistory of the phenomenon and defining its categorical-conceptual apparatus. Of course, this is the root cause that distinguishes its essence by positive and negative signs. But to this day, the problem of establishing a criterion for identifying populism remains difficult to solve. Populism could be defined as a certain socio-political movement, political "ideology", strategy of power, type of behavior and actions, etc. or distinguish it from other socio-political phenomena, but we have no reason to unambiguously qualify any type of communication as populist. We can say the same about demagoguery, but because of its obviously manipulative and speculative nature, it can be established by the laws of formal logic and common sense.

Best of all, this problem can be tracked when trying to monitor the concept of "populism" in the mass media, when we meet a large list of its use, which are arbitrarily produced by politicians. Somewhere intuitively, through comparison, interpretation, or contextual analysis, we can distinguish between well-founded intentions and baseless promises.

Another challenge is to find out the impact of language on people's behavior and whether language can act as an unambiguous means of political action. In this case, we consider language as a contractual system of sound and graphic signs, which makes up the matrix of constructing a picture of the human world. This understanding is quite justified in terms of the state language or the language of

science, but it raises reservations about socio-political communication, when the essence of what is said will depend on the method of decoding words in the speech process. Thus, any understanding and value judgments of a speech, prospectus, program, etc. are reduced to the way they are interpreted. On the other hand, there is purely politics as a sphere of people's activity, devoid of any generally binding canons of communication. To prove otherwise, all people would have to think the same way. But at best, we can talk about a certain culture of communication. The paradox of political communication is that in the absence of such a cultural level, we can give it a moral and ethical assessment, but it cannot be a prerequisite for interaction.

Populism, like no other phenomenon, is a product of political communication. Since it was transformed into a tool and political technology, speech, both oral and written, has become an integral companion of the struggle for power. The fact that representative electoral democracy has become the dominant form of government today has actually legitimized the pluralism of communicative practices in politics. Thus, what corresponds to the majority principle has become true. True as something contractual and generally binding, but by no means unambiguous.

As a result, the entire apparatus of political argumentation of populism is reduced to the fact of "inflating words" (Latin *inflatio* - inflating). This purely economic term, like no other, is able to accurately convey all the semantic content of the depreciation of a language unit. Words lose their value, primary meaning, and unambiguity. Irresponsible inflating of the semantic field underestimated the specific weight of the word, leaving it a purely sign function in the process of a communicative act. As a result, a purely negative everyday understanding of populism is formed, which identifies populism with demagoguery. We have repeatedly encountered this in domestic political practice, which is significantly revived during the pre-election period. There are so many baseless accusations and promises that the government as an institution is undergoing a significant devaluation. The more unsubstantiated statements there are, the more difficult it is

to understand what is really happening, who is defending what position, who is telling the truth and who is not. "Word inflation" is the result of the ambiguous use of language, which makes it impossible to establish the boundaries of populism as a criterion for its identification.

To study the communicative content of populism, it is also advisable to turn to the philosophical sciences, which in the XX century proposed many alternative approaches. Developments in the framework of analytical philosophy, logical positivism, existential-phenomenological approaches, and structuralism allowed us to form a sub-branch of language philosophy. It is advisable to recall the communicative philosophy (K. Jaspers, J. Habermas), the logical-semantic program of language analysis (L. Wittgenstein), linguophilosophical (K. Castaneda), anthropological (K. Levy-Strauss), poststructuralist (R. Bar) and postmodern (J. Deleuze) approaches.

In terms of methodology, the developed ideas of speech play, communicative action and the so-called "new language" are of great applied importance. Let's try to identify them. The term "language game" was introduced into language theory and linguophilosophy by the Austro-English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. He defines it as "the process and result of conscious linguocreative activity of an individual aimed at non-stereotypical variation of the form and content of language units on the game register of communication in order to influence the emotional and/or intellectual sphere of the addressee" [53]. On its basis, Jurgen Habermas develops a theory of communicative action. It takes place in a live and regulatory language game. The very concept of "communicative action" is understood mainly as "the act of generating a statement, although many authors recognize the activity of the understanding process." [56] The product of political expediency was the so-called "new language". [5] This is a specific form of language and vocabulary that, due to its limitations, tries to structure the thoughts of its native speakers according to a template, limiting freedom of thought. It entered the sphere of scientific interest thanks to the dystopia "1984" by George Orwell [39], who presented "new language" as a prototype of the artificial

language of closed societies.

If we proceed from the linguistic and communicative approach, populism can be considered as political models of verbal (oral speech, text) and nonverbal communication practices. Among the most common are political speeches, comments, political advertising, booklets, brochures, political program, platform, videos. However, they need to be differentiated by form and content. Depending on the type of communication between the sender and the addressee, they can be divided into dialogical and monologue. "Dialogue - writes Sergey Potseluyev is a text that is created by two communication partners, one of whom sets a specific program for the development of the text, its intention, and the other should actively participate in the development of this program, not being able to go beyond it. But a monologue is a text that, although initiated, explicitly or visibly, by a communication partner, develops according to the program of its creator, but without the (active) participation of the partner. Thus, from the point of view of common sense, if speech is not a monologue, then it should be a dialogue. The same logic should work in reverse" [44]

When we talk about the content of communication practices, it often does not correspond to its verbal presentation, because of this, it needs contextual analysis. For this purpose, it would be advisable to use the best practices of philosophical and political thought – hermeneutics and content analysis. The hermeneutical method is a method of interpreting texts, which is based on the inclusion of textual information in a broader context of knowledge with interpretation. Content analysis is a method of quantitative and qualitative analysis of the content of a text in order to identify and measure various facts or trends that occur in it; a method of scientific and psychological research of tests and other information carriers.

From the point of view of this aspect, populism and demagoguery should be considered as forms of mobilization and manipulative communication practices in politics, implemented through dialogical and monologue political rhetoric. Other forms close to them include parapolytics [30: 15], quasi-politics [37], paradiologue

[44], and double bind [45]. A common essential feature of these concepts is their negative content, which is mainly formed by adding a prefix with negative content to a constructive political phenomenon. In the dictionary of foreign words, the Greek "para" and Latin "quasi" are interpreted as prefixes meaning adjacency, displacement, indentation, deviation, change and are used in complex words to denote something "fake".

To denote deviations from constructive politics in political science, the concept of "parapolytics" is used. Its appearance in the post-Soviet space is connected with an attempt to describe the shortcomings of transformation processes in the newly formed political systems. For the first time, it is used by the Russian scientist Leonid Ionin, who in his publication notes that "a characteristic feature of Russian activity today is the extreme intensity of political activity plus the lack of practical results." [30: 6] The main object of criticism is the power elite, the state official apparatus, or generally the bureaucracy. Despite the course taken towards liberalization and democratization, it remains nomenclature in the future. "The effect of parapolytics," writes Ionin, "is stagnation at all levels of society, which is accompanied by active activity at its top. The conclusion is that real life in our country is increasingly absorbed by politics. Facts, events, and situations are only as important as they perform political functions. The success of a politician is not the success of the country, but his personal success in the parapolitic sphere." [30: 7]

In Russian political science, the concept of parapolytics has been used not so long ago. Vladimir Kholod, borrowed from Russian sources, largely complements and expands it. Following the same logic, he contrasts parapolytics with positive politics. "Politics and parapolytics are two antipodes described and analyzed in different definitions and criteria." [58: 23]

The prefix "para" (para – near, when, in contrast) means either location next to, or deviation from something, violation, deformation of the content, indicated by the root lobe of the word. With the help of this morpheme, the word "parapolytics" reflects the meaning of the antipode of politics in its generally accepted, traditional

sense. Similar to the meaning to "parapolytics" are "politicking", "dirty technologies", "political demagoguery" and so on. However, in terms of the scope of its semantics, the term parapolytics is a priority in this series, since it accumulates the total content of negative policies. According to Kholod, it is reflected in various social shortcomings, in non-recovery costs of material resources, in the multi-scale destruction of the social structure and even the social structure. "According to the criterion of functionality, parapolytics refers to a socially ineffective, destructive and unpromising type of socially regulated activity, being dysfunctional in terms of social contemplation. According to the criterion of political participation, it is an "intensive" way of alienating individuals from rationally conscious cooperation in socially regulated interactions at all political levels. According to the ideological criterion, parapolytics is the politicization of social utopias, irrational social philosophy. According to the social criterion, it acts as a technology for achieving artificial equality or preserving inequality. In accordance with the general humanistic criterion, parapolytics acts as an ideologized technology of human oppression as the highest value." [58: 25]

An example of paradoxical communication is the "paradialogue". This is "a language situation where a politician is asked about one thing (or he simulates a possible question himself), and he answers about a completely different one." [44] He lives in a situation of constant substitution of things. The etymology of the word "dialogue" indicates a conversation characterized by reciprocity and competition, as well as division. That is why communication, in which competitiveness and reciprocity are devoid of clear semantic distinctions, acting as a parody of oneself, can quite legitimately be called a paradialogue. The prefix "pair" means not only adjacency, but also deviation from the truth, displacement, deviation, change. Thus, a paradialogue is a kind of upside-down dialogue, its discursive parody and simulation. According to S. Potseluev, the paradialogue is a communication of "consciousnesses" in which they systematically bring each other to objects devoid of any meaning. Events are perceived as a certain effect that is inherent in the language, the essence of which is meaningless, because they

themselves belong to the language. This is always a double meaning that excludes interpretation from the point of view of common sense. "He is always neutral, because he is not in a dialogue or in a monologue. Such a meaning is found in the paradiologue as a stream of "pure becoming", "discourse", which for ordinary everyday consciousness is almost indistinguishable from delirium." [44: 34]

For science, "paradiologue" is a new concept that is at the stage of its formation. But despite this, we meet with paradiologue on a daily basis. From the point of view of an outsider, we often witness a meaningless conversation from the point of view of common sense, and we do not notice it when we act as a direct participant in it. However, if in everyday life this is the result of misunderstandings and emotional tension, then in politics they mainly act as a strategy for political communication of a politician.

A paradiologue is not an ideological substitute for a dialogic idea in its essence, but an absurd show of ideological speculators. S. Potseluyev claims that the speech of the participants of the paradiologue is a manifestation of the verbalization of the autocommunicative flow of their consciousness. Instead of the interaction of "points of view", "concepts", "ideologies", it has an elementary combination of two streams of thinking and language in space and time. In the conversation of experts, the struggle for communicative power is conducted in the context of a substantive dispute, because of this, outwardly it can really be quiet. However, in a dialogue, the communicative struggle comes to the fore, subjugating the subject logic of the dispute. The struggle dominates, turning the dialogue into a kind of communicative-domineering "art for art's sake", and the subject logic of discussion topics into a collection of nonsense. Potseluev notes that in paradiologue, the order of remarks on the topic is often violated. Its participants speak simultaneously, under all circumstances, while remaining on their own wave. For this reason, the decoding of the paradiologue by an outside observer occurs not only linearly, as in book discourse, but also spatially, similar to visual perception. "An outside observer is able, at best, to give a meaningful interpretation only to individual fragments of the paradiologue, or to generalize



that one of the participants seems more triumphant than the other. However, communicative triumphality is understood in a quasi-aesthetic sense. An outsider is not able to join such a "dialogue" (since he does not have a thread of judgment that could be followed), and does not unequivocally stay away from any of the opponents. Dialogue introduces an outsider as an interlocutor, while paradiologue condemns him to the role of an element of the public." [44: 36]

The public is a type of political mass that is formed under the influence of propaganda, manipulation, and indoctrination tools. The appearance of the public is justified by Serge Moscovici, who, based on the classical works of mass society research (G. Tard, G. Lebon, H. Ortega-Gasset), came to the conclusion that in the XX century the crowd is transformed under the influence of mass media and communication. The crowd is related to the public, as the social body is related to the public spirit. The French scientist rightly emphasizes that for Tard and Le Bon in the life of the mass on the crowd, everything depends on mental factors and everything is explained with the help of them.

A common type of paradoxical communication is double bind. If you translate this concept from English, it will essentially mean "confusion of concepts", "double utterance", "communication trap" or "double trap". We will use the "double trap" option, as it best reflects the contradictory nature of communication. Initially, this concept appeared in the theory of communication in the 1950s in the framework of psychology and psychiatry. Subsequently, double bind was adapted to a wide range of socio-political interactions. Unlike a logically absurd statement, which is grammatically correct but contains essentially contradictory elements, "double traps" are an example of an absurdly contradictory communicative situation where mutually exclusive messages are sent to the addressee at the same time. The absurd correlation of mutually exclusive messages in relation to the same subject must be fundamentally distinguished from the paradoxical message. According to S. Pospelov, the essential difference between contradictory and paradoxical communication is that in the first case, one alternative is chosen and the other is rejected. Therefore, in the case of conflicting

prerequisites for actions, the choice remains logically possible. But the paradoxical nature of the prerequisites makes it impossible to choose as a condition for performing this action, since no alternative is logically and actually allowed. "It can be argued that paradoxical stimulation to action is a typical formula of power, while paradoxical choice itself is an integral sign of any double trap as a power – communication relationship." [45] According to the principle of forced choice, the subject is obliged to choose necessity. "A person who finds himself in a double bind situation - according to S. Potseluyev - risks being punished for correctly assessing the situation, and moreover, being accused of treachery and insanity, if he dares to claim that there is a significant difference between the actual assessment of the situation and how he is asked to perceive it. This is one of the important elements of the double trap – the prohibition on awareness (articulation) of the contradiction inherent in it. Thus, such questions cannot be answered correctly due to their paradoxical nature, but silence in such a situation is much worse than any verbal answer." [45] Stereotypes play a key role in political double traps, which are an important element of materializing the institutional order of any communication. Double bind encourages irrationalism in politics and arbitrariness as a way of behavior that has nothing to do with any form of normativity, since they contradict themselves.

Researchers of the double bind theory consider double traps as a familiar element of paradoxical communication, in which a power aspect is clearly or implicitly present. Sergey Potseluyev suggests typologizing them on the basis of significant differences, which, in his opinion, are associated with the different nature of institutionalization at different levels of political communication. Thus, it highlights the micro-, meso-, and macropolitical situations of double bind. The example of family communication acts as a classic model of a double trap, and the child's relationship with his family as a typical (template) example of institutional interaction. On this basis, a type of double bind of Type A and B is proposed, which can be generically described as, on the one hand, the difference between a word and a business, and on the other, the difference between words. The structure

of these interactions will become more complex as the level of political communication increases.

Among the ways to resist double bind, S. Potseluev divides two types of reactions – rational and adventurous. He suggests considering rationality somewhat conditionally, taking into account the general irrationality of the double trap space. Although "in these situations, it is impossible to behave logically and consistently, however, you can try to think and act rationally, that is, to realize the absurdity and paradox of the existing situation and go beyond it in practical and theoretical awareness." [45] The most common forms of a rational reaction include behavioral automatism, which consists in peremptory execution of orders, maneuvering tactics as a way of selective behavior style, and strategic positioning, in which the political subject not only understands the essence of the situation well but also has the necessary resources to change it. Adventurous reactions to the policy of double traps carry a significant destructive potential for the current circumstances. Among its main forms is ultra-paradoxical action, which is an example of an inadequate (primitive) action of a political actor, symbolic adventurism, in which for the double bind victim is the object of special understanding (mythologization) and disaster policy as a form of total and demonstrative violation of law and order, principle adventurism and "sanctified selfishness" in politics.

The considered examples of political communication are mainly destructive in nature. Since we are unable to give an objective assessment of these processes, we can only try to evaluate them using ethical theory. By it, K. G. Ballestrem understands "the normative theory of morality as opposed to descriptive moral theories. The latter tries to explain why certain social groups have certain moral ideas; normative theories, using general principles, seek to justify ideas about how to behave in a particular situation." [6] So the question is "what should I do?" It is basic for ethics. This version of political ethics is a kind of attempt to find a "golden mean" between an idealistic and realistic answer to a question. These are two great confrontational traditions in the history of political thought, which are mainly presented as a contrast to the views of I. Kant and N. Machiavelli on

politics.

However, "pragmatic" scientists are trying to overcome this categorical attitude. "The main reproach for moralism is a lack of realism, and most importantly, a lack of practical application." [6] C. G. Ballestrem quotes Montesquieu as saying: "There is no need to be directly involved in politics to see how radically its customs contradict morality and reason. These words could convince everyone, but they could not change anyone." The disadvantage of realism is its outright cynicism, its unconvincing attempt to present the dispassionate pursuit of particular interests as the highest morality. Where there are objective contradictions of interests, sooner or later there is a struggle for power, in which a far from clear conscience wins. As for the forms of political communication, their power status is determined by the role of language practices, which act as an indispensable tool for connecting the ruling class (elite, bureaucracy) with society. In particular, demagoguery and populism are an integral part of the image of politics as a dirty business ("the problem of dirty hands"). This approach lies within a long-established tradition in the history of political thought, but modern political science deliberately avoids such an understanding because of its triviality. Those who want to govern must be held accountable, and those who take responsibility must have their own political beliefs. The paradox of the situation comes down to the rhetorical question: why should someone who is responsible for the welfare of the public feel a lack of morality? Why should those who are delegated to implement public policy be less honest than other citizens? Politics may be a dirty business, but no more than other activities. Politicians, as a rule, are no more immoral than society.

The answer to these questions lies in the way of solving the moral dilemma: can a politician ignore the principles of morality in the performance of his public duty in the name of a high goal? Its end result will always be truth, untruth [20; 28; 35] or half-truth [50], while the ways to achieve them will be different for each politician. The theory offers many ways to solve the pure type, but in practice they are all just a variant of the answer to the dilemma, and not its removal. Thus, J.

Locke rejected deception as a means of politics that poses a threat to public order and a return to the natural state; I. Kant transfers the moral dilemma to the plane of personal choice, calling for avoiding situations in which deception would be morally justified; utilitarianism of J.S. Mill morally justifies deception, provided that it is really allowed in the name of good; for N. Machiavelli, deception is a mean to achieve the end; M. Weber refrains from any moral restrictions of the profession of a politician.

According to S. Zapasnik, "the final separation of economics and politics from morality occurred after the French Revolution, as a result of the spread of the ideas of individualism. It has led to the formation of new political principles that are relatively separated from ideology, political doctrines and their programs." [28] From now on, the emphasis is on the politician's personality. In a world where a politician is primarily required to be trustworthy, the problem of support becomes particularly important. However, the expectations of voters in parliamentary democracies are an insufficient condition for keeping a politician from cheating. First, the social reality in developed countries is so complex that it can be very difficult to understand it. Because of this, the politician has the opportunity to manipulate the voter, keeping silent about those weighty circumstances that would lead to their acceptance of certain circumstances. Secondly, today politicians have the means of social engineering and propaganda, which are in the service of gaining their trust in society.

The career of a politician today does not depend on the mandatory implementation of the program of his pre-election struggle for power. According to the storekeeper, it depends on the way he uses the technique of information, discussion and persuasion, on his ability to inspire confidence among voters. "In a democratic society," he believes, "where the will of a citizen is realized through a plebiscite, as a rule, those politicians who are suspected of hiding information about the real state of affairs, the existence of alternative programs and proposals, as well as their personal intentions and difficulties in implementing them lose." [28] S.Zapasny is convinced that "those politicians who became known to have

used the suggestion technique will never return to power." But does this mean that the politicians in power have obtained and are implementing it honestly? We will not find a single politician in history who would say that he will manipulate the minds of the masses, indulge their needs, pursue a policy of social inequality, protect corporate interests, tolerate corruption, and be indifferent to the problems of unemployment, inflation, the environment, and so on. However, following this logic, the dark side of a politician will become the subject of publicity only when he is deprived of power and ethical choices are not relevant to the sphere of political decisions, but only a dilemma of his own conscience.

#### **1.4. Modern political and cultural codes of the «rating» of populist politicians in the realities of modern politics**

In the modern media space, the term "populism" is one of the most commonly used, thanks to politicians, public figures, journalists, bloggers - society is offered a simplified, "template" definition of "populism" - as the formation of the popularity of politicians by offering voters "simple solutions - complex issues". However, such simplification can be equated with the optical effect of "bokeh" (bokeh - deliberate focusing of attention on certain details against the background of "blurriness"), when the complex nature of the political and cultural phenomenon "populism", its specific features, true goals, and most importantly-potential risks remain out of public attention.

It is on "democratic risks" that the leading experts of modern socio-humanitarian discourse focus their attention - Z. Brzezinsky, K. Weyland, A. Grzimala-Busse, J. Levicki, D. Ziblatt, M. Konovan, P. Teggert et al., in particular, the work "populism and the erosion of democracy" by A. Grzimala-Busse notes: "modern populism has become a real threat to liberal democracies through reduced tolerance, disregard for the opposition, disregard for freedom of speech, undermining the official institutions of democracy, devaluing informal values that are the basis of democracy".

Populism is a real threat to the democratic statehood of modern Ukraine,

says Professor G. Kuts: "Populism poses threats to the democratic development of countries, because under the slogans of populism and through the use of tools of democracy, power can be obtained by persons who will cause the reverse of democratic practices, which has already happened in the recent history of Ukraine and led to the appearance of two Maidans" [36: 93]; N. Rezanova, investigating the populist determinants of legitimizing power, states: "It is precisely the disregard for future consequences due to the abuse of rhetoric and actions that the majority of the electorate likes that keeps the country trapped in populism. But the complexity of the situation is that this populist cycle is repeated many times in the history of independent Ukraine" [48: 177].

Ukrainian scientists and human rights defenders of the group "First of December" - V. Bryukhovetsky, B. Gavrilishin, Cardinal Lubomyr Husar, I. Dzyuba, I. Zakharov, M. Marinovich, V. Panchenko, M. Popovich, V. Skuratovsky, Yu. Shcherbak, I. Yukhnovsky presenting an extremely emotional, but scientifically balanced appeal to Ukrainian society, noted: "populism willingly parasitizes social troubles, slyly simplifying complex things, shamelessly exploiting simple social emotions, seducing society with easy ways to material well-being and justice. His empty promises and terrible "curses" against the "enemies of the people" are a bribe to a tired society. For them, he seeks to make a profit on an unprecedented scale. He is not familiar with the sense of responsibility, so he willingly runs away into imaginary opposition. Populism has become a real threat to Ukrainian statehood. By its very nature, it is not capable of constructive work. National and state interests are strange to him" [19].

Paradoxically, the socio-political reality of the XXI century, on the one hand, has created "comfortable conditions" for modern democracies (modernization of democratic institutions, the latest forms of "democratic transactions", democratic educational projects, etc.); on the other hand, "unfavorable conditions", which, in addition to the globalization of their challenges, political and socio-economic crises, terrorism, military conflicts, can be attributed to the phenomenon of modern populism. Accordingly, special attention

should be paid to the analysis of the determinants of modern populism, which can be represented as follows:

- 1) representative democracy;
- 2) socio-economic crisis;
- 3) a charismatic leader.

In support of this generalization, we give several statements - P. Teggert says: "Globalization, economic growth crises and other structural circumstances lead to disillusionment in certain social groups, forcing them to join populist policies" [80: 20]. I. Kiyanka - "Populist slogans are aimed at people with a low basket of incomes, low wages, and very often also with a low level of political and legal culture. This phenomenon leads to the formation of a culture of "mass man", which is easy to manipulate, teach to oil "cliches" and stereotypes" [32: 27]; O. Yarosh - "International experience shows that the populist movement became more active during periods when countries were going through turning points in their history. With sharp socio-economic shifts, especially when the old foundations were broken, and the new ones were not yet clearly and clearly minted, populist figures enter the political arena" and adds: "Populism is most widespread among the strata with a low level of political and legal culture and in the conditions of the structures of democracy that have not yet been strengthened. The inability of the masses to distinguish demagoguery from realistic proposals, a black-and-white vision of the world, a willingness to adore another idol and hate his competitors - all the symptoms of a low political culture are quite actively used by populist leaders to mobilize public support" [65: 21-25].

Populist politicians of the "globalization era" openly speculate on "socially acute topics" - poverty, unemployment, terrorism, wars, migrants, etc., provoking radical sentiments in the minds of modern people. Leading researcher of modern social and humanitarian discourse Z. Bauman, analyzing the "crisis of the modern world order", emphasizes the transformation of morality, culture, psychology: "Modern society is imbued with anti-humanism, and modern man is becoming more and more disoriented, limited and helpless" [8: 13], which "shamelessly"



uses "modern populism". The Ukrainian researcher T. Pryadko also supports the discourse emphasizing that "populism parasitizes the special state and content of mass consciousness, its saturation with myths, utopias, stereotypes that balance psychological anxiety, uncertainty in the future, fatigue from trying to understand and explain the surrounding reality, which is rapidly changing" [47: 141].

It is believed that in the realities of modern world politics, the "rating" of populist forces (movements, parties, leaders) is due to a set of determinants that synchronize with the basic impulse - "new reality" - "new normality". It is in the format of "updated reality" that new codes are created to understand socio-political reality. Therefore, modern populism is a logical and integral element of transcoding global politics in a renewed world, as noted by the leading expert of our time in. Beck: "the prosperity of modern populism is due to the fact that the power of populism is the greater, the less state policy is able to provide answers to the questions that a radically renewed world poses to it" [10: 26].

Summarizing the reasoned conclusions of leading researchers of our time, it becomes quite obvious that there is a correlation between "modern populism" as a political and cultural phenomenon and "erosions of democracy" as key risks of modern world politics. In the conditions of socio-political reality of the XXI century, even countries with "stable democratic immunity" (the United States, Western European countries) are not protected from the "virus" of modern populism, which leads to the emergence or deepening of "erosions of democracy". However, it is obvious that "modern populism" is a "product of the globalization era", and its specific features - "aggressive expansion", "paradoxical", "multifaceted" - are due to the "new normality" - the "new reality" inherent in the new society. The process of "transcoding" all the system elements of modern society: politics, economy, culture, science, public consciousness in accordance with the renewed world of the XXI century will change the world forever and create a unique research material for the latest science.

## **CHAPTER 2. POPULISM AS A POLITICAL CULTURAL PHENOMENON OF CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS**

### **2.1. Populism in Western Europe in the late 20th and early 21st centuries**

The problem of populism occupies one of the leading places among the topics of modern political research. And this is due to the important role of populism in the life of society, both in the theoretical and practical plane. First of all, this concerns the political processes taking place in Ukraine today, especially in election campaigns. And studying the experience of Western European countries, it is necessary to note the rich democratic heritage of political institutions and a number of initial provisions of political leaders and programs that were implemented during this period. The development of populism in any period of its formation is facilitated by reasons, in particular: the strengthening of the political and economic crisis, social stratification, and the aggravation of urgent problems in education, medicine, and culture. On this basis, the populism of the political power and regime arises, the purpose of which was to reconcile the opposing interests of different strata of society and reach consensus between the movements and the parties that defended them.

The growth of populism in Western Europe, which was observed in the 1990s, has a number of features. The first is that these forces are generally prone to nationalist ideology and rhetoric. The second feature is a critical attitude towards the EU, an attempt to weaken the impact of globalization processes on their countries. The third characteristic feature of Western European populism is a sharp criticism of mass immigration, which is recognized as a threat to traditional European values and culture. These features generally bring populists closer to the camp of right-wing radicals, which gives some researchers reason to believe that populism and right-wing radicalism are varieties of the same ideology, and the difference between them is more quantitative (populists tend to make less radical decisions) than qualitative. However, there are political characteristics that make it

possible to distinguish populists from classic right-wing radicals.

One of them is the generally positive attitude of populists towards democracy and electoral procedures. But right-wing radicals tend to believe in the life-saving possibilities of authoritarianism. Populists use democratic institutions in the struggle for power, always considering the will of citizens to be the basis of their legitimacy. Another specific feature of modern Western European populism is the emergence of forces that defend the principles of the free market, restrictions on state regulation of the economy and tax pressure, while simultaneously calling for protectionist policies.

In the public life of Germany in the post-war period, the first noticeable manifestations of populism appeared in the 1990s. The political "arena" of its appearance in this country had its own specifics, formed in previous decades in Germany, even during the existence of two German states. One of them is too pronounced political centrism, which was intensively cultivated in West Germany after the Second World War. The stability of the political center was promoted by the country's party system, which ensured the formation of either center-right or center-left governments that relied on large parties or coalitions with a minimum number of participants. Another feature was the strict "taboo" in the country's political discourse of nationalist ideology or rhetoric.

In the context of many years of important efforts for German society to "overcome the (Nazi) past", the latter began to be perceived as too firmly connected with this past. By definition of S. Pogorelskaya: "...in Germany, it is better to gain a reputation as a cosmopolitan than a "nationalist". "Nationalism" means political death, smouldering on the verge of political legality, next to the scandalous NPD" [42]. At the same time "overcoming" to a large extent actually represented the displacement of a number of issues beyond the limits acceptable for frank discussion and genuine discussion of topics. In the 1990s, the manifestations of the crisis of the social state built in Germany in previous decades, a huge increase in the number of immigrants from outside Europe caused an increase in dissatisfaction with the government and the political system as a

whole. This was also facilitated (not only in Germany) by the reduction of differences between the old left- and right-center parties, which for decades formed the basis of the German party "establishment". In general, many voters stopped seeing in their programs answers to questions that really worried them. At the same time, right-wing radical views, outright justification of violence and authoritarian methods of exercising power have not found and do not find significant support in German society. The result of the unarticulated request of some citizens by large parties was political initiatives in Germany that had signs of legal populism. One of them is associated with the name of Ronald Schill, a judge from Hamburg. In the 1990s, he created the offensive State governed by the rule of Law Party (Schill's party), which in its election campaign focused on the problems of strengthening the rule of law, fighting crime, calling for a tougher immigration policy, etc. [43]. In the Hamburg parliamentary elections, his party won 19.4% of the vote, and its leader received the post of Senator for the interior in the city government (similar to the post of Minister). His activities on it led to a conflict with the mayor, who represented the CSU. In the end, the careless, extremely "politically incorrect" statements of R. Schill regarding the sexual orientation of the head of the city caused sharp criticism, almost harassment in the media, and put an end to his political career.

Another populist speech on a national scale was participation in the 2002 election campaign. Jurgen Melleman, one of the leaders of the Free Democratic Party, was once the minister of economy in one of the governments of Helmut Kohl. According to H. Funke and L. Rensmann, Yu. Melleman turned to anti-Semitism in his political agitation (taking, in particular, an indiscriminately anti-Israel position). At the same time, he called for "breaking the taboo" on discussing certain topics, sharply criticized the German political establishment. The election campaign ended unsuccessfully for the "Free Democrats", and Yu. Melleman left the party. In June 2003 Yu. Melleman, a former paratrooper, was killed during another skydive. The investigation could not determine whether it was an accident or suicide. In general, questions that Yu. Melleman raised too openly occupy a

central place in the programs and agitation of German right-wing radicals. But his speech was focused primarily on democratic mechanisms for the exercise of power, designed to expand electoral support for the generally respectable FDP, and this gives grounds to determine Yu. Melleman as more as a populist politician.

In today's Austria, populist signs are most noticeable in the activities of the Austrian Freedom Party (APF), which has existed since 1955. The peak of its popularity today is associated with the name of Joerg Haider, who headed the party in 1986. In previous decades, the APF regularly participated in elections, receiving an average of 5-6% of the vote, and twice participated in government coalitions, but in general did not have a significant influence on political decisions. In post-war Austria, the left-wing Socialist Party of Austria (since 1991 - The Social Democratic Party of Austria) (SDPA) and the right-wing conservative Austrian People's party (APP) competed for power. At the same time, the country actually developed a system of separation of powers between them, under which Austria was led many times by bipartisan "large" coalitions [4].

During the scandalous election campaign of 1999 J. Haider actively used the appeal to the topic of Austria's Nazi past, which was previously largely pushed out of public political discourse. By definition, H. Funke and L. Rensmann, " his (J. Haider) the demand to finally free the nation from collective guilt for the crimes of Nazism and in general for the Nazi past, which hinders the development of a positive national identity, meets the needs of 75% of Austrians." German researcher H. Helmer wrote that J. Haider in 1999 "attracted - including speeches to Waffen SS veterans - an electorate that did not see anything particularly bad in the Nazi past." The slogan "Austria above all else!" it turned out to be attractive for many voters. The APF leader called for the expulsion of "foreign parasites" from the country, while the APF opposed the EU's expansion to the East. Despite the strong protests of 14 countries - all members of the European Union at that time - in February 2000. The APF formed a government coalition with the ANP (Conservative representative Wolfgang Schussel became chancellor, and J. Haider did not join the government, retaining the post of Governor of the province of

Carinthia). In the end, Austria's relations with the EU returned to normal, because under the government with the participation of the APS, "nothing super-scary happened in Austria in domestic political terms: only a more or less standard right-wing policy was carried out" [38].

In general, it is customary to qualify the APS as an ultra-right party. In our opinion, populism manifested itself in its bright leadership character, characteristic of its agitation against the opposition of "friends" and "strangers", its tendency to offer simple and radical solutions to complex problems. Y. Haider was a leader who, in a completely populist spirit, appealed to a "simple Austrian" whose interests the political establishment does not want to understand. In the spring of 2005, the politician left the APS, creating instead a new party, which he considered its legal successor - the Union for the future of Austria (UFA). In October of the same year, J. Haider died in a car accident. Today, both the APS and the UFA, whose leader is H. Strache, take part in the political life of the country.

Speaking about populism in modern France, first of all, it should be paid attention to the party, which has been a prominent participant in electoral competitions for more than 40 years. It is talking about the National Front (NF), established in 1972. For many years, its leader was Jean-Marie Le Pen, who had a reputation as one of the most odious French politicians. Since 2011 the NF is headed by his daughter Marine Le Pen. The National Front appeared at a time when, against the background of the global confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the democratic countries of the West, the left-wing parties - the Socialist Party and the communists (FCP) - had a very great influence on the political life of France. At that time, the NF was primarily an anti-communist organization. Today, when "communism" has ceased to be a powerful factor in World Development and conflicts, in the context of profound social changes in France itself and Europe as a whole, other accents have become the main ones in the National Front program.

In the first, most general definition, it can be defined as nationalist. The NF postulates the category of "nation" as the basic, core for the formation of its ideology. They see the nation as a kind of heritage, which is temporarily ruled by

each new generation, and belonging to the nation - as the main factor of identity. At the same time, the party's program emphasizes that the nation needs clearly defined territorial borders, borders - like a house of doors and windows. At the same time, the NF leadership strongly rejects the accusations of racism.

The second main focus of the National Front's program requirements is the traditional family: heterosexual, focused primarily on the birth and upbringing of children. Increasing the birth rate among indigenous French people is considered a task of political significance. The National Front proposes to ban abortions at the constitutional level, calls for broad social assistance and benefits for families with children.

However, the most important issue of the National Front's political efforts was the problem of mass immigration, the resettlement of residents of its former colonies in Africa to France. Immigration in its current forms and scale is seen as a critical threat to the French nation, its security, development, and very existence. Supporters of the NF believe that in the amount in which immigrants arrive in France, their complete assimilation is impossible. At the same time, according to Jean-Marie Le Pen, the elite "imposes a moral ban on French society not only to resist the invasion of foreigners, but even to discuss this problem." The National Front proposes to change and complicate the procedure for obtaining French citizenship and calls for facilitating the return of immigrants to their countries of origin, in particular by providing assistance to their governments to encourage appropriate efforts.

In general, the NF is usually classified as a right-wing (or sometimes "ultra-right") party. It is possible to point out several distinctly populist signs of its political behavior. The main one is perhaps an indirect, but understandable juxtaposition of "friends" ("real", Native Frenchmen) and "strangers" (immigrants), who in the logical and rhetorical constructions of the NF appear as evil, a threat to their own, the culprits of their troubles and problems. The majority of European populists (and right-wing radicals) agree with the critical attitude of the National Front to globalization and European integration, as well as the activities of EU

supranational structures. Typical of populist rhetoric is the accusation of the political establishment of collusion, the imposition of unspoken taboos on certain issues and topics [57].

The French researcher P. Perino sees an important reason for the success of the National Front in the excessive rapprochement of the French left-center and right-center. The voter, losing the ability to identify their interests and views with their programs, "goes" to extreme, even non-system politicians. According to his definition, "the extreme right has largely confiscated in its favor the functions of the opposition that are vital for a pluralistic democracy." This occurs in a situation where class differences and conflicts that were crucial in the past have largely given way to differences with ethnic overtones. On the other hand, the data of opinion polls allow to point out a certain social profile of supporters of the National Front. This is mainly a man, a peasant, a craftsman, a small merchant or a worker with a low level of education and modest earnings. In the territorial dimension, the success of SF is greatest in departments with a high percentage of expats, and at the same time in areas experiencing an economic depression (industrial decline).

The political activity of Silvio Berlusconi and his party "Go Ahead, Italy!" has become a specific and at the same time very bright manifestation of the latest Western European populism in recent years. The latter in its program combined anti-communist rhetoric, in certain "doses" nationalism (appeals to the "national pride" of Italians, etc.) with a liberal program in economic matters. By definition, H. Funke and L. Rensmann, S. Berlusconi in the struggle for power used the "anti-nationalist" attitudes inherent in the middle strata of the Italian population, a long tradition of rather negative attitude towards the state apparatus. It is believed that for many Italians, tax evasion is not immoral, and success in an illegal "game" with the state is perceived as something to be proud of. Perhaps this view is a certain exaggeration, but it undoubtedly reflects some specifically Italian realities [55].

"Go Ahead, Italy!" it is an exclusive leadership, leadership organization, absolutely dependent on its charismatic leader. A major role in its popularity was



played by the media owned by S. Berlusconi. Italy in the post-war decades was characterized by chronic political instability, constant government crises (despite the fact that political actors changed much less often than governments). The consequence of this H. Funke and L. Rensmann considers the growth of political indifference of the population, the disbelief of many citizens in the possibility of the existence of a useful and uncorrupted government for them. Such sentiments were successfully used by S. Berlusconi, whose "anti-party party" appealed to voters with arguments in the spirit of "what is useful to the "ordinary person" from these corrupt parties." In general, leadership, skillful manipulation of controlled media, appeals to the feelings of the "ordinary Italian" are obviously populist signs of "Forza Italia". The combination of traditionally right-wing (nationalist) accents with a rather liberal economic program in its program is also characteristically populist.

An important feature of Italy's political scene is the great socio-economic, cultural, and mental difference between the rich North and the poorer south. The Italian national state inherited it from previous eras, when on its modern territory there were a number of very different state and political entities.

Populism has manifested itself in a rather peculiar way in the modern domestic politics of the Netherlands. In the early 2000s, Pim Fortuyn, the leader of the Pim Fortuyn list Party (PFLP), had a reputation as a populist (often in conjunction with the definition of "ultra-right"). This party emerged on the eve of the 2002 election campaign, and the main focus in its campaigning was on the issue of immigration. Despite the murder of P. Fortuyn himself nine days before the vote, the party he founded, which first ran in the election, received 17% of the vote and, along with the Christian Democrats and Liberals, took part in the governing coalition. In the early elections in January 2003, voter support was significantly lower (5.7%), and in the 2006 elections. The PFLP did not get into parliament.

P. Fortuyn is a sociologist, until 2001 a columnist for a conservative magazine, and host of a weekly TV show even before his debut as an active

politician, he was known for his sharp criticism of the Dutch political elite, "apparatchiks" and left-wing intellectuals. According to P. Fortain, this elite monopolized the country's political space, imposing on everyone its "untouchable" principles of multiculturalism, the welfare state, and so on. By definition, K. Vossen, anti-elitism P. Fortain was close to the popular populist formula of "colluding elites" against ordinary people. On the other hand, the founder of the "PFLP" was not characterized by populist "glorification" of the "common people". From the point of view of P. Fortain, politics should first of all be a competition of bright leaders, and the elite should play the role of enlighteners and leaders, "pastors" of the people. P. Fortain addressed to leading Dutch politicians - for vulgar pronunciation, bad clothes, etc. In contrast, he himself dressed up in very expensive and imposing clothes, creating a demonstratively aristocratic image.

Harsh criticism of the Dutch political establishment and a certain bias towards charismatic leadership make it possible to speak of populist traits in P. Fortain's activities and his party. At the same time, in contrast to the classical populists, P. Fortain did not seek to be completely "his own" for ordinary people, and unlike right-wing radicals, he criticized Islam not as a threat to traditional national values, but rather as a threat to the values of freedom.

Dutch politicians with populist characteristics sometimes include Geert Wilders and the Freedom Party he leads. The latter is known for its radically anti-Islamist stance. G. Wilders defends the theory of a Muslim conspiracy aimed at Islamizing Europe, proposes to ban the Koran (as a text justifying a totalitarian ideology in spirit), and deport Muslims who do not want to assimilate from the Netherlands. At the same time, he is known for his consistently pro-Israel position. The Freedom Party advocates expanding the mechanisms of direct democracy, introducing direct elections of mayors, police commissars and judges.

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During 1990-2010, in many European countries, populism manifested itself as radical left and right populism, social populism, national populism, and centrist (newest) populism.

As for left-wing radicalism in the context of populism, as V. Litvin notes, it provides for participation in the political life of reformed communist and Orthodox parties, whose main task is to condemn the existing liberal order, in a combination of populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and socialism. So bright parties of this direction in the political arena of Central European countries can be considered such parties as: the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which until 2001 was represented three times in the Bulgarian parliament; the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Republic has been in Parliament continuously since 1992, and received the support of the electorate in the range of 10.3–18.5 %; the Communist Party of Slovakia – in the Parliament of 2002, while received the support of 6.3% of voters; the Slovak Workers' Association is represented in the Parliament of the country with from 1994 to 1998, receiving 7.4% of the vote.

The program foundations of left-wing radicalism to some extent coincide with the position of radical right-wing parties, which combined populism, nationalism, xenophobia and authoritarianism. The activity of parties of this type originates from the nationalism of the pre-war period. In the political activities of Central European countries, parties were not represented by significant political groups, and were insignificant elements of the party system of their countries, although sometimes they could occupy prominent positions, mainly by combining with individual national populist parties and creating so-called "anti-transformation coalitions" - however, they never occupied key positions in them. Such parties, among others, include: the Slovak National Party before 1998, which received the support of voters at the level of 5.4–9.1 %; the party of Hungarian life and Justice, which, however, was not part of the parliament; the league of Polish Families, which was represented in parliament precisely as a populist force in 1997-2001, when 5.6% of the electorate supported it in the parliamentary elections; "Greater Romania" and the party of Romanian national unity, were represented in the country's parliament before 2000, and had no the movement for Latvia had a slightly higher voter support rate(15%) and was a member of the Latvian parliament in 1995-1998; the Slovenian National Party, whose activities as a

pronounced populist force lasted until 2000 with different levels of support – from 3.1 to 10% of the vote; also more modern representatives include the Bulgarian coalition "Ataka" represented in parliament in 2005 and 2009 with the support of the electorate of 8.1 and 9.4%, respectively.

Social parties based their populist activities on opposing the influence of industrial capitalism and defending the idea of traditional agriculture. In Central Europe, social populists carried out their activities in the mid-90s of the last century. These are mainly representatives of such parties as: the Hungarian party of independent small owners, which had its representatives in parliament in 1990-2002, with the support of voters at the level of 8.8–13.2 %; Self-Defense Of The Republic of Poland, represented in the Polish parliament in 1991, and in 2001-2005, having received 5.1% of support), the Estonian people's Union, in 1999 had 7 representatives of Deputies in Parliament. In the 90s, the transformed representatives of agrarian populism, who never received high public support, tried to find it at the expense of the anti-capitalist political spectrum and adopted some of the principles of the radical left, but this was most typical only for Poland.

National Populism does not address xenophobia and criticism of previous regimes. It also differs from radical right-wing populism by increasing attention to the legacy of "real socialism", while national populist parties often enjoy significant support from the population, and therefore dominate the ruling coalitions. During election campaigns, national populists label nationalism with calls for respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, ensuring the interests of an idealized national community, but do not resort to radical actions, and in their ideological orientation complement nationalism with a broader, non-nationalist political direction, which is aimed at specific groups. The success of their activities, from this point of view, is explained not only by the existing nationalist tendencies, but also by the appeal of national populists to the social group that has undergone significant negative transformations in their lives during the period of transformational changes. National populists appeal to the people, primarily as members of the national community; and emphasize that all their troubles are

caused by external enemies and the betrayal of local anti-national elites. Most of the activities of such parties ended in the late 1990s, just at a time when the liberal-democratic direction of ideologies was established in Central Europe.

Modern national populism can be defined as the program basis for the activities of the Polish Law and Justice Party, which entered parliament in 2001, receiving 9.5% of the vote and, accordingly, 44 deputy mandates. However, this was only the beginning of the electoral success of the national conservative political force led by the Kaczynski brothers, as in the next elections in 2005 and 2007 they received, respectively, 27.0 and 32.1% of the vote (and the post of President).

Centrist (modern) populism does not carry an ideological burden. It appeared in the late 90s, but became widespread in the first half of the next decade. The latest populism does not aim to radically influence the consciousness and behavior of voters, to mobilize their efforts in the fight against the ineffective previous government. As for the ideological doctrinal basis, the latter, in their opinion, is harmful for a true democratic country. First of all, they call for common sense and rational thinking in solving both strategic and tactical tasks of socio-political development. Therefore, such parties, especially if they have a popular charismatic leader, often receive public support. Modern parties representing centrist populism are mostly not anti-democratic, anti-capitalist, or anti-western: they mostly do not support any previous configurations of the political elite, although in some circumstances they may even cooperate with this elite by participating in the formation of a coalition [45].

The newest populism adheres to the party, which was actually based on it, namely: the Slovak party of the public understanding represented in Parliament in 1998, with the support of 8% of voters; "Direction – Social democracy" in Slovakia, which was the permanent representative of Parliament since 2002, and at different times received different support of the electorate and from 13.5 to 34.8 %; the Alliance of new citizens of Slovakia, are represented in Parliament in 2002, with 8 % of voter support; the party "New era" in Latvia, got pretty good indicator

of support in elections in 2002 and 2006 – of 24.0 and 16.4 %, respectively; the Estonian party "Res Publica", elected to Parliament only in 2003, but got 24.6% of the votes; National movement Simeon II in Bulgaria, presented in Parliament in 2001 and 2005, when it received the support of the electorate 42,7 and 19.9 %, respectively; the labor Party in Lithuania, the Parliament was submitted in 2004 and 2008 with the support of 28.4 and 9.0 % of the voters; the Lithuanian liberal democracy party "Order and justice", elected to Parliament in 2004, gaining 11.4% of voters), the Union of farmers and New democratic party of Lithuania, elected to Parliament only in 2004 with the support of the voters at 6.6 %; the party "Citizens for European development of Bulgaria", showed the first place in the parliamentary elections in 2009, with a score of 39.7 % of the vote.

Analyzing the manifestations of populism, in post-communist European countries, V. Litvin concerns, that post-communist populism is a dynamic phenomenon. Central European countries are moving from radical forms of populist politics through nationalism and authoritarianism to more moderate tendencies. It should also be agreed with the researcher's opinion on the ambiguity of the manifestations of modern populism, because there are more or less radical versions of this phenomenon. Thus, "soft" populism is a challenge to the existing system of representation, in particular the party system. This may indicate a crisis of representativeness, based on the peremptory view for most populists that institutionalized political parties are corrupt, form cartels and remain alienated from the people, and are characterized by excessive ideologicity. While "hard" populism can carry a constitutional threat: here we are talking about a danger not only for the existing structure of representation but also for certain basic principles of liberal democracy – the protection of human and civil rights, as well as national minorities. In general, the dividing line between these two manifestations of populism is not clear and is constantly changing [45].

In a sense, the latest populism has become a reaction to the integration processes in Europe and globalization. The latter contribute to the erosion and destruction of traditional national identities. The reaction of those to whom

changes bring with them losses and new problems is the search and actualization of narrower, local cultural self - determination, in particular in the form of "subnational" or nationalist movements - Catalan, Basque, Scottish, local movements in Bavaria, Brittany, Occitania, Alsace, etc. The authors quote the French researcher Rene Monza in this regard: "One of the ideas dear to the heart of this type of extra-right regionalists is that it is possible to be a Frenchman and an Arab or a black Frenchman, it is much more difficult to be an Arab and a Norman or a black Provençal" [82].

## **2.2. Populism as a communicative strategy in political discourse of the USA**

As for American leadership, only populist extravagance allowed J. Bush will become the leader of the election race. The American press wrote that "Bush laid out to voters the map that he considered the strongest: tax cuts. The presidential candidate successfully illustrated his position: "Let's take a family: spouses with a total income of 50 thousand dollars a year. Thanks to my program, the amount of taxes they will pay will be reduced by 50%." In the predominantly agricultural state of Iowa, Bush tells residents that he is well aware of the specifics of local agriculture and reminds them of his plans to ease the tax burden on farmers: "Raise your hands, who pays income tax to the federal government?" he asks the farmers. Amount of hands. – "You will pay less!" The crowd cheers happily."

Donald Trump is another prominent example of a populist politician. Based on the analysis of fourteen of his speeches during the presidential race period Mr. Trump used a number of linguistic influence techniques.

Trump's Republican National Convention speech provides the following examples of manipulative techniques as defined by N. Ligacheva [83]:

1. Shock tactics, Trump used civil unrest to demonstrate that the nation is in peril and only a republican candidate would be able to resolve the situation. "Our Convention occurs at a moment of crisis for our nation. The attacks on our police, and the terrorism in our cities, threaten our

very way of life.”

2. The contrast principle. Trumps creates a negative impression of his predecessor, while it may be viewed as a personal attack the blame is placed on his entire administration, thus condemning the entirety of the Democratic party. “President Obama has almost doubled our national debt to more than \$19 trillion, and growing”

3. Statement of fact. trump juxtaposed himself to Obama by promising to rejuvenate economy once he assumes the office: “With these new economic policies, trillions of dollars will start flowing into our country. This new wealth will improve the quality of life for all Americans.”[84].

In the United States, populist rhetoric is used to varying degrees by both ruling parties, rhetoric that contrasts the individual (taxpayer) with the government's plans. This is precisely the key point of populism, when anti-elite rhetoric comes from those who actually own power.

Today, rather unexpectedly for most observers, populism in the United States has entered a phase that is unlikely to be found in recent American history. Donald Trump, a politician who is not connected with the party establishment, a businessman, and partly even a person from the world of show business, using a wide arsenal of populist techniques, was able to become head of state.

During the 2016 presidential campaign D. Trump, who had no significant political experience, was able to win the primaries with impressive success and become the Republican presidential candidate during a rather intense struggle. [46]

His campaign, which was conducted under the slogan "Make America Great Again", focused on such problems as illegal immigration, the withdrawal of production outside the United States, and consequently job cuts in America itself, the huge national debt, and the fight against Islamic terrorism. In the spirit of Republican principles, candidate Trump called for tax reform, including cutting certain taxes, and repealing President B. Obama's medical reform. He also defended protectionist measures on foreign trade, harshly criticized NAFTA (the



North American Free Trade Agreement), the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the WTO, and put forward the idea of introducing high duties on Chinese and Mexican exports. During the Campaign, D. Trump called for more use of its own minerals in the American energy sector, reducing dependence on oil imports from the Middle East. He expressed a skeptical view of the anthropogenic nature of global warming, spoke about the possibility of the United States withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement (the position on which, after being elected president, seems to have somewhat softened) [12].

In matters of foreign policy, D. Trump defended the reaction or refusal to participate in international security agreements, criticized NATO and American partners in this organization, and expressed doubts about the need for sanctions against Russia, which the Obama administration imposed after the annexation of Crimea. He considered Islamic terrorism to be the main threat to the United States.

Describing the electoral program of D. Trump, it can be defined as nationalist (a mixture of civil and ethnic nationalism, adjusted for the specifics of this phenomenon in the United States), protectionist and close to the tradition of American isolationism in relation to foreign policy issues. It's obvious that Trump's social opinion of assessments by philologists and the authors of political media the rating of the populist. (It is permissible to see it from the guidance, more you can know about a hundred). What is the reason for this?

Undoubtedly, this is the nature of the Republican candidate's pre election rhetoric and public behavior - very harsh, often rude, and at the same time not devoid of elements inherent more in show business than in normal politics. From the point of view of the system of argumentation, the core of D. Trump's rhetoric was (rather paradoxical for a billionaire) the opposition of himself as a representative of the "people", the existing social elite, The Washington bureaucracy and the "politicians" against whom he turned against [25].

With any attitude to the personality of D. Trump, it is impossible to deny him a kind of charisma. With numerous populists both in the United States and outside the country, D. Trump is also related to the fact that he never belonged to

the Republican or any other party establishment.

At the same time, in addition to the populist political style and rhetorical discourse, it could also be noted populist accents in the program of the last winner of the presidential election [23].

One of them is rather an isolationist position in relation to international affairs, criticism of the active participation of the United States in international unions, and interference in conflicts outside the country. At the same time, and this is also very consonant with the isolationist approaches of populists, etc. Trump insists on the need to strengthen the Armed Forces, extremely decisive actions in the event of an immediate threat to American interests.

B. Becker pointed out a number of differences between the position of D. Trump and the traditional approaches of the Republican Party. In particular, in contrast to Republican politicians, D. Trump, promising to cancel the so-called "Obamacare" (the state medical program for the poorest Americans, which was defended by President B. Obama), stated the need to preserve other social health programs [4]. In this, according to the analyst, D. Trump was close to European populist parties. During the campaign, D. Trump also criticized the widespread practice of providing education loans in the United States, which, according to an opinion poll, is considered a problem by a significant majority of supporters of both Democrats and Republicans. Such a "cross-party" position is one of the most characteristic features of populist politicians (note that in a certain way they can serve as an argument in favor of populism) [66].

As a populist nationalist, putting him on a par with V. Putin, U. Chavez, R. Erdogan and V. Orban, defined D. Trump is a well-known American political scientist F. Fukuyama. As B. Becker, he noted notable differences between D. Trump and many Republicans, in particular, in relation to the public role of the government (Trump's bet on a strong government contradicts the traditional Republican doctrine of a "small government", a government with minimal social responsibility), in supporting public investment in infrastructure projects, which was constantly opposed by Republicans and supported by Democrats. In this

regard, Trump parted ways with the predominantly pro-Republican "Tea Party".

From F. Fukuyama's point of view one of the reasons for D.Trump's success is that for a long time the system of checks and balances operated in the United States in such a way that it almost paralyzed the executive branch, did not allow it to make and implement any difficult decisions. According to Fukuyama, it is necessary that the authorities can work, and the responsibility of politicians to citizens is realized during the next elections. Blocking the full possibility of a change of power (for example, through the use of "jerrymandering" techniques by some Republican politicians, etc.) is the first step towards shifting liberal democracy to electoral authoritarianism. Potentially, the presidency of D. Trump contains such a threat (although F. Fukuyama is optimistic about the ability of American institutions and civil society to prevent this) [71].

His analysis of the specifics of D.Trump's relationships with a rich past and current experience of American populism was proposed by an American researcher M. Kazin. In it, he distinguishes two traditions.

The first of them, that it can be rather conditionally defined as a "left", part of a broad liberal political trend, branding the social elite as the culprit of social problems, does not identify it with any ethnic or religious group (this tradition M. Kazin considers it a version of "civil nationalism"). It once included the people's party, the progressive movement of the 1920s, and others. However, D. Trump represents another, different tradition of American populism - racist-nationalist, whose supporters associate criticism of the elite with attacks on certain "non-white", non-Christian minorities. At one time, one of the most odious examples of this tradition was the activities of such an organization as the Ku Klux Klan. Today, D. Trump acts in a similar way which during the presidential campaign identified these "dangerous" minorities quite clearly: immigrants from Mexico and Muslims [72].

In line with the nationalist line in the American populist tradition, there is also D. Trump's criticism of the global elite for promoting a policy of open borders, which allegedly allow immigrants to take jobs from Americans and lower

their living standards.

As for foreign policy, isolationist accents are characteristic of all American populists, but it is right-wing, nationalist populism that has always been particularly negative about the active participation of the United States in international affairs, primarily in certain large organizations [8]. Campaign of D. Trump, with his criticism of NATO, the United States European allies, has become the newest reincarnation of long-standing American isolationism. The Republican candidate borrowed even one of his slogans, "America first," from a political pressure group of the same name that was active in the late 1930s, accusing "International Bankers" of trying to drag the US into the European war (and quickly ceased to exist after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor).

According to M. Kazin, the last presidential race in America witnessed a return to active politics and liberal, left-wing populism, the embodiment of which was the struggle for the right to run for the Democratic Party of Senator B. Sanders. At the same time, a populist feature of both the Trump campaign and the Sanders campaign was that they both criticized the vices and corruption of the system, acting within its framework, without questioning its foundations [73]. At the same time, and this distinguished them from the populists of the past, both Trump and Sanders gave rather vague definitions of the "people" that they sought to represent against the elite. However, as noted by M. Kazin, in today's United States, which is increasingly becoming a collection of different ethnic, cultural, and gender groups with sometimes difficult relationships, it is really quite problematic to define "people".

A sharp critic of D. Trump, whom he describes as a populist, is the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy. In the case of Trump, in his opinion, politics is subject to the laws of reality shows. "Voting for Trump is a vote against equality and respect for minorities," this prominent European intellectual said in an interview. From Levy's point of view, authoritarian populism is a popular phenomenon in modern Europe, seeking to establish (or establish, as in Hungary) a new type of political regime - "democracy", authoritarian power that is legitimized

through democratic procedures and broad voter support. The philosopher announced the emergence of a new "populist international", today inspired by the victory of the populist Trump. Populism combined with a disregard for elites and democracy unites Trump with Russian President Putin. Another point of unity between them lies in the personal plate: "the same vulgarity, the same belonging to the club of fake testosterone Kings" [18].

It is obvious that it is not yet possible to assess the presidency of D. Trump. It was his election to the post of head of the United States that had a touch of randomness, determined by the specifics of the indirect voting system, because in the end, the winner received significantly fewer votes than his rival. However, it was not accidental that there was a very close support for D.Trump's candidacy by part of American voters [34]. It was a confirmation of the classic thesis that populists succeed when the political establishment, for one reason or another, is either unable to solve the real problems of a significant part of society, or ignores them. On the other hand, the victory of D. Trump is the latest example of the contradiction noted above more than once, the multidirectional majority and procedural and constitutional components of democracy. Being an obvious success of democracy as the embodiment of the will of the majority, as well as as a system open to the real participation of not only traditional party elites, the victory of D. Trump at the same time poses considerable threats to democracy as a system for protecting minority rights and the difficult search for a compromise between different interests. The authoritarian tendencies of populism were given the opportunity in the United States to realize themselves, putting the country in front of a challenge - to prove the strength of its civil society, its guarantees of rights and freedoms for all [18].

Populism often embodies the so-called "paradox of democracy" - a certain contradiction ("friction") between complex democratic institutions and the demands for "justice", a better life for the sovereign people. In another aspect, we can talk about the "institutional paradox of populism" - criticizing existing political institutions and the establishment, populists seek to use them and become the new

elite themselves. According to K. Davix, populism in representative democracy is an inevitable phenomenon, but at the same time it is a "corruption" of democracy, and populists are more likely to "corrupt" than "educate" democracy. At the same time, there is also a point of view that the positive function of populism in a democratic system is that it forces you to pay attention to failures in its functioning, which can damage this system as a whole [21].

Thus, when populism appeals to public attitudes, then there is actually an attempt to adapt to the stereotypes of mass consciousness, and then populism becomes a means of gaining power. And the subordinate mass needs from the authorities, first of all, guardianship, care, paternalistic provision of basic comfort-physiological and psychological. Second, establishing or maintaining order. Third, giving meaning to collective and individual existence, creating an attractive joint idea. Although this is a kind of illusion, but based on it, society cannot exist normally, otherwise it falls into a state of anomie. If the government does not want or cannot offer citizens an important and interesting illusion, then it risks losing its popularity, if, of course, it has it.

### **2.3. Principles and problems of studying the phenomenon of populism in Ukraine**

In Ukraine, over the years of independence, a system with the hegemonic dominance of a particular cultural complex has not been formed. The reasons for this are both in the multi-level heterogeneity of Ukrainian society, and in political practices that were much more aimed at using this complex structure than at overcoming it.

At the same time, Ukrainian politics and society as a whole have not deviated from the dominance of the discursive complex, which has taken positions that can be interpreted in the categories of hegemony. In conditions when the absolute majority of discourses exploited certain forms of particularity, the discourse of populism acquired hegemonic forms. The special properties of the latter allowed him to easily absorb various moments and entire layers of the

absolute majority of the leading political discourses of Ukraine. Decades after the "Orange" Maidan, populism determined the nature and content of public political communication in the country and, accordingly, created an original political reality. Ukraine of the XXI century is primarily a country created in the conditions, under the influence and as a result of the hegemony of populism.

Populism is one of those concepts in relation to which in political theory there are a huge number of attempts to define, identify, "catch" the phenomenon, but it is not yet necessary to talk about any consensus that has established a fixed meaning.

For a long period, since the actualization of the problem of populism in political science, attempts have been made to record the unique features of this particular phenomenon, but one way or another they remained at the descriptive level. The accumulation of individual case studies only increased the complexity of theoretical generalization, blurring the subject of attention. The authors of high-profile generalizing works generally wondered whether it was possible to reduce populism to one concept [21] and, in the end, still refused to do that. For example, E. Gellner and C. Ionescu were forced to go this way in the introductory article to the collection "Populism - its significance and national characteristics" edited by them [70], which was published in 1969 and for a long period became "canonical" for researchers of the problem. In the 70s and 90s of the last century, efforts focused more on classifications and typologizations of organizational and ideological manifestations of populism, but such approaches did not form theoretical clarity.

In the end, this condition has not been completely overcome to this day. F. Panizza even sneers that an almost cliché has formed when the authors of texts about populism initially constantly complain about the lack of clarity of the concept and even express doubts about its usefulness for political analysis [75: 1]. At the same time, he himself is sure that despite the lack of scientific agreements on the meaning of populism, it is quite possible to "determine the analytical core around which a significant degree of academic consensus is formed" [75: 1]. Based

on this, three approaches to the interpretation of populism are distinguished: empirical generalizations, historical descriptions, and so-called "symptomatic readings" [75: 2].

The approach based on the accumulation and interpretation of empirical data is the simplest and most obvious. It is based on positivist logic, according to which on the basis of individual cases that could be designated as "populism", it is possible to identify certain special characteristics and attributes of the phenomenon as a whole and, thus, form its clear definition and distinguish it from other similar phenomena. However, populism, known since ancient times, demonstrated its ultra-high plasticity and multi-dimensionality. Attempts at a thorough register of properties led to a roundabout way - individual researchers identified more than two dozen features, but even this did not provide a convention on understanding the phenomenon of populism.

At the same time, the accumulated empirical knowledge turned out to be suitable for analyzing and interpreting individual cases of political practice that could claim to be recognized as populism. This gave grounds for a whole group of researchers to abandon the idea of a generalizing concept and a general methodological vision of the phenomenon. From their point of view, it would be quite sufficient to focus on individual historical examples of relevant practices. At the same time, it was quite clearly distinguished geographically (by the region of Latin America), chronologically (the second third of the twentieth century), socio-economically (crisis processes of transition to industrialization). In addition, almost every case was complemented by charismatic leadership. A classic example of populism interpreted in this way is its involvement in the interpretation of Peronism (on behalf of H. Peron, President of Argentina in 1946-1955 and 1973-1974).

The "historical" approach has certain advantages. In particular, it allows to take into account the context and exclusive parameters of specific manifestations of populist practices. However, the shortcomings of such a vision are much greater, they make themselves felt even within its "Latin American gravity". Thus,



industrialization explanations and bindings are not functional to describe and explain the new wave of populist practices in the region associated with the activities of politicians such as U. Chavez (president of Venezuela in 1999-2013), L. Lula (president of Brazil in 2003-2011) or F. Lugo (president of Paraguay in 2008 - 2012). And also in relation to a number of other politicians and political forces both in Latin America itself, as well as in Africa, Asia and Europe, who, using the latest communication technologies, master and improve the methodology of interaction with society, which is quite consistent with the logic of populism.

It is around this logic that the foundations of a theoretical understanding of populism are built by the third of these approaches - symptomatic. Its essence is not to address the identification of certain entities that are irrefutably inherent in populism, but to "simply read the discursive structure of the Russian language... further study of the modalities of discourse with which populism can be associated" [78: 230]. Proponents of this approach note the special role of the meaning "people" in populist rhetoric. The semantic field of populism is built around it. It is this signifier that acts as the nodal point of a special discourse - the discourse of populism. At the same time, "people" is also an "empty signifier", from which other categories of this discourse originate and are filled with meanings. Accordingly, contextually, "people" can be defined differently, depending on the parity in the struggle of discourses in a particular historical and political situation. This can be a fairly wide range of meanings - from "all citizens" living in this territory, to certain social groups that this or that manifestation of populism gives the right to be considered "people". At the same time, in both the first and Second cases, even in the case of claims to the inclusiveness of the "people", the definition through its use also implies the identification of "non-people", "other" than "people". These "others" can also be defined differently depending on the context, but within the framework of populist interpretation, they will always be given the meaning of opponents and even threats to the "people" and their interests. This, from the point of view of supporters of a symptomatic understanding of the phenomenon, is the content and logic of populism - the

conflict distinction between the "people" and their "enemies".

It is worth considering that "people" here is not so much an operational concept as a sacred one. Which, moreover, has a long history, reaching back to the roots of educational discourse. It was thanks to it that the doctrine of popular sovereignty was formulated and justified, within the framework of which the "people" were considered as the source and bearer of supreme power and state sovereignty. In this context, "people" resonates both in the French "Declaration of human and civil rights" of 1789 and in the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996, in which the preamble refers to the sovereign will of the people, and Article 5 states that "the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine is the people. The people exercise power directly and through state and local government bodies."

However, the conclusion of the famous European intellectual U. Eco that "in fact, "the people" as a reflection of the will and feeling, as a natural living force that embodies morality and history, does not exist" [62: 230], does not seem to be an exaggeration. There are citizens, he continues. The "people" are a simulacrum of political practice, which, however, is very much needed by both politicians and non-politicians.

The latter, symptomatic interpretation of populism has the highest competitive methodological power. It allows to bring populism beyond reductions to certain forms that are attributed to it in the actual political or everyday discourses - to demagoguery, irresponsibility, manipulation, and so on. On the other hand, through such a vision, the perspective of research is more clearly visible - if populism is a speech practice (or one that is somehow updated verbally), if populism is a separate discourse, then it is worth investigating it, starting primarily through the achievements of debatable theories. Finally, another notable advantage of this approach is that the methodology proposed by him seems most suitable for studying the experience of Ukrainian populism, which is already rich, complex and effective.

The constant socio-political crises inherent in Ukraine, the low level of political culture of the population and individual politicians have become quite favorable ground for the use of various kinds of manipulative technologies. A special place in the process of political manipulation belongs to populism, which is increasingly found both in electoral processes and in everyday political practice.

To ensure the necessary political result, Ukrainian politicians resort to the use of various kinds of political technologies, but populism remains one of the most effective, and it is used by almost all subjects of political activity (individual politicians, political groups, political parties, public associations, etc.). These technologies include both the means to achieve fast, local and often short-term results, and to obtain a more global and long-lasting effect. In the political struggle, populists resort to such demagogic techniques as appealing to prejudice and flattery of the crowd, exploiting its instincts and unfounded promises. In Ukrainian political practice, almost all its representatives resort to such techniques. Politicians appeal not only to the mind but also to the feelings of voters. And the more convincing these appeals are combined in a politician's speeches, the more successful and politically significant it is. This is the nature of the political struggle, with the use of populism.

A large number of domestic politicians constantly use populist methods, because in the modern political struggle it is necessary to please society, which requires the ability to communicate in a simple language that is understandable to the people, to speak simply about complex things, clearly express thoughts, highlight pressing problems, and criticize the government for its miscalculations. All these components contain elements of populism.

An important feature of Ukrainian populism is the accusations made by representatives of the current government structures of their predecessors, who each time leave behind a heavy legacy. This trend has already developed into a tradition when all social problems that the authorities cannot cope with are addressed to previous leaders. Another category of political actors who use populist technologies is radical politicians because in this case there is a certain

distance between goals and means, which can be formed over time by a categorical requirement: if a goal is set, then there must be means, you just need to find and apply them. At the same time, there is a dependence: the more radical a politician is, the more he uses populist techniques [78].

Such aspects of political populism are most clearly seen in the context of the historical development and formation of Ukraine as an independent democratic state. Thus, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, there were two main political trends in the political practice of Ukraine, each with its own ideas about the people. The first of them can be called traditionally Communist. According to it, "workers, peasants and the working intelligentsia", that is, "workers", were considered "people". It is worth mentioning that in the USSR, deputies of all levels only after the adoption of the Constitution of 1977 began to be called "people's deputies", and not "workers of deputies". For a long time, the Bolshevik tradition caused a certain wariness to such an "extracurricular" concept as "people". Thus, according to the Communist tradition of populism, "bourgeois nationalists", other "democrats" who appeared during the years of "perestroika", "speculators", "gentlemen", "kulak farmers" and other "grabbers" who opposed the working people were taken out of the framework of the "people".

The second trend is national–state. According to the political philosophy and rally rhetoric of representatives of this trend, the people included supporters of an independent democratic Ukrainian state, Ukrainian national revival, and true masters on Earth. Outside the framework of the people were "lumpens with sausage psychology", "mankurts", "fifth column", "red landlords – chairmen of collective farms", "party figures" and other "communists". And the general public was presented with facts from which it followed that potentially Ukraine is not inferior in a number of economic indicators to the leading European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain). That is, in terms of living standards, Ukrainians after gaining independence should not be inferior to the French or Germans.

The spread of populism in the mass consciousness of post-Soviet Ukraine has led to the fact that "populist techniques are resorted to not only by individual

political forces and politicians, but, to one degree or another, by all or almost all political forces. In the "political market", as in any other market: if there is demand, then there must be supply" [43].

The term "populism" in the USSR began to be actively used at the end of Perestroika – as a synonym for unjustified demagoguery. There is an opinion that Mikhail Gorbachev was the first to put this political label on his political opponent Boris Yeltsin. As V. Litvin wrote: "The first manifestation of the struggle for the sympathy of the masses was an unexpected and sharp surge in populism, the allocation of popular politicians. There is a search for the simplest and most accessible slogans" [97; 200]. Thus, populism is interpreted here not ideologically, but purely technologically – as a means to win the sympathy of the masses by proclaiming the simplest and most accessible slogans.

From this point of view, populism has indeed become one of the most effective means of fighting for power in the post-Soviet space. Indeed, under a purely populist slogan (in the official version: "Ukraine is being mercilessly robbed by the center", in the "Muscovites ate your fat" adapted to the needs of the common people), it was possible to collect those record 92% of votes for the independence of Ukraine in the referendum of December 1, 1991. The famous (but forgotten today) "5D" (democracy, statehood, trust, spirituality, welfare) made Leonid Kravchuk president at the same time. However, in 1994, he was beaten by Leonid Kuchma under the simple and accessible slogan "Order and decency" (on election posters, it was presented, as a rule, in Russian, correlating in this way with another promise – to introduce the official Russian language and deepen integration with Russia). It should be noted that populist Alexander Lukashenko won with similar slogans in Belarus at the same time. But, unlike his Ukrainian counterpart, he also tried to implement his political program.

Later, in March 1998, 30 parties and blocs competed in the parliamentary elections in search of accessible and understandable slogans. And certain image-making findings (for example, "politicians are engaged in demagoguery" from the election video of the "Greens", which really had a very relative relationship to

environmental protection) can be considered surprisingly successful. Along with the traditional "left" populism (N. Vitrenko and V. Marchenko), "right" populism (a powerful promotion project of the party "for a beautiful Ukraine" by G. Balashov and L. Chernovetsky) actively began to look for its place in the sun.

However, in the everyday use of our politicians and mass media, the word "populism" seems to have become used in a third meaning, different from "ideological". After all, "the electoral field of Ukraine is still divided among the main players who build populist strategies, focusing on "their voters", their myths, stereotypes and established attitudes" [49]. In other words, such communication is based on the activation of existing ideas and attitudes and is resonant because it corresponds to the ideas and expectations that have already developed in the mass consciousness, and fixes them. At the same time, the specifics of the use and dissemination of populist technologies of political manipulation depend on how closely the relationship between the main participants in political communication is established.

In previous years, there has been an interesting trend of a kind of consensus of political elites regarding the manipulative activities of their media components. It consists in the presence of a fairly obvious agreement between the mentioned forces regarding their game in the media field, including the rules of the "manipulative game". Indeed, during 2006-2008, there began to be a gradual decrease in the mass media of such a widespread method of manipulation as labeling back in 2004-2005. It should be understood as "unsubstantiated and accompanied by dubious evidence, imposing negative (from the point of view of the majority's perception) evaluation categories on society in order to compromise political opponents" [29; 76].

There is also a fairly moderate use of such methods of manipulation as silence (in the sense of blocking information about the actions of a certain participant in a political process or a certain event in political life), half-truths, which are usually understood as dissecting information that objectively and thoroughly covers insignificant details and superficial or incorrectly interpreted coverage of others.

It is characteristic, however, that the last two mentioned methods remain in wide use in relation to participants in political life who do not belong to the power elite of Ukrainian society, to marginal political forces, various socio-political associations with meaningfully different views on the ways of social development. In this connection, we should talk about "constructing by the Ukrainian mass communication media "an image of society devoid of socio-political diversity", since the positions spread through the use of the mentioned tool do not go beyond a certain discourse, offered as competing, differ insignificantly, and are, so to speak, "inside the "establishment" [29; 76]. This should be explained by the fact that persons who exercise a decisive influence on domestic mass communication media, including television channels, share common values and seek to deprive "strangers" who do not belong to an artificially constructed consensus of influence on public policy.

However, some manipulative technologies that are clearly populist in nature continue (consciously or unconsciously) to be used by domestic media, in particular on television. Thus, N. Ligacheva in her research [49] identifies the following:

1. Using stereotypes. Representation of a specific object in a simplified, understandable form. The stereotypical representation is fixed in the mind and is almost impossible to test by experience.
2. Replacing names, or "labeling". Negative value judgment about a person.
3. Repetition of information. The message is repeated with a certain frequency to fix it in the mind.
4. Approval. Instead of contrasting arguments, unsubstantiated statements are presented, presenting only one favorable position.
5. Setting rhetorical questions. The audience is asked simple questions, but with the appropriate context, which orients the viewer in the right direction for the manipulator.
6. Half-truths. It consists of objectively covering minor details while important facts are hushed up.

7. "Spiral of silence", or manipulation of the public opinion poll. Such comments are submitted that convince citizens that the majority of society supports a particular point of view or political position. This method is based on the laws of mass psychology, forcing people with different views to hide them, so as not to find themselves in socio-psychological isolation.

8. Anonymous authority. Links to which give the message solidity and plausibility.

9. "An ordinary story". Information about acute political and social events that have tragic consequences is presented in a businesslike and calm tone, which contributes to the indifference of the population's perception of it.

10. Presence effect. This is achieved by using special techniques that create the illusion of presence.

11. The primacy effect. Attempts to pass information first. The efficiency of providing information can be used as a manipulative technique that does not allow the audience to comprehend the information received.

12. Statement of fact. The desired position is presented as a fact.

13. Distraction. It is aimed at distracting attention from significant events to less important ones, which reduces psychological resistance on the part of society.

14. Use of eyewitnesses of the incident. Selecting people and editing information with the right semantic range.

15. The principle of contrast. It is used when it is necessary to provide negative information about political opponents, and the use of direct accusations seems too explicit.

16. Psychological shock. Information about emergency events that cause shock and destroy all levels of psychological social protection and introduce inspired schemes into the mind.

17. Creating associations. The object of messages in the eyes of the public is covered with reference to negative stereotypes of consciousness.

18. Information blockade. Blocking "unnecessary" information, detaining it, or presenting it in a favorable context [79].



One of the priority areas of activity of domestic mass media, at the present stage, in the field of manipulative influence is an attempt to complicate, in the direction of deterioration, the entire political process in Ukraine. This type of activity is aimed at supporting or at least empathizing with the overwhelming majority of the political audience in the process of political struggle between influential political players and determining their political position with the position of a particular political force.

This picture was also observed during 2010-2011, despite changes in the country's political leadership, the constitutional process, and new features in mass media coverage of the activities of the power elite. In this component, the Ukrainian media continue to successfully divide society into groups: those who support the actions of the authorities (whose activities are covered in the media "tactfully"), those who support the opposition (less loyally), and those who have despaired of both the government and the opposition (those who "protest").

Describing the process of political manipulation in Modern Ukraine, it is necessary to pay attention to the tools of political manipulation of a strategic direction through a widespread, popular and influential media product: shows, scandals, intrigues and investigations; various "Star shows"; shows that demonstrate the "truth of life". The main content of some of them and many other tools of manipulative influence, which aims to directly or indirectly influence the political consciousness and behavior of Ukrainian citizens, is "obsession with greed and the desire for instant enrichment, TV games and TV contests, voiceless singers, neo-viral speakers, physical and moral "bruising" as the main way of public behavior" [29; 49]. An important purpose of their application is to root in the public consciousness the desire to "be like others", in the conditions of highlighting not the best qualities, actions and views of "others", completely ignoring the absolutely obvious fact that "life is like this", because such are specific persons, including those who assimilate this thesis.

Based on the specifics of populist pre-election considerations, it becomes clear that mass political consciousness can be a favorable space for applying

various demagogic-populist techniques and levying effective manipulative influences.

However, such opportunities are not unambiguously available, and for their implementation it is necessary: to take into account public needs and wishes; to take into account a certain convention of the content and state of mass consciousness; to focus on the structure of motivation of public consciousness and behavior; to clearly define groups of influence; to impose the right of free interpretation of influences on such groups; to clearly understand the boundaries of possible influence on mass consciousness; not to subject a detailed analysis of those situations and events that have developed in society.

Another important component of the manipulative influence of the system of domestic mass communication media is the direction that can be conditionally called "the spread of horrors". Its presence can be traced in the fact that the vast majority of Ukrainian media are real reference books of accidents, human tragedies, and criminal life. At the same time, political communication in Ukraine has peculiar features: citizens continue to demonstrate an "tolerance" that is not typical of civil society to warnings about possible (and existing) violations of legislation in general and legislation on ensuring freedom of speech in particular. And this is successfully used by politicians when using populism.

The revolution of dignity, the bloody end of the Maidan standoff in January - February 2014, Russia's aggression, its occupation of Crimea, and the subsequent war in the Donbas did not limit the extremely high level of populism in Ukrainian politics and society. Moreover, the scale of the spread of populist technologies has finally acquired signs of dominance in political communications. The hegemony of populism has a distinctly negative impact on social and political processes in a difficult and responsible period for Ukraine.

On the one hand, populism has confidently spread beyond politics itself to other discourses - media, expert, scientific, legal, diplomatic, etc. The very appeal to the "fight against populism" takes place within and according to the canons of populist discourse itself.

On the other hand, the scale and strength of populism is inversely proportional to the effectiveness of politics. Irresponsibility, demagoguery, low efficiency, and dysfunctionality of modern Ukrainian politics are largely a consequence of the dominance of populist strategies - a consequence, not a cause. The level of populism that has persisted and developed since the Maidan of 2013-2014 significantly complicates (if not blocks) attempts at structural reforms in the economy, politics and social sphere.

These scales and effects of populism in post-revolutionary Ukraine were confirmed by the results of a study conducted on the basis of the 2014 parliamentary election campaign, conducted by the public Organization Bureau of analytics "Tectum" [41].

One of the stages of this study was an expert survey, which included 50 respondents according to certain criteria defined as "expert" in the field of political practices (in particular, communication practices themselves) of Modern Ukraine. This survey could not claim any specific representativeness, its research potential was somewhat different - an attempt to identify certain trends in understanding the phenomenon of populism in Ukrainian expert circles and the peculiarities of its domestic manifestations.

The main problem that emerged from the results of the study was the lack of methodological unity and clarity in approaches to the interpretation of the phenomenon of populism, even in the expert community. Its active exploitation in political and media discourses has led to a blurring of the essence of the concept. In this context, an attempt to provide analytical clarity in the interpretation of populism as a special type of political practice that presents itself through the construction in public broadcasting/rhetoric, on the one hand, the image of the "people" as the highest, "sacred" value and total community (which claims to unite without any clarifications regarding the structure, stratification of all representatives of society, citizens of the country) and the image of the "non-people" (first of all, "power", "elite", "politicians") as a separate layer that does not fall into the total community "the people" and (almost by definition) are hostile to

it, on the other hand. At the level of autumn 2014, it could be stated that "the image of 'power' after the Maidan lost its dominant negative connotations and opposition to the image of the 'people' in pre-election populist practices" [41].

On the other hand, the image of the "enemy of the people" turned out to be blurry and polysyllabic. The categories "elite", "enemy", and "oligarchs" used for its analysis gave only a fragmentary reflection.

Both in expert circles, in media discourses, and in public opinion in general, the dominant interpretations of "populism" are those that correlate with "previously unfulfilled or unrealistic promises", "disregard for program provisions and failure to fulfill already given promises", "demagogy". The vision of populism proposed by the authors of the project as "an attempt to present their point of view as the position of the entire people" was confirmed with the position of the expert community at the level of 24% (5th position in the results of the expert survey). Other ideas were ahead of this interpretation of populist activity: as a manifestation of "previously unfulfilled/unrealistic promises of politicians" (58%), "demagogy" (40%), "creating the image of enemies from political opponents and using in a negative context the categories "power", "elite", "oligarchs", "populists" (32%), "differences between public declarations and real interests" (28%) [41].

The designated hegemony of populism is a "non-classical" hegemony. In any case, within the Gramscian matrix, through which, in fact, the understanding of hegemony was established.

Especially threatening is the dominance of populism during the war, aggressive militaristic pressure on the Ukrainian state from Russia. It is in this context that populism in its current scale, forms and influences acts as one of the main threats to the national security of Ukraine.

This spread of populism means not only the use of certain rhetoric, but (and mainly) the formation of a special picture of the world, the creation of a specific social reality. Populism (especially in the scale and forms acquired in the last period) has ceased to be just a competitive technology for fighting for the favor of the voter. Now it is a factor that strongly influences the structuring, direction and

dynamics of political and social changes, the activities of state, political, economic, and social institutions, the transformation of old ones and the creation of new ones.

At the same time, the absolute majority of influences and changes that occur due to the dominance of populism are destructive both from the point of view of the prospects for democratic development of Ukraine, and (especially in recent months) the preservation of its state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Note the following of them, the most threatening:

- First of all, due to the influence of populism, an excessively simplified picture of socio-political reality, existing problems and tasks, social needs, interests and identities is formed. Populist discourse tends to replace them with an amorphous, unstructured entity, which it calls "the people»;

- Populism slows down and then blocks the articulation of the interests of public groups, complicates the possibilities of their representation and protection. Similarly it affects the definition and implementation of national interests;

- Populist discourse draws and maintains an internal boundary, dividing the entire society into "righteous" and "others" (who, for the most part, are also "enemies"). Thus a state of constant confrontation is maintained and fueled in the public consciousness;

- Populism is based on self-sufficient criticism of the existing status quo and, thus, entails permanent delegitimization of the existing political and social order;

- Political programs formulated on the basis of populism are based on a two-dimensional ("people" - "enemies") picture of the world and offer "simple solutions to complex problems". At the same time, attempts at comprehensive reforms are being vulgarized;

- In the end, almost any categories, concepts, meanings that are passed through populist discourse are emasculated, lose their meanings, turn into "empty meaning". Populism undermines Ukrainian politics, and this is obviously its greatest destructive force and most negative impact.

All these negative manifestations and influences of populism are especially intensified during the pre-election period. The presidential election campaign in the

spring and summer of this year demonstrated that neither external aggression, nor the tragic events on the Maidan, nor the demands for renewal and "reset" of power voiced there led to the development of immunity to the hegemony of populism in Ukrainian politics and society.

In Ukraine, a kind of "institutional sclerosis" was formed, which arose due to the long-term dominance in the system of real representation of the interests of oligarchic distribution groups and which was not overcome even after the revolution. Moreover, the restoration of certain institutional elements that were firmly established during the V. Yanukovich regime has begun (in particular, the informal-shadow Institute of so-called "caregivers" and the like. Until recently, the general structure of redistribution of public goods, formed at the end of the last century, was preserved.

The difference between the domestic experience and the British or other options that took place in democratic countries was that the groups that provided the accumulation of these sclerotic symptoms did not just influence politicians and the government, but directly integrated into it, ensuring the so-called "fusion of the state and business". As a result of this merger, both the state and large businesses lost their functional autonomy. Its main consequence was large-scale corruption, which before the revolution of dignity, and even more so after it, is assessed as the main problem of modernization and formation of Ukraine's competitiveness.

Another consequence, strongly connected with the redistribution process in general and the informal institutionalization of the dominance of the interests of a narrow conglomerate of political and economic groups in the redistribution of resources, was the unwinding of the flywheel of populism. First of all, in its social version - supporting and cultivating paternalistic sentiments in society.

## CONCLUSIONS

Thus, the status of the language changed when communication practices became the main tool of political argumentation. At the same time, this circumstance did not mark the removal of the division into rulers and subjects, but only institutionalized it in the plate of linguistic initiative of the addressee (ruling class) in relation to the addressee (society). Due to the conditional symbolic characteristics of language practices, both politicians and citizens have become hostages of their own interpretations, creating conditions for manipulation and speculation. In other words, the political reality has remained unchanged, but the rules of the game have changed. The lack of a clear criterion for identifying the unambiguity of judgments has given rise to many examples of paradoxical and absurd political communication. Parapolytics, paradiolog, demagogy, anti-technologies, indoctrination, double bind have become an integral part of political reality, while the irrational and emotional essence of a single source of power (the people) is not able to assess them from the point of view of common sense. This is precisely the reason for the everyday interpretation of politics as a "dirty" business, which is alien to political science, but not unfounded, and populism as a form of manipulating the consciousness of the masses.

Summarizing the reasoned conclusions of leading researchers of our time, it becomes quite obvious that there is a correlation between "modern populism" as a political and cultural phenomenon and "erosions of democracy" as key risks of modern world politics. In the conditions of socio-political reality of the XXI century, even countries with "stable democratic immunity" (the United States, Western European countries) are not protected from the "virus" of modern populism, which leads to the emergence or deepening of "erosions of democracy". However, it is obvious that "modern populism" is a "product of the globalization era", and its specific features - "aggressive expansion", "paradoxical", "multifaceted" - are due to the "new normality" - the "new reality" inherent in the new society. The process of "transcoding" all the system elements of modern

society: politics, economy, culture, science, public consciousness in accordance with the renewed world of the XXI century will change the world forever and create a unique research material for the latest science.

So, an important prerequisite for the relative success of populists in Western Europe was the skeptical attitude of many citizens to traditional parties, which they ceased to identify with their real problems and interests. It should be agreed with the opinion that in some countries, excessive strengthening of a stable "political center" has led to the radicalization of protest moods, in particular, a shift in electoral support towards populists.

Today, a common feature of the majority of populist parties in Europe, both Western and Eastern, is rather a positive attitude towards the regime of President Vladimir Putin and foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The latter is perceived by them as an example of a strong "national" policy, not limited by the influence of any supranational structures. Some European right-wing and populist groups also sympathize with the Russian regime's blatant hostility to liberalism and attempts to update values that are positioned as "traditional". Therefore, further research on the future role of populist ideas in Western European countries with the peculiarities of forming parliamentary coalitions and implementing new programs is promising.

Thus, when populism appeals to public attitudes, then there is actually an attempt to adapt to the stereotypes of mass consciousness, and then populism becomes a means of gaining power. And the subordinate mass needs from the authorities, first of all, guardianship, care, paternalistic provision of basic comfort-physiological and psychological. Populist politicians exploit these fears and hopes by applying appropriate linguistic techniques, such as:

1. Shock tactics in an attempt to lower audiences inhibitions by shocking news or predictions or putting their opponents in unfavorable light.
2. This is often supplemented by the use of the contrast principle. Opponents' pit themselves against their predecessors and either exaggerate their fault both personal or professional or launch an outright



disinformation campaign.

3. Repeating of the statement. Populists almost invariably repeat their statements, constantly reapplying linguistic techniques therefore increasing their affect on the audience.

Second, establishing or maintaining order. Third, giving meaning to collective and individual existence, creating an attractive joint idea. Although this is a kind of illusion, but based on it, society cannot exist normally, otherwise it falls into a state of anomie. If the government does not want or cannot offer citizens an important and interesting illusion, then it risks losing its popularity, if, of course, it has it.

The main conclusion about the possibility of establishing populism in Ukraine as the dominant competitive political alternative was the existence of a long-term institutional crisis, when a significant part of social demands remains unsatisfied, when "the institutional system loses its ability to absorb social demands." This situation opened up more and more opportunities for representatives of the political class in the struggle for electoral commitment and power to introduce interpretations of these demands and interests into the public space. At the same time, there were no opportunities for their implementation, not only at the level of lack of incentives for politicians to be responsible for their promises, but also because of the rapidly declining ability of existing institutions to fulfill such tasks. Thus, the flywheel of Ukrainian populism, motley at the level of ideas and symbols and ubiquitous at the level of technology, was unwound. The spread, which became dominant and eventually took hegemonic positions, became one (though perhaps not the most recognizable yet) of the reasons due to the unfolding revolutionary situation. At the same time, without neutralizing the institutional "paralysis" and its consequences, without forming a new, functional and effective institutional system, it is impossible to hope for a significant loss of populism's current positions.



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