

МІНІСТЕРСТВО ОСВІТИ І НАУКИ УКРАЇНИ КИЇВСЬКИЙ
НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ ЛІНГВІСТИЧНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ

Кафедра германської і фіно-угорської філології
імені професора Г. Г. Почепцова

Кваліфікаційна робота магістра з лінгвістики

на тему: «СТРАТЕГІЇ І ТАКТИКИ МОВЛЕННЄВОЇ МАНІПУЛЯЦІЇ В
АНГЛОМОВНОМУ ДІАЛОГІЧНОМУ ДИСКУРСІ»

Допущено до захисту

«___» _____ року

студента групи МЛа 60-19
факультету германської філології
освітньо-професійної програми
Сучасні філологічні студії (англійська
мова): лінгвістика та перекладознавство
за спеціальністю 035 Філологія
Пешко Богдана Володимировича

Завідувач кафедри
германської і фіно-угорської
філології

Науковий керівник:
Кандидат філологічних наук, професор
Волкова Лідія Михайлівна

Національна шкала _____
Кількість балів _____
Оцінка ЄКТС _____

(підпис)

(ПБ)

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE
KYIV NATIONAL LINGUISTIC UNIVERSITY
Professor G. G. Pocheptsov Chair of Germanic and Finno-Ugrian
Philology

Master's Qualification Paper

STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF SPEECH MANIPULATION IN
MODERN ENGLISH CONVERSATIONAL DISCOURSE

BOHDAN PESHKO

Group MLa 60-19

Department of Germanic Philology

Research Adviser

Professor

LIDIYA M. VOLKOVA

PhD (Linguistics)

Kyiv –2020

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INTRODUCTION

Language as a means of communication can be used for different purposes. Manipulation is one of these purposes. Manipulation is a wide-ranged phenomenon, present in almost every dimension of our social life: politics, art, education and interpersonal communication. The speakers resort to manipulation when they have to achieve certain pragmatic tasks, for instance, to get the information they need, to make the hearer do what the manipulator wants, to convince the hearer in something or to avoid discussing this or that topic, etc.

We may come across the term of manipulation within a variety of fields. Fairclough describes manipulation in every day life as “the strategies that people use to get others to do what they want them to do” which are “partly linguistic, involving manipulative uses of language”. The term “manipulation” is also used in a multitude of specific professional contexts. The on-line version of Encyclopaedia Britannica (accessed in 2004), for example, enlists such fields as logics, statistics, computing, mathematics, agriculture, religion, arts and medicine. In each of above-mentioned fields, manipulation, or rather manipulative strategies, are applied in a specific manner, however, they all share a common feature, namely, in all instances something is done to change the current state of affairs.

Though the notion of manipulation was investigated by many scholars such as Demyankov V. Z. (Демьянков, 1984, 1989), Dmytruk O.V. (Дмитрук, 2006), Dotsenko E.L. (Доценко, 2003), Znakov V.V. (Знаков, 2002), Klaus G. (Клаус, 1962), Kolosov S.A. (Колосов, 2004), Pyrogorova Yu.K. (Пирогова 2001), Sheynov V.P. (Шейнов, 2002), Shostromm E. (Шостромм, 2002), Carnegie D. (1982), Lushyn P. (2003) but these investigations lack a linguistic aspect of speech manipulation in the English conversational discourse. Most of them are concentrated on the notion of manipulation as a psychological phenomenon or describe manipulation as a market or political tool.

All these aspects will be taken under consideration in the course of the research. This Paper is targeted at giving a precise analysis of strategies and tactics of speech manipulation in Modern English discourse.

The object of this Diploma Paper is the phenomenon of speech manipulation in the English conversational discourse.

The subject of the Diploma Paper is strategies and tactics of speech manipulation and means of their realization in the English conversational discourse.

The main aim of the Diploma Paper is to apply a systemic analysis to the notion of speech manipulation and to its strategies and tactics in terms of pragmatic linguistics in general and discourse analysis in particular.

The aim mentioned above envisages the fulfillment of the following tasks of research:

- to analyze the works of scholars on the topic chosen;
- to update the definition of discourse and analyze approaches towards it;
- to summarize different points of view concerning the notion of manipulation;
- to characterize the conditions and reasons of manipulation;
- to define strategies and tactics of speech manipulation;
- to investigate means of linguistic expression of speech manipulation in the conversational discourse.

The following methods were used in order to fulfill the main tasks:

- analysis of the theoretical background;
- discourse analysis;
- contextual analysis;
- systematization and correlation of the information investigated;
- generalization of the conclusions drawn;

Theoretical significance of the paper lies in the fact that the results of this study may contribute to the better understanding of the important role of speech manipulation in conversational discourse.

Practical value is the opportunity to apply the data obtained to the process of study of discourse analysis and linguistic interpretation of the text.

The paper has the following structure: the introduction, two chapters, the general conclusions, the resume, the list of reference materials and the appendices.

In **the Introduction** we analyze the actuality, theoretical and practical significance of the work, its aims and methods of investigation.

The First Chapter “General characteristics of conversational discourse and speech manipulation” outlines the notion of discourse and manipulation and focuses on the conditions and reasons of speech manipulation.

The Second Chapter “Strategies and tactics of speech manipulation in the English conversational discourse” is devoted to the analysis of different communicative strategies and tactics of speech manipulation and the means of their realization.

In Conclusions we generalize the theoretical and practical results of the given research.

Illustration material used for the research is represented by fragments of conversations which contain manipulative speech acts, extracted from the British and American fiction prose.

CHAPTER ONE. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONVERSATIONAL DISCOURSE AND SPEECH MANIPULATION

1.1. Discourse as a Linguistic Phenomenon. Conversational Discourse

In the last decade discourse becomes the object of research in different fields of linguistics and is viewed in many aspects: semantic (Кронгауз 2001), structurally-grammatical (Леонтьев 2000), communicatively-functional or pragmatic (Кибрик, Плунгян 1997), sociolinguistic (Серажим 2002: 92). Such multi-aspect of interpretation of discourse notion has been reflected in the variety of its definitions.

A widespread nowadays generalized definition of discourse which is interpreted as:

- a complex communicative phenomenon (Гніздечко 2005: 13);
- realization of language, speech activity and speech (Кусько 2002: 86);
- unity of speech and text or in other words a process of language activity and its result (Кибрик, Плунгян 1997: 276);
- an integral speech phenomenon of intermediate sequence between the speech/communication, communicative behaviour, on the one hand and the text, on the other hand (Карасик 2002: 276);
- integral speech phenomenon of mental-communicative activity which is a complex of the process and result and which comprises both lingual and non-lingual aspect (Фролова 2005: 256);
- a coherent text together with extralinguistic (such as knowledge about the world, opinions, aims of an addressee), sociocultural, pragmatic, psychological and other factors (Дейк 1989: 8);
- this is speech which is considered as a purposeful social phenomenon, an action, as a component which participates in people's interaction.

Discourse is speech which is plunged into life (Алексеева 2001: 136).

Discourse is a succession of interconnected utterances which are connected by similar target task.

- discourse from the cognitive-communicative paradigm is defined as an intellectual-communicative activity, which is realized in broad sociocultural context and is the complex of the process and result (Шевченко 2005).

Such a complex and multi-faceted nature of discourse is the reason why a certain type of discourse is analyzed in linguistic literature more often than the discourse as a whole (Шейгал 2004: 15).

D. Crystal defines discourse as ‘a continuous stretch of (especially spoken) language than a sentence, often constituting a coherent unit, such as a sermon, argument, joke or narrative’ (Crystal 1992: 25). G. Cook giving more specific definition of discourse states that it is ‘the stretches of language perceived to be meaningful, unified, and purposive’ (Cook 1989: 156). Some linguists use in their works the term "interaction" instead of "discourse". They claim that there is no difference between these two notions. The first source of confusion which must be briefly considered, and which may largely explain why the notion of interaction is not universally regarded as relevant, is to be found in the definition of the very object of analysis, discourse. P. Riley distinguished a discourse from an interaction proposing three types of ambiguity (Riley 1985: 204):

1) discourse is something used as an equivalent of de Saussure's parole to refer to all the realizations of the underlying langue; in this sense, the object of analysis consists of all the utterances which speakers in fact produce, utterances which then are considered in terms of their relationship to langue;

2) discourse is also used to refer to the object of analysis which British and American linguists call "suprasentential linguistics"; from this perspective, discourse is any series of utterances which are not simply juxtaposed, but which form part of a higher structure, being linked by semantic cohesion;

3) discourse is also used in a wider sense by linguists who try to analyze the communicative functions of language, such as Widdowson (1985); here it is used

to refer to the entity consisting of the text (verbal, non-verbal messages) and of the circumstances in which the text is produced and interpreted (who the speaker is, whom he is addressing, what his communicative aim is etc.).

P. Riley states that discourse is a ‘phenomenon involving two or more participants influencing one another... Nor can the notion of interaction be limited to the fact that one of the participants, his interlocutor(s), either in the sense that he is guided by feedback or by his own construing of the situation’ (Riley 1985: 206).

In this paper we consider discourse as a remedial phenomenon, as a dynamic process which presupposes that its participants should follow particular direction which is grounded on some point of view that may be changed in the course of conversation that is promoted by language means (Fontanille 1991: 127-130).

Analyzing **conversational discourse** it is vital to distinguish between the main characteristics of the conversation, which are:

- 1) the sender and the addressee who are in speech interaction;
- 2) speech events;
- 3) the topic of the conversation (Демьянков 1992: 16-23).

According to The Speech Act Theory, the dialogue is a sequenced change of speech acts. To understand the dialogue structure one should assume that every illocutionary act creates a possibility for finite, usually rather limited set of pertinent illocutionary acts as a reaction. Conversation generates and limits spectrum of permissible counter steps for every speech act (Searle, Vanderveken 1985: 15).

J. Searle considers communication to be an interlocking, social, cognitive, linguistic enterprise which includes the participants, the aim, the uttered information and the result of the conversation (Серль 1986:160).

However, conversation is not only a pure information exchange. Interlocutors bring to the process assumptions and expectations as how the conversation develops and what contribution each of them is expected to make. The process of conversation can fulfill such functions as asking, criticizing,

flattering, warning, etc. The main goal for interlocutors is to interpret the intended speech act appropriately (Coulthard 1991: 42).

Ideal conversation presupposes effective communication which is directed at achieving a communicative agreement. Speech acts which constitute a conversation may induce an interlocutor to react on the turn by answering it or by doing some actions (in other words, they have some perlocutionary effect) (Толмасов 1986: 202). In manipulative discourse effective communication takes place when the manipulator gets what he wants or produces an effect he intends to produce and an addressee takes it for granted.

One of the basic features of conversation is that the roles of the speaker and the listener change. If more than or less than one party is talking it is 'noticeable' and participants set out to 'remedy' the situation and return to the state of one and only one speaker.

The second feature of conversation is that the speakers change turns (turn-taking). The current speaker can exercise three degrees of control over the next turn. Firstly, his/her first option is to select which participant will speak next, either by naming him/her or by alluding to him/her with a descriptive phrase. If the current speaker selects the next speaker, he/she usually also selects the type of next utterance by producing the first part of an adjacency pair, for example a question or a greeting, so that the selected speaker has to produce an appropriate answer or return greeting. The current speaker's second option is to constrain the next utterance, but not to select the next speaker. His/her third option is to select neither and leave it to one of the other participants to continue the conversation by selecting him/herself (Coulthard 1991: 59-60).

In informal conversations and informal meetings, the issue of turn-taking is often quite complex, depending on power and status. Who has the floor (the right to talk at any given moment) often varies according to rules of the social group. Once someone has the floor, it is possible to try to interrupt, but a speaker can ignore this. Silence sometimes leaves the floor open, but there are turn-holders –

ways of signaling that the speaker intends to continue after a break – like “umm...” or avoidance of final intonation pattern (Spolsky 1998: 19).

It is necessary to single out the main characteristics of conversational discourse, which are as follows:

- the construction of speech occurs not by means of logical expansion, but by means of associative usage of separate utterances which are accompanied by gestures, facial expression, etc.;
- utterances are as a rule elliptical which is a result of constant control of a sender over addressee's reaction;
- lack of time to correct an utterance and impossibility to return to its beginning which results in usage of wrong grammatical constructions and stylistic inaccuracy;
- conversational discourse is carried out in emotionally-expressive contact of interlocutors, in conditions of their mutual perception of one another which results in communicative influence on one another which may be direct or indirect.

Taking into account that discourse analysis is a relatively new discipline, it is hardly surprising that the discussions to which it has given rise include ambiguities, inconsistencies and even contradictions, which are due partly to a lack of precision in the definition of some of the basic concepts and partly to the inadequacy of the analytical tools which are used.

1.2. The notion of manipulation

Consciously or subconsciously we use various linguistic means for manipulation. People often try to make us feel, think, say or do things that are in their best interests, causing us to feel as if those things are our own top priority. We see this in politics, business, mass media and social situations (МОЛЪ 1967: 45-48).

Manipulation penetrates into the relations of people. Our closest people often try to tell us how to think. They push our buttons in order to receive the feeling of power. They are too kind when they feel they have to behave this way and are not friendly enough when they feel secure. There exist a great number of people who try to influence us. The problem arises when they push too much and use means of manipulation in order to achieve what they want (Ницше 1990: 107).

Every researcher who approaches the field of manipulation in linguistics, discourse analysis, psychology of political science is aware of the ambiguity, semantic complexity and absence of an accurate definition of the notion of manipulation. Literally, manipulating means using someone else's hands to craft an object; acting or managing crafty usage of hands (as American Heritage Dictionary states) and sometimes aiming at changing the original shape of an object. From the psychological point of view manipulating a human being means using a person, in other words making it so that this person would follow a certain pattern of behavior in order to fulfill the needs and interests of a manipulator not taking into consideration the manipulated person. The person, however, unlike the object is marked by an ability of cognition, which gives him a possibility to follow his own interests; that is why it is vital to acknowledge that the manipulator uses certain aspects of human cognition.

Some people consciously or subconsciously manipulate others. It is of primary value to provide the definition of the notion of manipulation. The word "manipulation" derives from the Latin "manipulis" which can be translated as sheave or "manipulare" which means "to operate" in positive sense – helping; and from French "manipule" which means a handful, like handful of grain. In modern literature manipulation is regarded as an art of influencing people's mind and behavior with the help of creating some kind of influence.

Manipulation is the notion that is used but is rarely seen as obvious. The scientist Sheynov introduces the following definition of the word "manipulation": "Manipulation is a certain psychological influence that is used to achieve one side profit with the help of disguisedly making others do different things (Шейнов

2002:4). However, manipulation is not only the influence but also the stimulus or persuasion into doing something (verbally or nonverbally). Manipulation arises when the manipulator pursues some aims that must be completed by the manipulated person and puts it in their mind. The main peculiarities of manipulation are the disguised intention of the manipulator and the completion of this intention by manipulated person. Manipulation is always based on the knowledge of reaction that should follow as a result of a certain stimulus and the more accurate this knowledge the more effective manipulation turns out to be (ЦеґеВ 2003: 1).

To be done successfully, manipulation should not be noticed by the manipulated person. The success of manipulation is guaranteed when the person manipulated upon believes that everything what happens with him/her is inevitable and natural. That is why the nature of manipulation lies in double influence – except sending some message openly, a manipulator also sends an “encoded” message, hoping that it would influence the addressee in a way the manipulator needs. So the communicative task of a speaker is to influence a person without him/her noticing this influence and doing what the sender wants him/her to do (Barben 2005: 1; Hoffmann 2001: 1; Wolff 1978: 3-4).

According to T.A. van Dijk, manipulation is a communicative and interactional practice, in the course of which a manipulator exercises control over other people, usually against their will or against their best interests. In everyday usage, the concept of manipulation has negative associations - manipulation is **bad** – because such a practice violates social norms. The crucial difference between persuasion and manipulation is that in the case of persuasion the interlocutors are free to believe or act as they please, depending on whether or not they accept the arguments of the persuader, whereas the in the course of manipulation recipients are typically assigned a more passive role: they are victims of manipulation. This negative consequence of manipulative discourse typically occurs when the recipients are unable to understand real intentions or to see the full consequences of the beliefs or actions advocated by the manipulator. Manipulation not only

involves power, but specifically abuse of power, that is, domination. More specifically, thus, manipulation implies the exercise of a form of illegitimate influence by means of discourse: manipulators make others believe or do things that are in the interest of the manipulator, and against the best interests of the manipulated. Manipulation is a social phenomenon - especially because it involves interaction and power abuse between groups and social actors, a cognitive phenomenon because manipulation always implies the manipulation of the minds of participants, and a discursive-semiotic phenomenon because manipulation is being exercised through text, talk and visual messages (Dijk 2005: 1).

According to N. Artunova manipulation is controlling or influencing something or someone in order to achieve a certain result carrying out a strong or cunning influence especially for your own advantage.

The usage of manipulation can have the following aims:

- getting something you want from others even if they are not ready to give it to you firstly;
- making others think that they were the first to have the idea to help you when, in fact, you have put efforts to favour this idea for your own advantage;
- by means of deception making people do something in such a way that they would not choose if they made the decision independently;
- presenting the reality in the light that you want and not as it is in reality;
- hiding behind the “mask” for people to see you in a positive light when, in fact, you behave not in the best way towards them;
- maintaining control and power over the others even if the latter think that they are the ones who maintain control and power;
- involve everyone into your own problems in order not to solve them by yourself;
- making others feel guilt and responsibility over the actions and words that are purely yours.

People are prone to self manipulation which gives a chance to be manipulated by the others (Никульшина 1988: 147).

1.3. Conditions and reasons of manipulation

Manipulation is always covert and the content of the manipulative intention can be quite different from the informative intention. Manipulation is not exactly persuasion, not precisely coercion and not merely similar to deception.

The main reason of manipulation is onerous conflict. It lies in the eternal human conflict between reliance on themselves and based on the external environment. Here the problem is confidence in yourself and trust other people. A person loses the opportunity to act on his own thoughts and become “ a thing ” in the hands of manipulator. One more reason is lack of confidence in himself. It prompts to seek support in prominent individuals. E. Fromm believes that the normal relationship between people - this is love. But many people do not: know how to love. Most people do not even know that we can not love our neighbor until we love themselves. The more we accept ourselves with all our weaknesses and disabilities, the more loved we are. A manipulator is trying to replace the love power over another person. Dzh. Bugentalem explains the third reason of manipulation. He believes that risk and uncertainty around us so great that modern person feels helpless. This passive manipulator does renounce control over the situation and makes us become an object. The fourth reason is the fear of predicament. Many examples can be found in the works of Eric Berne, William Glasser. They state that people begin to play games in order to cope with their own emotions and to avoid undesirable closeness (Berne 1972: 23-27).

Albert Ellis believes that one more reason of manipulation is the need to obtain approval of everyone we met and cross (Ellis 1995: 56).

1.4. Manipulative speech acts in conversational discourse

The notion of “speech act”, that is the, the performance of a certain act through words (requesting something, refusing, greeting someone) is fundamental in human communication. For Searle the basic unit of language is the speech act or

illocutionary act, the production of a token in the context to understand language one must understand the speaker's intention. Since language is intentional behavior, it should be treated like a form of action. Thus, Searle refers to statements as speech acts. Speech act theory was firstly presented by J. Austin in his work "*How to Do Things with Words*". The speech act is the basic unit of language used to express meaning, an utterance that expresses an intention. Normally, the speech act is a sentence, but it can be a word or phrase as long as it follows the rules necessary to accomplish the intention. When one speaks, one performs an act. Speech is not just used to designate something, it actually does something. Speech act stresses the intent of the act as a whole. According to Searle, understanding the speaker's intention is essential to capture the meaning. Without the speaker's intention, it is impossible to understand the words as a speech act.

J. Austin observed that there are many uses of language which have the linguistic appearance of fact-stating but are really quite different. **Performatives** like "*You're fired*" and "*I quit*" are not used to make mere statements. One can apologize by saying "*I apologize*," promise by saying "*I promise*," and thank someone by saying "*Thank you*." These are examples of **explicit performative** utterances, statements in form but not in fact which were contrasted by J. Austin to **constatives** which describe or report some state of affairs such that one could say its correspondence with the facts is either true or false. Performatives are utterances whereby we make explicit what we are doing. They are not directed at stating or describing things, but at changing the state of them. However, unlike the special cases J. Austin focused on, utterances can count as requests, apologies, or predictions, as the case may be, without containing a performative verb in their structure. It is perfectly possible to apologize, for example, without doing so explicitly, without using the performative phrase "*I apologize ...*" These **performatives** are called **implicit** (Austin 1962: 12-27).

Everything what we say is aimed at influencing an addressee, irrespectively whether we describe something to him or give an answer to his question, etc.

Utterances are not produced and said aimlessly, but are directed at changing the state of things by influencing an addressee, producing some effect on the listener. A link which ties a man and language is the concept of intention: a man is a doer, an intention is an instrument, and intention joins man and language into speech activity. Speech activity is one of manifestations of human life activity, and every human action is connected with some particular aim. That is why it is possible to claim that any speech act is a realization of some intention of the speaker. Intentionality of a speech act is a requirement *sine qua non* of normal communication. The convention of intentionality of a speech act regulates process of communication. It can be formulated in the following way: a speaker pursues some aim by his speech act. Intention can be considered as kind of a wish. To be more concrete, it is a wish to realize which some steps should be taken. If the intention belongs to a speaker, his acts, aimed at realization of this intention, include producing of speech or, moreover, they are reduced to this process (Почепцов 1986: 74-75).

When we use language, we characteristically do three things:

(1) we say something; (2) we indicate how we intend the listener to take what we have said; and (3) we have definite effects on the listener as a result. Usually we expect to do all three things at once. For example, if the sender tells the addressee: “The *police stopped drinking by midnight*”, the sender might intend to **say** that the police enforced a midnight curfew. In so speaking, he might intend to **communicate** to an addressee that what he has said is to be taken as a claim on his part (rather than, say, an admission). And because the sender has made this claim about the police, he might intend to **affect** an addressee in a certain way, for example, to relieve an addressee rather than anger or surprise him, perhaps because the sender knows that an addressee is worrying about how late his children were out.

Although we communicate in many different modes, linguistic communication occurs only in those cases in which we **intend** in using language to convey certain attitudes to our hearer (for example, that we want our utterance to

have the force of a request) and the hearer **recognizes** what these attitudes are, based upon what we have said. Such communication is based on but certainly not exhausted by what we say when we speak. On the other hand, such communication does not extend to how we have affected the hearer because we have said something and have communicated our intended force (attitude). Any effects beyond the successful recognition of the speaker's intentions, such as convincing, annoying, or confusing the hearer, are not part of communication but the result of communication, or perhaps the result of failure to communicate (Richards, Schmidt 1990: 30).

In this context it is necessary to consider the notions of **locutionary**, **illocutionary** and **perlocutionary** acts.

J. Austin identifies three distinct levels of action beyond the act of utterance itself. He distinguishes **the act of saying** something, what one does **in saying it**, and what one does **by saying it**, and dubs these the **locutionary**, the **illocutionary**, and the **perlocutionary** act, respectively. The locutionary act is an act of the sentence uttering. Conventionally associated with each illocutionary act is the force of the utterance which can be expressed as a performative such as “promise” or “warn”. The perlocutionary act can be described in terms of the effect which the illocutionary act, on the particular occasion of use, has on the hearer (Гак 1982: 15; Иванова та ін. 1981: 271; Правикова 1989: 73-75; Brown, Yule 1996: 232; Volkova 2007: 94-95; Widdowson 1996: 61-63; Yule 1996: 48-49). Let us consider the following example. A bartender utters the words: *"The bar will be closed in five minutes"*. In saying this, the bartender is performing the locutionary act – he produces a meaningful linguistic expression. He also performs the illocutionary act (the intention of the speaker in making the utterance) of informing the patrons of the bar's imminent closing and perhaps also the act of urging them to order a last drink. Whereas the upshot of these illocutionary acts is understanding on the part of the audience, perlocutionary acts are performed with the intention of producing a further effect. The bartender intends to be performing the perlocutionary acts of causing the patrons to believe that the bar is about to close

and of getting them to order one last drink. He is performing all these speech acts, at all three levels, just by uttering certain words (Austin 1962: 68-122).

It is worth mentioning that this utterance can be classified as **constative** according to J. Austin's classification because it does not correspond to all the characteristic syntactic markers of a **performative** utterance which are as follows:

1. The subject is in the first person (I or we);
2. The verb is in the simple present tense (state, ask, pardon, etc.).
3. The indirect object, if one is present, is you.
4. It is possible to insert an adverb hereby.
5. The sentence is not negative.

However, John Austin's theory of speech acts was generalized to cover all utterances by his student, J.R. Searle. He proved that people perform speech acts every time they speak. For example, asking "*What's the time?*" the speech act of making a request is performed. The answer may be as follows: "*It is now ten o'clock*" which is not a **constative**, but a **performative**, because it may be paraphrased as: "*I hereby pronounce that it is ten o'clock in the morning*" (Searle 1969: 69). Moreover, as it has already been mentioned, every utterance is aimed at influencing an addressee, and a speaker has some pragmatic intention while producing an utterance. Hence, we would disagree with separating all utterances into constatives and performatives. Rather, they can be separated into **implicit** and **explicit performatives**.

The level of locutionary acts, acts of saying something, is essential to characterize such common situations as these: where the speaker says one thing but, not speaking literally, means (in the sense of trying to convey) something else instead and where the speaker means what he says and indirectly means something else as well. Moreover, the same sentence can be used to perform illocutionary acts of various types or with various contents. Just as in shaking hands we can, depending on the circumstances, do any one of several different things (introduce ourselves, greet each other, seal a deal, congratulate, or bid farewell), so we can use a sentence with a given locutionary content in a variety of ways. For example,

we could utter 'I will call a lawyer' to make a promise or a warning, or just a prediction. J. Austin defines a locutionary act as the act of using words, "as belonging to a certain vocabulary...and as conforming to a certain grammar,...with a certain more or less definite sense and reference" (Austin 1962: 92-3).

The distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is essential because utterances are generally more than just acts of communication. They have two levels of success: considered merely as an illocutionary act, a request (for example) succeeds if the audience recognizes the speaker's desire that they do a certain thing, but as a perlocutionary act it succeeds only if they actually do it.

Realization of an illocutionary act may be estimated from its **efficiency**. **Efficiency** of an illocutionary act is estimated by aims which an illocutor could achieve by performing an illocutionary act. All illocutionary acts have a certain influence which may be realized effectively or non-effectively. For example, a person who performs an illocutionary act of questioning aims at influencing an addressee in such a way that he answers the question given. If he succeeds in it, his illocutionary act will be considered to be an effective one.

Quantity of illocutionary acts performed by a speaker equals to quantity of illocutionary forces of an utterance (the illocutionary force is the meaning the speaker intended to convey in performing the illocutionary act). That is why it is possible to distinguish primary illocutionary acts and forces, secondary illocutionary acts and forces, etc. Utterances containing only one illocutionary force can be called **simple performatives**, unlike utterances containing two or more illocutionary forces which are called **complex performatives**.

Complex performatives, like simple ones, may be explicit and implicit. Explicit are those complex performatives which contain an illocutionary verb which corresponds to an illocutionary act $n+1$ (any illocutionary act except primary one).

Let us consider following examples:

Let me ask, how old are you?

Let me note, that this is disgraceful.

Primary illocutionary forces which are determined by their common structural-semantic characteristics are identical. These are illocutionary forces of prompting. Their secondary illocutionary forces which develop on the basis of primary illocutionary forces are different: the first expression has illocutionary force of a question, the second one – that of remark.

Implicit are those performatives which do not constitute the description of an illocutionary act $n+1$. For example, an utterance “*I have a headache*” can be considered as an implicit complex performative, if it is a prompt to turn off the TV.

Units belonging to supersyntactical level may also have more than one illocutionary force. For example, advertisement texts as usual do not contain any explicit prompts to buy goods, they just describe their merits, but by doing that they implicitly urge to buy them. These texts have two illocutionary forces, the first one being that of description and the second one - that of prompting (Почепцов 1986: 24-27).

Considering all stated above, we would account any utterance as an **explicit** or **implicit** (depending on presence or absence of a performative verb) **performative speech act**, aimed at influencing an addressee and changing the state of affairs.

One of the main tasks of pragmalinguistics is the study of the influencing function of speech units and their pragmatic potential in the aspect of regulating influence on human psychics and behavior with an aim of realization of effective communication (Киселева 1978: 4-5).

Verbal influence in a broad sense is an influence on the individual and/or collective mind and behavior, conducted by different speech means. Verbal influence in a narrow sense is the usage of peculiarities of arrangement and functioning of the language with an aim to construct messages having increased ability of influencing mind and behavior of an addressee. In the course of verbal influence, activity of one person is regulated by another person by means of speech. Any speech act is a form of influencing an addressee by sending the latter some information, necessary to change his mode of operation. So, verbal influence

is equal to the process of verbal interaction considered in an aspect of its purposefulness. In the course of any act of communication the communicants follow some non-verbal aims which result in influencing the activity of the addressee. In fact, it is impossible to say something “in a neutral way”, because even small talk presupposes “realization of power”, or influence on the perception of world by other people (Стернин 2006: 1-2).

The peculiarity of verbal influence consists in its informational, but not in the semantic character. The sender influences the addressee not because of the intensity of the process of speech activity, but because of skilful combination of verbal means, taking into account extralingual factors.

Manipulation of linguistic form and structure implies that linguistic material beginning with the smallest or most discrete segment or form and leading to quite large linguistic entities will be fashioned to undergo some change, transformation, mutilation, mutation that is relatively unexpected on the part of the viewer/reader. This is done clearly with the purpose of providing another means of directing the viewer/reader's attention squarely onto what is the subject and substance of the particular discourse in which the manipulation occurs.

One must view the manipulation of linguistic entities as a type of foregrounding. Foregrounding is a linguistic process in which some elements, such as words, phrases, sentences, stresses, intonations, or the like are given prominence or made more meaningfully significant by the language-user (Pelz 1983: 17).

The two notions: indirect speech act and manipulation are not identical. The main difference lies in the fact that in indirect speech act the hearer decodes speaker's true intentions. In manipulative speech act the speaker hides his true intentions and motives in order to make the hearer do what the speaker wants.

1.5. Modern approaches to the phenomenon of manipulation in conversational discourse

Manipulation is characteristic of our social environment, the extraordinary levels of manipulations affect people more than one would imagine. There is no doubt that when people manipulate, whatever the motive, they are deprived of the right to decide for themselves, and likewise of what they want to do and who they want to become. A person's mind is the most valuable property. And yet people surrender to it so easily. We let other people influence us. We allow them to guide our actions and our thoughts. Therefore, manipulation is often viewed as undesirable and objectionable from the standpoint of morality.

The object of manipulation is indeed forcing others to do what they usually would have refused to do. Every day people try to influence us so that we behaved and thought as right from their point of view. There are two kinds of manipulations.

The first refers to manipulation when a person has complete choice, but another person affects the structure of their beliefs so that the person makes suboptimal choices. The second type of manipulation is that someone unfairly limits the choices and the possibility to choose. Apparently, these two kinds of manipulation are completely different. The first type is not so serious, because, after research a person can overcome this manipulation. The second type leads to worry, because the choice is very limited.

Thus we have two basic approaches to the phenomenon of manipulation:

1) manipulation as a negative phenomenon, because it practices a hidden control over another person, which in turn leads to a unilateral advantage.

To manipulate effectively it is extremely important to create confusion as a strange concept or idea to put the listener in the intentionally hopeless situation. The problem of creating such a situation and its pseudo solution, in terms of L. de Saussure (trouble and resolution), is the central mechanism of the manipulation. Manipulator is a problem in the mind of the recipient, and then gives him the only

possible solution, of course, in their favor. In addition, the intention of manipulation may remain unnoticed if the addressee firmly believes in kindness or super competence of the speaker. For example,

(1) 'Christ, it's too dangerous. I don't need to get involved in anything like this, 'he argued. 'I can get all the money I need.'

'How?' Eve asked contemptuously. 'By laying a lot of fat women with blue hair? Is that how you want to spend the rest of your life? What happens when you put on a little weight and start to get a few wrinkles around your eyes? No, George, you'll never have another opportunity like this. If you listen to me, you and I can own one of the largest conglomerates in the world. You hear me? Own it. '

'How do you know this plan will work?'

'Because I'm the greatest living expert on my grandmother and my sister. Believe me, it will work. ' (..)

She said to him now, 'Make up your mind. Are you in or out? '

He studied her for a long time. 'I'm in.

(Sheldon S., Master of the Game 514-515)

Eva offers George to pay court and later to marry her sister, the successor to the huge property and one of the largest U.S. firms. It creates in his mind the problem: it depicts the future life, which only depends on wealth of rich women, old age, which is not far off. And while he looks for relevant solutions, she invites him to his pre-planned solution. Besides, she is really competent in all that is related to the sisters, and George, realizing this, agrees.

2) manipulation as a positive phenomenon, because it does not include explicit persuasion of the person practicing a more moderate way convinced someone of something. In addition it can be used to achieve positive goals for bringing a man, who is being manipulated on (this often happen in communication parents - the children and teacher - student), or to respond to persuasion explicitly, i.e. as a means to counter-manipulation.

Consider the following example of counter-manipulation:

(2) - I think I like you very much. You must give me time to get used to you.

- *Then it's yes? He interrupted.*

- *I suppose so.*

(W. Somerset Maugham, The Painted Veil, 34-35).

This example illustrates the positive side manipulation. Walter by manipulation of positive response ("then it is yes"?) has received an honest and objective feedback - she agreed to marry him.

There are some other classifications of manipulation. The most common among them is the distinction of verbal and non-verbal manipulation. In this paper we will concentrate only on the concept of verbal manipulation, i.e. manipulation by means of speech devices used by the manipulator. Also, group (mass) manipulation and individual manipulation are distinguished. An example of mass manipulation is manipulation in advertising or manipulative speech of a politician in election campaign. However, in this paper we will discuss only individual manipulation in conversational discourse.

Conclusions to Chapter One

Any speech act is a form of influencing an addressee by sending the latter some information, necessary to change his mode of operation. So, verbal influence is equal to the process of verbal interaction considered in an aspect of its purposefulness. Here the notion of manipulation, which is a certain psychological influence that is used to achieve one side profit with the help of disguisedly making others do different things, is of vital importance. The main peculiarities of manipulation are the disguised intention of the manipulator and the completion of this intention by manipulated person. It is possible to account any utterance as an **explicit** or **implicit** (depending on presence or absence of a performative verb) **performative speech act**, aimed at influencing an addressee and changing the state of affairs.

Depending on the profit gained by means of manipulation and the kind of influence upon a person which it exercises, manipulation can be of two kinds: positive and negative. Negative manipulation exercises hidden control of a person which results in one-side profit and is conducted against best interests of a manipulated person. Positive manipulation is used to achieve positive aims and to bring profit to the manipulated person (this often happens in parent-children and teacher-student communication).

Manipulation in conversational discourse presupposes the presence of some implicit information which is implied both by the manipulator and by the manipulated. Manipulators try to achieve their goals by encoding certain implicit information into their utterances; and those who are manipulated, even without understanding it, try to resist it by means of implicit information encoded into their messages as well.

CHAPTER TWO. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF SPEECH MANIPULATION IN THE ENGLISH CONVERSATIONAL DISCOURSE

2.1. Correlation of strategies and tactics in the English conversational discourse

In the process of communicative interaction the realization of the general communicative intention of the speaker and the listener predetermines the use of definite communicative strategies. Speakers will find they always need to take a strategic approach to be a master of communication. Strategy is the foundation on which any effective communication depends. It is necessary to be able to analyze an audience in every formal situation and develop a communication strategy that facilitates accomplishing their communication objectives. A good communication strategy allows to exercise better control over the work and to frame the issues in a perspective other than research. A communication strategy removes doubt, emphasizes planning, and involves all the project participants in raising the visibility of the research.

Any communication presupposes the employment of a set of speech strategies and tactics by the speaker. It means that there is a particular set of linguistic means which helps the speaker to realize the aim pursued. The term strategy is often used in linguistic literature (ван Дейк, 1989; Демьянков, 2005; Игнатенко, 2005; Ярхо, 2004).

A strategy, a word of military origin, refers to a plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal. Two terms “strategy” and “tactic” are often mixed up. “Taktike” refers to an army organization. Strategy is a speech act of planning or organizing something. Tactic is connected only with the action. Strategies consist of different tactics and many participants who try to achieve their aim.

A strategy can also be seen as a cognitive representation of the means of reaching a goal or of a style for doing so in the most effective way. A strategy involves human action: goal-oriented, intentional, conscious, and controlled

behaviour that establishes or prevents changes in the world and its states of affairs' If the results in the final state fit the intentions of the agent, the action is weakly successful, but strongly so if the action brings about some goal or far-reaching purpose (Дейк 1989: 272).

Strategic discourse refers to the study of communications, critical discourse analysis, and the use of strategies to create communicative meaning. Discourse forming strategy allows to apply the rules of effective speech realization at that time when the speaker follows the communicative rules of society (ДЕМЬЯНКОВ 1990 :335)

There are following constituent elements of strategy

- 1) aim- choice and motive transformation into aim-motive;
- 2) organization of a strategy , assessment of situation;
- 3) verbalization (Сухих 1986: 72-73).

Communicative strategy can be defined as an optimal realization of the speaker's intentions for reaching a definite aim of communication, e.i. control and choice of communicative actions and their flexible variations in a definite speech situation.

Strategy of discourse construction is considered to be a creative realization by the communicant of the plan of construction of their speech behaviour which aims at achieving common verbal/non-verbal task. Strategy is characterized by the attributes of dynamism, flexibility and variability because communication units are in the process of construction.

Communicative strategy includes:

- the choice of global communicative intention;
- the selection of components of the sentence semantics and extralingual consituation, which correspond to modified communicative meanings;
- the determination of succession of communicative components;
- the choice of communicative form (a dialogue, a written text, a weather forecast, current events); style (formal, informal) and genre (poetry, a joke, a slogan, an advertisement).

The constituents of a definite communicative strategy may also contain argumentation, motivation, evaluation, emotional expression, thinking aloud, justification and so on.

The realization of strategies in communication greatly depends on the level of acquaintance of interlocutors, social, psychological, cognitive and other factors.

There is no universal typology of communicative strategies. T. van Dijk distinguishes the following strategies depending upon the type of the discourse:

- 1) cognitive;
- 2) contextual;
- 3) communicative;
- 4) semantic;
- 5) syntactic;
- 6) textual and others.

He considers that it is the communicative strategies that determine the "style" of communicative interaction and they are the most relevant means of realization of the communicative intention (Dijk van 1998).

Some linguists distinguish two types of communicative strategies: **communicative proper** and **semantic**. Communicative proper strategies are rules and succession of communicative actions the speaker sticks to, while semantic strategies include semantic planning of the intention taking into account linguistic means within the limits of each communicative action.

Examining the means that are used in order to verbalize emotions the manifestation of the prototypical situations of their appearance (Шаховский 1987) and intentions of the speaker play an important role. **Intention** of the speaker is one of the key notions of pragmatics (Green 1989). It is realized through the actions of the communicants that are performed by them in definite speech situations that is why context has to be taken into consideration defining the intention of the speaker.

Strategy of speech communication is a complex of verbal activities which are directed at the achievement of a particular communicative goal, and tactic of

speech communication is a particular line of behaviour on a particular stage of communicative interaction which is directed at achieving of desired effect or at preventing an undesired one. **Tactic** also describes concrete verbal actions which are aimed at influencing a particular stage of communication. Orientation of different tactics to achieving a concrete aim forms up a strategy and, thus, it is possible to state that strategies and tactics are interconnected, with the former being dependent to a great extent to the latter. Communicative strategies are flexible and predetermine the use of definite communicative tactics.

A tactic of discourse is the flexible and dynamic appliance of speaker's verbal capacity to organize speech according to the plan of speech activity. A strategy is a complex of speech activity directed to achieve a certain communicative aim, a tactic of communication is considered to be a certain way of behaviour directed to succeed. A tactic outlines verbal actions directed to influence during a certain stage of communication. Different aim-oriented tactics form strategy. In the case when one tactic is not effective, it is possible to choose new one to prevent undesirable consequences. Otherwise, the speaker can improve his further actions applying new tactics.

Communicative tactics is a definite way of conduct on a certain stage of communicative interaction, directed towards reaching the desirable effect or preventing the undesirable effect; means which enable to reach the communicative aim.

In different speech situations different tactics are used: some of them are more important in the informal type of communication, others - in the official one. In linguistics there doesn't exist a universal typology of communicative tactics. The right choice of the communicative tactics to a great extent depends upon the communicative experience.

Communicative experience is a combination of knowledge about appropriate and inappropriate communicative tactics, which contribute to or prevent the realization of the corresponding communicative strategies.

Tactic of discourse production is speaker's flexible dynamic usage of their verbal abilities of construction of speech course according to their plan of speech activities aimed at achieving the task of communication which is restricted by the frames of verbal interaction. Hence, the connection between global strategic aim and verbal aim consists of smaller tactical aims which are solved within the limits of initiating and reciprocal speech acts.

The notion of technique is:

- the systematic procedure by which a complex or scientific task is accomplished;
- a practical method, skill, or art applied to a particular task;
- the manner and ability with which an artist, writer, dancer, athlete, or the like employs the technical skills of a particular art or field of endeavor;
- the body of specialized procedures and methods used in any specific field, especially in an area of applied science.
- ability to apply procedures or methods so as to effect a desired result (5)

The word technique is derived from Fr. "technique" which means a formal practical detail in an artistic expression. Every discipline uses its own technique and it is of significant importance to each branch. In terms of discourse and manipulation technique is considered to be a method or a manner of manipulation; ability of the speaker to use structure, language and ideas to express his point of view, suggestion in the way that his message will be understandable for other people; approaches and processes which are applied to manipulate the hearer; peculiar way of performing the task.

Taking everything into consideration it is possible to conclude that strategy of speech behaviour corresponds to global pragmatic aim set by the speaker. A tactic concerns language means used to achieve strategic pragmatic aim. Tactics are comparatively independent and can be used in complex or in isolation.

Communicative strategies and tactics find their realization with the help of linguistic means in speech acts which form discourses (texts) as categories of communication.

The specific intention of the speaker defines the corresponding technique of the conduct of speech – informative, which shapes the type of information that has to be told, the way of presenting this information and the appropriate linguistic means that convey the pragmatic aim of the speaker to achieve the intended emotional impact on the hearer. It is important to take into consideration the factor of the setting or degree of formality of the situation, where we differentiate between formal and informal discourse.

The analysis of dynamic pragmatic conversations is reflected in the study of pragmatic uncertainty and speech strategies. Pragmatic uncertainty means that the speaker uses uncertain, indistinct and indirect language to perform illocutionary acts.

Both sides of interaction are able to apply pragmatic uncertainty in order to achieve their aims and intentions. Both sides try to restrain interlocutor from applying pragmatic uncertainty correspondingly they have to elaborate certain speech strategies (Lushyn 2003: 17-230).

Speech strategies are divided into two types. They are strategies at the discourse level and strategies at the level of the text. The first one includes speaker – oriented metapragmatic comments (S-MPCS) and addressee – oriented metapragmatic comments (A-MPCS). The second one is formed by three elements: limitation of the text length, determination of the theme and idea of the conversation, repetition of the already known facts as the basis for the further communication.

T. van Dijk outlines several types of strategies. Each set of strategies is related to a certain overall goal of the speaker/ listener. Cognitive strategies are a problem -solving strategies that enable humans to act on the basis of incomplete, limited information. Cultural strategies enable speakers and listeners to utilize relevant cultural information in interpreting utterances. Social strategies reflect

information about a group's social structures, values, and conventions. Interactional strategies reflect the use of specific interactional strategies in a given context and inferences about the other interactant's beliefs and values. Pragmatic strategies refer to speech acts; that is, they reflect what social action is being accomplished by specific utterances in a given context. Semantic strategies enable individuals to infer global meaning while schematic strategies allow us to anticipate what is forthcoming in a discourse. Stylistic and rhetorical strategies enable interactants to assess discourse effectiveness (Дейк 1989: 278).

As can be readily seen, all these strategies operate at different levels of discourse and at different levels of social structure. Taken together, these strategies enable participants to appropriately adapt their communication to different participants and in different settings.

Our distribution of strategies of manipulative conversational discourse exists at the pragmatic level. The strategies of these levels are realized by semantic, pragmatic, rhetoric "steps" and by their tactics. All answers of the manipulated person influence the choice of manipulative tactics or even the whole strategy.

Manipulation is supposed to be a general super strategy of the speaker that includes other interconnected strategies. General super strategy of manipulation presupposes egocentric strategy because it is beneficial only for one interlocutor.

Manipulators adhere to certain strategies and tactics that help them achieve their communicative goals efficiently. Let's consider the following examples:

(3) - *All right. How was our second day of class?*

- *Good.*

- *You 're making progress? Enmanno told me you have an ear for the language*

(John Grisham. The Broker, p. 101).

In this extract the implicit compliment is used in order to achieve a desirable aim.

A person can also use a vague formulation of responses not to answer the question directly.

(4) - *Are you married, Ermanno ?*

- *Not I! There are too many beautiful fish in the sea for me to have singled just one out.*

(John Grisham. The Broker, p. 145).

Ermanno resorts to the usage of figurative speech in order to explain why he is still not married and to hide that he is a ladies man and give a **positive self-representation**.

If the speaker wants to hide their true intentions, he may resort to the tactics of **the strategy of masking his real intentions**, namely the hint, for cooperation between the use of indirect speech acts, indirect rendering content expressions. Consider the following example:

(5)- *Did nothing happen from that time to the time when the whole house knew that the Diamond was lost?*

- *Nothing.*

- *Are you sure of that? Might you not have been asleep a part of the time?*

(Wilkie Collins. The Moonstone, p.46).

In this example, one of the interlocutors deliberately incorrectly perceives the content of expression, to get more information about the situation.

(6) *"Don't you think those chairs look rather inviting?"*

(W. Somerset Maugham, The Painted Veil, p. 32).

In this example, the desire to understand the character to get what she says is right, but with a hint.

When the speaker wants to avoid disclosing some information that might damage their self-esteem or manipulation purposes, they resorted to **a strategy of evasion**.

(7) - *Does he play as well as you?*

- *I have no illusions. [...]*

- *Don't you like him?*

- *He doesn't very much interest me*

(W. Somerset Maugham, *The Painted Veil*, p.42).

In the example the speaker does not want to answer questions relating to a particular man, and to avoid further inquiries, using tactics of prevention to the source continued to question him, saying: "He is very interested in me."

(8) - *If you went back to town, then I really would owe you one.*

- [...] *Just walk away?*

(Jane Austen. *Pride and Prejudice*, p. 252).

The first statement is a statement, transformed into a directive. Talking does not say directly: "Please, come back to town," but her desire masked by indirect speech act.

(9) *"And what did you do?"*


Steward looked at them anxiously. "Were you nervous, worried?"

(O. Mandino. *The Greatest Miracle in the World*, p. 37).

The second statement does not answer the question by asking questions. Steward avoids answers and disclosure of classified information. The second question makes it possible to divert the interlocutor, in order to avoid the response.

The analysis of illustrative material and theoretical sources allows us to identify three main strategies in accordance with which the manipulator can operate to achieve their pragmatic goals - manipulating partner:

- 1) the strategy of positive self-representation;
- 2) the strategy of masking real intentions of the speaker;
- 3) the strategy of evasion.



General super strategy of manipulation includes strategies of positive self-representation because the manipulator aims at achieving and saving his positive self-perception to manipulate his interlocutor. The strategy of masking real intentions and the strategy of evasion are used when the speaker faces the situation when it is necessary to mask his real intentions and avoid answering the question. These three strategies can also exist independently.

The opportunities of semantic, pragmatic, stylistic choice are restricted to the frameworks of these strategies. They characterize the speech and allow to achieve pragmatic aims more effectively.

2.2. Manipulative strategies in the English conversational discourse

Strategy of positive self-presentation is directed at realization of those tactics which would influence the creation of positive image of the speaker, so that no any negative conclusions will be drawn from what was said by the speaker concerning his personal or social model in the communicative-context model of the hearer (Дейк 1989: 277).

If the speaker created an image of a positive person, it is easier for him/her to manipulate the hearer. Everything what is said by him/her will be considered as acceptable and no negative inferences will be drawn from his/her utterances. This strategy is realized within the frames of more global strategy of politeness. However, the strategy of positive self-presentation does not only presuppose being polite, but doing it with an aim of manipulating the partner.

It is worth mentioning that this strategy does not equal the strategy of “positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, which is very typical in biased account of the facts in favor of one’s own interests, while blaming negative situations and events on opponents or on the others”, as it puts T. van Dijk (Dijk 2005: 15) since this strategy is widely used in prejudiced, political and PR discourse which is not the object of our investigation.

Speech tactics within the frames of this strategy are various. They may be used in connection or separately, depending on reaction of the person manipulated upon. Let us consider main tactics of positive self-presentation strategy and verbal means of their expression.

Complimenting in the most apparent way explicates politeness in relations between the communicants and creates a positive image of the speaker due to their ability to ease social relations (Spolsky 1998: 20). Within this tactic the pragmatic fact of verbal interaction of the communicants in the course of which the speaker, as a rule, tries to direct relevant intellectual processes of the hearer to lead him/her to the condition needed is obvious. This tactic may also block undesired conclusions and reactions of the hearer.

Semantics of the word “compliment” includes the meaning of influence upon the addressee. Compliment presupposes social and emotional influence on the interlocutor and may be considered as an emotionally adjusting pragmatic tactic of the communicant within the frames of the communicative strategy of self-presentation. Compliments may also perform a phatic function of improving of the interlocutor’s mood and maintaining with him solidary relations and the function of establishment of the communicative contact with the interlocutor (ДВИНЯНОВА,

Морозова 2002: 118-119; Морозова 2001: 1). All this contributes to positive self-presentation of a speaker creates his/her positive image and helps to perform a manipulative act.

Explicit compliments are those that contain a semantically positive adjective, a verb, or an adverb. They correspond to direct speech acts. Implicit compliments are those in which the value judgment is presupposed and/or implicated by Gricean maxims. They may involve reference to something that a person has done and that he/she is proud of or comparing a person to someone that the speaker thinks the other person might admire. They correspond to indirect speech acts (Boyle 2000: 28, 35).

Let us consider the following examples.

Two women get acquainted. They are supposed to work together and one of them is going to exercise some influence against the other one:

(10) – *“Lindsay’s been telling me all about you”, Cindy said over the din.*

– *“Most of it’s true, unless she’s been saying I’m some kind of crackerjack forensic pathologist”, Claire said grinning.*

– *“Actually, all she’s been saying is that you’re a real good friend”.*

(Patterson. 1st to Die, 134 -135.)

This example represents usage of an explicit compliment and is aimed at positive self-presentation as a kind and sincere person. It also contributes to the change of relationship between the interlocutors towards the reduction of distance.

Specifications, explanations and corrections are another tactics which are realized within the framework of the strategy of positive self-presentation aimed at manipulating peoples’ opinions and actions. They are targeted at preventing any negative and unwanted inferences drawn by the hearer from the speaker’s utterances (Дейк 1989: 282).

(11) *“Now, Mrs. Ruffin, I’ve read about you, and you seem to be a very religious woman. Is this correct?”*

“I do love the Lord, yes sir,” she answered, as clear as always.

“Are you hesitant to sit in judgment of another human?”

“I am, yes sir.”

“Do you want to be excused?”

“No sir. It’s my duty as a citizen to be here, same as all these other folks.”

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 123)

This conversation takes place in the court. The judge wanted to excuse the juror, who was actually an Afro-American, from performing her civil duty. However, she wanted to establish justice because she was sure that the charged was guilty. So she refused, but in order to sound polite she had to resort to the tactic of explanation.

The desire to create a positive image of oneself makes people avoid being too explicit in conversations. They also need to prevent negative inferences which may be drawn from this or that utterance. Therefore, they look for “protecting” means to make the real meaning of an utterance sound “softer”. That is why the speakers resort to **the tactic of modification of the illocutionary force of an utterance** (ДМИТРУК 2006: 3).

Modification of illocutionary force of an utterance may be done in two ways. It may be either increasing of illocutionary force of the utterance or its decreasing. The marker of politeness and positive self-presentation is the tactic of mitigation of the illocutionary force of an utterance (Алексеева 2001: 142; Ярхо 2004: 2).

People “protect” themselves with the help of different devices, such as positive transformations (or transformation of a negative proposition into a positive one which may be done with the help of impersonalization, when the doer of the action is not referred to, vague or figurative language, euphemisms) (Дейк 1989: 282), hedges, function words.

Let us consider the following example.

(12) – *How often does a dead cat happen, Doctor?*

– It’s hard to say. Once a month, maybe only every six month.

(McCullough. On, Off, 37).

This conversation takes place in a laboratory where the experiments on animals take place. First interlocutor resorts to impersonalization not to sound too direct and to preserve his positive image. Impersonalization has the function of mitigating individual's responsibility for his/her action (Баханов 2001: 222).

According to J. Channell, an expression or word is vague if:

- a. it can be contrasted with another word or expression which appears to render the same proposition;
- b. it is 'purposely and unabashedly vague';
- c. its meaning arises from the 'intrinsic uncertainty' (Channell 1994: 20).

J. Channell also considers that vagueness is present in a great deal of language use. She claims that by means of vague language the speaker avoids being too direct and giving information (Channell 1994: 12-13). The latter case will be considered in paragraph 2.2.3. of the given Master's Thesis. The speakers use of vague language in order to avoid being too direct contributes to the general politeness principle and to the strategy of positive self-presentation. This may be proved by the following examples:

(13) *"I'm getting worse", I said.*

"To be frank", the doctor acknowledged, "It's not the trend we were hoping for".

(Patterson. 1st to Die, 248).

The doctor resorts to vague language in order not to sound too direct, implying that the health condition of his patient has really worsened.

(14) – *Are you married, Doctor?*

– *Not I! There are too many beautiful fish in the sea for me to have singled just one out (McCullough. On, Off, 49).*

In this example the Doctor resorts to figurative language to explain why he is not married and not to say that he is a ladies' man directly to save positive image of himself.

(15) *"What about any relationships that might've ended badly? Someone, who out of jealousy or obsession might've wanted to do her harm?"*

*“Recklessness always seemed like a basis for Kathy’s relationships”,
Hillary said with an edge.*

(Patterson. 1st to Die, 214).

In this dialogue, the inspector asks the family of the killed woman about her surrounding. He uses euphemisms and figurative language not to be too explicit and not to offend them. In this way he creates positive self-image of a delicate person and gets information he needs.

(16) *“If you are elected prime minister, will you apologize to the Chinese people for atrocities committed during the war, such as the rape of Nanking?”*

The speaker may also modify the illocutionary force of his statement with the help of special remarks – **hedges** which correlate with the concept of face and politeness strategies (Ярхо 2004: 1, 8). When the speaker intends to avoid responsibility, to reduce or eliminate risk, to offset possible losses, he/she modifies his utterance so as to sound non-committal, ambiguous, allowing for contingencies. By making the statement ambiguous and, thus, cautious, the speaker takes contemporary measures against possible loss. He/she leaves open a way of retreat or escape. And the remarks which the speaker resorts to in order to make his/her statement non-committal, cautious and ambiguous are defines as hedges. To the list of hedges belong those text components which are characterized by the propensity to spare commitment (Channell 1994: 218; Knyazeva 1999: 21).

We consider the **modals** as hedges that are most often used with the purpose to create a positive self-image. To this group belong modal auxiliary verbs (may, might, could, can), modal lexical verbs (verbs of thought (think, believe, suspect, assume, doubt, suppose, expect, guess, reckon, wonder, imagine, know, see, feel, find, remember, recall), verbs of seeming/appearing (seem, appear, sound), the verb “try” (Future Indefinite)), modal sentence adverbs (truth adverbs, such as perhaps, maybe, possibly, probably, apparently, evidently, admittedly, presumably, personally), modal adjectives (unlikely, possible, likely, probable), and modal phrases (such as to my mind, in my opinion, to my way of thinking, on the

average, on the whole, etc.) (Hatch 1992: 127; Knyazeva 1999: 21-22, Parret 1976: 50-56).

The following examples illustrate the use of hedging agents which are used as verbal devices to “protect” the speaker and to create ambiguity.

(17) *'He was more of a good listener, fascinated by Rosslyn.'*

Clarke thought she'd misheard. 'Rosalind?'

'Rosslyn. The chapel.'

'What about it?'

*Sithing leaned forward. 'My whole life's devoted to the place. You **may** have heard of the Knights of Rosslyn?'*

(Rankin. Set in Darkness, 183).

The addressee has found that he's talking about something not familiar to a hearer, a woman whom he liked. So he decided to correct the awkward situation by using a question (which actually is a gap-filler) that he made sound more polite and pleasant by hedging it with a modal auxiliary verb “may”.

(18) *Mr. Wilbanks held up the paper and pointed to the front page. "I refer to the photograph of my client," he said. "Who took this photograph?"*

"Mr. Wiley Meek, our photographer."

"And who made the decision to put it on the front page?"

"I did."

"And the size? Who determined that?"

"I did."

*"Did it occur to you that this **might** be considered sensational?"*

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 90-91).

The journalist has used the photo of the accused in a murder and his lawyer has thought that it was unfair. The hedge (modal auxiliary verb) “might” softens the statement and makes it sound not too direct.

(19) *"So it's **possible** to come and go?"*

"For you, Mr. Traynor, yes. We'll make an exception."

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 99).

In this example, the speaker hedges his question by two linguistic means. First of all, he impersonalizes his question, which actually means “May I come and go?” He also hedges it by a modal adjective “possible” to make it sound more polite, helping the speaker to save his face.

Apart from the modals, exists a group of words which are defined as **intensifiers**. They are divided into **emphasizers**, **amplifiers** and **downtoners**. **Emphasizers** and **amplifiers** are used as hedges when they are preceded by the negator “not”: not really, not always, not altogether, not totally, not completely, not entirely, not very (much), not so, not quite. Mostly used for the purpose of hedging **downtoners**. They are divided into four types: compromisers (kind of/sort of, quite, rather, more or less, pretty, fairly), diminishers (partly, partially, slightly, somewhat, in part, to some extent, a little), minimizers (a bit, barely, hardly, scarcely, little) and approximators (almost, nearly) (КНЯЗЕВА 1999: 22; Quirk et al 1982: 195).

The speakers often try to avoid giving a direct answer and confirming that they do not know something. The pattern “negation+really” mitigates the categoriality of a statement and helps the speaker to avoid giving a direct answer and makes the whole expression sound more vague. It is worth mentioning that the particle “really” in this function is always placed after the negation, because the opposite position will lead to the increasing of the illocutionary force of an utterance, as in the following example:

“*Well, I don’t **really** know*” (the particle is placed after the negation, the utterance sounds not categorical) and “*Well, I **really** don’t know*” (the effect is the opposite, the speaker stresses the fact of his unfamiliarity with the fact) (АЛЕКСЕЕВА 2001: 149-150).

Let us consider the usage of downtoners:

(20) *'Does it answer your questions?'*

'Pretty much.' she admitted.

(Rankin. *Set in Darkness*, 170).

(21) *'But you know that in the year 2000, the secret of Rosslyn will reveal itself?'*

'Is this some New Age thing?'

Sithing snorted. 'It's very much an ancient thing.'

*'You **believe** Rosslyn's some sort of ... special place?'*

'It's the reason Rudolf Hess flew to Scotland. Hitler was obsessed with the Ark of the Covenant.'

(Rankin. Set in Darkness, 183).

In both cases the speakers tried to sound not too categorical and softened their utterances by hedges “pretty”, “believe” and ‘sort of’.

Approximators (almost, nearly, approximately, around) serve to express an approximation to the force of the verb (imply a denial of the truth value of what is denoted by the verb). R. Quirk et al exemplified it by the following statement: “*I almost resigned*” (Quirk et al 1982: 200).

A.V. Yarkho distinguishes also implicit lexical hedges, and among them she recognizes the so-called “unsure commentaries” (you know (see), I mean) (Ярхо 2004: 9). However, we would also add to this group discourse markers “well”, “though”, “then”, “so” and “like”. These markers can also be called “hesitation markers”, because they do not only express uncertainty and, thus, mitigate the illocutionary force of an utterance, but also perform the function of gap-fillers, because they give the speaker time for planning or some correction work. They indicate the process of thinking and show that the speaker is continuing and does not give floor to his/her partner. All these means contribute to the creation of the image of politeness too, making the utterance sound not so abrupt and sharp.

These words and expressions are also called pragmatic markers which have little or no meaning in themselves and can only be understood either through clues in the context and/or situation, or else by having a conventionalized pragmatic meaning mapped onto them. In other words, the function of pragmatic markers is that of monitoring discourse and conversation in various ways. They also contribute to the creation of coherence of the discourse. They move the text

forward and ensure that the hearer gets a coherent picture and can make sense of what is being communicated (Erman 2001: 1338-1340). B. Erman also claims that a very important modal function of pragmatic markers is to relieve the speaker from being completely committed to truth value of the proposition in question, i.e. they function as hedges (Erman 2001: 1341). However, we would disagree with B. Erman in the point that he doesn't approve hedging function of the pragmatic marker "you know". Let us consider the following examples:

(22) *'They found a body, **you know**,' Hugh Cordover was saying. [...]*

'A body?' Lorna asked.

'It was on the news.'

(Rankin. Set in Darkness, 33).

The speaker had to talk about unpleasant things (dead body), so he hedged it with "you know" to make it sound more acceptable.

The pragmatic marker "I mean" usually shows implicit uncertainty. This can be proved by the following example:

(23) *"**I mean**, at some point I gotta talk to Danny, right?"*

"I guess. You're the Sheriff."

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 289).

The speaker also emphasizes his uncertainty by using a vague expression "at some point" and asking for approval by an adverb "right".

According to S.C. Levinson, the discourse marker "well" has no semantic content, only pragmatic specifications for usage. "Well" in English serves to warn the recipient that some inferencing must be done to preserve the assumption of relevance (Levinson 1995: 50). "Well" is also frequently used when expressing disagreement, challenge, or criticism. A contradiction such as "*That isn't true*" is an affront when it gives the lie to what someone has just said, but "*Well, that isn't true*" mitigates the effect by transferring the criticism to a higher authority. Hence, it performs the harmonizing function as well (Schourup 2001: 1035). L. Schourup also argues that initial "well" prospects that something will now follow, it prefaces

a host utterance. Clause-internal “well” works the same way: the speaker is heard as considering what to say next (Schourup 2001: 1043).

(24) *“It’s not loaded?”*

“Hell no. Don’t you know anything about guns?”

“Afraid not.”

“Well, you’d better learn, boy, at the rate you’re goin’.”

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 75).

In this example the speaker did not want sound too sharp in expressing his advise, so “well” prefaces the utterance performing harmonizing function, making the whole utterance sound “friendlier”.

(25) *‘I can prove I knew him.’*

‘How’s that?’

‘The present he gave me.’

‘What present?’

‘Only, I didn’t have much use for it, so I.. I gave it to someone.’

‘Gave it to someone?’

‘Well, sold it. A second-hand shop on Nicolson Street.’

(Rankin. Set in Darkness, 178.)

The speaker has done something what is not greeted by the society – he sold the present. At the beginning he said that he gave the present to someone, resorting to the tactic of vagueness, and then he corrects his previous statement. The discourse marker “well” mitigated the negative impression which may create his utterance.

According to I.O. Alekseyeva, the pragmatic marker “though” softens the utterance. It is often used in the communicative patterns of the type “refusal+gratitude”. It is also often found when it is necessary to soften the mistrust to the interlocutor’s statement as in the following example:

A: They might have family papers-documents.

*B: They might have. Doubt it, **though**. (Алексеєва 2001: 144-145).*

The pragmatic marker “then” may be considered that of politeness, because the speakers, while facing difficult communicative situation, often resort to it to soften their statements. This effect is achieved because the level of politeness of pragmatic clichés increases if the cliché has expanded structure. When this pragmatic marker is present in the cliché, it expands its structure and contributes to mitigating of categoriality of an utterance. It also helps the speaker to fill the gap to find appropriate words for further communication (Алексеева 2001: 143, 164).

(26) “*Will you come back **then**, Mr. Traynor?*”

(Grisham. *The Last Juror*, 65).

This example represents polite invitation, the structure of which is expanded by means of pragmatic marker “then” to make it sound more polite.

(27) “*It’s that I’ve known you for ten years, and never once, on anything, have I ever heard you ask for help*”.

“**Then** surprise”, I said, looking straight into her eyes. “Cause I’m asking now”. (Patterson. *1st to Die*, 140)

In this example the speaker had to ask for help, so she expands her statement with the pragmatic marker “then” to make it sound more pleasant.

(28) “**So, like**, this is serious, right? You and Moon”.

“We’re just...”

“Good friends?”

(Rickman. *Midwinter of the Spirit*, 158).

The first speaker has asked about very personal question concerning relationship between two people. That is why he expanded the structure of the utterance by two pragmatic markers “so” and “like” which mitigated its illocutionary force and made the whole utterance sound more pleasant and acceptable.

Other powerful verbal devices that create ambiguity of expression and mitigate the illocutionary force of an utterance are function words. When the

speaker wants to influence an addressee, to direct him/her certain behavior he/she willingly uses particles, because they help to form indirect speech acts which enable him/her to influence an addressee in a mild, socially-acceptable form. Particles' ability to saturate the text with pragmatic information is rather natural, because pragmatic meanings are originally included in the particles and are actualized by them in the course of interaction with the context and the situation (Волкова 1987: 47-48).

We have come to the conclusion, that among all function words particles are the most effective means of creating the "subjective modality" (or expression of personality of the speaker, his attitude to the information). However, only some particles contribute to positive self-presentation of the speaker. Conducted analysis of the illustrative material has revealed that this power in the greatest degree is inherent in the following particles: *too*, *just*, *in fact* and *actually*.

(29) *"I'd rather be arrested," he said.*

"Me too."

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 196).

The ability of the particle *too* to represent the predicate results in construction of elliptical sentences which consist of a kernel element and a particle. The more elements are removed, the more those that are left are accentuated (Алексеева 2001: 135). It means that the structure of the reply in the given example emphasizes its expressiveness. The particle indicates solidarity of the speaker, his/her consent with his interlocutor.

(30) *'If you're cold, we could go to the tropical house.'*

She shook her head. 'I'm fine. I don't usually do much on a Sunday.'

'No?'

*'Maybe a car boot sale. Mostly, I **just** stay home.'*

(Rankin. Set in Darkness, 37).

The woman wanted to deny the invitation. The particle *just* gives additional emotive coloring to the utterance, makes it sound more polite. If we try to extract the particle the utterance will sound rather sharp (* *Mostly, I stay at home*).

The particle *actually* is usually used when the speaker wants to correct the statement of his/her interlocutor in a mild and friendly way. The use of this particle helps the speaker to save face in a situation when it is necessary to contradict his/her interlocutor. It is also used when the speaker wants to save time for thinking about what one should say further. This can be proved by the following example:

(31) – *Eido is my assistant in every way. He and his wife live on the tenth floor of the Nutmeg Insurance building, where I have the penthouse. As you well know, since you live in the Nutmeg building yourself.*

– **Actually** *I didn't know.* (McCullough. *On, Off*, 49)

The same function is represented by the particle “in fact”, which is the synonym of the particle *actually*:

(32) “*What happens now?*” *I managed to say. My voice came down in a whisper.*

“*I want to continue with the treatments*”, Medved replied. “**In fact**, *increase them*”.

(Patterson. *1st to Die*, 248).

The first speaker is a very ill woman, whose health condition got worse. The second speaker, the doctor, stated that he wants to increase the treatment in a mild way, using the particle *in fact*, which made it sound more acceptable and not so categorical.

Verbal indirectness is an often used linguistic tactic which helps to save face and to make a positive self-presentation, thus manipulating a person. It is much better to get what we want without explicitly saying what we mean. This contributes to the creation of image of politeness. Politeness is the most explicit motive for indirect expression of a request or a directive. By employing R. Lakoff's

theory of politeness as a basis for her analysis, D. Tannen clarifies the role of indirectness in conversation as follows: “A fundamental aspect of language is what literary analysts call ellipsis and analysts of conversation call indirectness (or, in formal pragmatics, implicature): conveying unstated meaning” (Tannen 1989: 23).

Indirectness is preferred for two main reasons: to save face if a conversational contribution is not well received, and to achieve the sense of rapport that comes from being understood without saying what one means. In addition, by requiring the listener or reader to fill in unstated meaning, indirectness contributes to a sense of involvement through mutual participation in sensemaking. Indirectness not only increases distance between the speakers but also can enhance rapport. Indirectness in manipulative discourse is achieved by means of indirect speech acts.

According to J. Searle, indirect speech act is a speech act performed indirectly through the performance of another speech act, for example: “*Can you pass me the salt?*” The sentence is grammatically interrogative, but it is conventionally used to mark a request. We do not expect a verbal answer to this question, but that the hearer will pass the salt. Likewise, the utterance “*There is a fly in your soup*” may be a simple assertion but, in a context, it also may be a warning not to drink soup. Analogously, the statement “*I won’t do it if I were you*” has the congruent force of an imperative (Лазар 1999: 62; Серль 1986а: 195-96).

One of the most important issues is that of the quantity of illocutionary forces in indirect speech act. In modern linguistics this issue is still debated. We agree with J. Searle that indirect speech acts consist of two illocutionary forces, since one illocutionary act is performed by means of the other one. In J. Searle’s example “*Can you pass me the salt?*” the primary illocutionary act is that of request and the secondary one is that of question. The second illocutionary act is literal and the first one is not (Лазар 1999: 62, 67; Серль 1986: 207-8). This idea is close to J. Leech’s point of view. He considers that while using an indirect speech act the speaker offers the hearer several illocutionary forces, and the latter takes the responsibility of selecting one of them (Leech 1983: 23-30).

T. A. Shishkina suggests another classification of utterances according to the different degree of indirectness. She singles out speech acts with high and low degree of indirectness. The degree of indirectness is characteristic for that illocutionary act the indirect meaning of which is included in the context of an utterance or is understandable through the lexical loading of the sentence (ШИШКИНА 1983: 84-90). We consider J. Searle's example "*Can you pass me the salt?*" to be indirect speech act with low degree of indirectness, because its meaning is transparent, idiomatic and is clearly understood from the context.

Indirect speech act is characterized by polysemantic correlation between the structural form of the utterance and its pragmatic meaning. The speaker bases his/her speech act on the shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, social conventions (for example the form of a question softens the imperative aspect of a request) and on the common abilities of a reasonable judgment of a hearer (on general powers of rationality and inference – **illocutionary force indicating devices**) (Searle 1969: 73).

By means of indirect speech act the speaker sends to the hearer much wider sense than that which he actually utters. This can be proved by the following example:

(33) "*Can I help you?*" a large, badly dressed ole boy growled from the center of the Board. His name was Barrett Ray Jeter, the chairman. Like the other four, he'd been appointed by the Governor as a reward for vote-gathering.

"I'm here for the Padgitt hearing," I said. [...]

"This is a closed hearing, Mr. Traynor," Jeter said.

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 268).

In this example indirect speech act possesses a high degree of indirectness, because its pragmatic meaning is not idiomatic and it is not easy to understand from the context. The utterance is a constative in form, but as an indirect speech act it is a directive. It actually means "You have to go away, because you are not allowed to enter". The speaker uses indirect speech act in order not to sound rude.

By means of this tactic he saves his face and the face of his interlocutor and remains polite.

2.3. Speech tactics of masking the speaker's real intentions and verbal means of their realization.

Strategy of masking speaker's real intentions (Дейк 1989: 293) is used with an aim to hide real intentions of the speaker, so that the manipulator will influence an addressee without explicitly stating his/her aims and intentions. In other words, the speaker's intention is covert. This manipulative strategy must largely escape the awareness of the manipulated subject. The need for this hidden intention is immediately connected with another feature generally ascribed to manipulative discourse, i.e., that it is aimed at deceiving the addressee in some way or another. In order to be successful, this deliberate deception must remain hidden, so that the manipulator is insincere.

It is expedient to note that it is not always done deliberately; very often manipulators mask aims and the fact of the manipulatory influence without actually realizing it (Доценко 2003: 100).

Tactic of increasing of illocutionary force of the utterance is an increase of categorical force of an utterance. In manipulative discourse it is performed with an aim of emotional influence on an addressee by emphasizing this or that element of an utterance. It provides very effective control of the hearer's attention, the improvement of structural organization of relevant information (for instance, negative predicates), or at stressing the subjective macroinformation (Дейк 1989: 297).

This tactic is realized by lexical means, such as modals, particles, words expressing generalization, and syntactic means, such as repetition, elliptical sentences, emphatic constructions and inversion. It also may be realized by flouting maxim of quantity, when the speaker gives some additional information to persuade and addressee in truthfulness of what has being said.

Modals having heightening effect are represented by a modal verbs must/ought to, shall, will, should, would, have to and all modal words expressions which express amplificatory evaluation of this or that utterance (e.g. frankly, honestly, truthfully, exactly, absolutely, completely, entirely, definitely, surely, awfully, perfectly, certainly, totally, obviously etc.; I'm sure, positive, certain... etc; no doubt that, of course, etc) (Студенец 1989: 86-88, Palmer 1995: 17-18, 100-102):

(34) *“You are a professional,” he informed me. “A very important man in this town, and you are dressed like, uh, well...” He scratched his bearded chin as he searched for the proper insult.*

I tried to help. “A student.”

*“No,” he said, wagging an index finger back and forth as if no student had ever looked that bad. He gave up on the put-down and continued the lecture. “You are unique—how many people own a newspaper? You are educated, which is rare around here. And from up North! You are young, but you shouldn’t look so, so, immature. We **must** work on your image.”*

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 181-182).

In this example the second interlocutor tries to persuade the journalist (the first interlocutor) to change his image. The modal verb “must” intensifies the fact that there is a dire necessity to do this.

(35) *“...our nation was built by the blood of our soldiers. Wars **will** always be with us.”*

*She responded: “Wars **will** be with us as long as ignorant and greedy men try to impose their will on others.”*

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 237).

The modal verb “will” emphasizes the certainty of the speakers in what they utter and imposes their personal point of view on the speaker.

(36) *“Whether you like it or not, Professor, I **have to** be here”.*
(McCullough. On, Off, 114)

By using the modal verb “have” the speaker implies the necessity of being here and that he will stay whether Professor likes it or not.

(37) “*So what’s your explanation?*”

“**Frankly**, *I haven’t a clue*”.

(*Francome. Tip Off, 42*).

The second interlocutor wants to persuade the first one in his sincerity and intensifies his utterance by the modal word ‘frankly’.

(38) – *Did she ever complain about being noticed? Followed? Watched from a car or by someone on the other side of the street?*

– *No, Lieutenant, **honestly**.*

(*McCullough. On, Off, 109*).

The conversation takes place between the father of a killed girl and an inspector who investigates the case. The father did not believe that his daughter was killed, he was sure that she did not have any enemies. He intensifies his reply by the modal word “honestly” to persuade the inspector in the truthfulness of his words.

(39) *'He's probably the only man I know who plays Wishbone Ash on surveillance.'*

'Who are Wishbone Ash?'

'Exactly.'

(*Rankin. Set in Darkness, 66*).

The first interlocutor uses the modal word “exactly” to persuade the second one that there can be no doubt in what he believes to be true.

Particles *just, only, solely, purely, barely, exclusively, chiefly, especially, essentially, largely, mainly, mostly, particularly, primarily, principally, specifically, even, still, yet* emphasize the kernel element of an utterance if they are located in a direct proximity to this element. They are used in discourse as means which help to focus the hearer’s attention on the information which is considered by the speaker to be the most important one. In these cases the pressure of the verbal units on the context is observed, which results in the increase of categorical force of the utterance, influence on the addressee; it also creates an effect of psychological tension. The aim pursued by the speaker who uses these particles in

this context is an emotional amplification of his/her arguments and an attempt to convince the interlocutor in the truth of his/her information (Алексеева 2001: 151, 158).

(40) –*What do they say?*

– *Nothing much. **Just** that I'm "in for it".*

(Rankin. Set in Darkness, 31).

The particle “just” is used in post-position to the kernel element, intensifying it. The particle emphasizes the information that “nothing much” was said.

(41) “*Whatta you think of the jury?*” he said. *He appeared to be completely sober.*

*“I **only** know one of them,” I said.*

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 124).

The second speaker implies that he does not possess enough information about the jury because he lacks information about them. The booster particle only intensifies the implicit meaning of the utterance.

(42) *'What do the police say?'*

*Cammo looked at him. 'So middle-aged, and yet so naive. The forces of law and order, Roddy - I offer this lesson gratis and for nothing - are like a leaky sieve, **especially** when there's a drink in it for them and one or more MPs involved'. (Rankin. Set in Darkness, 31)*

The particle “especially” connects the kernel element with additional information, intensifying its meaning.

When the particle “really” is used in the middle of an utterance its main pragmatic aim is to create a context of opposition (as opposed to something). With the help of this particle the speaker may not only express the different opinion to this or that subject; he/she may also try to influence the addressee with an aim to urge him/her to change something (his/her attitude to the fact) (Волкова 1987: 49).

(43) “*Why do you insist on testifying?*” was Lucien’s first question, and the courtroom was still and silent.

*“Because I want these good people to hear what **really** happened,” he answered, looking at the jurors.*

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 150).

The particle intensifies the confidence of the speaker in what he is going to tell, assures the hearers that he believes this information to be true.

Words expressing generalization are used to show that the information given is not a casual or an exceptional one. The speakers usually use these words to increase the weightiness of their information. Typical words used for generalization are as follows: always, every time, all the time, constantly, permanently, all, everybody, never, nobody, no one, none, etc (Дейк 1989: 295-297).

Let us consider the following examples:

(44) – *Do they stay for the entire service?*

– *Oh no. They’re **always** too busy for that.*

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 99).

(45) – *Are they still camping outside your mother's house?*

– *Yes. **Every time** I visit, I have to field the same questions. (Rankin. Set in Darkness, 241)*

(46) *“She talks about you **all the time**,” he said.*

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 203).

Adverbs “always”, “every time”, “all the time” are used to generalize the statements and to emphasize the ideas of the speakers.

(47) *“Do you know a man by the name of Danny Padgitt?” Ernie asked.*

*“**Never** heard of him,” Malcolm said.*

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 149).

The adverb “never” intensifies negative meaning of the utterance. It forms a complete negation and the sphere of action in this case is extended on the whole utterance (Алексеева 2001: 152). It is worth mentioning that “the level of decrease of the negative meaning corresponds to the level of its implicitness” (Белова 1997: 216). In this case the negation is explicit, thus, the intensifying force of this booster

increases. Negation with the help of the adverb “never” is much stronger as compared to the regular form of negation, formed by means of an auxiliary verb and a formant “not”.

(* *Haven't heard of him*).

(48) “*You think Wilbanks knows?*”

“***Nobody*** knows,” *Baggy* said with even greater smugness.

(*Grisham. The Last Juror, 120*).

The pronoun “nobody” intensifies the meaning of the utterance. The whole utterance is an indirect speech act (a directive), which implies the following: “There is no any person who knows this, so you should stop wondering about that”.

(49) – *Do you have any specific knowledge of any of crimes other than you've read in newspapers?*

– *Knowledge? (...) No. **None at all.***

(*Patterson. 1st to Die, 288*).

The last speaker gives a negative answer to the question he was asked, affirming it by a generalizing statement “*None at all*” which makes it sound persuasive and categorical. As in the previous example, it is an indirect speech act which implies a directive.

The role of repetition from the point of view of pragmatics consists in intensifying or accentuation of the utterance’s illocutionary and expressive component. It is considered to be a means of speech influence upon the addressee. The speaker emphasizes those elements of his/her utterance which he/she considers to be the most important within the frames of this or that situation (Маліновський 2005: 125).

We agree with T. van Dijk who considers repetition as a semantic, pragmatic and rhetorical means which is functional in relation to the global aim of being more effective; its rhetorical function consists in attributing more “weight” or “importance” to the repeated proposition or the statement, because it makes this proposition or the statement more effective (Дейк 1989: 286-287).

Among the most effective means of manipulative influence are polysyndeton (repetition of conjunctions in close succession used for logical and intonational accentuation of the most important components of an utterance), anaphora (repetition of a word or a word group at the beginning of succeeding sentences or clauses), epiphora (repetition of the final words or word groups in succeeding sentences or clauses). Anaphora and epiphora perform the same function – consolidation in the addressee’s mind of key words/word groups. This effect is achieved because the new information on the familiar ground more effectively overcomes the defensive mind barrier (ИГНАТЕНКО 2005: 151). We consider that another effective way of increasing of illocutionary force of the utterance is the kind of repetition which is known as syntactical tautology – a superfluous repetition of semantically identical words of word groups which is used to lay stress on a certain part of the sentence (Norrik 1994: 17-18).

Let us consider the following examples:

(50) – *You still pushing the theory that I win if you remain here, and I lose if you go to the courtroom?*

– *There **was the only** time I went with you, and that **was the only** case you lost.*

(Topol. Conspiracy, 16).

The speaker refuses to go to the courtroom with his interlocutor (the juror) being sure that he would lose if he goes with him, so he resorts to repetition to emphasize his idea.

(51) “C’mon”, I pressed, “**you don’t think** it would work? **You don’t think** we’d be good at this?”

(Patterson. 1st to Die, 140).

The anaphoric repetition adds expressiveness to the speaker’s words and is a means of an effective influence upon the addressee.

Following P. H. Mathews, we would define ellipsis as an omission from a syntactical construction of one or more latent words (those words which might be clearly understood from context), or structural incompleteness of a syntactic

construction (Matthews 1992: 38-44). Ellipsis is widely used to add to the text dynamism and expressiveness (Бельчиков 1999: 592). We consider ellipsis as a means of increasing of illocutionary force of an utterance due to its ability to make utterances sound more concrete, precise, persuasive, depriving it of superfluous wordiness. This can be proved by the following examples:

(52) *“Who are your friends?” he asked.*

“Sonia Liebman in the O.R. No one else, really”.

(McCullough. On, Off, 52).

Both replies of the second speaker are elliptical, the second one modified by the generalizing pronoun “no one” and the particle “really” that make it sound more persuasive.

Emphatic constructions express focus on a particular participant. They can be of different kinds: an auxiliary verb “do”; an emphatic -self; it is smb/smth who/that; it is then that; it is by/with/through/what smb/smth that etc, expressions of the type “the thing/point/fact/truth/problem/trouble/result/view/reason/idea is/was that”. This can be proved by the example below:

(53) *“It’s a Japanese politician who is worrying me right now”.*

(Topol. Conspiracy, 53).

The construction “*It is a Japanese politician who...*” emphasized focus on this person. The speaker implies that he will be primarily concerned by the Japanese politician and no one another in the nearest time.

Inversion is the violation of the word-order within a sentence. It may comprise principal parts of the sentence (complete inversion) or influence the secondary parts of the sentence (partial inversion) (Stein 1995: 135-138). It is widely recognized that some inversions have ‘emotional’, ‘expressive’ meanings and discourse functions and are often used with an aim of emphasis (Алпатов 1990: 176; Green 1982: 119-120). We consider that they increase illocutionary force of the utterance by adding emotional coloring to the members of the sentence which are involved in inversion or to the whole sentence:

(54) *“Shall I report to you?”*

“Yes, of course. **Anything you need, just ask**”. (Francome. *Tip Off*, 15).

The speaker puts “anything you need” at the beginning of an utterance to lay stress on the implicit meaning that his interlocutor may ask for anything without feeling awkward about that. The generalizer “anything” stresses this meaning.

(55) “Do you expect trouble?”

“No, not really.”

“**Neither do I. But I can’t convince Momma.**”

“Nothing will happen, Sam.”

(Grisham. *The Last Juror*, 294).

The complete inversion adds to the utterance an emotive coloring and makes it sound more persuasive.

The tactic of **indirectness in rendering the content of an utterance** is represented by two sub-tactics: the sub-tactic of **using of indirect speech acts** and the sub-tactic of **hinting**.

In indirect speech act one pragmatic meaning is accumulated on the other one and transposition of pragmatic meaning is observed. Analyzed data has proved that with an aim of masking speaker’s real intentions and thus manipulating a person constatives are transposed into directives, requestives or questitives; and questitives are transposed into directives, constatives or requestives.

Let us consider the following examples:

(56) – **If you went back to town, then I really would owe you one.**

– You’re kidding, aren’t you? Just walk away?

(Patterson. *1st to Die*, 127).

The first utterance represents a constative transposed into a directive. The speaker does not say directly “Please, go back to town”, but masks his wish by means of indirect speech act.

(57) “**Reverend Small will preside over the Lord’s supper this Sunday,**” she said. It was her weekly invitation to sit with her in church. Reverend Small and his long sermons were more than I could bear.

“Thank you, but I’m doing research again this Sunday,” I said.

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 278).

The first statement is a constative transposed into a requestive, namely, an invitation to come to the supper on Sunday. Probably the speaker knew that the hearer doesn’t like being present there, that is why she didn’t state it in a direct form, but masked it by means of indirect speech act.

Constatives transposed to questitives are represented by the following example:

(58) *“I don’t think he killed himself. I’m trying to find out what really happened”.*

“I couldn’t see him doing that myself. Chuck loved life too much”.

(Topol. Conspiracy, 241).

The first speaker asked for information by means of transposition of a constative into a questitive. As it is seen from the answer of an addressee, it is directed not to the direct constative, but to the indirect questitive meaning of an utterance.

Constative utterances which perform the function of questitives are characterized by special semantic structure. If interrogative utterances are characterized by a two-fold semantic structure which includes the inquiry about the competence (the inquiry if an addressee possesses the information about some component of a situation) and the subject of inquiry; constatives transposed into questitives have only one component – the subject of inquiry. The speaker implicitly states that the addressee possesses this information about the subject of inquiry (Гладуш 1989: 29).

According to L.M. Volkova, interrogative utterances which contain in their structure the particle “already” always represent indirect speech acts-injunctives. For example, an interrogative utterance *“Are you leaving **already**?”* said by a hostess addressing to her guests will mean “Do not leave too soon”. Hence, it is an indirect speech act-injunctive, because the hostess tries to prevent her guests’ leaving (Волкова 1989: 16-18).

Let us consider some other examples of questitives transposed into injunctives (directives or requestives).

(59) *“Are you seriously going to ride him yourself?” Emma asked as we drove from the de Morlays’ to Wetherdown.*

“Yes”.

“Even after last time?”

“You may see some improvement”, I said modestly, not wanting to raise my own hopes too high. “and, anyway, he’s my horse”.

(Francome. Tip Off, 337).

The interrogative utterance *“Even after last time?”* is not aimed at receiving some new information from an addressee. It represents an indirect speech act-directive with an implied meaning *“Don’t do it!”* The particle *“even”* at the beginning of an interrogative utterance modifies its illocutionary force by increasing it. However, the speaker has no right to prohibit her interlocutor to ride; that is why she masks her directive, expressing it in a form of an indirect speech act.

Referential uncertainty may take place when the speaker presents it in non-standard, associative way. This type of information decoding (which is called **“hint”**) is connected with conscious intention of the speaker to present information incompletely and with elements of uncertainty (Костецкая 1989: 221). Hint is a means of indirect rendering of information and a means of implicit verbal influence. The key word, essential for understanding the phenomenon of hinting is **conjecture**. It presupposes that the hearer should infer the meaning of an utterance from incomplete information, from reduced way of verbal expression of hint’s content.

According to P.F. Stroson, hints do not belong to illocutionary acts, because intentions constituting illocutionary complex are characterized by overtness. They have avowability. The essence of a hint consists in the fact that the hearer has to suspect (and not more than that) presence of some intention, for example, intention of introducing or disclosing some opinion. Intention which has the person who

uses hints is nonavowable (Строчин 1986: 144). Hence, it is an effective tactic of masking speaker's real intentions.

Hints are used to make indirect requests, for instance "*I would like to have the letter in the 5 o'clock post*" (an utterance is pronounced by a boss addressing to his secretary). According to N. Fairclough, a business executive chooses a hint to request the secretary to type a letter for manipulative reasons: if the boss has been pressurizing the secretary hard all day, such a form of request might head off resentment of refusal (Fairclough 1989: 55).

Let us consider the following examples:

(60) – *Why don't you meet me at Harry's Bar at nine?*

– *I thought you were with Sara?*

– *I am.*

– *But I'm with Emma.*

– *That's okay. I'll pay.*

(*Francome. Tip Off, 68*).

In this example the first utterance represents an indirect speech act. In form it is a question which is transposed into requestive, because its direct meaning is: "Let us meet at Harry's Bar at nine". The second speaker wanted to refuse to come, because he was with a friend and did not want to create inconveniences. He hints that he would not come because of that, or that the person who invites him should pay for both of them. The first speaker manipulated his interlocutor by saying that he will pay to make him sure that he may come with his friend and not to worry about money.

(61) "*Haven't you forgotten something?*" Taylor said.

"What's that?"

(*Topol. Conspiracy, 276*).

The first speaker hints that another speaker should do something, but he wants his interlocutor to understand what exactly he wants from him himself.

Speech tactic of regulation of communicative interaction helps the speaker to renew the turn-exchange which was about to finish. In these cases the

speakers use elliptical questions. These questions, first of all, show the speaker's involvement in conversation. Secondly, they require from the interlocutor to explain or re-state his/her statement, thus enforcing explicitness. Finally, they express distrust or doubts concerning the content of the interlocutor's statement. These elliptical questions serve as indirect requests to the interlocutors to be more explicit in communicating their ideas. In such a way the speakers ask their interlocutors for more information, and, thus, manipulates them.

(62) *"It was once a fine paper," Mr. Sullivan said. "But look at it now. Less than twelve hundred subscriptions, heavily in debt. Bankrupt."*

"What will the court do?" I asked.

"Try and find a buyer."

"A buyer?"

"Yes, someone will buy. The county has to have a newspaper."

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 12).

In this example the statement of the first speaker did not seem explicit enough to the first one, so he asked again in order to get more information.

The pragmatic markers "well" and "so" in the form of a question also help the speaker to get information he/she needs. It shows that the speaker is waiting for an answer and does not leave the hearer possibility to avoid answering the question. It is evident from the following example:

(63) *"How much did he pay you?"*

Knowles hesitated.

"Well?" *Cady pressed.*

"A hundred thousand", Knowles whispered. "In cash".

(Topol. Conspiracy, 251).

(64) *"OK, what about the low-lives who killed that crow in the church?"*

"So?"

"Well, that's got to be evil".

(Rickman. Midwinter of the Spirit, 399).

In the second example the hearer does not understand the topic of discussion, so he asks his interlocutor by using interrogative “so”.

2.4. Speech tactics of evasion and verbal means of their realization

The manipulative strategy of evasion actually means the evasion of the manipulator from giving this or that information which may harm manipulator’s pragmatic aims or his/her image, answering some questions, maintaining the conversation and preventing his/her interlocutor from asking other questions (Дејк 1989: 298). It is also worth mentioning that if the manipulator does not want his/her interlocutor notice that he/she evades discussing the topic, it should be done in a polite, “hidden” way in order not to offend the speaker and to save his/her own face.

As a rule any communication presupposes asking questions. Sometimes the speakers cannot answer them honestly and directly, or they might not want to reveal their thoughts or the information they know. In these cases they resort to **speech tactic of breaking the ongoing message**, which is used when the speakers want to stop discussing the particular topic. In order to remain polite speakers cannot just say “I must leave”, “Let’s not discuss this” or “Stop asking me such questions”. So that when they want to stop discussing this or that topic they answer the question with a statement that does not actually contain any new information. It just sounds like an answer without being such. The speakers do not make their statements explicit and often sound indirect and vague.

(65) *“What do you feel like?” Raleigh asked.*

“Why don’t we just walk”.

(Patterson. 1st to Die, 225).

The answer clearly shows that the second speaker does not want to discuss her feelings and is willing to stop this topic. Indirect answer, which is a question in form but a directive in meaning, helps her to do it. This indirect speech act is aimed at being interpreted by the hearer as “Do not ask me anything”.

One of effective linguistic means which helps to stop the conversation is the concessive particle “anyway”. This device allows the speaker to stop the conversation without violating the politeness principle, and, thus, to manipulate the partner. If, for instance, a person says “*Bill likes Mary anyway*”, it will actually mean “Stop trying to persuade me” (Волкова 1987: 24).

This can be proved by the following example:

(66) “*That’s all?*” *I shook my head and smiled at Claire.*

“*Like I said, I only had a few minutes. **Anyway**, it was your theory*”.

(*Patterson. 1st to Die, 155*).

The same effect can be observed in the example (102), when the speaker used the particle “anyway” in his final remark, meaning “I will ride the horse whatever you think and let’s stop this conversation”.

Sometimes the speakers want not only to stop discussing the topic, but also **to prevent their interlocutors from asking further questions**. When the speakers understand that they cannot answer the questions of their interlocutors, they need to say something that would not only stop the conversation, but make their interlocutors understand that no more information is available. The most widely used verbal means to reach this aim are offers to postpone the discussion of a problem until later and indirect speech acts-directives which mean “Stop asking me that” .

(67) “*Do you regret sending Sam to the white school?*”

“*Yes and no. Someone had to be courageous. It was painful knowing he was very unhappy, but we had taken a stand. We were not going to retreat.*”

“*How is he today?*”

“*Sam is another story, Mr. Traynor, **one I might talk about later, or not. Would you like to see my garden?***”

(*Grisham. The Last Juror, 69-70*).

In this example the second speaker offered to talk about Sam another time. However, she made her statement rather vague by telling “*one might talk about it later, or might not*” what did not mean that she promised to talk about it later, but

did not deny this possibility. Her final remark “*Would you like to see my garden*” was intended to show that discussion of this topic is closed and her interlocutor should not return to it again.

(68) “*And you’ve made an arrest?*”

“*Yes sir, but no details now. Just give us a couple of hours. We’re investigatin’*. That’s all, Mr. Traynor.”

“*Rumor has it that you have Danny Padgitt in custody.*”

“*I don’t deal in rumors, Mr. Traynor. Not in my profession. Yours neither.*”

(Grisham. *The Last Juror*, 31).

As it is clearly seen from the statements of the first speaker, he tried to get some information from the second speaker. However, he masked his question in the form of a statement (“*Rumor has it that you have Danny Padgitt in custody*”). The second speaker avoided giving this information. His replies were directed at stopping the conversation. By his first answer he gives the partner hope that the problem will be discussed or solved. By the second one he demanded from his interlocutor not to ask about this by means of an indirect speech act (a constative transposed into a directive: “*Yours neither*”).

(69) “*Have you interviewed your client at the jail?*” I asked.

“*Of course.*”

“*What was he wearing?*”

“*Don’t you have better things to report?*”

(Grisham. *The Last Juror*, 49).

The second speaker did not want to disclose what was wearing his client in the jail; that is why he wanted to evade answering the question by making his partner speak and hinting him at the fact that he does not want to share his information. This indirect speech act is a questitive transposed into a directive and should be interpreted like “I won’t tell you about that”.

If the topic is boring and unpleasant, interlocutors may not only want to stop it, but to start talking about something else. However, if only one of them is not

willing to discuss it, he/she resorts to **the tactic of changing the topic of conversation**. The essence of this tactic consists in saying something what would make the partner talk about some other topic. As a rule it is achieved by uttering short statement or a question which does not continue the previous topic, but starts a new one. In such a way one interlocutor makes his/her partner do the same, i.e. change the topic, which was his/her initial pragmatic aim.

There are very many situations when a speaker tries **to give floor to a partner**. Than he/she manipulates the person by making him/her take the floor. The most widespread situation is when a person makes his/her speaker talk when he/she has not given enough information to continue or does not want to disclose it. In this case he/she saves his face by making another person speak. In this case the speaker makes his/her interlocutor add something in order to get more information to be able to continue a conversation or to evade discussing this or that topic. This aim is reached by using some statements or questions which do not add any information to the topic of conversation and sometimes are completely irrelevant.

(70) *“Then bail is denied until the preliminary hearing.”*

“We waive the preliminary.”

“As you wish,” Loopus said, taking notes.

“And we request that the case be presented to the grand jury as soon as possible.”

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 41).

In this example the speaker has received the information that the preliminary hearing was waived. It created an inconvenient pause because the speaker did not expect this. So the speaker filled this communication gap by a statement which does not add any new information to let his partner continue.

(71) *“It’s a setup,” Baggy whispered.*

“What?”

“They’re baitin’ us into runnin’ a picture of Danny in his cute little jail outfit. Then Wilbanks can run back to the Judge and claim the jury pool has been poisoned yet again. Don’t fall for it.”

(Grisham. The Last Juror, 85).

The utterance *“It’s a setup”* sounds rather vague and not understandable. The second speaker could not understand what the first one meant by it, so he made his interlocutor add something.

These cases are examples of manipulating the interlocutor because one interlocutor makes the other speak and thus evades speaking him/herself.

2.3. Classification of manipulative linguistic techniques

Blass lists a number of linguistic techniques used in manipulation:

- omission:

(72) - Why did you come to France, Monsieur Shannon?

- My agency sent me.

- What is your assignment?

- I’m Admiral Jake Grafton’s assistant. I do what he tells me to do.

(Coonts S. The Traitor, p. 228).

Mister Shannon avoids direct answer and says *“I do what he tells me to do.”*

- minimization:

(73) - People are being murdered in this country every year by the hundreds, which is a scary thought!

- People are being murdered in places like Africa by the hundreds every month; we don’t have it so bad.

(Douglas J. Broken Wings, p. 119).

The character tries to minimize the level of murders and compares one region with the region with the higher level of murder.

- exaggeration:

(74) - *I don't want a leadership position out here!*

- *It is your duty to lead! What are you talking about?*

- *In a combat zone like this, trying to keep these Marines in order is like herding cats!*

(Webb J. *Fields of Fire*, p. 71).

During conversation one of the infantrymen exaggerates the complicity of marines control.

- repetition:

(75) - *Where were you at the time of the murder? -I don't remember!*

- *That is not good enough! Where were you at the time of the murder? -I don't remember what I did that day!*

- *You better start giving me some answers! Where were you at the time of the murder?*

(Kellerman J. *Private Eyes*, p. 175)

The investigator tries to manipulate suspect's answer. He repeats the question in order to make the suspect answer his question.

- distortion:

(76) - *I didn't release trading secrets! It was John! He gave out everything that was used to make a profit on the airline deal.*

- *That is a misleading lie and you know it! You supplied John with the information he released, therefore you assisted him - you aided John in the crime, which makes you just as guilty!*

(Grisham J. *The Broker*, p. 21).

In this extract the broker wants to “distort” his participation in this crime.

- figurative speech:

(77) - *Roberts! I want these Marines prepped and ready to go for tomorrow's combat mission by 2000 tonight.*

- *Roger that sir; I am all over that like white on rice, on a paper plate, in a snowstorm!*

(Webb J. *Fields of Fire*, p. 71).

In the given extract the sergeant assures with the help of figurative phrase his commander that the task is quickly and effectively done.

- emotional appeal:

(78) *-I thought you loved me...*

- "Of course I love you, " he said tenderly. "You surely can't have any doubt of that now."

(Maugham W. *The Painted Veil*, p. 85).

In order to get the answer she appeals to emotions.

L. Saussure notes that manipulation is not about using metaphors, particular syntactic structures or specific semantic features of quantifiers, but about making them play a particular role at the pragmatic level. It is possible to distinguish two “basic ways” of influencing people and making them believe and do what one wants them to do: testimony and argumentation. If testimony is given with a deceptive goal that is not made overt, it is manipulative. Argumentation is often used to gain the trust of the addressee that is needed for the acceptance of testimony. Argumentation serves to determine “whether the claims are warranted, or grounded in evidence and inferences that are themselves acceptable and hence constitute good reasons for the claim”. In turn, argumentation itself can, of course, also be a tool to deceive and manipulate (Saussure 2005: 46).

Nicholas Allott explains that in manipulative discourse “key information about the misused term is not arrived at by the hearer”, but this information “can be accessed if some re-analysis is undertaken”. Saussure claims that according to relevance theory a specific device in the mind is dedicated to the detection of intentions: the “mindreading device”. He adds that the role of such a device is the same in any variant of the theory of mind (which he views as a form of ‘popular psychology’) (Saussure 2005 : 57).

Modern techniques of manipulation are the part of our every day life. Manipulative techniques give unfair advantage over interlocutor. Manipulation

escapes the awareness of the manipulated subject. The need for this hidden intention is immediately connected with another feature generally ascribed to manipulative discourse, that it is aimed at deceiving the addressee in some way or another.

The modern manipulation techniques are part of our daily life and some techniques may help pave the way for greater response to a later request :

- **Specificity**

(79) - *It was a business deal six years ago. Some very nasty people are not happy with how the deal was finished. They would like to find me.*

- *To kill you?*

- *Yes, that is what they would like to do.*

(Grisham J. *The Broker*, p.297).

Specific expression of opinion, not the total will be more likely and realistic and that will contribute to better results of manipulation.

- **Touch**

(80) - *(He reproached closer to touch her.) You are not going to do much by crying, you know. Promise me to do as we talked before.*

- *Ok, darling. [...]*

(Mangham Somerset W. *The Painted Veil*, p. 72).

This technique provides personal contact for several seconds, as a preparatory step for further inquiry. Strange as it may seem, it really affects the performance of manipulation.

- **Technique "Foot-in-the-mouth"**

(81) - *How have you been doing lately financially? I heard you got a very well paying job. [...]*

- *Yeah, can't complain now!*

- *[...] Could you lend me some money? I'll give it back to you as soon as I can.*

(Grisham J. *The Broker*, p. 147).

This technique involves questioning the man with the discovery of considerable interest in the answers as a preparatory step for further request or query. Examples

of the results of this method can be found in the study of Howard (Howard), published in 1990, "the influence of verbal responses to common greetings on compliance behavior: the foot-in-the-mouth effect" [72, 47].

• **Technique "fear-then-help"**

(82) - *You are going to tell me who was responsible for that attack against my team! Believe me, I will make you life a living hell You will never see your family again, all of your terrorist friends will know you are cooperating with the FBI, and I'll make sure your jail mates are very friendly.*

... I can help you out of this. All you need to do is give me the information concerning that day, and I'll make all of this go away.

(Baldacci D. Last Man Standing, p. 125).

This technique involves creating tension to relief as a preparatory step for further inquiry. Bright and successful examples in large numbers can be found during the police interrogation procedures.

• **Attributive equipment**

(83) - *I don 't think I can handle this one; I don't know if I am qualified!*

- You underestimate yourself my friend. We have worked on numerous cases together, and I know you can handle this. Based off of what I have seen, I consider you one of the best investigators here.

(Douglas J. Broken Wings, p. 85).

This technique involves commenting on actions and deeds of a person to create it a good impression of yourself. Examples of results from such tactics can be found in the study of Millet, Brickman and Bolen, published in 1975 "attribution versus persuasion as a means for modifying behavior". (Brickman, Millet, Bolen 1975)

• **Technique "Something better than nothing"**

(84) - *Hey man, where are all rounds for our weapons?*

- Supply didn 't drop them off yet. I don t have very much to offer right now.

- Well at least give us enough rounds for one cartridge so we can at least create the illusion of being ready to fight!

(Webb J. Fields of Fire, p. 263).

The essence of this technique is to add to request information that something is better than nothing, and thus eliminate the need to further justify.

• **Technique "Foot-in-the-memory"**

(85) - I don't know why I put up with your attitude. In fact, I don't know why I haven't fired you already.

- You know exactly why you haven't fired me. You know that I know you are having sex with Roger's fiancée.

(Kellerman J. Private Eyes, p. 64).

This technique requires a recollection of past situations where their behavior does not meet standards or approval, or try to ask to imagine a situation that will not comply with established policies. Example results of such equipment can be found in the study Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, and Miller, published in 1992 "using cognitive dissonance to encourage water conservation".

The above mentioned techniques are very powerful and effective in manipulating a person, because they give you an unfair advantage in dealing with people who do not know these concepts can influence them.

Conclusions to Chapter Two

In this Chapter, we dealt with the strategies and tactics of speech manipulation in Modern English conversational discourse.

Strategy of speech communication is a complex of verbal activities which are directed at the achievement of a particular communicative goal, and tactic of speech communication is a particular line of behaviour on a particular stage of communicative interaction which is directed at achieving of desired effect or at preventing an undesired one. Tactic concerns language means used to achieve strategic pragmatic aim.

T. van Dijk outlines several types of strategies: cognitive, cultural, social, interactional, pragmatic, semantic, stylistic and rhetorical strategies. Each set of strategies is related to some overall goal of the speaker/ listener. All these strategies operate at different levels of discourse and at different levels of social structure. Taken together, these strategies enable participants to appropriately adapt their communication to different participants and in different settings.

The analysis of the theoretical sources and illustrative materials allows us to distinguish three main strategies in accordance with which the manipulator can operate to achieve their pragmatic goals - manipulating partner in the conversational discourse:

- 1) the strategy of positive self-presentation;
- 2) the strategy of masking real intentions of the speaker;
- 3) the strategy of evasion.

Strategy of positive self-presentation is directed at realization of those tactics which would influence the creation of positive image of the speaker, so that no any negative conclusions will be drawn from what was said by the speaker concerning his personal or social model in the communicative-context model of the hearer

Strategy of masking speaker's real intentions is used with an aim to hide real intentions of the speaker, so that the manipulator will influence an addressee without explicitly stating his/her aims and intentions. In other words, the speaker's intention is covert.

The manipulative strategy of evasion actually means the evasion of the manipulator from giving this or that information which may harm manipulator's pragmatic aims or his/her image, answering some questions, maintaining the conversation and preventing his/her interlocutor from asking other questions

Blass lists a number of linguistic techniques used in manipulation, such as omission, minimization, exaggeration, repetition, distortion, figurative speech, connotative or substandard language and emotional appeal.

To manipulate people effectively one must choose appropriate strategies and tactics. In accordance with interlocutor response and the communicative situation the manipulator can change the techniques and tactics of manipulation during the conversation to reach the real aims of manipulator.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

It is important to note that speech manipulation is always observed within a context of communication.

Manipulation can be positive and negative. Negative manipulation is one-sided and unbalanced, advancing the goals of the manipulator at the expense of the person being manipulated. These relationships become troubled over time. Positive manipulation is used to reach positive results and to do good to manipulated person.

In the conversational discourse it is possible to identify three main strategies in accordance with which the manipulator can operate to achieve his pragmatic goals – manipulating the partner:

- 1) the strategy of positive self-representation;
- 2) the strategy of masking real intentions of the speaker;
- 3) the strategy of evasion.

Our distribution of strategies of manipulative conversational discourse exists at the pragmatic level. The strategies of these levels are realized by semantic, pragmatic, rhetoric “steps” and by their tactics.

Strategy of positive self-presentation is directed at realization of those tactics which would influence the creation of a positive image of the speaker, so that no negative conclusions will be drawn from what was said by the speaker concerning his personal or social model in the communicative-context model of the hearer. Complimenting in the most apparent way explicates politeness in relations between the communicants and creates a positive image of the speaker due to their ability to ease social relations. Specifications, explanations and corrections are targeted at preventing any negative and unwanted inferences drawn by the hearer from the speaker’s utterances. Speakers resort to the tactic of modification of the illocutionary force of an utterance. People “protect” themselves with the help of different devices, such as positive transformations (or transformation of a negative proposition into a positive one which may be done with the help of impersonalization, when the doer of the action is not referred to, vague or

figurative language, euphemisms) hedges, function words. Apart from the modals exists a group of words which are defined as intensifiers. They are divided into emphasizees, amplifiers and downtoners. Among all function words particles are the most effective means of creating the “subjective modality”. Verbal indirectness is preferred for two main reasons: to save face if a conversational contribution is not well received, and to achieve the sense of rapport that comes from being understood without saying what one means.

Strategy of masking the speaker’s real intentions is used with an aim to hide real intentions of the speaker, so that the manipulator will influence an addressee without explicitly stating his/her aims and intentions. In other words, the speaker’s intention is covert. Tactic of increasing of illocutionary force of the utterance is performed with an aim of emotional influence on an addressee by emphasizing this or that element of an utterance. This tactic is realized by lexical means, such as modals, particles, words expressing generalization, and syntactic means, such as repetition, elliptical sentences, emphatic constructions and inversion. It also may be realized by flouting maxim of quantity, when the speaker gives some additional information to persuade and addressee in truthfulness of what has being said. Speech tactic of regulation of communicative interaction helps the speaker to renew the turn-exchange which was about to finish. In these cases the speakers use elliptical questions. These questions, first of all, show the speaker’s involvement in conversation. Secondly, they require from the interlocutor to explain or re-state his/her statement, thus enforcing explicitness. Finally, they express distrust or doubts concerning the content of the interlocutor’s statement. These elliptical questions serve as indirect requests to the interlocutors to be more explicit in communicating their ideas. In such a way the speakers ask their interlocutors for more information, and, thus, manipulate them.

The manipulative strategy of evasion actually means the evasion of the manipulator from giving this or that information which may harm manipulator’s pragmatic aims or his/her image, answering some questions, maintaining the conversation and preventing his/her interlocutor from asking other questions.

Speakers resort to speech tactic of breaking the ongoing message, which is used when the speakers want to stop discussing a particular topic. One of the effective linguistic means which helps to stop the conversation is the concessive particle “anyway”. When the speakers understand that they cannot answer the questions of their interlocutors, they resort to preventing their interlocutors from asking any further questions. The most widely used verbal means to reach this aim are offers to postpone the discussion of a problem until later and indirect speech acts-directives which mean “Stop asking me that”. However, if one of the communicants is not willing to discuss the issue, he/she resorts to the tactic of changing the topic of conversation. The essence of this tactic consists in saying something what would make the partner talk about some other topic. There are numerous situations when the speaker tries to give floor to the hearer. In this case he/she manipulates the person by making him/her take the floor.

RESUME

В дипломній роботі на тему “Стратегії та тактики мовленнєвої маніпуляції у сучасному англомовному діалогічному дискурсі” розглядаються комунікативні стратегії та тактики маніпуляції. Робота вміщує 91 сторінки та 100 використаних джерела. Робота складається зі вступу, двох розділів, висновків, резюме, списку використаної літератури та ілюстративних джерел.

У першому розділі розкриваються сутність понять дискурсу та маніпуляції, а також розглядаються причини та умови маніпуляції. У цьому ж розділі досліджуються маніпулятивні мовленнєві акти у діалогічному дискурсі.

У другому розділі розглядаються основні стратегії та тактики мовленнєвої маніпуляції і вербальні засоби їх реалізації в англомовному діалогічному дискурсі.

Ключові слова: маніпуляція, дискурс, мовленнєві акти, стратегія маскуваня реальних намірів мовця, стратегія уникання, стратегія самопрезентації, позитивне та негативне маніпулювання.

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