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**Master's Qualification Paper**

**MISUNDERSTANDING IN DIALOGICAL DISCOURSE AS A SPEECH  
PHENOMENON: PRAGMATIC ASPECT**

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## INTRODUCTION

As a result of the widespread use of interdisciplinary scientific research, the leading directions of research are being modified: increasingly binary-oppositional disciplines are becoming the intersection vectors. Thus, cognitive science and sociology find their common ground, which allows scientists to comprehend communicative phenomena in a new way. At first glance, these disciplines demonstrate completely opposite perspectives on the study of communicative phenomena. In essence, cognitive science is aimed at in-depth study of the implicit, internalized mental processes that accompany communication, while sociology addresses the extra lingual, social context that influences the formation of worldviews, guidelines, communication, production and interpretation of discourse. The unifying element of these directions is the discourse in which mental processes materialize, speech behavior, stereotypes, prejudices inherent in certain social groups are realized. Consequently, linguistics is involved in the function of the explicator of the claimed aspects. The emergence of new paradigms for the study of communicative phenomena leads to a revision of the results of previous investigations.

The study of the procedure and principles of interpretive activity belongs to the basic problems of linguistics as a cognitively oriented science (O. Kravchenko), as evidenced by the latest studies aimed at studying the rules and mechanisms of thought and speech activity: processes of understanding and interpretation (I. Bekhta, G. Bogin, D. Brown, D. Wilson, F. Johnson-Laird, V. Demyankov, O. Kubryakova, D. Sperber), modeling of creation algorithms (O. Khudyakov) and perception of discourse (M. Birvish, A. Garnham, M. Daskal, O. Zalevskaya), operating with types of knowledge during the act of understanding (O. Kibrik, U. Cheif, V. Shabes). Within these studies, an integrative cognitive model of discourse interpretation (V.

Kinch, V. Krasnykh) is formed to create a mechanism for projecting information in the mind of the addressee.

Though communicative misunderstanding has been quite widely and deeply researched, the new perspectives require a rethinking of the achievements. In addition, previous work on the issue of misunderstanding in discourse does not demonstrate the complexity and synergy to which modern linguistic science tends. The key concept is the contextual model as a cognitive model of the communicative situation, which performs the function of design and adaptation of discourse to the needs of the situation.

There are currently several approaches to the study of misunderstandings. In line with the first - communicative-pragmatic approach - the main attention is focused on the factors that lead to communicative deviations, failures, failures during speech interaction (F. Batsevich, F. Bosco, E. Weigand, B. Gorodetsky, M. Daskal, R. Keller, J. Austin, S. Pohepinskaya, S. Slavova). The study of misunderstanding is from the point of view of the producer of the discourse, and the object of analysis is the inefficiency of the use of lexical means, which leads to the failure of communicative intentions. The text-discourse approach to misunderstanding is realized in attempts to study the manifestation of inadequate understanding in the text-discourse format. It studies the discourse phases of misunderstanding, the organization of corrective remarks (K. Bazzanella, R. Damiano, E. Shegloff). The interpretive approach is based on the signs of misunderstanding as an interpretive activity (V. Demyankov, O. Kubryakova), understanding of aspects of discourse information (propositional, reference) (B. Goodman, M. Johnson, P. Cole, D. Lakoff, O. Paducheva), inference processes and derivation of implicit information (O. Kaganovskaya, R. Carston, G. Molchanova, D. Wilson, D. Sperber).

**The purpose** of the Qualification Paper is to study characteristic features of misunderstanding as a type of infelicitous communication in general and communicative failures in particular.

**The object** of the Paper is the misunderstanding as a speech phenomenon in Modern English dialogical discourse.

**The subject** of the Paper is pragmatic and functional characteristics of misunderstanding in Modern English dialogical discourse.

To achieve this goal, we need to solve the following **tasks**:

- analyze the concept of speech in modern linguistics;
- explain the problem of understanding and misunderstanding in speech discourse;
- analyze strategies and tactics used for overcoming the communicative misunderstanding in the English speech;
- analyze partial misunderstanding in dialogical discourse;
- point out and analyze speech acts of expressing misunderstanding.

The main **methods** we use in this work are the methods of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, descriptive, comparative, statistical methods, as well as the method of continuous sampling.

**Theoretical significance** of the Paper can be explained by the fact that the results of the study may contribute to the deepening of the philological point of view on the problem of the phenomenon of misunderstanding in communication.

**Practical significance of** the Paper lies in the fact that its results can find application in teaching university courses in discourse analysis, stylistics, text interpretation, and a practical course in English. The results and materials of the research can be used to create textbooks on the theory and practice of the English language and the analysis of various types of conversations.

## **CHAPTER ONE. DIALOGICAL DISCOURSE AS AN ENVIRONMENT AND RESULT OF INTERPERSONAL INTERACTION**

### **1.1. The concept of discourse in modern linguistics. Speech as the main form of interpersonal communication**

Many terms used in the research field are characterized as many-sided and contradictory. They certainly include such a thing as discourse. Many disciplines are associated with the study of discourse, for example, pedagogy, sociology, pragmatic linguistics, linguistics of speech, cultural studies, psycholinguistics, jurisprudence, etc. Each science and scientific direction approaches the study of discourse depending on the specifics of the subject.

Discours (French) (from lat. discursus - movement, conversation) is translated as “discourse” (less commonly – speech, type of speech, text, type of text). It is considered as one of the complex concepts for definition. But, despite of this, it is often an applicable and functionally convenient term.

Initially, the word “discourse” in French linguistics meant speech in general or text. As expected, the theory of discourse takes its origins from the concept of E. Benvenist, who defines discourse as “speech assigned to speakers”. He drew a line between the plan of narration (récit) and the plan of the language assigned by the speaking person (discours). An identical distinction was also observed in L.V. Shcherba: language as a system and as ability, speech activity and language material, texts.

Studying discourse as a subject of text linguistics, and discursive analysis as one of its methods, T.M. Nikolaeva considers the discourse as “a multi-valued term of the linguistics of the text used by a number of authors in meanings that are almost homonymous” and outlines the main ones:

- 1) a dialogue;

- 2) an oral-colloquial form of the text;
- 3) a group of statements, interconnected by meaning;
- 4) a coherent text;
- 5) a speech work, oral or written. (Grice, p. 245)

In modern linguistics, the term “discourse” is understood as a speech-thought process and as a complex unit semantically related proposals. The term “discourse” is associated mainly with verbal communication in dialogic speech.

Borbotko V. G. believes that dialogical speech communication is perfectly acceptable to represent as a discourse generated by a collective speaking subject. (Bezmenova, p. 134).

The dialogue is interpreted by scientists as a type of discourse that is realized in a specific communicative situation in which communicants exchange their thoughts, and the result of this communication is a text. Some linguists believe that dialogue is a conversation of two or more persons united by subject-practical activity, a communication situation, and psychological attitudes of the participants. In the process of dialogic communication, there is a constant change in replicas, which allows us to consider dialogue as a rhythmic process.

Speech is characterized by momentary production, the speed and spontaneity of the process of reflection of phenomena and situations of the objective world, actively speaking in relation to the expression of their individual attitude to facts, abundance emotional reactions. The dialogue involves the psychological interaction of partners, and this is possible in the case of reflection by the subject not only yourself, but also your partner in a communication situation. The presence in the consciousness of each member of the communication of their own “personal baggage” and the “alien world” opposed to it creates a personality dialogue (Hancher, p. 188).

We can say that in dialogical communication a person acquires a special discursive way of thinking, which is a specific communicative system of semantically related speech acts.



The problems of speech interaction of people associated with the generation of speech and its understanding, as well as with the mental processing of information, are considered by the cognitive direction in science.

Methodological principles of researching misunderstanding as a type of interpretation forms the methodological basis of the dissertation, explains the basic conceptual apparatus, among which the key concepts are understanding and interpretation, without which the study of misunderstanding as a type of discourse interpretation becomes impossible. Inconsistency of linguists' positions on the determination of these concepts (M. Daskal, T. van Deyck, O. Zalevskaya, R. Keller, G. Ryle, U. Cheif), as well as their opposition (N. Arutyunova, O. Kubryakov), the uncertainty of the status and content of the phenomenon of misunderstanding (E. Weigand, M. Kiasashvili, O. Potebnya) caused additional difficulties in scientific research.

Cognitive processes are processes of subjective reflection of reality, which are considered as acts of human interaction with the world, providing him with new knowledge and developing his thinking. The main cognitive processes are sensations, perception, attention, memory, imagination and thinking, which are involved in the process of processing input information during communication.

The basic position is to define interpretation as a cognitive process and at the same time the result of clarifying the content of speech and non-speech actions, which is synonymous with the concept of understanding as an interpretive activity. Components of this activity are perception and identification of the form of expression, clarification of its semantic and pragmatic content through individual traits of the addressee as a bearer of the inner world, mental and emotional base, formed conceptual system and own thesaurus, as well as speech personality with individual cognitive features. The result of interpretive processes is the understanding, misunderstanding or misunderstanding of speech and non-speech information retransmitted by discourse. These forms form the types of interpretation according to

the degree of success of the disclosure of the content of the discourse by the addressee.

Optimal interpretation, or ideal understanding - involves the formation of internal representation, identical to the representation of the addressee, which is determined by the full disclosure of the semantic and pragmatic content of the statement through the prism of the interpreter, which is almost unrealistic. We speak of understanding as close to ideal and sufficient for the implementation of semantic speech interaction, the formation of a single internal representation in its fullest form (W. Marslen-Wilson).

Despite contradictory interpretations in the interpretation of misunderstanding (M. Birvish, V. Demyankov, O. Potebnya), we tend to the concept in which in case of misunderstanding the result of interpretation is not regarded as a form of understanding, because it concerns the difficulties of understanding (K. Fossler, E. Weigand).

Sensations are the main source of knowledge and a condition for the development of a person who perceives objects of surrounding reality, and are the channels through which information about the outside world reaches the brain through vision, hearing, touch, smell and taste.

As a result of combining isolated sensations a holistic perception of objects or situations is formed (Gorfein, p. 67).

Auditory perception is directly related to the process of dialogic speech and is significantly different from tactile and visual perception.

The perception of speech as a cognitive process includes the following stages: transition from an acoustic or graphic code to an internal speech code; decoding of syntactic structures, grammatical forms; understanding general outline of the statement; understanding of the intentions and motives of the statement; assessment of the information received (the content of the statement, its ideas, the speaker's position, etc.); understanding of the choice of form and language means.

Effective speech perception is possible with the active desire of the listener to understand the speech of the speaker, who expects to receive feedback as a reaction to his statement. Since the main goal of verbal communication is the exchange of information, feedback is most fully implemented in dialogue.

Given the existence of a relatively ideal understanding and misunderstanding as an interpretive failure, misunderstanding as a type of interpretation occupies an intermediate position in this trichotomy on the scale of success of the interpretive act. Against the background of English-language communication, it is manifested in two dimensions: a) the formation of an incomplete representation of discourse (incomplete understanding); b) the formation of incorrect representation by the interpreter (misunderstanding).

The basis of the study of misunderstanding as a type of interpretation is cognitive analysis of discourse, which reveals the constructive nature of mental operations that accompany the process of interpretation, considering the model of discourse processing as a constructive-integration procedure (V. Kinch). According to it, the text base, which is built on the basis of linguistic information, is intertwined with the knowledge of the interpreter and integrated into a single whole in the integration phase. Interpretation is understood not as a static or abstract procedure, as in linguistic semantics, but on the contrary - as a dynamic, long process of assigning meaning and functions to units of discourse (T. van Dijk).

At the stage of perceiving speech, the listener has a representation as a cognitive process in which not only individual objects and their properties are reflected, but also typical properties of groups of objects, schematization of the image, i.e. the creation of cognitive schemes. Representations as a reflection of reality are subjective and cannot be transmitted directly from one partner to another; therefore, it is impossible to find out what part of the content of these ideas coincides with the partners of speech discourse. Elements of the content of representations in the sign system of the language can be transmitted from one partner to another and

compared. In the process of speech perception, generally accepted concepts are formed and adopted as criteria for mutual understanding (Lebedev, p. 26).

Memory is a cognitive process that regulates speech activity. Verbal memory is a more complex and specifically human kind of memory. An overwhelming amount of knowledge a person receives through language, perceiving information verbally and storing it in his memory. At the heart of verbal memory is a complex process of transcoding the material reported. The process of memorization can approach the process of speech thinking if a person performs complex coding operations of memorized material (Bezmenova, p. 192-247).

The starting point for the study of misunderstanding as a type of interpretation is the theory of mental representation and situational models (F. Johnson-Laird), and the theory of cognitive strategies of discourse (T. van Deyck, W. Kinch), which are subject to three main levels: semantic, pragmatic and interaction. When perceiving speech information, the interpreter constructs a semantic framework of discourse in the form of a text base, consisting of sentences connected locally and globally. Relevant during the constructive comprehension procedure is the presuppositional information stored in the memory of the native speaker, the so-called "Cognitive set of interpreter". This cognitive model reflects the processes and mechanisms of processing language information and predicts the processing of interactively relevant information, and socially relevant and encyclopedic knowledge, a set of textual and social strategies (L. Tsurikova).

Different types of thinking participate in dialogical discourse. Verbal-logical, conceptual thinking is one of the main types of thinking, characterized by the use of concepts, logical constructions that operate on the basis of the language, language means.

Thinking is such a cognitive activity of a person that is perceived through external speech expression. Speech is one of the forms in which thinking takes place. Speech sounds, written images, movements can be signs of speech when

certain thoughts are expressed in them and when they serve the purposes of mutual communication.

Semantic interpretation of discourse is accompanied by its pragmatic interpretation, during which the pragmatic framework of discourse is formed in the mental reality of the interpreter, which embodies information about the communicative type of speech act, motivational base of the addressee, conditions of speech act - its pragmatic context. The interactive level of discourse interpretation predicts the creation of a representation of an actualized social situation. The mental representation of discourse obtained by the recipient during the comprehension of the speech message does not represent a copy of the text or its meaning, but is a consequence of strategic processes of constructing meaning based on textual elements of discourse, extra linguistic contextual conditions and components of internal subjective-motivational base (Atayan, V. Krasnykh, I. Susov).

Understanding the dialogue as a communicative activity based on the verbal interaction of the speaker and the listener convinces the opinion formed in linguistic literature that “introducing the concept of personality into linguistics means the ability to say that language belongs primarily to a person who is self-aware and its place in the world, its role in practical activities and language communication, its attitude to the accepted principles and conventions of discourse, creatively using them in their subject and speech action. As for interpersonal relations, it should be noted that the social significance of participants in interpersonal communication must be included in the scope of our research: without this, it is impossible to analyze speech, because the speaker in the dialogue not only expresses his thoughts about what or events, but also interacts with people around him (Kooij, p. 10).

The speaker's immediate interlocutor is at the same time the address of the speaker's communicative intention, that is, the intended carrier of information if the question is addressed to him, and the subject of the desired action if the request or prohibition is addressed to him. The essence of the communicative role remains

unchanged; it represents the status of either an addressant or an addressee. Therefore, the stable ratio of addressee to address, realized through text as an object-symbolic link in communication, is the initial, basic “cell” of dialogical communication. A similar approach defined the framework of the pragmatic problems of a personality-oriented study of dialogue communication:

- adequate description of the content of the communicative role in the dialogue;
- the speaker and his role in acts of verbal communication;
- the image of the listener in the dialogue;
- typology of communicative failures in the framework of dialogue interaction.

We can consider the communicative roles in the dialogue. The definition of formal parameters of communicative roles is based on two sources. We are talking about the type of impact that the communicant needs to have on the partner, and the conditions for the appropriateness of the form of expression of this impact. The communicative roles themselves are determined by the relation of the communicant:

- to the result of communication (positive/negative/indifferent);
- to the execution of a programmable action (performer/outsider, possibly a performer);
- to initiative (initiator of communication/addressee);
- to the necessary information (possesses information/does not possess).

An analysis of the calculus of the communicative roles of speech partners allows us to conclude that the semantics of the addressee’s speech position is in his desire to bring all the recipient parameters to positive values; the task of the addressee is to help the addressee in this. Only in this case can we talk about cooperative

dialogue interaction. It is therefore not accidental that the second circle of problems considered by linguistics in this aspect is the modeling of speech portraits of the speaker and the listener, and the identification of their role in the positive outcome of dialogue interaction.

The author of the initiating dialogical remark takes a more active position in the process of communication since it sets the reference area as the topic of the subsequent statement and determines its primary intentional plan. (Krasnykh, 2001)

The image of the addressee is the key in considering the initiation of speech exposure, which necessarily involves an informational change in the listener's consciousness, his response (verbal or non-verbal) to the speech stimulus.

We emphasize once again that a constructive role in achieving the result of a change in the psychological, mental and physical condition of the addressee belongs addresser. It is necessary to possess those social and psychological roles that are actualized in a specific communication situation in order to influence the recipient. In other words, it is necessary to build in your statement such an image of the speaker, which in the most pleasant way for the listener develops the topic of communication, both in terms of content and in speech.

In this regard, relevant options for the speaker's speech behavior are those that are aimed at finding a common language with the listener and at the communicative co-authorship of the speaker with the listener.

In the analysis of the functioning of misunderstanding, the problem of structural and semantic organization of mental representation of discourse in the mind of the interpreter, which is defined as a projection of discourse in the experience of the interpreter; as a structure, the components of which have a semantic load, and collectively present the semantic-pragmatic content of the message - its full meaning. The core of mental representation is the concept. It serves as a starting point for the production of the statement and the ultimate goal of its perception (V. Krasnykh). The concept of expression is a deep meaning, the most and absolutely concise semantic

structure, which is the embodiment of the author's intentions at the time of its generation. Interpreting the utterance, the addressee in mental reality, ultimately, fixes its concept in the form of a mental clot, which integrates all possible speech and extra verbal information.

Variability is a communicatively essential property of the speech system that allows the speaker (consciously or intuitively) to choose from the variant series available in the language such means that, in his opinion, to the greatest extent possible in each particular communicative act would correspond to his communicative intention. Every statement is created by its sender for a specific purpose, therefore, it is always pragmatically oriented. Therefore, the semantics of the communicative role of the author of the initiating dialogue replica cannot be considered in isolation from the image of the message recipient. The very meaning of the speaker's image is the speech effect exerted on the listener. It is safe to say that this value is polysemantic in nature. As language environment helps to reveal realized in this case, lexical semantic variant ambiguous word, and similarly the "world" listen-conductive causes potential ambiguity implementation of the speech of the speaker exposure. The strategy for constructing this impact is formed taking into account the level of education, awareness, social-role, psychological, age, professional and other parameters of the listener. Such characteristics, in turn, determine the choice of the appropriate strategies by the addressee to provide them with a speech effect on the addressee. Here the question naturally arises: from what linguistic means does the speaker make a choice at the moment of generation of an adequate own intention and situation of communication of the utterance? The choice made by the speaker in the process of speech interaction is also the choice of an emotional language unit, which acquires its emotional power only when realized in speech. It should be noted here that there is no general definition of emotions; we will take the following for a working definition: emotions are a person's experience of his



attitude to the world around him and to himself, it is pleasure, joy, fearlessness, confidence, disgust, grief, fear etc.

In conditions of direct communication, the transfer of information between communicants is carried out on a certain emotional background and is accompanied by the expression of one's own position and assessment in relation to what is expressed. In order to give his cue more credibility, the addressee of the statement often appeals to expressive-figurative means and expressions. The emotional and figurative-conceptual sources of expressiveness of the dialogical remark are organically linked and, since in the integral psychological structure of the personality, cognitive, emotional and volitional processes are not isolated, but function in unity, highlighting those that play a large role in reflecting the world and regulation human activity behavior at a given time cut (Bandura, p. 167).

One of the most important ways of forming the emotiveness of dialogical speech is hidden meanings. Hidden grammatical meanings potentially exist in the semantic structure of linguistic units but are found only in a specific speech act. Listening person has desire to decode hided meaning because the replica by using time-personal linguistic techniques are indications original signals on the existence-sense-existence is clearly unexpressed.

In communication a problematic situation often arises: "What does the addressee say and what does he really think?" The way out of this situation is accompanied by emotions of different tonality. At the same time, the content of the de-encoded hidden meaning is also emotionally colored for the addressee, since in general the emotionality of speech is the result of the interaction of the emotional charge of the replay itself and the personality of the listener, his predisposition to emotions.

It is interesting to note that a signal of additional expressiveness of the dialogical remark can be a deviation from the norm, a violation of social and linguistic stereotypes. Any deviation from the norm enhances not only attention, but

also the emotions of the addressee. Maybe that's why "language is more likely to fix an anomaly in its semantics than a norm". There is an opinion that entering into a dialogue, we very often make a speech mistake in the process of searching for a word form that most adequately reflects the described situation. However, this often does not interfere with maximizing the communicative effect, and can sometimes even serve to strengthen the contact between communication partners.

In each individual case, the addressee implements his emotionally-oriented strategies for influencing the addressee in the form of the most suitable, in his opinion, speech options for this communicative situation. (Lamb, p. 154)

Any dialogical remark can be characterized, first of all, as an event limited by the factors of the speaker and the listener. It is a manifestation of bilateral egocentricity: the addressee takes into account the addressee factor, and the latter, in turn, takes into account the peculiarities of the speech manner of performing the former, showing activity or passivity in maintaining speech contact. Such a communicative situation appears as an ideal variant of the flow of communication.

## **1.2. The problem of understanding and misunderstanding in dialogical discourse**

One of the main aspects in the process of a communicative act is the problem of understanding – misunderstanding by the active members of a (dialogical) speech exchange. This problem is quite complex and is studied by such disciplines as linguistics, communication psychology, rhetoric, sociology, psycholinguistics, etc. When exploring the problem of understanding – misunderstanding, we should also speak about the success or failure resulting from it, i.e. "Communicative failure" in the process of communication. The purpose of this work is to review the various approaches of researchers to the study of the problem of understanding – misunderstanding in the process of speech interaction.

The concept of mental representation of discourse reveals the essence of misunderstanding as a type of interpretation, in the format of process and result, as it captures deviations of mental reproduction of semantic components of discourse during the interpretation procedure, taking into account linguistic and cognitive factors influencing its course. Based on the concept of mental representation of discourse, misunderstanding is a process and negative consequence of interpretive activity, during which the addressee receives on a pragmatic and conceptual level, based on explicit and implicit information, incomplete or incorrect mental model of discourse due to influence of cognitive prepositions emotional base.

Any act of linguistic communication necessarily assumes a normal perception of speech by its participants, that is, an understanding of speech. In this case, we can talk about successful communication. Successful communication is an adequate communication, in which more or less complete, but necessarily sufficient, from the point of view of communicants, mutual understanding is achieved. But within the limits of normal perception, understanding of speech can differ in lesser or greater depth and accuracy, that is, less or more adequately corresponds to the content of the statement that the speaker puts into it. The problem of understanding – misunderstanding in the process of speech interaction has attracted the attention of scientists of various fields of science: philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, psycholinguists, linguists.

Every person appropriating the culture of society in the process of socialization, creates the basis for understanding the speech of both other individuals and other people in his speech. This necessary degree of similarity, arising as a result of the formation of personality by society, is the basis for mutual understanding. It is noteworthy that the central place in the socialization of a person is occupied by its activities, the formation of skills for the implementation of these activities and their very implementation are those processes that determine the cultural fragments necessary for assimilation, and at the same time these are the processes during which

these fragments are assimilated. The formation of the personality psyche is carried out in the process of a person's awareness of his social relations with other people, that is, as an awareness of his interactions with other people (Abulkhanova-Slavskaya, 1970), since for a particular person, his social connections are realized and realized as interactions. Thus, the formation of the personality psyche and, consequently, the formation of a "likeness of intellects" – the basis of mutual understanding in speech communication – takes place in the form of internalization of the socio-historical experience of a particular linguistic culture.

Moreover, the formation of the psyche of the personality is uniquely determined by society in the sense that for the individual of a particular society there is no other way to become a person than to internalize the socio-historical experience of this society. Consequently, the formation of the psyche of personality and the formation of a "likeness of intellects" does not depend on the arbitrariness of the individual in the sense that its arbitrariness is limited by the framework of the culture of society (Goffman, p. 56).

The members of the same linguistic culture understand each other because they have identical experience, within certain limits, and, therefore, are "like intellects". However, it should be noted that the degree of understanding among different members of linguistic culture is different. And to solve the problem of understanding with the degree of detail necessary for linguistics, one should go down to a lower level of abstraction, to the level of specific activities of the person, since it is the totality of activities that the person can perform that determines the size of the fragment of culture acquired by the person and the potential "similarity of intellects". In any specific linguistic analysis of the mutual understanding of the communicants, we can only talk about a partial person who has mastered only part of the total culture of society (Gorelov, p. 54).

Thus, it becomes necessary to use the concept of "role repertoire of personality", which describes through the activities of communicants the degree of

“similarity of their intellects”. Since a fragment of society’s culture is assimilated by a personality only in the process of its activities, the role repertoire of the personality is the nomenclature of its activities and is an indicator of its cultural knowledge, and the similarity of the role-playing repertoires of communicants is the similarity of their intellects.

Understanding the text requires not only knowledge of the language in which the text is written, but also a certain set of interrelated information regarding the content of the text. It is possible to substantiate the hypothesis according to which the structure and semantics of the text form, as it were, one part of a complex mechanism, the other part of which is contained in the consciousness and memory of the individual perceiving the text. When these two different components come into interaction, and, according to the researcher, the process of perception and understanding of the text occurs (Borbotko, p. 10).

In speech, a linguistic sign does not present all the content that it evokes when the addressee and addressee are perceived in the brain, but only the meaning of the linguistic sign common to the communicants – some content that represents the meanings of this sign among the communicants.

It should be noted that to understand the text, the communicant needs context, you need to have an idea about the addressee, his goals and motives, the conditions (social and physical) for producing the text, etc. This information is extracted from the text by its consumer since the process and structure of communication are displayed in the text itself. The communication process is characterized by dynamism and heterogeneity, which are manifested in the fact that in the process of one act of communication, communicants can change the language, style of speech, tonality of communication. In a specific act of communication, communicants interact as social types that bring into this act social properties that have developed as a result of social practice in other acts of communication. Social relations linking a separate act of communication with the social structure of the whole society are virtually represented

in social characteristics that are actualized in speech and non-speech actions. In the social characteristics of communicants, one should distinguish between actual and potential determinants – actual ones that determine speech actions in a particular communication act and genetically go back to this type of communicative acts, and potential ones that genetically go back to other types of communication acts, but can modify the action of relevant determinants (Lakoff, p. 87).

Speaking about the problem of understanding – misunderstanding in verbal (dialogical) communication, it seems necessary to mention such a mutual understanding of communicants, which is often called half-word understanding, when one of them is often even insignificant, and sometimes extremely transformed, or part of an object, phenomenon or in general, an action or movement becomes a sign, or a symbol, causing a reaction equivalent to a reaction caused by a whole object, phenomenon, action or movement (Goffman, p. 56).

The closer social experience is, the easier people understand each other. Usually, perfect mutual understanding comes from good, long-standing comrades, from spouses with long-term experience of living together (Brudny, p. 26).

So, analyzing the work of various researchers on the problem of understanding and misunderstanding in a speech (dialogical) communicative act, we conclude that the degree of understanding and misunderstanding by communicants of one another depends on a whole complex of different factors, and the phenomenon of understanding itself can be represented in following its forms: complete (perfect) understanding, partial (or incomplete) understanding, a complete misunderstanding (or no understanding). In the latter case, a complete misunderstanding (or no understanding), we can talk about the unsuccessful form (type) of communication.

Discourse characterization of misunderstanding as a type of interpretation focuses on the discourse aspects of misunderstanding as typical interpretations and studies its implementation in the form of a materialized product - English dialogic units that have a clear organizational structure. The analyzed material records the

manifestation of misunderstanding in two main types: incomplete understanding of discourse (59.14% of the total) and incorrect / inadequate understanding of discourse (36.29%), and proves the existence of discourse hybrid models where misunderstanding speech message is transformed into incomplete and vice versa (34.57%). Quantitatively, this is confirmed by the presence of a percentage of hybrid models and the dominance of incomplete understanding in English-language communication.

Both types of misunderstandings are characterized by discourse and cognitive features against the background of English communication. However, their unifying feature is cognitive dissonance - the internal conflict of the participant in the dialogic interaction, which is caused by the lack, inconsistency and irrelevance of the interpreted information. In case of misunderstanding, cognitive dissonance is usually inherent in the addressee, when the understanding is incomplete - an incomplete mental representation of the statement is formed, and in the interpreter, when the misunderstanding represents a misunderstanding of the interpreter - an incorrect internal representation of the communicative message is formed.

### **1.3. Strategies and tactics for overcoming misunderstanding in the English dialogical discourse**

The communicative situation of misunderstanding has its own typical structure, which boils down to the following components: replica-stimulus, containing the statement, positions the difficulties for the interlocutor; replica reaction, explicates an incorrect or inadequate interpretation of the previous replica; corrective remark, corrects the interlocutor and brings closer mental representations of both speakers; replica confirmation (optional), registering understanding and acceptance of the intentional meaning. This is the structure of the situation of misunderstanding with

self-correction, that is, the adjustment of the previous replica by the addressee to approximate two considerations (Grimshaw, p. 156).

The units of the discourse manifestation of misunderstanding in the English-speaking environment are dialogic units - minimal dialogic blocks, which trace the dynamics of misunderstanding as a communicative-cognitive phenomenon. The most complete form of external manifestation of misunderstanding covers four phases of development: stimulation of misunderstanding), response, correction or information supplement, acceptance or anticipation of correction. The analysis demonstrates zero character expression and the implicit presence of individual phases of the interactive cycle of misunderstanding, including response cues and corrective cues. Such an implicit presence is achieved through the insertion of narrative discourse, which performs the function of replacing the discourse zone of the character (I. Bekhta) at certain communicative stages of misunderstanding and is an effective means of explaining the speech and thinking states of communicators.

In conditions of a false understanding of the replica stimulus, corrections are initiated by the speaker, who noticed the inadequacy of the replica reaction. In other words, the driving force is a misinterpreted replica and, as a consequence, an inadequate response. In the case of self-regulation, the addressee identifies the communicative problem and has an arsenal of strategic and tactical operations to choose from for action. The addressee does not provide a framework for choice, as in the case of responsive tactics, but the recipient is limited to a trigger that provokes a misunderstanding. In addition, the selection of the speaker's strategy is determined by the personality of the addressee. Consider an example:

“Miranda: And you have no style or sense of fashion.

Andy: That depends on...

Miranda: That wasn't a question”.

In the cited passage of the discourse, Miranda notes a misinterpretation of her remark in terms of the speech act used. Instead of an asertive, Andy interprets the



statements as coercive, which prompts him to justify tactics. This remark is the impetus for the initiation of the use of certain corrective measures. Since Miranda has a high social position (she is Andy's immediate supervisor), she immediately corrects her subordinate, directly noting that this was not a question. Thus, it explicitly conveys an embedded pragmatic meaning that brings them closer to understanding. In this situation, social status allows Miranda to neglect the principle of politeness. This means that extra-linguistic factors (the identity of the addressee) influenced the behavior of the leader while correcting the situation of misunderstanding.

Prior to initiating corrective actions in a situation of misunderstanding, a replica-reaction in which there is no semantic consistency with the previous replica, that is, this replica demonstrates an incorrect, inadequate interpretation, is initiated. A reactive replica with certain deviations, as well as contextual factors, determine the direction of corrective operations.

Given the fact that the majority of speakers comply with the rules of cooperative communication, a global strategy in the context of a situation of misunderstanding is to overcome this communicative-cognitive complication. Such a statement follows from the analysis of the fact-finding of 750 examples from cinema discourse, which showed 99% of cases aimed specifically at eliminating the misunderstanding. Considering self-correction in a situation of misunderstanding, we single out accommodation as a key discursive strategy, which consists in various adaptations of a problematic remark with the needs of the interlocutor. According to the results of the analysis, this strategy is implemented in a **meaningful and formal approximation**. We refer semantic, pragmatic, cognitive to the difficulties of the substantive plan, while stylistic and genre to the formal. Statistical information postulates that meaningful accommodation is the predominant means of eliminating a misunderstanding due to the common nature of the reason. This applies to intercultural communication, while in the cross-

communication, the formal component of the statement plays an equally important role (Hirst, p. 201).

As we have established, the strategy of meaningful accommodation is realized due to the approximation of mental representations and contextual models of speakers. The addressee primarily determines the communicative problem; it prevents the addressee from correctly interpreting the embedded meaning; this contributes to the success and effectiveness of further actions, that is, the speaker must be clearly aware that it needs to be adjusted. Subsequently, the replacement operation is performed on the incorrectly interpreted component. Here is an example of meaningful accommodation for overcoming misunderstandings in discourse

“Amy: I wish there were some way I could make it better.

Bernadette: Welly you brought me French fries. That’s a start.

Amy: Uh, actually, I got you apple slices ‘cause you’re pregnant.

Bernadette: Apple slices? What kind of lunatic goes to McDonald’s and gets fruit?”

A fragment of the conversation vividly represents a situation of misunderstanding, formed through false inference Bernadette. A woman uses the generally accepted association associated with a trip to McDonald’s, that is, with the acquisition of fast food, junk food. However, Bernadette is pregnant, giving situations of a different reading context from her friends, in particular Amy. So, the perception and interpretation of actions, actions on the part of Amy occurs through a new prism – pregnancy, while the context of perception of information by Bernadette remains unchanged. Since the context determines the reading of the content of statements, this situation has two layers of possible interpretation. Choosing the most common option, Bernadette does not tie things to the updated contextual background of Amy. Thus, a rebuttal is necessary, followed by an explanation to restore consent. The corrective cue contains the replacement of the incorrectly inferior lexical unit Frenchfries with

apple slices, followed by an explanation in the form of a causal clause, which has a hint of justification.

In the context of a misunderstanding with acomodative self-correction as used, we distinguish **contrasting tactics** (Grimshaw, 1990). In essence, such tactics are intended to reject, object to a false interpretation and offer an alternative reading, thereby bringing their understanding closer to the understanding of the interlocutor. Consider a fragment of discourse to demonstrate the appropriate tactics:

“Charlie: I have a kid now.

Lisa: Oh, God, Charlie, what poor girl did you knock up?

Charlie: No, no, it’s my nephew. He and my brother are living with me now. I’m like, Mr. Family Guy”

This passage illustrates two different interpretations. Lisa uses the value, closer to his individual experience, at the same time is more common in society. However, the views do not match Charlie’s nested value. Despite the years that have passed since the last meeting of the speakers, a person has not changed his position in life and remains an ardent bachelor. In conversation, he needs to object to the woman’s understanding (“*No, no...*”) to provide a new, clearer and more explicit statement: “*It’s my nephew*”. Typically, a new interpretation looks like an explanation or clarification (Kecskes, p. 265).

We also emphasize **the tactics of refuting understanding** that are responsive. It is used as a response to the request of the addressee to confirm understanding. However, the understanding turns out to be false, and the addressee’s task is to “edit” it. The explication of the refutation of understanding echoes contrasting, but the difference lies in the impetus for communicative actions: either expressing doubts about the correct understanding, or inadequate replica-reaction. Let us trace the implementation of the tactics of refuting understanding on a discursive example:

“Shawn: I can see that part, but once again it begs the question... What the hell

are you doing here??

Henry: I'm here for the "Insta-Tan" misting.

Shawn: You fake bake?

Henry: No, Shawn, a fake-bake is lying in a tanning bed. What I do is called "self-realistic skin toning." It's a non-hypo-allergenic tanning mist"

In this example, a misunderstanding arises from the semantic content of the phrase "*Insta-Tan*" *misting*, which is quite formal and highly specialized. Sean does not find this term in his encyclopedic knowledge, therefore, using the context, he is trying to guess the meaning of this word. In his communicative course, Sean finds a more common name and wants to receive verification of his own interpretation. Henry rejects the hypothesis of Sean's interpretation, although we see that the differences between the two terms are insignificant, given that Sean is not related to this area. However, it is important for Henry to be aware of all the details, which is why misunderstanding arises.

**The formal accommodation strategy** involves changing the form of presentation of information. In this case, the content remains unchanged, while the expression plan is modified, as a rule, to simplify the perception of the interlocutor. Consequently, this strategy is implemented through **rephrasing tactics**. Often there are problems in interpreting figurative speech, filled with metaphors, comparisons, especially individually authorial, not fixed in the dictionary. A style of discourse can also provoke confusion. We can demonstrate with an example:

"Phil: Listen, Mr. Rivers. I don't need to... I was ripping big bloody hunks of meat and eating them like tartare when George was still... in the jungle!

Mr. Rivers: You think you are stronger...

Phil: I am more experienced. I can't be demoted, Mr. Rivers. I just can't".

In the conversation, Phil resorts to metaphorical imagery in order to convey his idea, which is necessary in his case for hidden approval and advertising of

himself. The figurative form of the expression of thought complicates the understanding of Mr. Rivers, and he cannot correctly interpret the implications of meaning. Consequently, the communicative problem manifests itself in the replica of the addressee used to verify the interpretation. Understanding is false, which forces Phil's addressee to rephrase and express his opinion directly. As you can see, the meaning remains the same, but is wrapped in another shell, more acceptable and understandable to the interlocutor.

By correcting another, the illustrative material also confirms the general belief that such an action is not common. With a sample, only 2% of cases report applying this approach to restore agreement (Hirst, p. 208).

In the situation with the correction of another, the identification of the communicative problem occurs rather late, only in the fourth replica. The first two replicas show no complications. As a rule, the third replica explicates differences in interpretations that provoke actions. The corrective replica reproduces the problem part or the entire replica with the correct meaning. In the vast majority of cases, the fourth replica modifies and partially repeats the first replica, rethinking it in a new light. Also a possible explanation of the misunderstanding is provided by the addressee. We offer an example for analysis:

“The Woman: I'm so hungry.

The Man: Yeah. Me, too.

The Woman: What should we eat?

The Man: Oh, you actually meant you were hungry for food. I thought-forget it”.

The ambiguity of the *hungry* token leads to misunderstanding. A woman puts a direct meaning in this word (physical need for food due to hunger), while a person perceives the word in its metaphorical meaning with sexual overtones. The misinterpretation of the intention of the interlocutor occurs. That is, the problem takes place in the semantically pragmatic dimension of the conversation and comes to the

surface in the third replica, when the categorical objectionable embedded meaning. In the fourth replica, a person perceives the meaning of a woman as an attempt to explain his understanding.

In such and similar cases, we fix the application of a **strategy of relevance compensation** of a missing one due to differences of interpretation. Although relevance is excited only by the addressee, speaking aloud the correct statement balances the communication process and exposes the views and personality of the speaker. Quite often, a misunderstanding remains hidden behind the reluctance to apply the fourth corrective cue; in this case, the communicants resort to a face-saving strategy. Recognition of misunderstanding or misunderstanding is not always acceptable depending on the circumstances of communication. Therefore, the addressee implicitly overcomes the misunderstanding without an explicit verbal expression and uses the fourth cue to develop a theme or introduce a new one. Note that after the third replica, a longer pause is possible for processing the received information and generating new ones.

The relevancy compensation strategy is represented by specification tactics to make the value intricate. Referring to the last example, refinement is implemented by adding for food to hungry tokens, which eliminates the ambiguity. As a result, there remains the only way to read the situation. Thus, the specification introduced maximizes understanding between speakers.

Misunderstanding as a communicative-cognitive phenomenon declares itself with the help of discourse (text) markers, which are lexical-semantic, syntactic and stylistic means that signal the inadequate course of the interpretive act. The results of scientific work prove the dominance of discourse markers of incomplete understanding in the second phase of the interactive cycle of misunderstanding - reaction-replicas, while corrective cues (the third phase of the interactive cycle of misunderstanding) are the main source of misunderstanding. Thus, the signaling function of corrective cues as markers of misunderstanding was first announced.

In communication in English, discourse markers of incomplete understanding are replicas of the second phase of the interactive cycle of misunderstanding, which take the form of interrogative sentences with the pronoun “what”, which indicates the missing element of the interpreter's mental construction. Remarks-reactions with the verb "to mean" in its composition are aimed at revealing the pragmatic content of the discourse, clarifying its relevance, clarifying the hidden implicit propositional content. Reputation remarks, polite apologies in the form of an apology (Excuse me? Pardon? Sorry? I beg you pardon?) And lexical devices that reproduce the semantics of the irrational activity of language thinking also serve this purpose: I'm not sure; I didn't get; I didn't follow you; I can make neither head nor tail of it; I'm afraid I misunderstood and identify the semantic category of humor / seriousness: Are you kidding? Serious?

#### **1.4. Partial misunderstanding**

In the study of aspects of understanding, such as understanding a word, understanding a sentence, understanding a text, as well as understanding a metaphor, understanding a joke, understanding an absurdity, understanding specific texts, some individual cases of misunderstanding are sometimes considered.

The phenomenon of partial misunderstanding is gradually beginning to be perceived in linguistics as a separate problem that requires special study. In recent years, pre-comparative analysis of the pragmatics of understanding and non-understanding.

Misunderstanding is described within a particular discourse community. Misunderstanding begins to be viewed in terms of its interpretation and as the result of the ambiguity of the message.

Attempts are made to identify the types of partial misunderstanding, which, according to M. Birvish, “represent an additional illustration of the levels of

understanding”. The scholar highlights: 1) understanding; 2) misunderstanding; 3) quasi-understanding; 4) pseudo understanding (false understanding); 5) misunderstanding.

Discourse markers of misunderstanding in the English-speaking environment are found in the third phase of the interactive cycle of misunderstanding - the phase of corrective remarks. These are negative particles (no, not) in combination with exclamations and interjections, negative verb forms, lexical means with semantics of rational / irrational understanding. A sign of misunderstanding is the speaker's input of speech information, which is substantively conflicting to the existing statement. An indicator of misunderstanding in the communicative space of English prose is the discourse zone of the narrator, which captures the emotional arousal, ineffective cognitive efficiency and erroneous mental actions of the interpreter.

The notion “partial misunderstanding”, which serves as a basic representative of the concept “Misunderstanding” and denotes a mental state, is mainly defined in dictionaries through the verb misunderstand, denoting a mental action of not understanding. The prefix mis- comes from OE mis- and is used with verbs and verbal derivatives in the meaning of amiss, badly, wrongly, unfavorably. Alternative designations of the anti-concept “Misunderstanding”, such as misapprehension, misconception, misconstruction, in- (non)comprehension, etc., are also derivatives from the corresponding verbs and are formed using prefixes that give them a negative meaning.

In almost all dictionaries, they are interpreted in the most general terms as a negation of the content of the words understanding and understand. Thus, we can formulate two general conceptual features of the concept “Misunderstanding” (they are designated by us in Roman numerals). Sign (I) “lack of understanding of what is happening” is allocated according to the following definitions: fail (failure) to understand (a question, situation, instruction etc.) (WNED, WNWD, LDAE, Merriam-Webster); be unable to understand something (LA). The general conceptual



sign (II) “wrong, erroneous understanding” is allocated on the basis of such definitions as: fail (failure) to understand (something said, done, etc.) correctly | properly, understand (something said, done, etc.) wrongly | incorrectly (LDCE, LA, Roget's II, OUP); mistake of (meaning or intention) (WNWD, WordNet, Ultralingua); do not understand properly (CCELD). This form of definitions of lexemes misunderstand and misunderstanding, as a reference to the corresponding positive concept: see understand(ing) (Columbia, Roget's II), confirms that in the content of the anti-concept there is a complete denial of the content of the corresponding concept.

Actualization of individual conceptual features of the anti-concept “Misunderstanding” occurs through the negation of the corresponding features of the concept “Understanding”. The signs of the anti-concept are distinguished by us, mainly, by analyzing statements containing either the derivatives under consideration or negative syntactic constructions with the verb understand.

The first conceptual sign of the anti-concept is formulated by us as (1) “inability to perceive what is happening, what people hear, read, observe”; it is actualized in statements such as: *I must have misunderstood what she was saying – she talks so fast.*

*I think he was phoning from a pub – it was so noisy I couldn't understand a word he said.*

The next example of actualization of certain conceptual signs of the anti-concept “Misunderstanding” is the denial of the feature (2) “inability to think, to draw conclusions as the result of thinking.” This feature is actualized in statements of the type: *I don't understand why the experiment failed.*

Conceptual sign (3) “inability to act properly, to understand the situation” is actualized in the following examples: *I think I had better explain the situation in case you misunderstood it (LA); She didn't really understand the situation (NOD); I am*

sorry. I misunderstood. I thought you were going on holiday tomorrow, not next Friday (LA).

The anti-concept feature (4) “lack of intelligence, ability to learn” is actualized in statements such as: *His ridiculous comments were obviously based on complete misunderstanding:*

*I'm not very good at chemistry and I never really understood physics.*

The next example of actualization of a single conceptual attribute of the anticoncept “Misunderstanding” is the negation of the attribute (5) “inability to empathy”, which is reflected in statements such as:

*She felt very alone and misunderstood; Why am I always misunderstood by people who work with me?; He is one of football's most misunderstood men;*

*I don't understand him – one minute he's smiling and friendly and the next he won't have anything to do with me.*

By negating feature (6), the anti-concept feature “discrepancy of opinions” is formulated: actualized in such examples as: *They usually sort out their misunderstandings; We had a slight misunderstanding over the bill.*

In the content of the anti-concept “Misunderstanding” there are additional conceptual signs (7) “spat, little quarrel”, and (8) “misunderstanding, confusion”. Feature (7) is updated in such definitions as: quarrel, slight quarrel; an argument that is not a very serious one; debate, clash, rift, squabble.

This feature can be objectified in statements such as: *We've had our misunderstandings in the past, but we're good friends now; We were not quarrelling; it was just a misunderstanding (Columbia),*

The misunderstandings between territories have grown during the emergency (Britannica). Feature (8) is updated in definitions and examples of the type: be confused about, confuse (STAE); I told him to meet me here half an hour ago, but perhaps he misunderstood and thought a different restaurant;

Harry got angry because he thought Booby was after his job. But it was all a misunderstanding; There must be some misunderstanding – *I don't have a sister* (WordNet); There must be some misunderstanding *I thought I ordered a smaller model* (OALD).

The closest synonym for misunderstanding is incomprehension and its derivatives. Their meanings correspond to the general conceptual attribute (I) “lack of understanding” and are defined in dictionaries as lack of understanding, failure to understand; the state of not understanding.

Explication of a complete misunderstanding is carried out by a combination with the words blank, complete, entire, for example: Her explanations were met with blank incomprehension (OALD); They gave him a look of complete incomprehension (NOD).

In the semantics of these means, such individual signs of the concept under study can be actualized, such as “inability to perceive” – *His French accent is so strong I find it incomprehensible*;

“Inability to explain what is happening, to interpret what is meant” – It is incomprehensible that anyone should live in such out- of-the-way place (LA). Additionally, the emotional component of the meaning can be explicated, for example, “surprise” – *Didn't go on staring in incomprehension*.

The element of partial misunderstanding is also actualized in negative syntactic constructions with the verb comprehend and the noun comprehension, for example: *One may be unable to comprehend a poem, no matter how clearly one understands every sentence of it*;

*The process of family breakdown cannot be fully comprehended without also studying other external facts*;

*They didn't comprehend how hard he had struggled*;

*The child read the story but didn't comprehend its meaning*; There are some things happening on our planet that even scientist do not comprehend (LA). The

meaning of the construction beyond somebody's comprehension also contains the semantic attribute "surprise", for example: How anyone can write such rubbish is beyond my comprehension.

*He was caught up in frightening events far beyond his comprehension.* In statements with these syntactic constructions, several conceptual signs are simultaneously detailed, which correlate both with the ability to understand any global, complex scientific issues, and phenomena of a particular nature.

These means can objectify the actual lack of physical perception: *I was sure I had misheard her question*; If we are given a sentence pair which is distinguished by a juncture, we often mishear or are uncertain (Britannica), and also express the conceptual attribute (2) "ignorance of what is happening",

for example: *I don't see how a diabetic can overdose on sugar when they are taking insulin; She says she is going to buy a house, but I don't see how. She has no money.*

In these tools, a combination of signs can be objectified in examples of a volumetric nature: I fail to see what you are getting at (what you meant);

We talked to her for an hour, but we couldn't make her see the sense | reason; Everyone else laughed but I couldn't see the point of the joke; *I didn't see the point of his last remark; You just don't see. It's not that I don't want to give up smoking. I simply can't.*

The semantics of negative syntactic constructions with sensory verbs can contain emotional components of meaning, for example, "surprise":

*I was surprised that he couldn't see my point of view or "irritation": I don't see why I should help her.*

The meaning of misunderstanding can be emphasized when using the verb see in negative constructions with causative verbs: We talked to her for an hour, but we couldn't make her see the sense or reason.

In statements with similar constructions, the undesirability of a misunderstanding is often explicated, for example: *Please don't put the wrong construction on his behavior. I like Jenny, don't get me wrong, but I do think she acts a little childishly at times; He wasn't like some of the men I knew. Don't get me wrong, he is no wimp, just a little shy.*

Undesirable misunderstanding on the part of the interlocutor is explained by the possibility of an unjustifiably negative reaction to the words and actions of the speaker and, as a result, negative emotions, for example: *Don't get me wrong and be offended.*

We have systematized linguistic units, the meanings of which indicate their belonging to a single field of means of expression of the concept partial "Misunderstanding". The distinctive components of meaning were characterized, which oppose the allocated funds to each other and determine the scope of their use (implementation and expansion of certain conceptual features).

It was also found that the means of expressing misunderstanding may contain in their semantics a negative assessment of this phenomenon and emotional components ("surprise", "upset", "irritation"), reflecting the reaction of communicants to manifestations of misunderstanding in speech communication.

## Conclusions to Chapter One

We can summarize that the whole set of scientific ideas about discourse that interact with each other and are inseparable parts of one concept, testifies to the frequent use of this term in modern science, but at the same time emphasizes the absence of transparent boundaries and a finite number of structural components of this concept.

Based on the foregoing provisions, it can be concluded that dialogic discourse is a complex type of speech activity that involves the participation of cognitive processes (sensations, perceptions, attention, memory, thinking) that provide knowledge of the outside world and communication of interlocutors. Participating in the generation of statements, cognitive processes determine the success of speech activity, the richness of speech, the quality of perception and understanding of it to listeners, the speed of all processes at certain stages of speech activity, as well as the speed of code transitions from the mental (internal) code to the external speech code and vice versa. In addition, speech itself is the highest level of cognitive processes that accompanies the processes of auditory perception, verbal memory, presentation, verbal-logical thinking and is a necessary means of dialogic communication.

The main communicative load of cue-corrections is aimed at eliminating the cognitive dissonance felt by one of the communicators. This communicative-restorative function is performed through the introduction of additional semantic-pragmatic information, repetitions, paraphrases, speech clarifications, additions and explanations. Lexical and syntactic means, semantic and pragmatic content and functionality of English corrective remarks are significant, which reveals the prospects for further research.

In the course of our study, we found a set of basic strategies and tactics that are used by speakers to get out of the situation, a misunderstanding. For self-regulation, accommodation is the key strategy, it aims to adapt its discourse to the needs of the

interlocutor. In the correction of another, we trace the strategy of compensating for relevance, which balances the communication process, reveals the existing understanding, and modifies the addressee's replica. In the future, the prospect is the study of specific strategies and tactics used depending on the social class, gender and age, that is, the dependence of the choice of strategies and tactics on social variables.

## CHAPTER TWO. PRAGMATIC ASPECT OF MISUNDERSTANDING

### 2.1. Speech acts of misunderstanding

The communicative context includes, first of all, the communicative competence, which is defined as the choice and implementation of language behavior programs depending on a person's ability to navigate in a given communication situation (Hirst, p. 41).

Lingual cognitive analysis of misunderstanding as a type of interpretation "in the practical plane explores the specifics of the misunderstanding as a communicative-cognitive phenomenon at different information and content levels of discourse: propositional, reference, pragmatic. The misunderstanding which covers anomalies of algorithm of construction of mental representation of discourse is analyzed.

At the deep cognitive level, misunderstanding is manifested in the misunderstanding of the semantic components of discourse: the semantic framework in the format of the propositional content of discourse, and its actualized counterpart - reference content with all elements of external situational relevance, as well as communicative motivation in the form of pragmatism. Adequate interpretation of the components of discourse is a guarantee of a "perfect understanding" during dialogue games. But the incompleteness of individual semantic components and incorrect interpretive course form a mental representation of the discourse on the basis of inadequate semantic constructs, create cognitive preconditions for misunderstanding as a type of interpretation.

Thus, a person's communication skills come to the fore, namely his operation with a strategic and tactical arsenal, primarily in overcoming misunderstanding. If the speaker is not able to adequately implement strategies or tactics or interpret the strategic behavior of the interlocutor, probability the occurrence of misunderstandings



increases. Elaboration of the situation from a strategic point of view vision is closely intertwined with the pragmatic causes of misunderstanding, representing prospects for future research (Gorfein, 1989).

The main causes of misunderstandings depending on the level of occurrence:

1) impossibility / misunderstanding of the semantic component:

*Raj: I still want him on my balcony. I say we postpone it every two months.*

*Sheldon: Hold on. Bimonthly is an ambiguous term, do you mean move it once a month or twice a month?*

*Paradise: twice a month.*

*Sheldon: Then no.*

In this example, the misunderstanding arises because of the semantic meaning of the word “every two months”, which contains lexical ambiguity. The ambiguity of this word is difficult to understand between communicators, because the concept laid down in the speaker is not reflected in the mind of the translator with the desired value and needs further interpretation. By restoring (clarifying the addressee of the nested lexical meaning) mutual understanding is restored.

2) impossibility / misunderstanding of the pragmatic component:

*Penny: Eh, so Christy, what are your plans?*

*Christie: Well, well, Howard said he'd take me shopping in Beverly Hills.*

*Penny: Yes, no, I meant plans to find a place to live. Except with me, not that I don't like having you, but it's a bit crowded here.*

In this passage, “plans” are a key concept that the recipient misinterprets. The proposal remains unchanged, but investment has a different pragmatic meaning. Given the situational context, we understand that by resorting to an indirect communicative act (“What are your plans?”), Penny wanted to hint that it was time for her sister Christie to look for another place to live, but she couldn't I misinterpret it.

Some linguists, including K. Fossler, interpret misunderstandings as a gap at some point. The spiritual-linguistic connection between the speaker and the listener, for example, if what is said figuratively is taken literally or vice versa:

*“Well, I met someone there ...”*

*“Congratulations,” Jack said coldly.*

*“Don’t be an idiot. I mean, I’ve met an extraordinary person, someone – well, someone who may have been the most important person I’ve ever met in my life. The most important person any of us could meet. to meet ...”*(Lakoff, pp. 107–108).

In the last statement of his ideas there are consonant concepts of cognitive dissonance – the mental state of the addressee, which accompanies the misunderstanding.

In general, the result of interpretation can be considered as a logically connected world, a formed model world with its own connections.

Consider an example of dialogic discourse with misunderstandings provoked by ontological and communicative contexts.

*Alan: You know, Sherry, I would really like to see more of you*

*Sherry: Maybe we should wait and see how the night goes.*

*Alan: Oh, no. I mean I have only got one good eye. Can we change places?*

*Sherry: Sure (Austin).*

The ontological context is constructed based on what Alan has damaged his own eye, so he is forced to wear a blindfold. He meets his ex-girlfriend at dinner, with the same bandage. In the process of their communication, a misunderstanding arises, which is caused by the ambivalence of the statement “I would really like to see more of you.” While producer Alan invests in this the phrase has a direct meaning, given the ontological context (its damaged eye), the addressee Sherry interprets his statement in a conventional manner, believing that Alan wants to initiate the resumption of relations.

So, in this situation Sherry misinterprets Alan's strategy, his illocutionary goal because that a man refers to a literal meaning and a woman to a metaphorical one. Worth it note that Sherry demonstrates egocentrism in her interpretation because she does not take into account the ontological context. The woman infects the meaning that is closer to its understanding, perception.

*“After the meeting, people trickle out of the room, still talking, and I go round the table, picking up coffee cups. “It was very good to meet you, Mr Harper”, I can hear Connor saying eagerly. “If you’d like a transcript of my presentation ...” “You know, I don’t think that will be necessary”, Jack says in that dry, quizzical voice. “I think I more or less got the gist”. Oh God. Doesn’t Connor realize he’s trying too hard?” (L)*

In the presented example, in the inner speech of the protagonist, there is a comment about the interlocutor's misunderstanding of inappropriate, obsessive behavior. Lexical (saying eagerly; dry, quizzical voice; oh God) and stylistic markers (rhetorical question “Doesn’t he realize ...?”) In the heroine's inner speech indicate that the lack of understanding in this case irritates her.

If the listener is aware of the misunderstanding, he can express it in a certain communicative form: in the form of a direct admission of his own misunderstanding, with the help of re-asking, clarification; can express surprise, irritation.

Propositional content is a central constitutive element in the structure of mental representation of discourse. It builds a semantic series of discourse, which is interpreted by the addressee. The format of suggestion errors is different and concerns the qualitative and quantitative reproduction. The discourse texture and the addressee factor become the key to effective communication and mutual understanding during speech interaction, or cause communicative deviations. Producer statements with an excessive amount or complexity of supply information have a high risk of misunderstanding. Metaphor, abstractness, ambiguity, diffusion, incompleteness -

discourse features that form the communicative basis of misunderstanding as a type of interpretation.

Misunderstanding can be expressed explicitly in the direct speech of the character. In this case, it should be considered that the misunderstanding is explicated by the performative speech act of misunderstanding. To do this, use the negative form of the verb is understood. The following example illustrates a direct expression of misunderstanding implemented by the phrase “I don’t understand”. A character gives an expensive card to another character, emphasizing his nobility, because he had the opportunity to keep it for himself.

If the listener is aware of the misunderstanding, he can express it in a certain communicative form: in the form of a direct admission of his own misunderstanding, with the help of re-asking, clarification; can express surprise, irritation.

Misunderstanding can be expressed explicitly in the direct speech of the character. In this case, it should be considered that the misunderstanding is explicated by the performative speech act of misunderstanding. To do this, use the negative form of the verb understand. The following example illustrates a direct expression of misunderstanding implemented by the phrase “*I don’t understand*”. A character named Thorin expresses misunderstanding, because he first encounters this artifact, as well as the family history associated with this card:

*“Your father could not remember his own name when he gave me the paper, and he never told me yours; so on the whole I think I ought to be praised and thanked. Here it is ”, said he handing the map to Thorin.*

*“I don’t understand”, said Thorin, and Bilbo felt he would have liked to say the same. The explanation did not seem to explain.*

*“Your grandfather”, said the wizard slowly and grimly, “gave the map to his son for safety before he went to the mines of Moria. Your father went away to try his luck with the map after your grandfather was killed; and lots of adventures of a most*

*unpleasant sort he had, but he never got near the Mountain. How he got there I don't know, but I found him a prisoner in the dungeons of the Necromancer."*

Regarding the social context, a person's social status includes many subtypes: gender, race, nationality, qualifications, education, position, which shape his behavior, views.

In addition, there are texts in the social context and discourses are generated. Accordingly, social reality and discourse are two dimensions that constantly intersect, overlap and interact. Neglect information embedded in the social context, or lack of understanding can be detrimental to the further course of interaction, in addition there is a high probability of communication escalating into a misunderstanding, as well as conflict. To demonstrate the role of the social context, we present a specific communicative situation:

*Missy: Any news you want me to pass along to Mom?*

*Sheldon: Well, she might be interested to know that I have refocused my research*

*from bosonic string theory to heteronic string theory.*

*Missy: Yeah, I'll just tell her you said hey (Bronte).*

In this fragment of the dialogic discourse, misunderstanding arises because of the difference in the social affiliation of the speakers, namely, in the sphere of professional activity.

With the help of dialogical discourse, the speaker can express his lack of understanding of the speech message in external speech, and in internal speech, evaluate the speech behavior of the interlocutor as a lack of understanding of his message:

*Julies got it wrong. He does know, and true to form, he's backing off. Oh God, why didn't I play harder to get, why didn't I pretend to be cool?*

*"I just don't know what to do."*

*"I don't understand"* (Green, p. 138).

Dialogical discourse, which expresses misunderstanding in inner speech, is, as a rule, more detailed than in outer speech. He can take the form of reasoning – talking to himself. An example of such sentence which includes the transition from one topic to another (from the statement of one's own misunderstanding to the search for a way out of this situation), is the following passage:

*I didn't do all this, except for another wrong name. What was I supposed to say? Should I correct my company name? If he registered there, would I just pay more attention to it if I mentioned it now? What would Andy think – would all this be passed on to Nick at headquarters? Who will take the blame for the state of anarchy that erupted during the KFC press call? (Wallace, p. 111).*

*An example is internal speech, and the topic of misunderstanding, which characterizes the representative of another generation, ie, different from the author of meta-statements, is the following passage:*

*The vicar sighed. "Oh, my dear Bobby," he said. "Will nothing shake your annoying callousness? It saddens me more than I can say. Here you are confronted face to face with death – with sudden death. And you can joke about it! Sacred, it's just a joke for your generation."*

*Bobby moved his legs. If his father couldn't see it, of course you were joking about something because you felt bad about it – well, he couldn't see it! That wasn't what you could explain. With death and tragedy, you had to hold a hard upper lip. But what could you expect? No one in their fifties understood anything at all. They had the most unusual ideas.*

*I hope it was a war, Bobby thought faithfully. This upset them, and they never became direct again (Christie, p. 11).*

The means of expressing misunderstanding can be classified, firstly, depending on which of the direct participants in the communication revealed the misunderstanding – the speaker or the hearer. If the speaker finds a misunderstanding, he usually tries to resolve it. Indication of misunderstanding from the speaker's point

of view when addressing the listener (misunderstanding) is most often expressed through evaluative statements, such as: You are confused (confused, confused) (Hornby). Such statements can be introduced by constructions that express an opinion: *I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say.*

*No, you're wrong, she didn't say that.*

*The speaker's statements may take on an emotional connotation and cast doubt on the listener's communicative competence: Do you have any idea what I am trying to explain?*

*The undesirable nature of a misunderstanding can be expressed in imperative statements that prevent its occurrence, for example: Do not misunderstand me!; Don't get me wrong and take offense.*

*Adherence to the principle of politeness can force the speaker to use interrogative constructions, by means of which he controls the process of conversation and prevents misunderstandings: Are you following me?; Do you understand my meaning? Do you understand what I mean?*

*When the listener is aware of a misunderstanding (I – misunderstanding), the reaction may be different.*

Sometimes it is restrained and expressed through neutral evaluative statements. For example: *I had listened to the conversation but I understood nothing* (Cronin, p. 46); *I don't understand this but John will explain; I didn't see the point of the last remark;*

Misunderstanding is often characterized by a temporary state of the listener: I was so confused in today's history lesson. I didn't understand anything. As a self-justification, the listener can point out the incomprehensibility of the message, noting that no one can understand this message:

*"If anyone can make head or tail of that", he reported, with professional irritation, "he damned well ought to be an authority on lexplication du texte"* (Snow, p. 57). It can be noted that in relation to his "I" the fact of misunderstanding is

justified, although in general the linguistic personality recognizes that this state should be given a negative assessment.

So, expressing the fact that they do not understand the message, the speaker and listener retain their prototypical roles and simultaneously act as observers interpreting their own discourse.

Some means that do not have a negative evaluative component of meaning in their semantics can acquire it in the interpretation of misunderstanding: *I tried to make him understand but he never gets the message.*

This statement gives a generalized characteristic of a person (he never gets the message), which can be interpreted as a negative assessment of his intellectual abilities. The observer can express an assumption or opinion that the misunderstanding could have occurred: *I told him to meet me here half an hour ago, but perhaps he misunderstood and thought I meant a different restaurant; I don't think she got what was I was talking about.*

In this case, the emotions of the observer in relation to the incomprehensible can be expressed: *I was surprised that he couldn't see my point of view .*

Reflection of a personal attitude to the subject of misunderstanding enhances the expressive coloration of the statement, since “the effect of expressiveness, or “highlighting” some information is achieved by strengthening the modality within the framework of some linguistic expression that is holistic in meaning” (Sacks, 1987).

For example: *We talked to her for an hour, but we couldn't make her see the sense of what we thought was the best way for her to do.*

Analysis of linguistic facts confirms the position that the message takes its place in a certain semantic continuum, in a certain space. To explicate misunderstanding, the following can be used:

In examples of this group, there is a sensory perception of a speech message by the subject of perception and the simultaneous awareness and / or expression of a misunderstanding of this message by some of the communication participants or an



observer, for example: *He spoke so fast that I couldn't follow him (what he said). I didn't quite catch what you said.*

*Don't tell Simon that – he might take it the wrong way; The last scene is open to misconstruction.* The author of the message can predict a misunderstanding by a real or potential partner: What the politician really meant will not be clear until we examined the text of his speech.

The difficulty of studying misunderstanding lies in the fact that it can arise both in a separate conversation and within the framework of a longer communicative space. As an example, in which misunderstanding arises and manifests itself only within the framework of this given conversation, we will cite an excerpt from the novel by Charles Bronte “Jane Eyre”:

“Now” he continued, again addressing me, *“I have received the pilgrim – a disguised deity, as I verily believe. Already it has done me good: my heart was a sort of charnel; it will now be a shrine”.*

Jane Eyre does not understand this statement, so she interrupts the conversation and reports her misunderstanding:

*“That speak truth, sir, I / don't understand you at all: I cannot keep up the conversation, because it has got out of my depth.”*

Then she explains which part of the speech message she understood:

*“Only one thing I know: you said you were not as good as you should like to be, and that you regretted your own imperfection; – one thing I can comprehend: you intimated that to have a sullied memory was a perpetual bane”* (Bronte, p. 164).

In this example, the expression of misunderstanding occurs with the help of appropriate linguistic means within the framework of the direct generation of conversation between the speaker and the listener.

In the next example, the speaker becomes, as it were, a listener to himself. He begins an internal dialogue with himself, in which he expresses a lack of understanding of the message he has just produced (he accused his friend of breaking

his pen holder, allegedly given to him by his late mother, although in fact this thing was bought by him):

Philip took two pieces of the pen holder and looked at them. He tried to keep from sobbing. He felt extremely unhappy. Still, he couldn't say why, because he knew very well that he had bought a pen holder during his last vacation at Blackstable for one and two pence. He didn't know what made him make up this pathetic story, but he was as unhappy as if it were true.

When he thought about this incident, he was very worried and decided that he should go to Luard and tell him that the story was a fabrication.

*The lie of the speaker himself seems so irrational to the speaker that he expresses in his inner speech his misunderstanding as to why it causes him so much emotion:*

*But he could not understand why he should have been so sincerely influenced by the story he was making (Maugham, p. 57-58).*

The speaker may anticipate a misunderstanding in a potential listener in a future or imaginary conversation. For example, in the following passages, speakers are confident that their messages will not be understood during a future conversation:

Without looking at the headlines he made for his speech. He did not agree with Robert Browning's references because he feared that they would be over the heads of his listeners (Joyce, p. 203).

*How can I explain this to Julis when I know she wouldn't understand, especially given that she met Nick on her territory when he was dressed in clothes he usually never wears to match him (Austin, p. 121).*

The protagonist of A. Sillitov's novel, a young man with cancer, presents the following development of the conversation in the event of a possible collision with the police: If the coppersmith asked us where we went, with this hump in my gut? – What it is? he would ask and I would say:

“Growth”. “What do you mean growth, boy?” he would ask the narcissists how (Sillito, p. 27).

The analysis shows that listeners can resist clearing up misunderstandings. In the following example, the governor ordered the actress, who publicly ridiculed the noble marquis who was present at her concert, to go to her and apologize. The actress begins the conversation with the erroneous statement that the Marquise may have misunderstood her words:

For Camilla, her half-closed eyes had an air of weary authority, and she began almost timidly, “I’m coming, señora, to make sure you couldn’t miss something I said last night, that your grace has done me the honor of visiting my theater. Your Grace, I may have misunderstood and thought that my words were intended to despise your mercy.”

The Marquis, in order not to humiliate himself in the eyes of the actress, does not recognize the very fact of insult with her false misunderstanding:

*“Misunderstood? Misunderstood?” said the Marquis ...*

*Does your mercy not offend her humble servant? Your Grace realizes that a poor actress in my position can be taken beyond her intentions ... that it is very difficult ... that everything ...”*

*“How can I be offended, señora? All I remember is that you performed well.”*

*Resisting the final clarification of the situation, the Marquis continues to express a misunderstanding, disagreeing with the fact that she was offended, and admitting his own “guilt” to the actress:*

*“Any misunderstandings between us are so clearly to blame,” isn’t it wonderful that she forgives me so quickly? (Wilder, p. 29-32).*

The constant reference to resentment and guilt in the development of this conversation serves as a concrete confirmation of the identified above associative connection between the concept of “Misunderstanding” and the concepts of clusters “Failure” and “Confusion”.

In general, this example shows that the expression of misunderstanding can occur in the interests of the participant in the conversation, becoming his only communicative goal.

In addition, from the examples given, it becomes obvious that misunderstanding can be expressed both by explicit and implicit linguistic means. As explicit means in a conversation, all the means identified in the second chapter of this work that denote the mental state of misunderstanding, such as lexemes of misunderstanding, negative syntactic constructions with verbs of mental activity, verbs of knowledge, verbs of sensory perception, syntactic constructions with some verbs of physical action and corresponding phraseologically related combinations.

By implicit means we mean such constructions that, while not having the direct meaning of misunderstanding, at the same time express it in an indirect form. The following example provides both direct and indirect indications of misunderstanding:

*“That,” said Hercule Poirot, “is exactly what I have been asking myself, Mademoiselle!”*

*“I don't understand you.”*

*“Who is Stephen Graham?”*

*She caught him by the arm.*

*“What's in your mind? What are you thinking about? You just stand there – behind that great mustache of yours – blinking your eyes in the sunlight, and you don't tell me anything. You're making me afraid – horribly afraid. Why are you making me afraid?”* (Christie, p. 171).

Misunderstandings as the result of interpretive activities arise under conditions of various propositional ambiguities. The share of the latter can be minimal (misunderstanding of a particular term), or maximum (incorrect identification of the macro-proposal of the discourse).

Representing an indirect speech act of misunderstanding. The following section of the dissertation proposes a classification of speech acts expressing

misunderstanding in an indirect form; at the same time, we adhere to the traditional approach to the analysis of indirect speech acts and their generally accepted classification.

Obviously, we can talk about different degrees of misunderstanding of the speech message. Quite often the listener, having understood the meaning of the message in the whole does not understand any part of it. However, in some cases, a speech message may not be fully understood, and to overcome such a misunderstanding, significant communicative efforts of the interlocutors are required.

In dialogic discourse, examples of explicit expression of misunderstanding are quite rare, in most cases, misunderstanding is expressed indirectly, through other speech acts. Expressions of misunderstanding through indirect speech acts, such as surprise, mistrust, explanation, irritation, etc., predominate quantitatively in our factual material and have a wider range of means of expression of misunderstanding (lexical, syntactic, stylistic and intonation means).

The transformation of explicit propositional content into internal representation is usually not difficult. Instead, the transformation of implicit propositional content into mental representation is accompanied by interpretive deviations. Understanding the unspoken is the main field of misunderstanding, because the derivation of implicit propositional information is achieved by inference actions based on their own presumptions, the subjective organization of information on the principle of relevance, the capabilities of the individual conceptual system. These factors, as well as the conflict presupposition zone, create preconditions for potential misunderstandings, as they often specify the coordinates of incorrect interpretative moves.

The following example illustrates a situation where the main character realizes her own misunderstanding. At the conference important to her career, she ignored almost all the information, and when she finally noticed the speaker's speech, she began to guess that he was going to terminate the agreement. Her inner language expresses her own misunderstanding and concern:

*“We appreciate the functional and synergistic partnership that Panther and Glen Oil used to do,” says Doug Hamilton. “But you will agree that we are clearly going in different directions. Different directions? Is that what he's been talking about all this time? My stomach rushes anxiously. He can't be – is he trying to get out of the deal?”*

On the other hand, a clear misunderstanding is not always a signal that a misunderstanding has indeed taken place in a particular communicative situation. The communicator may “pretend” that he does not understand the interlocutor, that is, in fact, an imaginary misunderstanding is possible.

Imaginary misunderstanding is used by the speaker when he wants to postpone the moment of answering a question or leave it.

*“What happened?” Bilbo called. “What did you lose?”*

*“It shouldn't ask us,” Gollum shouted. “Not his business, no, hollum! It losst, gollum, gollum, gollum”*

In this case, Bilbo asks what happened and why Gollum cries out for help, allegedly not understanding the reasons for such behavior.

In addition, it seems that misunderstanding – bullying should be considered as an imaginary misunderstanding. In the following example, the head of the company Jack stops the monologue of the employee with a request to simplify speech. To achieve the desired result, he has to stop the speaker several times. This situation illustrates a situational misunderstanding on the part of the speaker: incorrect prioritization in one's own work. Misunderstanding is realized by asking and clarifying the listener:

*“Sorry about that,” Jack Harper says, raising his hand. He speaks for the first time, and everyone turns to look. A thorn of anticipation is heard in the air, and Artemis glows smugly. “Yes, Mr. Harper?” she says. “I have no idea what you're talking about,” he says. “The whole room is disgusted with shock, and I nod with laughter, meaningless.” As you know, I've been out for a while.” He smiles. “Can you translate what you said into standard English? “Oh,” Artemis says, looking*

*embarrassed. Well, I was just saying that from a strategic point of view, despite our corporate vision ... “it silences its expression.” Try again, he says kindly. – Without using the word strategic.” “Oh,” Artemis says again and rubs her nose. “Well, I just said that. .. we need to ... focus on ... on what we’re doing well.” “ Ah!” Jack Harper’s eyes are shining. “Now I understand.”*

*Smith is already more insistent on the proposal “I doubt the honesty of the target dream”*

*Mr. Smith nodded. “Well, I think it’s all right, sir,” he said doubtfully again. “What do you mean, Mr. Smith Dersingham was impatient?”*

*“Well,” he hesitated, “I don’t quite know. I’m just wondering if all is well.”*

*At the moment, Dursingham is unaware of his misunderstanding, which is expressed in his irritation at Smith's insistence: “Oh, don’t say that,” exclaimed Dersingham angrily. “Of course, everything is fine. I’m not a fool. It’s a nuisance, and I wouldn’t do it if I could help, but that’s okay. A lot of employees who work on a commission have that arrangement and get their money as soon as the order passes.”*

This example demonstrates the relationship between the concept of “Misunderstanding” and the conceptual cluster “Unrecognizability”.

This is followed by a discussion of the topic of fraud, which for the first time makes a suggestion about a possible deception committed by Holspy, and about the possible misunderstanding of this deception by employees: *“I think they do, Mr. Derzingham. But you think of ordinary travelers, right? sir, guys who just get a very small commission, don’t they? “*

*“No, I don’t. I’m thinking of other guys who, uh, work a lot,” Mr. Derzingham said rather vaguely.*

*“Suppose Mr. Holspy leaves us! I can’t help but think about it, you know, sir.”*

In the process of telling what happened, Durzingham realizes his misunderstanding in retrospect, which is followed by Miss Durzingham’s reaction – she accuses her husband of misunderstanding, assessing the situation as a

communication failure, points to his stupidity by removing communicative guilt, says that provided for the following developments:

*He did not tell her a whole pathetic story.*

*Oh, Howard, you were stupid. Yes, you have. I will never believe you as a businessman. You told me I didn't understand these things, but I'm sure I understand people.*

The example from A. Christie's story "Birds of Stimfail" is an example of how misunderstanding as a communicative failure can be expressed in a clear accusation of the interlocutor as a subject of misunderstanding. As a result of the investigation, Poirot finds out that Harold, who became the object of fraud, considers the criminals to be two women who have nothing to do with the case. As Poirot announces the arrest of the criminals, Harold sees the women he considered blackmailers. He admits his misunderstanding, after which Poirot emotionally points out how deeply his misunderstanding is not exclaimed:

*"But I do not understand!"*

*"Now you don't understand! These are other ladies wanted by the police, the ingenious Mrs. Rice and the weeping Mrs. Clayton! These are famous birds of prey. These two make a living by blackmail."*

In the following example from J. Austin's novel "Mind and Sensuality", a complete misunderstanding arises because Mrs. Jennings overhears a conversation between Eleanor and Colonel Brandon about the future wedding of the latter and Eleanor's sister Marianne. Based on the overheard, Mrs. Jennings concludes that Eleanor is going to marry Brandon. The conversation begins with Mrs. Jennings informing Eleanor of her "discovery":

*"Well, Miss Dashwood," said Mrs. Jennings, smiling sharply as the gentleman stepped back, "I'm not asking you what the colonel told you; for, in my honor, I tried not to make this rumor, I could not help but catch up enough to understand his case."*



*And I assure you that I have never been so happy in my life, and I wish you joy with all my heart.”*

This misunderstanding leads to the choice of wrong proposals both by Mrs. Jennings (about the potential benefits of this marriage for Eleanor) and by Eleanor (about the possibility of visiting her married sister):

“Possibility!” Mrs. Jennings repeated, “Oh! So when a man has ever decided something like this, one way or another, he will soon find an opportunity. Well, my dear, I wish you joy again and again; and if there ever was a happy couple in the world, I think I’ll find out where to look for them soon.”

*“You probably want to go to Delaford after them,” Elinor said with a faint smile.*

*Misunderstanding leads to incorrect conclusions:*

*Why Mr. Ferrara was written about so hastily, she could not immediately understand. However, a few moments of reflection gave rise to a very happy idea, and she exclaimed, “Oh, now! I understand you. Mr. Ferrars must be this man.”*

*The misunderstanding is clarified much later, which is the end of this space of communication:*

*“My dear mother,” said Elinor, “what can you think of?” Why, Colonel Brandon’s only task is to benefit Mr. Ferrars.”*

*“Lord, bless you, my dear! – Of course you do not want to convince me that the colonel is marrying you only to give ten ligands to Mr. Ferrara!”*

Thus, the entire deployment of a conversation can be an expression of misunderstanding. The speech message for the sake of which the conversation was undertaken fades into the background. Instead, false propositions begin to be expressed, and then an expression of misunderstanding occurs, accompanied by its discussion and clarification.

The main reason for misunderstanding in dialogical discourse – violation of the maxims of the Cooperative Principle – can manifest itself not only in one specific

conversation between two specific interlocutors, but also in a series of conversations between different interlocutors, taking place at different times and in different places within a single communicative space.

Based on our own concept, we believe that the recipient eventually receives a semantic core of the statement or discourse, which reflects all possible information (propositional + reference + pragmatic), which is transmitted by the communicative message of the producer, but only in such a form (sometimes it acquires a significant transformation), in which it is mentally reproduced the addressee, because the semantic reception during the interpretive activity is always accompanied inference in relation to the information implicit in the statement (Bezmenova, p. 4–6).

In interpretation, one can rightly argue about the integration of meanings. Firstly, implicit (output information) obtained by interference, is added to the explicitly laid in the utterance and accordingly reflected in the mental reality of the interpreter in the form of internal representation. Such indifferent information is propositional and pragmatic.

It is irrelevant in what way – explicitly or implicitly – the information was given in the statement of the producer of the discourse. The addressee receives a mental model that reproduces the semantic-pragmatic content obtained from both sources, which flows into a single whole – the concept of expression.

The most difficult point of misunderstanding in the English-speaking environment is the lingual cognitive dysfunctions of the reproduction of the reference content in the mental representation of the addressee during the act of understanding, which is due to the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon. The inadequacy of the reference image in the mental reality of the listener often leads to misunderstanding, problematic clarification - to incomplete. Among the key aspects of the interpretive course in the reference zone are errors in clarifying the reference relation of individual terms, which is an essential aspect of the external-situational attachment of the whole statement. These include: the inability to reproduce the reference

relationship of individual singular terms and deictic elements due to contradictions in the area of situational presupposition, the choice of the wrong referent from among the potential, cognitive dissonance due to irrelevance (from the interpreter's point of view) of the identified referent.

In the following example from J. Priestley's novel "Angel Pavement", an unscrupulous businessman Golspie deceives his partner, Dursingham, in order to force him to pay for the delivery of a non-existent product. Golspie's deliberate and purposeful violation of the maxim of sincerity affects not only Durzingham, but also all people in this communicative space, for example, the accountant of Smith's company, Dearsingham's wife and others. For a long time, none of them understands that Golspie is lying, but, finally, the experienced Smith begins to guess about his misunderstanding of what is happening and expresses this in the form of a doubt about the reliability of the new treaty: *"I suppose this new arrangement's all right," said Mr. Smeeth dubiously.*

The expression of doubt as a manifestation of misunderstanding serves as a concrete proof of the associative connection of the concept "Misunderstanding" with the conceptual cluster "Confusion".

In the following example from the novel by I. McEwan "Amsterdam" there is an explicit expression of misunderstanding, realized as one's own communicative failure. Two friends, Clive and Vernoy, discuss a plan for revenge on their rival in a long-standing love affair. At the beginning of the conversation, Clive is internally aware of his misunderstanding and tries to clarify the situation, later he admits his misunderstanding in front of the interlocutor and assumes communicative guilt for this. During the conversation, the emotional state of each of them is unstable, which determines their speech behavior and the choice of the appropriate language means:

Clive gave the photographs back. He could not think clearly with the images still in his view. He said, *"So you're fighting to keep them out of paper."*

*It was part tease, part mischief, as well as a wish to delay voicing his thoughts.*

*Vernon was staring at him, amazed. "Are you mad. This is the enemy. I just told you, we've got the injunction lifted."*

*"Of course. Sorry. I wasn't quite with it"* (McEwan, p. 78).

Emotions manifested in this example, such as absent-mindedness (Not could not think clearly with the images still in his view), surprise (Vernon was staring at him, amazed), regret (Sorry) confirm the presence of an associative connection between the concept under study and the concepts of the "Confusion" and "Non-Compliance".

The analysis performed allows us to assert that the verb *misunderstand* with good reason can be called performative, since with its help (and with the help of appropriate alternative means) a special speech act of misunderstanding is performed.

The construction of the mental representation of the discourse by the recipient undergoes significant deviations under the conditions of violations in the understanding of co-referential relations - tracing of the referents during the discourse development. In contrast to interpretive errors in introducing referents into discourse, the inadequacy of referential discourse management is related to the impossibility of identifying an already actualized referent or making a strategically erroneous choice among a potential set of existing referents.

## **2.2. Specification speech act**

In the context of conversation, misunderstanding is associated, first of all, with ambiguity, ambiguity or hidden content of the content of the message, which needs to be clarified. The speech act of clarification, realized in a situation of misunderstanding (the so-called question-clarification), can be expressed in the form of a request to repeat what has just been said:

*We could feel her heart pounding ... It couldn't be possible that she died.*

*“Excuse me? What did you say?” she may have misunderstood the concierge (Barrett, p. 175).*

Clarification can be made in the form of a request for additional information using the questions “What and why” or their abbreviated versions:

*“But how did you actually find the woman they hired?”*

*“I looked for her in Denmark and found her there.”*

*“But why Denmark*

*Because Mrs. Ferrier’s grandmother was a Dane, and she herself is a perfectly Danish type. And there were other reasons” (Christie-1, p. 127).*

It is not easy for me to justify what Dinmont said next, but it was.

- something like, *“You know too much – it’s something that can sometimes be difficult for you. When you’re at least – I hope you won’t think ahead – you know too little. “*

*I stared at my cognac, which was circling around and which, as a result, jumped out of my glass. “What about?” That was all I could think of (Jacobson, p. 59).*

An explanation may be needed in the message, which is not clear as a result of separation from the conversation:

*“Why do you talk to yourself when your father is in trouble?” “What?” I asked, confused. “Wake up,” he shouted. I was stunned by the new vigilance / Everything came back too fast (Oakry, p. 17).*

A repetition of an incomprehensible part of the message can be used as an implicit requirement to clarify the content of the message:

*“OK,” George said. “And you won’t do bad things like Weed did.”*

*Lenny looked puzzled. “How I did it”*

*“Oh, so you forgot about that too, right? Well, I’m not going to remind you, I’m afraid you’ll do it again.”*

*A light of understanding flashed across Lenny's face. "They control us through Weed," he exploded triumphantly (Steinbeck, p. 13).*

The speech act of clarification, which explains the misunderstanding, can be expressed by huddling various constructions containing the verb to mean:

*"My idea is to print next week. What do you think?"*

*Clive pushed back his chair and clasped his hands behind his head. "I think," he said cautiously, "your staff is right. It's a really terrible idea."*

*"Value?"*

*– It will spoil it. "Dead right, it will be."*

*"I mean personally" (McEwan, p. 78).*

*Wesley was the first to find the cause. "Rose," he called, and the name spread on the lake and came up to her loudly, "do you have anything I can drink?"*

*"What do you mean?"*

*"I mean, I was thirsty" (Price, p. 220).*

To implement the speech act of clarification can be used a combination of several means of expression of clarification:

*Lady: Except that you cut a very stupid figure in the eyes of France.*

*Napoleon (quickly): What? (He throws the letter and pours out streams of barking) What do you mean? AND? Are you back on your tricks? Do you think I don't know what these documents contain? (The Show, p. 122).*

*As the examples show, the clarification may be accompanied by an emotional reaction, such as surprise:*

*"It should make JFK think twice," I said. It has always been very easy for me to be opposed to the opposition of the weak and the actions of the powerful. Of course, I now know that I am a radical that should not have been.*

*"Why did Dinmont ask that? He didn't have too much sense of humor, even for a priest."*

*"It's just a joke," I said. "I just knew" (Jacobson, p. 59).*

To consider these examples as an implicit means of expressing misunderstanding allows the context in which the speaker either describes to the subject of misunderstanding the consequences of actions (for example: It spoils it), or explains the hidden meaning of the message (Just a joke, I just knew), or explains the reason for choosing alternatives (I mean I'm thirsty).

### 2.3. Speech act of surprise

In case of violation of the expected course of events, which leads to the abnormality of the situation, the misunderstanding may be indirectly expressed by a speech act of surprise. The specificity of the situation determines the choice of discourse markers that signal surprise, such as the repetition of part of the message that caused the misunderstanding, or the use of an elliptical sentence consisting of one pronoun:

*“What a sarcastic smile,” Rachel said enthusiastically; “I declare that I am very afraid of you.”*

*“Oh, you can't hide anything from me – I know very well what that smile means.”*

*“What?” said Mr. Tapman, who himself had no idea (Dickens-1, p. 80).*

Expression of misunderstanding in conversation as an indication of violation of the maxims of the Cooperative principle Insufficient information content of speech messages is one of the most common causes of misunderstanding in conversation. An expression of misunderstanding in such a situation usually indicates a violation of the relevant maxim of the Cooperative Principle, namely, the maxim of the number “Make your contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary for this exchange of remarks.” In the following example, the misunderstanding is caused by the lack of information content of the messages exchanged between the young man and his elderly relative before their meeting. Without a proper understanding of a

young person's lifestyle, an elderly woman cannot understand how to travel without cash:

*"But I don't have the money," Stephen told her loudly. "What, dear? I just have to say goodbye to these nice people, they were so kind to me while I waited."*

*"I don't have any money myself, Aunt Wee." He uttered the words as best he could,*

*"No money." This time she heard.*

*"You must have something. You only see until tomorrow morning. Then I'll take the bank and put everything in order." "No money. No. Nothing."*

*For a moment they looked blankly, assimilating the situation. (Barrett, p. 64).*

Consider the influence of psychophysiological context on the emergence of a communicative situation of "misunderstanding".

*John: I went to see work in this surgery.*

*Sherlock: How was it?*

*John: Great. She is wonderful.*

*Sherlock: Who?*

*John: Work.*

*Sherlock: "She"?*

*John: It's (Sherlock).*

In this passage, John, Sherlock's assistant, is emotionally aroused after meeting a woman he liked very much. Under the influence of feelings, John can not fully adequately perceive and formulate statements. The emotional state partially "paralyzes" his mental processes, namely – distracts attention. Despite the fact that John controls the intonation, emotionality is manifested in the replacement of the pronoun it with she, when he talks about work (work), thereby provoking misunderstandings. Although John tries to hide his condition, it is very difficult for him to cope with emotionality. So, Sherlock, at first a little confused, quickly guesses about the woman involved and forms the right interventions.



*“Who are these unfortunate people?” said the Great Goblin.*

*“Oh and this!” said one of the drivers, pulling Bilbo’s chain so that he fell forward to his knees.*

*“We found them a shelter in our front door.”*

*“What do you mean by that?” said the Great Goblin, addressing Thorin. “To no avail, I guarantee! I’m probably spying on my people’s private business! Thieves, I should not be surprised to learn! Killers and friends of elves, unlikely! Come on! What do you have to say?” (Tolkien, p. 60).*

In this example, one of the heroes does not understand the meaning of the word “shelter” and interprets it extremely hostile, assuming all sorts of negative consequences.

The clarification can also be expressed in the form of one or more questions, which in the following example are asked ironically:

*“As soon as we fell asleep,” Gandalf continued, “a crack opened in the back of the cave; goblins came out and grabbed the hobbit and the dwarves and our squad of ponie”*

*“A pony army? What were you – a traveling circus? Or did you carry a lot of goods? Or do you always call six troops?” (Tolkien, p. 114).*

In this situation, Gandalf tells another character about what happened to him and his friends. For the first time in the conversation, he mentioned his ponies, which caused a misunderstanding among the character, who, they say, must provide travelers with housing, and therefore must know their exact number.

The clarification can also be expressed as a repeated question about what you have just heard. In the following example, the recipient began to say one word (robber), hesitated and ended his line with the word “hobbit”. The addressee had no idea about the course of thoughts of the addressee and perceived the received expression as a separate, still unknown to him word. This led to a clarification – whether he heard everything correctly:

*“What?”*

*“Bilbo Baggins, the storm is the hobbit,” said poor Bilbo, trembling.*

*“Burrahobbit?” said they were a little surprised. Trolls are slowly fascinated and may be suspicious of something new (Tolkien, p. 34).*

Clarification can be made in the form of a request for information using What-, Who- and Why-questions or their abbreviated versions. The world described in the novel by R.R. Tolkien, saturated with various fictional peoples, so the most common question is “who are you / they?”:

*“The captain of the guard came forward. “And – who is it?” he asked, pointing to Philly, Kill, and Bilbo.*

*“Sons of my father’s daughter,” replied Thorin, “Philly and Keeley of the Durin family, and Mr. Baggins, who traveled with us from the West” (Tolkien, p. 180).*

This example is notable for the fact that a misunderstanding (which is usually formulated as a reactive speech act) in this situation is proactive: the appearance of a new character begins with a remark about misunderstanding.

*“A tall man came forward, with dark hair and a gloomy face, and he shouted, “Hello, Turin!” Why do you forbid yourself as a robber in his hold? We are not enemies yet, and we are glad that you are alive without hope. We arrived hoping to find anyone who lived here; However, now that we have been met, there are questions for Aparli and the council.”*

*“Who are you and why would you participate?”*

*“I am the Bard, and the dragon was killed by my hand and your treasure was delivered” (Tolkien, p. 241).*

This example illustrates the first meeting of the heroes. The first, in absentia with Turin, introduces himself and offers negotiations, avoiding hostility. Thorin sees him for the first time and demands more information with a clarifying question.

Misunderstanding in the clarifying question can be emotionally charged, it can express confusion, fear, as evidenced by the author's comment:

*“Suddenly he learned that the man was getting up and approaching him. – Hello there! he called in a shaky voice. “Hi there! What is new?”*

*“What is this voice that speaks among the stones?” said the man, who stopped and looked at him not far from where Bilbo was sitting. Then Bilbo remembered his ring! “Well I'm blessed!” - he said. “It simply came to our notice then. Otherwise, I guess I could have spent a warm and comfortable night in bed!” (Tolkien, p. 261).*

In this example, Bilbo, hearing the footsteps, wants to know who is going. In response to his question, a remark is heard – clarifying the character, who loses the question of where the sound comes from, because he does not see its source, because Bilbo's finger is a ring that returns everyone who carries it into invisibility.

An inversion in a sentence may also indicate a speech act of surprise. In the following example, the protagonist Bilbo shows generosity, offering a magnificent gift to the king in exchange for his hospitality. The king does not understand why he deserved such a sacrifice:

*“Please,” said Bilbo, stuttering, standing on one leg, “accept this gift!” and he took a necklace of silver and pearls, which Dain had given him to part.*

*“How did I earn such a gift, O Hobbit?” said the king.*

*“Well, uh, I thought you didn't know,” said Bilbo, quite confused, “that, uh, some small return should be made for you, uh, hospitality. I mean even the robber's own I drank much of your wine and ate much of your bread” (Tolkien, p. 267).*

Speech act of surprise can also be expressed by the exclamation:

*At the same moment, Balin, who was a little ahead, shouted: “What was that? It seemed to me that I saw a flicker of light in the forest” (Tolkien, p. 139).*

This example illustrates a misunderstanding on the part of a hero named Balin, who is surprised to notice a sudden flash of light in the woods, which is interpreted as the presence of enemies.

Emotional tension associated with misunderstanding can be expressed in the irritation of RA. The author's commentary clearly demonstrates the negative connotation of the answer with such verbs as "cry", "scream", "shout", and the phrase "suffering and loss" indicates the emotional background of the episode – fear and loss:

"Feelings of fear and loss, like an echo of Shiveg Gollura, Saraot Bilbo, and, forgetting to even draw his sword, he slapped his hands in his pockets. And – there was still a ring in his left pocket, and it slipped on his finger. The goblins stopped. They could not see the sign of Osh. He disappeared. They shouted twice as loud as before, but not so enthusiastically.

*"Where?" they cried.*

*"Come back" to the back passage! Some shouted.*

*"Here!" some shouted. "This way!" others shouted". (Tolkien, 83).*

Irritation can also be expressed directly in the comments of the characters, for example, in the repetition of the syntactic structure:

*"Big elephants!" said Gandalf. "You're not such a revelry yourself. You've never drank raantelka!"*

*"What has that got to do with it? It was enough for me to do – with washing for fourteen!"*

*"If you dusted the mantelpiece, you'd find it just under the clock," Gandalf said, serving Bilbo's note (written, of course, on his own paper)" (Tolkien, p. 27-28).*

In this example, Gandalf is amazed that the extremely clean hobbit Bilbo has not yet wiped the dust from the fireplace. Bilbo, already annoyed that he had 14 uninvited guests on the eve of the conversation, does not understand why he should take care of the fireplace, given the scale of cleaning the whole house. Further, lexical markers of negative emotions indicate speech act of irritation:

*"The dwarves barely heard his little cries, though the only word they could catch was "help!"*"

*“What happened now on earth or under it?” said Thorin. “Of course, not a dragon, otherwise he would not continue to squeak” (Tolkien, p. 218).*

Thorin responds to cries for help instantly, allowing himself to express his misunderstanding of what could have happened to Bilbo this time.

The intensity of irritation can be expressed by a combination of lexical and syntactic markers with the author’s comment:

*– But what led you to the forest in general? the king asked angrily.*

*Thorin shut his mouth and said no more. (Tolkien, p. 155) The king angrily asked questions, not understanding the purpose of the visit of a whole company of travelers, who silenced a hero named Thorin, afraid to say too much.*

The verbal act of reproach as an indirect means of expressing misunderstanding is characterized by a more specific than in previous RA, the requirement to explain the misunderstood action:

*“Dine, I can tell you, it’s not coming out in two days now, and he has at least five hundred gloomy gnomes with him – many of them have had terrible dwarf and goblin wars that you have no doubt heard of. When they arrive, serious problems can arise.”*

*“Why are you telling us this? Are you betraying your friends or are you threatening us? Bard asked grimly.*

*“My dear Bard!” Bilbo squeaked. “Take your time! I have never met such suspicious people! I’m just trying to avoid trouble for all concerned” (Tolkien, p. 248).*

In this example, the speaker reproaches Bilbo for dishonesty, not understanding on whose side he is and which of them betrays, because here Bilbo reveals the secrets of those with whom he went all the way.

Another speech act that indirectly expresses misunderstanding is a speech act of doubt. This example illustrates a situation where the protagonist exaggerates Bilbo, offering such actions of the dragon, to which Thorin answers rhetorical questions, full

of doubts about what Bilbo offers. Thorin does not understand how cunning and unpredictable a dragon can be:

*“I’m sure we’re very dangerous here,” he said, “and I don’t see the point in sitting here.”*

Clarification also takes place in alternative issues. The following example illustrates a situation where one of the characters tries to encourage his companion with explanations, which is due to a misunderstanding of why his friend does not use all the chances of salvation:

*“Are you still in prison or are you free? If you – want to eat, and if you want – to continue this senseless adventure – it’s still yours, not mine – you better slap your hands and rub your feet and try to help me pull others – while there is a chance!”* (Tolkien, p. 178-179).

It should be noted that the distinction between types of contexts is presented approximate because all of these types are so closely interrelated, which sometimes seems very difficult to clearly define their affiliation to or another species. In addition, the causal nature of the misunderstanding is quite complex due to the breadth of the concept and its belonging to different areas. This is confirmed by the example with the social context, the original reason for the misunderstanding was the social context, which entails differences. in the cognitive bases of speakers. This correlation can be traced in other cases where the causes have several dimensions. So, the example proves the fact that the misunderstanding requires comprehensive consideration due to a lot of factors both lingual and extra lingual in nature.

As a type of interpretation, misunderstanding is characterized by a wrong course of thought, which leads to the construction of an inadequate internal model of communicative communication. This error is manifested in three strategic directions: proposing and verifying hypothetical interpretations at the initial stage of the act of understanding, deriving implicit information at the main stage of forming a mental representation of discourse, clarifying the compositional structure of discourse.

## 2.4. Speech act of irritation

The contextual plot of the situation of misunderstanding with emotional components determines its correspondence to a certain type of speech act, which reflects a certain emotional state. In those situations that can be attributed to the direct expression of the verbal act of irritation, there are appropriate semantic markers:

*“If anyone can do it with his head or tail,” he reported, with professional irritation, “he is damned, he must probably be an authority in the field of explaining the text”* (Snow, p. 57).

The expression of misunderstanding through this speech act may show a gradual increase in irritation:

As he struggled with his thoughts, he gradually became more and more irritable with the world around him, and things finally became so bad that Indra had to take an action.

*“Walter,” she said firmly as Anne went to bed tearfully after an argument involving many accusations from both sides, “it will save you a lot of trouble if you face the facts and stop trying to deceive yourself.”*

*“What do you mean, devil”* (Clark, p. 178).

According to dictionaries, the indicators of irritation are nervous excitement, annoyance and dissatisfaction. In addition, a negative assessment is usually built into the semantics of descriptions of the verbal act of irritation:

*“I never thought,” he thundered, looking into my mother’s face, “I never thought I should have the honor of meeting the mother of my almond blossom.”*

*“What is he saying?” Mother asked excitedly, clasped in the bear’s arms of the Turk.*

Like a verbal act of surprise, irritation can be expressed unintentionally. However, as examples show, the speech act of irritation, indirectly expressing

misunderstanding, can be, like some other indirect speech acts, attributed to violations of the principle of politeness.

In a conversation, expressing a misunderstanding, it may be indicated that the information content of the speech message heard by one of the interlocutors may be indicated. The following example shows how both people talk about their misunderstanding of such a message: “Nick just called me,” she says. “Are you OK?”

*That means he told her it was over.*

*“Did he tell you it was over?”*

*“No. Not at all. He just said he was confused and didn't think it fair for you to keep going. I don't understand.”*

*“Neither nor” (Green, p. 144).*

Mutual understanding can arise in a conversation if each of the interlocutors violates the maximum number, and the contribution of each of them is not informative enough. The following is an example of a kidnapper who has a girlfriend named Miranda.

In the conversation that looks like a “competition of minds”, the maximum number is constantly violated, each of the interlocutors “does not speak.” Miranda writes a note to pass on to her family and does not explain to the kidnapper some details of its contents, particularly why it is signed by another name:

The surprise can be said as a description of a situation of misunderstanding, carried out by emotionally expressive means of speech:

*We did our job, and then I asked the doctor what his fee was.*

*“No charge.”*

*Why not on earth (Dickens-2, p. 262).*

*“Tell me, Lisa, tickle how you take care of yourself.”*

*“Take care of yourself – why did you ask Lisa in surprise.”*

*“You know what I mean!”*

*“No, I'm damned if I do”*



*“There she is, Mrs. Blakeston, she's looking for you.”*

*“Mrs. Blakeston!” Lisa shuddered (Barrett, p. 94).*

The expression of misunderstanding through a speech act of surprise is characterized by a lack of strict control over speech actions; the surprise seems to be a “random companion” to the misunderstanding.

Mutual understanding can arise in a conversation if each of the interlocutors violates the maximum number, and the contribution of each of them is not informative enough.

The following is an example of a kidnapper who has a girlfriend named Miranda. In a conversation that looks like a “competition of minds”, the maximum number is constantly violated, each of the interlocutors “does not speak.” Miranda writes a note to her family and does not explain to the kidnapper some details of her content, including why she signs another name:

*“Very funny,” I said. She wrote something else and handed me a sheet of paper. It was said below, “See you soon, darling, Nanda.”*

*“What it is?” I asked*

*“My baby’s name. They’ll know it’s me.”*

*In turn, the kidnapper does not explain his actions, which frightens the girl, and the lack of information again leads to mutual understanding:*

*“But what did I do?” I asked*

*“Nothing. That’s why I’m afraid. I don’t understand” (Fowles, pp. 32-33).*

In the following example from W. Thackeray’s novel *The Fair of Vanity*, the misunderstanding is the result of a violation of the quality maxim “Don’t say what you think is a lie.” Rebecca Sharpe insincerely assures Joseph Sedley of her commitment to him, when in fact she needs a place in his crew to avoid the advancing enemy army. An interesting example is that Rebecca’s false words are accompanied by an interpretation by the narrator, expressing doubts that Joseph was able to understand the truth:

*“You men can take it all,” said the lady. “Separation or danger to you is nothing. Now you are when you were about to join the army and leave us to our fate. I know you were ... something tells you that you were. I was so frightened when that thought came to me in head (for I sometimes think of you when I am alone, Mr. Joseph), that I immediately fled to beg and beg you not to fly away from us.”*

This speech can be interpreted: *“Dear Sir, if the army has an accident and needs a retreat, you have a very comfortable carriage in which I offer to take a seat.” I don’t know if Joss understood the words in that sense.*

*- Yeah! thought Joss, “now she wants me to come to me. When no one can think of old Joseph Sedley anymore!” (Thackeray, p. 357).*

In the next example from A. Christie’s story “The Coming of Mr. Quin”, the expression of misunderstanding explicates the violation of such a maxim of quality as “Don’t say what you have no adequate reason for.” In a conversation that discusses a suicide many years ago, Mr. Quinn’s statement that the case might be solved sounds unsubstantiated to Richard and Conway; expressing their misunderstanding, they indicate a violation of this maxim of quality:

*“Astounding – that’s what it was. Here’s a man in the prime of life, gay, light-hearted, without a care in the world. Five or six old pals staying with him. Top of his spirits at dinner, full of plans for the future. And from the dinner table he goes straight upstairs to his room, takes a revolver from the drawer and shoots himself. Why? Nobody ever knew. Nobody ever will know.”*

*“Isn’t that rather a sweeping statement, Sir Richard?” asked Mr. Quin smiling. Conway stared at him.*

*“What d’you mean? I don’t understand.”*

Thus, the awareness and expression of misunderstanding in the speech interaction of the speaker and the listener indicates a violation of certain maxims of the Cooperative Principle, which caused the misunderstanding.

## Conclusions to Chapter Two

Misunderstanding – is a communicative-cognitive phenomenon that occurs during the reception of a speech message in the process of dialogic interaction of two or more interlocutors.

Analysis of English-language dialogic units that manifest misunderstandings proves its existence in two planes - communicative and cognitive. Misunderstanding combines the features of both discourse-communicative and lingual cognitive nature.

The analysis of conversations carried out in this Chapter, , made it possible to establish this phenomenon, to detect how misunderstanding, can be observed both in the conversation and within a longer communicative space. Awareness of misunderstanding and its expression occurs with the help of appropriate linguistic means, either in the process of generating a conversation between the speaker and the listener, or outside of direct speech interaction, that is, misunderstanding can manifest itself in a series of conversations between different interlocutors, taking place at different times and in different places within a single communicative space. The speaker can predict the occurrence of misunderstandings in a potential or upcoming conversation. It was found that a lack of understanding in a conversation in most cases is perceived by its participants as a communicative failure, however, conversations were also identified in which resistance to clarification of the misunderstanding corresponds to the communicative interests of the participant. It has been determined that in a conversation a different degree of misunderstanding of a speech message can be manifested – the listener may not understand either a separate part of the message or its full content. In the conversation, misunderstanding indicates a violation of the relevant maxims of the cooperative principle, which sometimes is the cause of misunderstanding.

It has been established that the verb *misunderstand* with good reason can be called a performative one, since with its help (and with the help of appropriate alternative means), a special speech act of misunderstanding is performed. We adhere to the point of view that not understanding, as well as understanding, is a meta discursive speech act. This means that in the structure of the conversation, speech acts of understanding and misunderstanding are juxtaposed with actual discursive acts, in which the content for which the conversation was undertaken is revealed. The expression of the meta discursive act of misunderstanding in a conversation indicates a deviation from its normative deployment against the background of the meta discourse of understanding. The speech act of misunderstanding can be realized in external or internal speech. For meta discursive utterances that are realized in inner speech, a more expanded form is characteristic than in outer speech.

Misunderstanding can be expressed both with the help of explicit and with the help of implicit linguistic means. Explicit linguistic means expressing misunderstanding are represented by means denoting a mental state of misunderstanding itself. By implicit we mean those constructions that express misunderstanding in an indirect form, while retaining their direct meaning.

The following classification of speech acts expressing misunderstanding in an indirect form is proposed: a speech act of clarification, a speech act of surprise, a speech act of irritation, a speech act of silence. Depending on the characteristics of the communicative situation, misunderstanding is actualized by means of the speech act mentioned above.

## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Misunderstanding from a communicative perspective is an individual-internal moment of communication and a signal of failure of one of the interlocutors to achieve their goals. As a communicative category, misunderstanding declares itself through interactive-phase discourse organization, communicative background and discourse markers-signs. The study proves that misunderstanding is not a sign of communicative failure, but requires additional communicative efforts from both interlocutors to achieve the goal - understanding the discourse retransmitted by the producer – disclosing the meaning of the statement by the interpreter with understanding all the information contained in this message.

From a cognitive point of view, misunderstanding is related to the concept of interpretation – a type of cognitive activity aimed at disclosing the content of the addressee's message. This type of speech and mental activity covers the mental operations that make up the act of understanding. Interpretation, and hence misunderstanding, are two-way cognitive categories that embody the process and outcome of the speech-mental mechanism of discourse processing.

Misunderstanding is intermediate in the trichotomy of understanding-misunderstanding-misunderstanding. The difference between these categories is explained by the concept of mental representation – the scheme of internal design of discourse in the experience of the interpreter. The final point of interpretation of the statement in the cognitive plane of the participant of dialogic games is the semantic core – the concept of discourse – the element in which speech information is integrated: propositional, reference, pragmatic. The reflective plane of interpretation involves the transformation and complementarity of explicit information implicit through their own conceptual system and speech experience, presuppositional fund and emotional base. The level of understanding depends on the degree of correspondence between the concept of discourse in the mental reality of the producer

and the concept, which, as a result of interpretation, is fixed in the mental plane of the recipient.

Within the framework of the general scientific anthropocentric paradigm, the connection of linguistics with other sciences of the humanitarian cycle continues to be strengthened – philosophy, sociology, psychology, cultural studies, etc. the science. The study of such a phenomenon as misunderstanding is currently recognized as one of the scientific problems of an interdisciplinary nature. In this work, misunderstanding is considered from a linguistic standpoint. Linguistic facts expressing the mental state that arose in the speaker or listener as a result of one of them not understanding the speech message in the process of their direct speech interaction are subjected to analysis.

In the process of speech interaction, the speaker and the listener recognize and express, with the help of various linguistic means, the misunderstanding that has taken place. It was found that misunderstanding arises within a certain communicative space, which can include both one conversation and a series of conversations following each other in a single space-time continuum. It was revealed that misunderstanding, firstly, can take place directly in the process of generating a conversation (“here” and “now”); secondly, misunderstanding can be realized after direct speech interaction, at another time and, possibly, in another place; thirdly, misunderstanding can be predicted, that is, predicted before the start of direct interaction between the speaker and the listener.

In view of the above, it can be argued that misunderstanding is a certain type of interpretive activity through which the recipient receives a projection model of expression, different at one or more levels from the model representation of the speaker. The communicative-cognitive status of this phenomenon is also indisputable. As a type of interpretation, misunderstanding embraces the intrinsic nature of expression and is a cognitive phenomenon that belongs to the addressee. Usually, it is adjusted in the process of further dialogic

interaction. We can be sure that we will achieve understanding in communication, even if the statements are misunderstood.

The main structural and semantic characteristic of a conversation, which unfolds in conditions of misunderstanding of a speech message, is the transition to meta discursive statements, in which the fact of awareness of the misunderstanding that has taken place is expressed in an explicit or implicit form. The verb *misunderstand* is defined as a performative verb, in the view of the fact that with its help (and with the help of appropriate alternative means) a speech act of misunderstanding is performed in a conversation. The attribution of misunderstanding to speech acts is due to the fact that when it is expressed, all the signs that are included in the traditional definition of a speech act are observed: intentionality, illocutionary goal, conventionality. In an indirect form, misunderstanding is expressed implicitly, as an additional illocutionary goal of such speech acts as clarification, surprise, irritation, silence.

The study of linguistic aspects of misunderstanding is of particular importance in connection with the need for further analysis of the characteristics of a linguistic personality. On the basis of the theoretical model developed and the results obtained, it is possible to conduct a similar study on the material of other languages and identify the general and specific features observed in this case. No less interesting and promising is the study of manifestations of misunderstanding in different types of discourses.

## RESUME

Діалогічне мовлення є складним видом мовленнєвої діяльності, який передбачає залучення таких когнітивних процесів, як пам'ять, увага, сприйняття, розуміння та мислення, які є індивідуальними для кожної особистості. Досить часто у діалогічному спілкуванні між співрозмовниками виникає непорозуміння. Наявність культурних чинників також може бути причиною непорозуміння.

Непорозуміння є виявом неспроможності одного з учасників розмови або донести певну інформацію, або інтерпретувати інформацію, що надається. Це стає перешкодою до ефективного спілкування, в результаті якого співрозмовники можуть втратити інтерес до спілкування та, певною мірою, почувають психологічний дискомфорт.

Дипломна робота складається зі вступу, двох розділів з висновками до кожного із них, загальних висновків та резюме українською мовою.

У першому розділі роботи увага зосереджується на узагальненні та аналізі основних термінів та понять таких як «діалогічне мовлення», «непорозуміння», а також представленні причини виникнення непорозуміння та шляхи його усунення.

У другому розділі розглядається прагматичний аспект мовленнєвого непорозуміння: аналізуються мовленнєві акти непорозуміння в сучасному англomовному діалогічному дискурсі.

**Ключові слова:** англomовний діалогічний дискурс, розуміння, непорозуміння, явне та неявне непорозуміння, часткове непорозуміння, мовленнєвий акт.



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