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# EMOTIONS IN METAMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF IDEOLOGIES

Emocijos metamentalinėje ideologijų organizacijoje

## SUMMARY

The paper undertakes an attempt at establishing a metamental model of ideology organization and the mechanisms for its sociogenesis. Foremost importance is assigned to emotional repertoires in the sustainability and systemic conversions of beliefs and convictions. The study argues for the preliminary function of emotional coherence in the ideology interpellations and in the intergration of ideological metamental spaces. The propagating potency of emotional operators results in the co-elaboration of significant cognitive, affective, and conative information that form the incontestable knowledge of ideological convictions. The empiricism of emotional experience translates to overarching bonds between the abstractness of ideological axis and the objective verity of the radial sphere.

## SANTRAUKA

Straipsnyje siekiama sudaryti metamentalinį ideologijos sandaros modelį ir nustatyti spėjimu grindžiamus jos socialinės genezės mechanizmus. Daugiausia dėmesio skiriama emociniams repertuarams užtikrinant įsitikinimų ir nuomonių tvarumą bei sisteminių jų keitimąsi. Tyrime akcentuojama preliminari emocinės darnos funkcija ideologijų interpelacijose, pabrėžiamas jos vaidmuo integruojant ideologines metamentales erdves. Sklindanti emocinių operatorių potenciali metamentalinuose kompleksuose lemia reikšmingos pažintinės, afektinės ir bendravimo informacijos, kuri formuoja ideologinius įsitikinimus, išsidėstymą. Emocinio patyrimo empirizmas rodo esminius ryšius tarp ideologinės ašies abstraktumo ir radialinės sferos objektyvaus tikrumo.

## INTRODUCTION

The ever-evolving interest to emotional bias in shaping the mindsets expounded earlier in the history in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Aquinas' *Summa Theolo-*

RAKTAŽODŽIAI: ideologija, emocinė darna, metamentalinis modelis, ašinė ir radialinė ideologemos.

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*giae*, Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1978), and Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (2002) and nowadays, in Thagard's *Hot Thought* (2006) and Slote's *Sentimentalist Theory of Mind* (2014) substantiates the claim that in ideology procurement "reason is only used to pin down prejudices", and that "rational arguments become effective only to follow the emotional leap akin to the leap of belief" (Pocheptsov 2004: 31). This holds that the function of emotions does not only confine to instigating cognitive activities, mediating social practices in constructing cultural concepts, and maintaining moral contexts, but rather shaping the very "emotion discourse" (Strongman 2003: 286).

The affective discourse builds a social structure which dwells on the value systems determined by a socioeconomic status, religious, political affiliation, race or gender. Emotion discourses can equally bring people together or highlight the cleavages on the way to their integration (see Radžvilas 2019: 166). Consequently, emotions are themselves social practices governed by the patterns of emotional scenarios that provide for the "cognitive semiosis" of symbolic action and motivation (Vasko 2019: 87) and form a part of lived narrative.

A social psychological account of ideologies in the paper seeks a departure

from a purely Cartesian approach to cognitive abilities and pursues the holistic view of emotions deeply entrenched in cognition and defining the very mechanisms of ideation. The author's standpoint is critical in a functional view of ideology as a dynamic conversion of knowledge and belief systems channeled by the dominant emotional repertoires of the time. The article argues that the experiential regularities that mediate the relationships between the individual and collective provide for the continuity of social stability and the possibility for a "cognitive information exchange" (Chernenko 2019: 2). The feeling rules that are introduced discursively (Lindquist 2017) throughout the social and emotional development of the person cultivate the feelings of in-group attachment and out-group derogation, thus determining the ideological identity. Such bipartite concern of ideology enactment validates the psychological aspect of an ideology where an ideological buy-in dwells on non-coercive beliefs in an immutable and unquestionable order of things justified by characteristic affective tones of ethical and aesthetic character. Accordingly, the stability of social patterns resides in the shared system of affective-cognitive orientation substantiated by the purposeful condemnation, marginalization or elimination of system-damaging elements.

## EMOTIONAL COHERENCE AND EMOTIONAL COHESIVENESS IN SHAPING IDEOLOGIES

The unfalsifiability of "emotional coherence" (Thagard 2006: 18) in the system of human reasoning holds a strong

position in decision making procedures of "ideological thinking". Social members are prone to rely on their intuitive

beliefs and preferences in their life navigation while many decisions and impressions are produced “in the silence of their minds” (Kahneman 2011: 4). Prior to deliberative argumentation, the “non-discursive elements of ideology” (Geuss 1981: 5) that subsume attitudes, rituals, habits, psychological dispositions, predilections, values, and desires more readily mainstream doctrinal aspects by generating beliefs and promulgating dominant values. Therefore, the stereotyped model of inculcating valuations is characterized by pipelining the ideas with the prevalence of a heuristic affect over rational choice.

The incursion of emotional reason or fast thinking into ideological coherence is firstly due to the abstract values and principles of the ideological core (Pinich 2019a) that yield a preference-based choice, and secondly, due to the high abstraction of universalized and idealized social standing, rarely questioned by the objects of ideology (Martin 2015: 18). The preference of the affect heuristics in ideology proliferation grounds in the very nature of emotional thinking earlier intuitively employed as the efficient mechanism of ideological ignition and further implemented as a political technology. Correspondingly, the acceptability of ideological elements results from their emotional coherence rather than cognitive calculations over them (Díaz Sierra 2017: ii). Therefore, the ideological elements are recognized as abductively sensible within belief systems (Keane 2018: 66–67) adding to rationalization and naturalization of ideologies preeminently through the positive or negative valence.

The lack of necessity in conscious calculations results in the “ideology interpellation” of their agents who are reluctant to questioning the beliefs, are prone to “faith-beliefs” (Lehrer 1991: 74) and are open to ideational consumerism. Emotional judgments serve as primary amalgamation of the first order states of belief and desire, very much like the “metamental evaluation” (ibid, p. 3) though beyond deliberate reasoning. The judgments derive from the “background system that provides positive evaluation of the belief adequate to meet objections to what one believes” (ibid), it is based on the coherence to the background information and turns beliefs into moral and justifiable convictions. Therefore, acceptance and preference come as a result not of the rational decision but as an outcome of coherence maximization presented to consciousness as a ready-made product of brain computations. Furthermore, a quick decision encouraged by association with a peer group weighs heavily against rational decision for ideological affiliation. Subsequently, innate morality (Joyce 2006) and culturally dependent moral norms make an essential prerequisite for unifying beliefs and establishing the recognized patterns of behaviour in a community.

The accessibility of emotional cognition serves both the source of intrapersonal emotional judgment and interpersonal emotional alignment. The emotional unity of a group prompts the jointness of social exchange which produces in-group interdependence and reduces their uncertainty in relation to others (Lawler, Thy, and Yoon 2000: 617).

The attachment to a group cements one's individual convictions in the recognition of justified ideological beliefs and diminishes self-responsibility for actions incurred by the ideological standing. The emotional uplift is similarly guaranteed by the commonality of experiences in the pursuit of a common goal.

The cathetic aspect of social cohesion drives social resilience providing for the sustainability of an ideology, and the cultivation of ideological enthusiasm. In the Parson's functionalist view of society, emotions along with cognition and evaluation bring personality and society together (1991: 7) while individual's affective organizations seek generalizations at a higher social level. Therefore, ideology agents cathected with the same quality of affective significance have the same order of meaning for their ego and become symbolically associated with each other. Emotional cohesiveness is achieved through the mechanisms of emotional communication when individuals get sensitized to the attitudes of others. Further, cathetic interests translate to commonality of motivation and action of an actor and their peers.

The ideological stance is established, transformed, and deteriorated through the discursive practices which define and maintain the attitudinal sets as well as modify and redefine them. Reference groups cultivate and produce numerous channels for ideology proliferation in 'translating objective conditions into subjective definitions, attitudes, and ideologies' (Dworkin 1979: 345). The recognized normative beliefs and estimated dissatisfactions are promulgated in verbalized feeling rules that form the attitudes of the peer groups. The prevalence of the peer and reference groups establish emotional dominance groups and emotional regimes. Reactionally though, the symmetry of discourse structure seeks emotional refuges for non-peer groups which make ideological adversaries and emotional dissidents. The bipolar discourse structure purportedly translates to the alike ideological organization of the mind that involves the psychomental models of a community and consists in the system of shared senses and emotions along with the implicated system of denounced convictions and beliefs.

## THE METAMENTAL MODEL OF IDEOLOGY ORGANIZATION

The complexity of ideological models encompasses various kinds of mental activities, cognitive and non-cognitive. Thus, the structural organization of ideologies necessitates a metaideological view of its constituents and their interrelation in generating the inherent logic critical for the sustenance of the communal unity of a society and forming the

necessary background information for ideological interpellations.

The emic/etic approach to the analysis of ideological systems entails the distinction of the minimal units of ideologies – ideologemes, as grids occurring in "distribution classes determined in relation to the contrastive emic units within the same slot of a behavioreme" (Pike 1967:

131). The study claims the constitutive function of ideologemes as mental complexes of significant information including its axiological processing and projective operability to the other mental structures. The 'information' here is viewed as a system of nomiotic configurations that involve the co-elaboration of cognitive and pathic (non-cognitive) information in the mind/brain (cf. Bianca 2017: 43). On that account, the integrated significant information of the mind, external phenomenal and internal intramental, is organized in a complex architecture and works with mind operators that maintain the very processing of the information. The propagating projection of the ideologemes is routed through the established cognitive and non-cognitive pathways defined as the ideological organization of the mind. Subsequently, the ideological dynamic structures can undergo further modifications and transpositions by re-establishment of the admitted ideas or rejection of the contested ones in the existing networks.

The manifestation of ideologemes translates to their cognitive conceptualization, further categorization, and subsequent representation in language or other semiotic systems. The system of ideologemes encompasses minimal ideological units that can be traced in language and include relevant concrete and abstract notions with predominant propositional or affective-emotional and attitudinal information respectively (Pinich 2019a). The *axial ideologemes* are transposed to the abstract notions and form the core of an ideology, whereas *radial ideologemes* are represented in con-

crete general notions that populate the ideological structures (the ideologemes are italicized hereafter). The primary design of axial ideologemes is aimed not at the nominalization of ideas, and their further articulation in the abstract words, but rather at an organization of the ideological semiotic space and establishing the reference point of an ideology. The radial ideologemes ensure ideology objectification and concretization, its time and place reference, state and action motivation. And the function of bridging the ideological axis with the perceptibility of its radial space is attended by mind operating potential of emotional ideologemes in-built in the ideological structure.

The key feature of the ideological axis is to provide for the ideological unity and ensure the evaluative integrity of a community by reference to shared beliefs, values, conceptions, and conation. The other feature of the ideological axis is the sustenance of balance within the ideological antinomies in the interrelatedness of dominant ideologies with competitive, waning or rising ideologies. Therefore, the distinctive property of axial ideologemes is encompassing the competing ideas in their centripetal move to the core of the ideological space. The high propagating projection of axial ideologemes to the other mind configurations fosters the ascent, maintenance, and transitions of ideologies by according the systems with the standardized values, judgments, and convictions at the core. These permanent processes translate to ideologies' flexibility, and the "boundaries that seem to separate one ideology

öom another may be loose and mutating” (Freeden 2013: 115). The enduring standards though involve general or specific ideological values, cardinal virtues, ethical and aesthetic judgments, and ideo-

logical convictions. Each of these can enter multiple combinations, resulting in variable ideological networks highlighting the existent or foreshadowing the newly-rising ideas (cf. Freeden 2013).

## AXIAL IDEOLOGEMES ORGANIZING IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURES

The persistence of ideological transitions is maintained by general or specific *ideological values* preeminently outlining human rights to *life, liberty, property, safety, and individual freedom, pursuit of happiness, justice, labour, and equality*. These axial ideologemes establish positive (recognized and celebrated) core values of an ideology that are distinguished for their objectivity and absoluteness, therefore declared in the doctrinal writings, national codified and uncoded constitutions or other human civil rights documents, e.g., Magna Carta (1205), The English Bill of Rights (1689), the United States Declaration of Independence (1776), the United States Bill of Rights (1789), Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789). Contrariwise, the negative values (exhibiting low or lack of value to the dominant ideology), which are characterized by relativity and subjectivity, are referable to a competitive ideology. For instance, with the dominance of the social equality ideologeme, the values of the divine right of kings or special rights of the nobility and clergy undergo devaluation.

The binary content of axial ideologemes is defined by historical context essential for shaping ideological net-

works. The commonsensical understanding of positive and negative values is developed through maximizing coherence to the background information largely attitudinal in its nature and relevant to the time. Nevertheless, even strong “decontestations” with subsequent semantic narrowing do not guarantee language precision (Freeden 2003: 57) in defining ideological core values. The ambiguity in the abstract notions is permanent despite their guiding and organizing potency both at the individual and at the collective levels. Nevertheless, the cementing of ideological stance is empowered by the consolidating power of emotional coherence within the ideology abstractness that derives from the complexity of value, attitude and virtue systems (cf. Maio et al. 2003: 284). And it is through the perceptibility of emotions and the modifying potency of radial ideologemes sanctioned by the contemporary discourse and displaying more factualness that further ideological transformations are feasible.

*Cardinal virtues* make the axial ideologemes that define eudemonic, deontological or utilitarian ethic values of complying one’s desires with the rightful knowledge of moral duty for the pur-

pose of the overall moral good. The moral virtues involve individual exemplary features and abilities in pursuing the well-being of the self and the community governed by the divine teleology of moral practices. Thus, within the ethic of autonomy (cf. Jensen 2011) the moral virtues of character (*courage, temperance, generosity, magnificence, greatness of soul, and even temper*) focus on the needs, preferences, and desires of individuals (self or other) (Fröding 2012: 32) with the restrictions on the encroachment or harm to the other. As regards the ethic of community, the fulfillment of role-based moral duties to others are concerned with the other-directed moral practices of altruism, compassion, mercy, humility, fidelity, love, kindness, justice, friendliness, and truthfulness. These are distinctly observed in the theological virtues of *charity, philanthropy, and tolerance*, as well as in the Aristotelian inventory of social virtues (ibid.), and in the groupings of virtues outlined in modern positivist psychology (cf. Salingman 2002: 132). The transcendental virtues (ibid.) of spirituality, hope, gratitude, excellence, and appreciation of beauty are likewise the transpositions of religious ideologemes of *faith, hope, God's love and forgiveness, and the love for God*. Natural and divine injunctions in the ethic of Divinity define the moral purity of an agent through these-worldly or other-worldly considerations and are observed in *reverence, modesty, chastity, piety, and charity*. Core virtues preserve the unity between the foregrounded and the antagonistic features defined as car-

dinal sins, moral flaws or shortcomings which, similarly to the negative values, are traced to competitive ideologies.

*Ethical and aesthetic judgments* integrate values, virtues, and conduct in defining most ideological practices. The propagating potency of these axial ideologemes results from simultaneous co-elaboration of cognitive, affective, and conative information. Thus, the continuity of belief, sentiment, and action constitutes the ideological consciousness of an agent. The ideological standpoint is also bipolar, evincing the recognition of the reference group position and the censure of the out-group standing. Therefore, moral knowledge dwells on the intuitive belief in the rightness of voluntary intention or activity, meanwhile moral judgment involves the polarization of both moral categories of value (*goodness and badness, appropriateness and inappropriateness, valuableness and disvaluableness*) and deontic moral categories of *obligatoriness, optionality, and wrongness* (cf. Timmons 2002: 7–8).

Moral decision making dwells on the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (*prudence*) which brings forth deliberation and decision making with reference to the correctness of the outcome of an action (Hughes 2001: 108). Explicit to the mind moral standards make subsumptions to safeguard moral judgments from subjectivity as they aim at cultivating the parochial unity of a peer group against the competitors. Along with that, moral emotions of *approval and disapproval, recognition and condemnation* result from moral judgment and ordain the agent



into the moral volition. Approaching things in an aesthetic manner is also pre-determined by the prior aesthetic knowledge of beautiful and ugly, sublime and low, comic and tragic. The aesthetic consciousness is represented in the ostensible ideal of *beauty, elegance, gracefulness, style, fashion, and manner*. Intuitively defined or authoritatively channeled as having high or low aesthetic value, the manifestation of everyday world can be, consequently, rendered not only declaratively, textually or discursively but also through form, outline, shape or pattern.

*Ideological convictions* form the type of axial ideologemes closest to the radial filling of the ideological structure. They are emotionally charged beliefs which are professed with the purpose of establishing the undeniable knowledge of ideological righteousness and justification of in-group attitudes, predilections, and desires along with the devaluation of the out-group stance deemed prejudicial. Therefore, the intellectual position of ideological agents is incurred by the intentionality revolving around the objective wisdom and assuredness in the justice of views, principles, and ideas. Attitudinally relevant thoughts, feelings, and behaviour which derive from the convictions (Skitka et al. 2018) serve as an ideological ignition and make the point of “emotion-cognition encounter” (Mercer 2010: 2). *Trustworthiness, justice, credibility, rationality, acceptance, and certainty* (beyond facts) make unfalsifiable categories of ideologies whose commonality dwells pre-eminently on the internal inferences.

*Emotional ideologemes* operate as the best source of evidence for ideological beliefs by exhibiting constitutive, revising and modifying functions. The foremost role of emotional ideologemes in the architecture of ideologies lies in their amalgamating power since beliefs make the necessary “ingredients of emotions” while judgments and values reside in the emotions (Yazici 2015: 903). Furthermore, the non-representational nature of emotions translates to the overarching bonds between the bodily experiences, perceptible excitants, and the thoughts attributable to them. Additionally, the network of various kinds of semiosis is involved expressed in words, moods, feelings, and mental concepts. Therefore, the omnipresence makes emotional ideologemes efficient operators in providing the structural monism of antagonistic attitudes and beliefs both on the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels.

Historicism of emotion repertoire systems is definitizing in specific experience and behaviour models against a particular background and is more articulate in terms of attributive clusters for multiple situations. For instance, *righteous anger* against injustice or atrocities can equally regulate attitudes at one time as does contemptuous *indignation* through elevated disapprobation at another (cf. Pinich 2019b). While *pride* and *elevation* can favour the social standing of the dominant group counterpoised with *awe* and *gratitude* of the dominated, the balance may similarly be cultivated by *sympathy* and *piety* on the side of the dominators as opposed to *guilt, shame, and embarrassment* of the subordinated.



## RADIAL IDEOLOGEMES FILLING IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURES

The abstractness of axial ideologemes finds its concretization in the antagonistic oppositions established within its atomic structure and also in the coherence to the system of related notions of the current discourse, concrete notions and facts inclusively. The integrative property of mind processing results in the configuration of concrete notions correlated and generalized under the general notion that reverberates the perceptual information. The specifying and concretizing role of general notions translates to the propositional aspect of an ideology. Therefore, the doctrinal ideological stance is ensured by the radial ideologemes that constitute the propositional facet of an ideology and populate the ideological space around the axial ideologemes.

The system of coherent notions involves the network of radial ideologemes as superordinates and hyponyms encompassed. Propositional ideologemes involve religious, political, economic, social, and moral ideologemes to name a few of all existing levels of social articulation. The systems of radial ideologemes, thus, gather and co-process significant information concerning respective issues. So, *religious ideologemes* cover *religious institutions, religious doctrines, religious acts, and sentiments*; *legal ideologemes* involve *power matters and legal regulations*; or *financial ideologemes* that subsume *financial policy, money and capital management, and the beneficiary*. *Crime and punishment ideologemes* build up a network of significant information on *wrongdoing, trespasser, object of viola-*

*tion, legal action, and retribution*. Moral issues encompass *moral principles, duty, virtue, standard, character and intention*, meanwhile *gender ideologemes* integrate information on *sex affiliation, marital status, outstanding behaviour, and domestic chores*. The concreteness of radial ideologemes exhibits more specificity in the lingual representation of full, partial, and acquired linguoideologemes (Pinich 2018: 7–9). Ideology, therefore, gets further objectivized in the lexicalization of time, space, ritualized procedures and participants involved.

The likeness in organization of ideological space means the bipartite linkage of linguoideologemes which represent the names denoting and attributable to the dominant and opponent ideologies. Full linguoideologemes encompass lexical units relevant to ideology-bound keywords denoting current ideological trends, vying doctrines, ideological theories and other consistent aspects of ideology representations. Partial linguoideologemes include bipolar aspects of ideological social ethics, peer and non-peer opinions of ideologically relevant issues, lexicalized ingroup favouritism, and outgroup derogation. Along with that, contextual linguoideologemes exhibit the acquired ideological fervour by reinterpreting notions equally exploited by other ideologies, and making extensive use of rhetorical devices and figures.

Notably, dominant axial ideologemes define the polarity of radial ideologemes in the “never-ending fight over the meaning” which entails constant discursive “assessments, arguments, decisions,

actions, and legitimations" over the ideologically significant issues (Verschuere, 2012, pp. xi–xii). Positively charged ideologemes establish the principle of "perfect rationality" of a dominant ideology (Larraín, 1994, p. 120) and retain the features of reasonable necessity in objectifying the rightness of the convictions, whereas negatively charged ideologemes as the features of competitive ideologies establish a network to the radial ide-

ologemes compatible with wrongful and condemned convictions. This process of value-orientation within ideology, spares the ideology practitioners from messiness in the bewildering social environment aiming at the finality of the dominant thought meanwhile providing for the communal unity through the interpretative leeway of natural language (cf. Freeden, 2003, pp. 56–57) and common practices of emotional experiences.

## CONCLUSIONS

The non-intentive metamental processes of emotional coherence ensure conversion of ideological beliefs and desires in the system of background information, the source of incontestable knowledge and convictions. The certitude of ideological rightness is established in the perceptive aspect of an ideology favoured by the ubiquitous and overarching bonds of emotional empiricism, factualness of emotion excitants and the attributable thoughts.

The continuity of ideologies is ensured by the perpetual shifts within their metamental organization. The centripetal move of significant information to the core of an ideology generates the axis admitted as timeless and unfalsifiable, based on general and specific values, cardinal virtues, ethic and aesthetic judgments and strong convictions in the rightness of ideological affinity. Multiple interpretations and historicism of the ideological core translates to the hereditary essence of axial ideological units that can undergo ascents, modifications, transformations, or rejections

throughout the sociogenesis of ideologies. The differential feature of ideological space is the bipolarity of its units' co-elaboration. Thus, the positive value of dominant ideologemes entails the contestant concepts of competitive ideologies.

The objectification of ideologies is achieved in the centrifugal move to the radial space populated by the units that find their reification in the reality. The propositional aspect of ideologies, therefore, is generalized under superordinate notions that subsume the characteristic properties of concrete objects and facts. Radial ideologemes involve religious, political, economic, social, moral, judicial and other ideologemes that refer to all existing levels of social articulation. The concreteness of radial ideologemes exhibits in the constitutive parts of ideological propositions involving doctrines, practices, parishioners, and sentiments. Concurrently, a particular range of radial ideologemes proves defining in the ideological organization and a psychomental model of the mind of its practi-

tioners. The ideological charge of radial elements is predetermined by their co-reference to the axial ideologemes through the source of emotional turbulence. Furthermore, the integrative prop-

erty of emotional coherence in holding ideologies together is also determinative in the migration of radial ideologemes; the transitions though don't mean ever deserting the system.

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