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МАРКЕРІВ (НА МАТЕРІАЛІ ДИСКУРСИВНИХ МАРКЕРІВ REALLY,  
ANYWAY)»

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**INTERACTIVE FUNCTIONS OF DISCOURSE MARKERS**

**(A STUDY OF DISCOURSE MARKERS REALLY AND ANYWAY)**

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## INTRODUCTION

Discourse analysis plays a pivotal role in today's linguistic studies. However, sometimes it gets overlooked and oversimplified; disregarded or dismissed due to the lack of resources or time needed in order to conduct extensive research. This work aims at revitalizing the interest in this field of study by highlighting and bringing at the forefront a small but crucial 'building brick' or rather 'glue' that holds together and implicitly articulates the messages hidden between the lines of a discourse. Or, rather, between breath and voice shifts, as we deal not just with the written text, but with spontaneous, unique oral utterances.

Further research and knowledge obtained in the course of our exploration sheds light on intricacies and semantic differences of discourse markers *really*, *anyway*, *actually*, and *in fact*. It is quite common for foreign language learners to treat these words simply as adverbs, but such an approach neglects their roles and key functions when it comes to using them on practice, in spoken discourse. Many wonder: why do native speakers sometimes construct an utterance in a way that seems unnecessary from classical grammar point of view?

It is important to understand that communication is a process. And as every process conducted by a human being, communication is inherently a faulty one. While we know theories of efficient composition of utterances and read a lot about the Politeness Theory, our brains try their best to adhere to the guidelines – but we cannot help but miss out on certain things. Sometimes we communicate when we are in a rush and getting your point across is more important than carefully crafting a well-worded explanation. Often, we have a desire to disagree or make clear to the interlocutor how we feel – without losing face and crossing the unspoken rules of conduct. As sentient and empathizing creature we might need to express solitude or friendliness while still following the tone and the theme of a conversation.

Discourse markers are reliable instruments in all the aforementioned endeavors. And the best thing is that they are not strictly constrained in their function, so the speakers can adopt and use them with accordance to their needs. And even more – deeper understanding of discourse markers gives an insight into the logic and the feel of the target language, which might help language learners understand the native speakers not just on the semantic level, but also introduce the unique outlook on the world.

At the current stage of discourse marker research many linguists have attempted approaching them from a number of various points of scholastic interest. As a result, a number of labels have been used to denote discourse markers. There are also debates surrounding the possibilities and limitations implied by every ‘name’ that is given to them. Some researchers label them as discourse markers, particles, signals, items (Fraser 2006).

Another group approaches the investigation from the point of view of pragmatics. Scholars of this approach label the linguistic elements of our interest as pragmatic markers, articles, expressions or connectives. Meanwhile, other studies might treat them as mere fillers, parentheticals or inserts (Andersen 2001)

However, term ‘discourse markers’ coined by Deborah Schiffrin is widely considered to be the most common and at the same time the less restrictive. In this study we establish ‘discourse markers’ as a preferred term. The markers analysed perform various functional tasks, such as aiding with co-operation and smoothness of a discourse, marking and organizing speech elements into utterances, signaling the attitudes of the interlocutors.

The core of our research, the study of discourse markers mentioned in the title, revitalizes the discussion around the importance of distinguishing sub-groups and varieties of functioning discourse elements which are commonly overlooked and hidden underneath the umbrella term ‘discourse markers’. More precisely, we

take a closer look at some of the most prominent and multi-functional contrastive concessive particles.

**The topic** of our research is ‘*Interactive functions of discourse markers (a study of discourse markers really, anyway)*’. It deals with the general characteristics of function words and their usage in dialogical discourse. **The aim** of our research is to make an attempt at synthesizing work in linguistic and discourse analysis while defining peculiarities of the function words in general and words *really, anyway, actually, in fact* in particular; to put the scholar studies and obtained knowledge to a practical use. **The purpose** of our study is to take a closer look at function words and their role in dialogical discourse. **The tasks** set in order to achieve our aims are as following:

- to study and analyze the scientific researches in the discourse analysis;
- to sum up the theoretical information about discourse, discourse analysis, and discourse markers;
- to define function words and their role in discourse;
- to conduct an analysis of function words *really, anyway, actually, in fact* and their use in speech.

**The object** of our research is functioning of discourse markers in Modern English dialogical discourse.

**The subject** we explore are function words *really, anyway, actually, in fact* as discourse markers and their functional peculiarities.

The **methods** used in the present study include semantic, functional-pragmatic and discourse analyses.

**The materials** used are profound linguistic studies in discourse analysis and actual usages of function words *really, anyway, actually, in fact* as discourse markers in speech. **The structure** of the Master’s Paper contains an Introduction, one Theoretical Chapter, one Practical Chapter, conclusions to both Chapters, general conclusions, résumé, and the list of reference materials.

*Chapter One* summarizes theoretical materials and linguistic studies of discourse and its components. In *Chapter Two* we investigate the peculiarities of function words *really, anyway, actually, in fact* and their role as discourse markers. The practical part of the research conducts an analysis of speech examples found in fictional dramatic works of Martin McDonagh according to the theoretical information, gathered during our research. *The conclusions* summarize the information presented in the research. *The list of reference materials* lists the sources used while conducting a research. *The list of illustration materials* lists the fictional example sources used during analysis in Chapter Two.



**CHAPTER ONE**  
**DISCOURSE APPROACH TO ANALYSING**  
**DISCOURSE MARKERS**

**1.1. Discourse as a linguistic notion**

When it comes to defining an abstract idea, concept, or notion, one may find it challenging to draw the line separating different but usually closely intertwined humanitarian sciences. Language and speech in particular could not be studied without acknowledging countless influences and research support from adjacent disciplines, such as sociology or psychology.

Generally, linguists differentiate between two kinds of language when it comes to identifying a potential study object. The first kind deals with more abstract matter and is aimed at teaching literacy through a set of rules or studying the relations between the said rules. The second one deals with the use of language in pursuit of communication; here we operate on the level of an utterance or a series of connected utterances and the goal is not only to adhere to the general rules of grammar and syntax, but also to create a coherent message which can be decoded by the addressee.

The latter kind of language in use is called discourse. Discourse conforms to the rules of the language (or ‘grammar’), but as long as the actors of communication can understand the messages exchanged the act of communication, and therefore discourse, can be considered successful even if some grammatical rules are violated in the process (Cook 1989).

The concept of ‘discourse’ is one of the basic in communicative linguistics and the social sciences, so it, like any widespread concept, allows many scientific interpretations. There is no clear and generally accepted definition of ‘discourse’ covering all cases of its use. Different interpretations of the term ‘discourse’ do not contradict, but complement each other, revealing the essence of this concept most fully, in terms of different sciences. This concept includes traditional ideas about

languages, texts, dialogues, styles and even language. For many, especially linguists, ‘discourse’ is usually defined as something ‘beyond sentence’. For others, the study of discourse is the study of language use.

The most commonly accepted differentiation of discourse definitions was made by Schiffrin (1995). Therefore, discourse is regarded as a set of sentences, as a language use, and as utterances – the latter definition in a way attempts to bridge the difference between two previous ones. But critical theorists and those who influence them may speak, for example, of ‘discourses of power’ and ‘discourses of social issues’, where the term ‘discourses’ not only becomes a noun, but also refers to a broad conglomerate of linguistic and non-linguistic social practices and ideological assumptions that together create power or a certain social issue (Schiffrin 2003).

It might be tempting to discuss the notion of ‘discourse’ in terms of postmodernist philosophers, structuralist theorists or even celebrated Elizabethan playwrights – the number of famous and familiar names associated with discourse highlights the importance of its thorough and profound study. For instance, William Shakespeare in *Richard II* writes: *‘Your fair discourse hath been as sugar / Making the hard way sweet and delectable’*.

Michel Foucault, on the other hand, approaches discourse in a less poetic way; the English playwright finds solace in imagery and ambiguity, while the French philosopher feels the need to give a clear-cut definition: *‘Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy’*. However, due to the linguistic nature of our research, we will not focus on definition of ‘discourse’ from sociological, political, philosophical, etc. points of view.

The research begins right where the words begin their official existence – we take a closer look at the dictionaries. According to McArthur, the word ‘discourse’ first appeared no earlier than in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. It was borrowed from French ‘discours’, which is, in turn, inextricably linked with Latin word ‘discursus’, meaning a ‘conversation’. In its current usage, this term conveys a number of significations for a variety of purposes, but in all cases it relates to language, and it describes it in some way. There are two commonly assumed definitions of ‘discourse’: 1) a general, often formal term for a talk, conversation, dialogue, lecture, sermon, or treatise – broader cross-disciplinary interpretation; 2) a unit or piece of connected speech or writing that is longer than a conventional sentence – inherent linguistic approach (Burns 1996). Discourse is also literally defined as ‘a serious speech or piece of writing on a particular subject’ (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English 2001, p.388). In this general sense, it incorporates both the spoken and written modes although, at times, it is confined to speech being designated as ‘a serious conversation between people’.

Discourse refers to topics or types of language used in specific contexts. We can talk about political discourse, philosophical discourse and so on. In addition, the word ‘discourse’ is sometimes used to refer to what is said, while the word ‘text’ is used to refer to what is written. It is important to note, however, that the distinction made here between text and discourse is not always clearly defined. This word is also used to establish a significant contrast to the traditional notion of ‘sentence’ – discourse refers to any naturally occurring expansion of language.

Discourse analysis is the study of written and spoken language in its psychological and social context, which examines both language form and language function and includes the study of both spoken interaction and written texts. The study identifies the key linguistic features that characterize different genres as well as social and cultural factors that can aid in our interpretation and understanding of different texts and types of verbal communication. An analysis of written texts might include a study of topic development and cohesion across the

sentences, while an analysis of verbal communication might focus on these aspects plus turn-taking, opening and closing sequences of social encounters, or narrative structure (McCarthy 1991).

From the standpoint of linguistics, discourse is a process of live verbal communication, characterized by a large number of deviations from the canonical written speech, hence the attention to the degree of spontaneity, completeness, thematic coherence, intelligibility of conversation for other people. Some linguists tend to think of a discourse as something that is not strictly specific to one particular speaker or writer, but it can as well include exchanges through various media produced by a couple or greater number of people.

While several contemporary analyses of discourse consider the sentence to be the unit of which discourse is comprised, some problems appear by restricting the discourse solely to the ‘set of spoken out sentences’. The first immediate problem is that actors of communication do not always speak in what might be accepted as a sentence. Although discourse is defined as a fragment that exceeds the sentence, not all language fragments can fall within this definition. Another problem of the view of discourse as language above the sentence is that people may begin to accept the structure of discourse the same as the structure of sentences of which discourse is comprised (Schiffrin 1995).

To be more explicit, the discourse is fully meaningful unit that transmits a complete message (Nunan 1993). In the light of this, larger units such as paragraphs, conversations and interviews all seem to fall under the rubric of ‘discourse’ since they are linguistic performances complete in themselves (Drid 2010).

## **1.2. General Overview of the Spoken Discourse**

Discourse falls into two major categories – the written and the spoken discourse – which are different in both the medium in which they exist as well as the process they require. While the written discourse is more likely to be composed

in accordance with certain rules and expectations, the spoken is more independent and variative as its key features are spontaneity and possibility of intervention by other actors of the communication. The works of McCarthy (1991) present the following types of spoken discourse to be distinguished:

- telephone calls (business and private)
- service encounters (shops, offices, etc.)
- interviews (journalism, official settings, jobs)
- classroom (lectures, classes, tutoring)
- rituals (prayers, religious ceremonies)
- monologues (speeches, stories, jokes)
- language-in-action (talk accompanying an act of doing smth)
- casual conversations (strangers, friends, intimates)
- organizing and directing people (work and community life)

Speech and spoken communication emerged way before the written language, which was the attempt to fixate messages in time in order to access them when needed. The contexts of creating and decoding written language are drastically different from the spoken ones. The text and its subsequent reader might be removed from each other in both time and space, which makes it more important for the creator of the written message to make the text more comprehensible in regards for variations in societal and special narratives and contexts in which potential decoders of the text might exist. Written language is aimed at facilitation of the remote communication.

However, written and spoken discourses share similar functions, such as requests for an action (verbal requests and printed public signs), acts of informing (gossips between friends and newspaper articles), and entertainment (anecdotes and stand-up comedy in spoken and fiction in written).

There are certain rules or regularities that creators of the messages follow when composing written texts. According to Nunan (1993), these rules depend on the context, or the situation that gives rise to the discourse, and within which the discourse is enclosed. Two different types of context are referred to: the linguistic context, i.e., the language that surrounds or accompanies the piece of discourse under analysis, and the non-linguistic context within which the discourse takes place, e.g. the type of communicative event, the topic, the purpose, the participants and the relationships between them, and the background knowledge and assumptions regarding communication.

The key differences between the written and the spoken language can be noticed not on the level of sentences, texts and utterances, but on the contexts in which they exist. Spoken communication generally requires all the participants to share at least the moment in time continuum, while written texts rely solely on the words and their meanings, which in combination should deliver a specific message with as little differences in interpretation as possible.

### **1.3. Discourse Analysis as a Modern Approach to the Analysis of Linguistic Units**

Discourse is commonly perceived as speech 'beyond the utterance'. But since discourses consist of a number of utterances which together form a specific meaning, the meaning of each separate utterance might be puzzling and unclear without the context of its discourse. The need for analysis arises.

Discourse analysis is a rapidly growing and developing field. Ongoing research in this area is currently derived from countless academic disciplines that are very different from one another. Of course, these include the disciplines that first developed models for understanding and methods of analysis, such as linguistics, anthropology, and philosophy. But there are also disciplines that have applied - and therefore often expanded - such models and methods to problems in their own scientific fields, such as communication, cognitive psychology, social

psychology, and artificial intelligence. Certain definition issues related to discourse and discourse analysis are by no means unique. In view of this disciplinary diversity, it is not surprising that the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis’ have different meanings for scientists in various fields.

In Volkova’s *Theoretical Grammar of English: Modern approach* discourse analysis involves pragmatic processes ‘used to bridge up the gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the interpretation of utterances in context’. The speaker is expected to put all their grammar knowledge to use when constructing and sequencing utterances. The hearer in their turn must decode a message consisting of ambiguous or vague expressions. It’s not like the speaker’s speech is full of literal riddles – simple utterance might be confusing and hard to interpret, especially by non-native English speakers, for example:

*‘Go and get ‘em tiger!’*

*Who should you get? Why does the speaker refer to you as ‘tiger’ when you are, in fact, a human being? Is it an order or simply a common phrase used to encourage and express one’s confidence in you? While we can speculate on the meaning implied by the speaker, the absence of context during examination of an isolated utterance is noticeable. The discourse seems to greatly influence the way we interpret the meanings of sentences (Volkova 2010, p. 208-209).*

Discourses differ in their goals, which lead to different structural organizations. The notion of ‘speech event’ indicates a considerable fraction of speaking conducted according to a set of rules. The dictionary definition of ‘speech event’, or ‘speech act’, is the following: 1) noun that names any of the acts that may be performed by a speaker in making an utterance, as stating, asking, requesting, advising, warning, or persuading, considered in terms of the content of the message, the intention of the speaker, and the effect on the listener; 2) an utterance that constitutes some act in addition to the mere act of uttering.

According to Volkova, the aforementioned ‘speech event’ involves ‘participants who assume clearly defined roles’ and happens in ‘a well-defined setting’. All participants share a profound understanding of the rules on which the speech event is based. Deviations from the rules may be referred to as ‘violations’ and are to be avoided in order not to disrupt the flow of the discourse. Discourse analysis deals with the identification and processing of the set rules for particular speech acts (Volkova 2010, p. 209-210).

J. L. Austin, British philosopher of language, developed Speech Act Theory, which perceives language as a kind of action rather than medium through which the messages are conveyed and expressed. All kinds of linguistic communication consist of linguistic actions. Previously, the most basic unit of communication was thought to be words, symbols, sentences, but it was Speech Act Theory that suggested that the production or expression of words, symbols, were the basic units of communication.

This issue occurs in the course of the speech act. The value of these units was seen as fundamental building blocks of understanding between the people who intend to communicate. The theory emphasizes that utterances have a different or specific meaning for their user and listener, different from their meaning depending on the language. The theory further identifies that there are two types of utterances, these are called constative and performative utterances. Austin further divides linguistic acts into three different categories:

- 1) *Locutionary act* – the act of saying something. It has a meaning and it creates an understandable utterance to convey or express a message;
- 2) *Illocutionary act* – is performed as an act of saying something or as an act of opposed to saying something. It is well-versed with certain tones, attitudes, feelings, or emotions. There will be an intention of the speaker or others in illocutionary utterance. It is often used as a tone of warning in day to day life;



- 3) *Perlocutionary act* – normally creates a sense of consequential effects on the audiences. The effects may be in the form of thoughts, imaginations, feelings or emotions. The effect upon the hearer is the prime characteristic of the perlocutionary utterances.

Austin himself admits that these three components of utterances are not altogether separable. ‘We must consider the total situation in which the utterance is issued- the total speech act – if we are to see the parallel between statements and performative utterance, and how each can go wrong. Perhaps indeed there is no great distinction between statements and performative utterances’ (Austin 1975).

The message conveyed through the discourse relies heavily on the semantic meaning of words and sentence structure. But to state that only these elements are essential is to make a grave mistake. For example, the hearer can recognize when a speaker has created a perfectly grammatical sentence from which they can derive a literal interpretation, but which they would not call clear, simply because they need more information.

In addition to our knowledge of structure, we also know other standard formats in which information is transmitted. We also rely on some principle according to which, although there can be no formal linguistic connections that tie together continuous linguistic strings, the fact of their contiguity forces us to interpret them as connected. We can easily fill in any compounds if needed (Brown 1983). One of the most important components in discourse analysis is known as coherence. Properly organized discourse conveys the message in the most efficient way. Coherent sequences performed by each utterance in a discourse possess specifically assigned functions.

The concept of coherence is not strictly defined. Roughly speaking, discourse coherence is a semantic relationship between speech events in discourse, which is more a feature of discourse perception than the discourse itself. For example, Widdowson approaches coherence in discourse from a pragmatic standpoint. He defines cohesion as ‘the overt relationship between propositions

expressed through sentences,’ and then perceives the coherence of a discourse as ‘the relationship between the illocutionary acts which propositions, not always overtly linked, are being used to perform’(Wang & Guo 2014, p. 460). Widdowson’s theory of illocutionary act based on Speech Act Theory is concise, providing an account of how some apparently unconnected utterances go together in a conversational discourse to form a coherent discourse. Simple as it is, this approach seems difficult to be applied to concrete analysis. Because the general problem with the application of Speech Act Theory is that people do not know how to assign speech acts in a non-arbitrary way if they look even quickly at a transcribed record of a conversation. In practical dialogue, several utterances may be used together to perform one illocutionary act.

#### **1.4. Discourse Structure and Its Models**

Another scholar, Eduard Hovy, makes a further examination of discourse in *The Multifunctionality of Discourse Markers* (1994) by taking a closer look at different structures, their interaction, and the way they are expressed in the text. It is clear that when speakers construct the discourse, they use a variety of cues and markers which aid with structuring the message and simplifying the decoding process for the hearer.

We can differentiate between four common structures and states that the key factors of effective communication include ‘*the semantics of the message, the interpersonal Speech Acts, knowledge about stylistic preferability, and the guidance information included by the speaker to assist the hearer’s understanding process (namely information that signals theme, focus, and topic)*’ (Hovy, 1994).

1. **Semantic information** – information about the world and the way it is perceived, non-emotionalized thoughts and dreams. Semantic information is what derives from known facts or hypothesis rooted in general knowledge; it can take a truth value. Each clause may contain semantic information, and information from one clause can be attributed or can derive from semantic information of the previous clauses by semantic interpropositional relations like case, temporal-sequence, part-of;

2. **Interpersonal information** – each discourse exists for communicative purposes of the speakers. Discourse goals refer to the speaker, the hearer, and the desired effect on the hearer’s cognitive and emotional states. These goals might also include some fragments of semantic information;

3. **Stylistic considerations** – semantic propositions are controlled by stylistic factors to achieve additional interpersonal goals. Formal style distances the speaker from the hearer, while informal strives to create an emotional bond or response between the actors of communication. Style becomes noticeable during the phase of sentence planning according to the context of a communicative situation:

- *clause aggregation* merges similar bits of information to avoid redundancy.

Cue words that signal aggregation: also, respectively, all except, etc.

According to Hovy (1994), the function, as well as the use of relations in discourse, can be intriguing and insightful for researchers in this area. Rhetorical relations (a type of interclause relation which is required for the discourse-level rhetorical structures) can be described as the presentational analogue of both semantic relations and interpersonal goals. Despite the absence of a unique rhetorical partner for each semantic relation or interpersonal goal, Hovy believes that certain strong correlates still exist. Different semantic sequences, relations, and patterns can be marked by a single preposition. But it remains unsolved which rhetorical relations can benefit from being defined as separate entities, and the way they co-pattern with semantic relation, interpersonal goals, and control information requires a more profound study.

### 1.5. Discourse Markers

A ‘discourse marker’ might be defined as a word or a phrase that performs a role in managing the flow and structure of discourse. Since their main function is at the level of discourse (sequences of utterances) rather than at the level of utterances or sentences, discourse markers are relatively syntax-independent and usually do not change the truth conditional meaning of the sentence.

Discourse markers are: a set of cohesive devices indicating semantic relations in an underlying structure of ideas; sequentially dependent elements that 'bracket units of talk and considered as a set of linguistic expressions that comprised of members of word classes as varied as conjunctions (*because, and, but, or*), interjections (*oh*), adverbs (*now, then*), and lexicalized phrases (*y'know, I mean*)' (Volkova 2010, p. 101). The term 'discourse marker' was coined by Deborah Schiffrin in her study *Discourse Markers*.

However, there seems to be no unified outlook on the status of discourse markers. Fraser (1999) notes that these lexical expressions have been examined and variously labeled by the scholars. Fraser recalls such terms as discourse markers, discourse connectives, discourse operators, pragmatic connectives, sentence connectives, and cue phrases being used to describe the units in question. There is no unified agreement upon their distinctions as well as functions in discourse.

### **1.5.1. General Overview of the Discourse Markers**

The notion of discourse marker is problematic to define in several ways: the terminology is not agreed upon and the interpretations differ across the study of discourse. The majority perceives discourse markers as usually short, phonologically reduced, and separate tone group parts. However, certain discourse markers can be completely integrated prosodically, syntactically, and semantically. Syntactically, discourse markers proto-typically appear in sentence initial position. They usually appear outside the syntactic structure, or they are attached to it loosely. For that reason in writing we commonly find a comma after a discourse marker. They are not subcategorised by any part of the sentence or the sentence itself; hence, they can be omitted without making a sentence grammatically incorrect. Semantically, most of the uses of discourse markers seem not to affect the truth conditions of an utterance. Of course, it is obvious that it could not be the case with all markers and all their uses.

A number of discourse markers are capable of conveying meaning, while other discourse markers seem to only function as discourse structurers. The issue of integratedness arises: unintegrated items perform a role in the discourse management; integrated items act as providers of coherence. Some discourse markers, as they do not have meaning, perform several pragmatic functions – they might show pragmatic ambiguity to a certain extent. Depending on the pragmatic context, the pragmatic characteristics of discourse markers could be applied differently (Schiffrin 1987).

Contrary to Schiffrin's theory, Halliday and Hasan (1992) argue that the linguistic units fall into the category of conjunctions. Those words and phrases explicitly draw attention to the type of relationship which exists between one clause and the ones that follow it, providing a kind of a formal relation between utterances:

- add more information to what has been said (*and, furthermore, add to that*)
- elaborate or exemplify it (*for instance, thus, in other words*)
- contrast new information with old one, or put another side to the argument (*or, on the other hand, however, conversely*)
- relate new information to what has already been given in terms of clauses (*so, consequently, because, for this reason*) or in time (*formerly, then*)
- may indicate a new departure or a summary (*by the way, well, to sum up, anyway*)

However, the notion of discourse markers at the time of the aforementioned researches was still a niche topic with little attention from the linguistic scholars. Subsequently, the difficulties with placements of the discourse markers in the field of linguistic research have emerged. Even though Schiffrin as well as Halliday and Hasan focused on the study of a few particular discourse items (*and, because, but, I mean, now, oh, or, so, then, well, and y'know* for Schiffrin and *now, of course, well, anyway, surely* and *after all* for Halliday and Hassan), their works were an attempt at discovering the functions of the words which are the active contributors to the coherence and interpretation facilitators in discourse.

Several revisions of Schiffrin's views (1987) were provided by Redeker (1991). The scholar questions the absence of a clear-cut definition for the discourse markers (or 'discourse operators') and highlights the importance of a broader framework to be applied when examining coherence of the discourse. Redeker suggests the following definition for 'discourse operators' (= 'discourse markers'): '... a word or a phrase... that is uttered with the primary function of bringing to the listener's attention a particular kind of linkage of the upcoming utterance with the immediate discourse context'.

Redeker also presents the list of examples which shall not be considered discourse markers: clausal indicators of discourse structure (let me tell you smth, as I said before, etc.); deictic expressions as long as they are not used anaphorically (now, here, today, etc.); anaphoric pronouns and noun phrases; expressions which do not deprive the utterance of a valuable quality or constituent.

The revised model of coherence, according to Redeker, consists of three components – Ideational Structure, Rhetorical Structure, and Sequential Structure (in opposition for Schiffrin's Ideational, Action, and Exchange Structures). Though both researchers agree upon the possibility of all three components to exist in the utterance simultaneously. But one of them will usually take a dominating position according to the needs of the context. The model of discourse coherence formed by Redeker (1991) states that two discourse units can be related:

- 1) Ideationally, if their utterance in the given context entails the speaker's compliment to the existence of that relation in the world the discourse describes (for example, temporal sequences, causes and reasons);
- 2) Rhetorically, if the strongest relation is not between the propositions expressed in the two units but between the illocutionary intentions they convey (antithesis, evidence, justification, conclusion);
- 3) Sequentially, if there is a transition of topics or a lead in/out of a commentary, correction, paraphrase, etc. between only loosely or (indirectly adjacent) related discourse sentences.

The aforementioned study conducted by Hovy (1994) also questions the correlation between the number of semantic cue words or phrases and their meaning, as well as their substitution in appropriate circumstances:

*‘Unfortunately, it is a strange fact of English (and many other languages) that the number of discourse relation words/phrases seem to be at least one (and probably two) orders of magnitude smaller than the number of verbs and nouns. One might expect that, given 50.000 verbs (i.e., distinguishably different processes or actions), the number of semantically plausible interconnections among them is on the order of at least half of the total number of possible interconnections, thus half of  $25 \times 10^8$ , a large number. But the number of semantic cues words appears to be fewer than 1.000. This implies that the semantic cue words/phrases are highly vague and possibly even ambiguous (where I take vague to mean not distinguishing among similar possible candidates and ambiguous to mean indicating several different candidates simultaneously). The same sort of argument may hold for the interpersonal intentions, if one could quantify communicative intentions somehow’ (Hovy 1994, p. 8).*

### **1.5.2. Discourse Markers in Speech**

Discourse markers are capable of working on several different of discourse connecting utterances. Generally speaking, discourse markers seem to be the adhesive that forms discourse.

According to the analysis conducted by Fraser (1993) discourse markers belong to the members of a pragmatic category. Each discourse marker in accordance with this theory serves a specific function, communication actors use a marker to signal the intended role of the utterance and its connection to the prior discourse. Among the relationship we can distinguish the intention to change the topic of the conversation, expression of unpreferred response (*well*), a repair of the phrase in pursuit of clarification of the meaning (*I mean*), etc. Fraser further explores the theory by assuming the existence of three potential types of a message:

- 1) Basic message – conveyed in the act of direct, literal communication. The type is signaled by basic pragmatic markers (*Please, pay attention*);
- 2) Commentary message – signaled by commentary markers, the speaker recognizes how the content of the message will be perceived by the addressee (*Frankly, your theory lacks facts*);
- 3) Parallel message – accompanied by parallel markers, which signal the speaker's emotions (*He put his damned shoes on the table*).

According to Fraser, discourse markers do not participate in discourse as a part of the propositional content of the sentence. They are detachable and may be deleted without changing the content meaning. They are commentary and separate the following types: discourse topic markers, discourse activity markers and message relationship markers.

Discourse topic markers denote the theme and content of the communicative exchange between the speakers at any given time of the discourse, including all the subtopics and relevant themes which arise in the course of talking. Markers *before I forget, by the way, in any case* signal the diversion from the starting topic of the conversation. *Again, now, in fact* signal the reemphasis on the previously mentioned topic.

Discourse activity markers are another type of discourse markers which serve as the signals of the discourse activity that are relatable to the current discourse such as explanations and summarizations. They are subdivided in the following types:

- Clarifying: to clarify, by way of clarification, etc.;
- Condescending: after all, at any rate, etc.;
- Explaining: to explain, if I may explain, etc.;
- Interrupting: no to interrupt, to interrupt, etc.;



- Repeating: once again, to repeat, etc.;
- Sequencing: in the first place, finally, lastly, next, to continue, etc.;
- Summarizing: in summary, in general, to conclude, so far, to sum up, etc.

The third type of discourse markers are message relationship markers. Their role is to signal the relationship of the basic messages which are conveyed by the ongoing conversation or the previously mentioned messages. These markers are divided into four groups: parallel, contrasting, elaborative, and inferential.

The most general are the parallel markers (*also, and, likewise, similarly, too, etc.*). They show how basic messages are parallel to certain aspects of the previous discourse.

Contrastive markers form the second group. *All the same, but, instead, otherwise, rather, regardless, etc.* are used in order to show drastic difference or juxtaposition, or to highlight close association between the messages stated in the discourse.

Elaborative markers show how the current utterance elaborates and presents in further detail earlier messages (*above all, besides, for example, furthermore, in fact, in other words, etc.*)

Inferential markers signal that the current message is a consequence of certain aspects of the prior discourse (*accordingly, then, therefore, of course, so, then, hence, as a result, etc.*).

However, the aforementioned classification made by Fraser (1993) cannot be considered extensive. Volkova states in *Functional Classification of Discourse Markers* that a list of discourse markers should include 'all those units of language whose function is to build bridges in discourse by serving in different ways as connective devices which help the listener a) to understand discourse as a single whole; b) to correlate discourse segments in the right and clear way; c) to make conclusions the speaker wants the listener to make'. The whole set, she suggests,

should include 50 language units (including, by the way, an adding conjunction 'by the way').

Despite the fact that the words we perceive as discourse markers come from different parts of speech, they perform the same function 'as specific means of discourse cohesion and interpretation'. According to Volkova, to the class of discourse connectors belong function words traditionally defined as particles (such as *just* and *already*) as well as functional words that are traditionally defined as adverbs (*besides, therefore, etc.*). However, since these words do not perform supposed syntactic function in the sentence, and even fail at meeting the first criterion of an adverb as they do not refer to anything in particular in the objective reality while '*being*' a notional part of speech, we might come to a conclusion that they cannot be classified as adverbs, but as functional parts of speech.

Further into the article Volkova suggests a following distinction of discourse connectors:

- ***discourse correlatives*** fit the sentence they belong to into a discourse context by means of correlation. For example, the utterance *He is here already* is opposed to the implicit proposition *He was not here before* at the discourse level. Therefore, the unit *already* correlates two types of discourse information; the second message is usually not revealed formally but is expressed implicitly. The words of this group practically always convey some implicit information, which becomes clear only within discourse. Simultaneously, they connect two types of information, explicit and implicit, by means of correlation;
- ***discourse linkers*** include the units which have a more evident connective function: they usually link two explicit messages within the same discourse. Let us consider the following example: *The house is small for a family of four. Furthermore, it is in a bad location.* The two sentences are linked together by means of the unit *furthermore*.

This classification distinguishes two kinds of discourse correlatives: *additive* correlatives add new information; *contrastive* correlatives oppose one utterance to the previous.

In turn, discourse linkers can be subdivided into five types: *additive* linkers (*also*) signal additive relations to what had been said; *contrastive* linkers (*anyway*) convey the idea of concession; *parallel* linkers (*similarly, likewise*), *summarizing* linkers (*thus, so*), and *sequencing* linkers (*to begin with, finally*) demonstrate similar qualities at the discourse level and according to their functional type they introduce information as similar, summing up or relating the order of events thus providing cohesive ties with previous discourse segments (Volkova 2010, p. 100-103).

### 1.5.3. Discourse Markers and Their Place in the Utterance

The question of position of discourse markers in a sentence (or, in our case, in an utterance) is not less debated than their terminology. Generally, according to observations presented by Fraser (1993) and Aijmer (2002), discourse markers tend to be used in the initial position in an utterance. Such a position allows to function as a hint to the status of the linguistic item, contains themes and is capable of introducing brand new topics, relates to the preceding discourse, serves pragmatic and interactional purpose.

According to Fraser (1993) three possible positions for a discourse marker placement exist:

1) sentence initial (at the beginning of the utterance):

*H: She's probably just gone off in a mood, int she? Something her mam said.*

*C: Aye. Anyways, I'll get these in. I'll see ya. Harry I'll see ya, lad, aye. Mind that rain.* (McDonagh 2015, p. 72);

2) sentence-medial (a kind of insertion in the middle of an utterance):

*K: Why did he bring poor Billy off with him anyways so if he's such a decent fella? Didn't he know his aunties would be worrying?*

(McDonagh 1998, p. 56);

3) sentence final (at the end of an utterance):

*M: Sure, every cat has its own separate personality, sure, not to mention its eyes and its miaow. Look at my Sir Roger. Sir Roger has a different personality to any cat. Any cat I've ever known, anyways ...*

(McDonagh 2001, p. 31).

Examples above share the same discourse marker *anyway(s)*, but its position in each case is influenced by the role and the purpose of the said function word.

#### **1.5.4. Non-truth Condition of Discourse Markers**

Non-truth condition, according to Fung and Carter (2007), describes the necessity of discourse markers not to be grammatically or semantically necessary in order for an utterance to make sense. In other words, the existence or lack of a discourse marker does not affect the truth condition.

Thus, discourse markers are not required to contribute to the semantic content of the utterance. The non-truth condition differentiates discourse markers from units which provide 'content'.

#### **1.5.5. Interactive Functions of Discourse Markers in Speech**

Though it might be impossible to provide the full list of the interactive functions of discourse markers, some prominent ones are worth mentioning in order to give an understanding of what possibilities those linguistic units provide to the actors of communication.

Connectivity, otherwise referred to as 'text coherence' is the most talked about and is even defined by Schiffrin (1987) as the main function of discourse markers. They can manage the interconnection between an utterance and discourse, make the relation between facts and conditions more explicit, and contribute to the logical and cohesive development of the communication. Fung and Carter (2007)

state that the fulfillment of the connective function is the prime goal of discourse markers like *well, you know, anyway*, etc.

Co-construction of meaning is the next function which is typically associated with discourse markers. Linguistic units that fulfill the aforementioned function usually give hints about the formation of discourse and can help the addressee construct a sort of a mental outline for the conversation (Fung and Carter 2007). This function is vital for the unplanned nature of the speech as it can provide the actors of communication with some sort of a ‘common ground’ for the proposition, digressions, and topic shifts during the process.

Besides, discourse markers can serve as a number of ‘traces’ signaling the immediate co-construction process taking place and caused by time constraints:

- thinking process (*I think, I see*);
- hesitations (*well, sort of*);
- reformulations (*I mean, in other words*);
- elaboration (*I mean, actually*).

The last function associated with discourse markers in this category gives them opportunity to serve as gap fillers and signal about pauses in discourse needed for actors of communication to formulate or think through their ideas. Some discourse markers might even signal the production problem which occurred on part of the speaker (Andersen, 1998).

## **1.6. The Classification According to Function**

Currently the classification and study of the discourse marker’s function are at the forefront. Discourse markers can be divided into two groups on the basis of their function – textual and interpersonal. It is worth mentioning some other independent parameters such as attitudinal, cognitive and interactional, even though they are considered to be non-mutual exclusive, which leads to undefined functional distribution of discourse markers in various contexts.

Some scholars even go as far as stating that taxonomy, the interest in grouping and labeling discourse markers might be excessive at times (Andersen, 2001). As the exclusivity of taxonomic framework contradicts the reality of

concurrency of textual and interpersonal functions, a proposition of conceptualization of discourse markers arises. According to Andersen (2001), linguistic item can be described as a combination of basic aspects of pragmatic meaning:

- 1) subjective
- 2) interactional
- 3) textual.

Deeper examination of this approach might be useful for describing functional complexity of discourse markers without forcing a specific aspect to be the only possible one.

### **1.6.1. Subjective, Interactional, and Textual Functions**

Andersen (2001) states in the study that all discourse markers are expressing a degree of subjectivity. When any speaker forms an utterance, they are forming it around an intention or a request they wish upon the addressee. Discourse markers can aid in deciphering the exact attitude of the speaker and simplify the interpretation, which results in a successful communication. Markers might as well express not only the way actors of communication perceive the information, but also how they perceive the communicative situation they take part in or their conversational and social relation to the addressee.

Andersen also argues that the aforementioned points can serve as a basis for singling out certain markers which possess an interactional capacity and are chosen in favor of the hearer's perspective and interest in the conversation). On the contrast, other discourse markers are used in favor of the speaker and are used to highlight their beliefs and attitudes.

It makes sense as well to identify markers that have more prominent textual features. This feature helps contributing to the coherence of a discourse.

In Andersen's own words, 'a pragmatic marker which has a predominantly subjective function describes the relation between the speaker and a communicated proposition/assumption, such as whether she finds it surprising or trivial, fortunate or unfortunate, etc. A pragmatic marker that has an interactional function describes

what the speaker perceives as the hearer's relation to a communicated proposition/assumption (i.e. it is hearer-oriented). Finally, a pragmatic marker with a textual function describes what the speaker perceives as the relation between sequentially arranged units of discourse, for instance between propositions or communicated assumptions in general' (2001, p. 65-66).

Interactive and subjective functions are inseparable as both take part in the formation of the communicative content of utterances and express the informative intention at the same time. The actors of communication are concerned with the informational content of the message as well as with the acts of saving their faces and subjecting to the principles of politeness. Textual and subjective functions also cannot be separated without taking into the account each other.

However, in spite of the bonds and mutual benefits, these functional aspects can and should be distinguished as one of three usually will take a more prominent position in the discourse marker in use.

### **1.6.2. Subjective Function**

In order to define subjective functions, the subjectivity itself shall be examined. It is regarded as the way in which language in use provides not only the key information, but also their expression of attitude and beliefs. An utterance will typically include a proposition (or a request) to the addressee and an expression of the speaker's attitude towards it.

Pragmatic markers certainly can express subjectivity. Subjectivity, as Andersen states, is 'essentially a non-structuring feature ... which comprises a number of different types of meaning' (2001, p. 67). Such types might include the speaker's validation of the information, their attitude which affects the content of the message, their evaluation of newsworthiness of the utterance. They can also indicate the source of knowledge (if the data comprises of the speaker's own observations or if they simply refer to the claims of others), reject the core content of the message (for irony or in case of a doubt), and show metalinguistic attitude (whether the speaker obeys to the rules of grammar and syntax or simply relies on the informal speech and neglects the lexical commitment).

### **1.6.3. Interactional (Interpersonal) Function**

While inherent subjectivity of the utterance is apparent, it is worth considering the speaker's attempt to take the addressee's perspective in the process of communicating. Particles with an interactional function express attitudes, feelings and evaluations of the actors of communication.

Pragmatic markers with predominant interactional function are hearer oriented. They may address the communicative assumptions of mutual respect and interest in forming a fruitful discourse.

The interpersonal function can also be associated with the social purpose of the language. However, politeness is not considered to be a part of the interactional function. The adherence to the norms of politeness might serve several subjective functions, such as not appearing too rude or assertive (saving one's face) – the use of certain discourse markers is explained by the speaker's relation to the core proposition of the utterance, and not to the addressee's perception of it. Apart from that, communication can be not favorable to the hearer. The speaker might call out or challenge other actors of interaction (Andersen, 2001).

Interactional meaning being hearer-oriented is required to engage the hearer and implies the need for their reply. According to Aijmer (2002), face-saving and politeness use discourse markers with interpersonal functions. Meaning of imprecision and approximation seem to signal the speaker's indirectness and desire to reduce the social pressure between the speakers.

Andersen (2001) mentions the relevance theory, where an actor of communication can distinguish between information that is relevant due to its support of the existing conceptual assumption and that which is relevant because it contradicts existing assumptions. Pragmatic markers aid with the disclosure of the occurrence of these inferential processes and provides direct signals which are involved in the interpretation process. Pragmatic discourse markers can be used in order to express agreement or disagreement, belief or disbelief, endorsement or rejection, conviction or doubt, and they can mark information as new or old, surprising or trivial, etc.



#### **1.6.4. Textual Functions**

The textual function of the discourse markers refers to the coherence between sequences of which any given discourse is comprised. It can be seen between two propositions, on the level of several utterances, between the turns of each actor of communication, between the topics and/or subtopics of a discourse, etc.

Discourse markers that express a more prominent textual function can communicate the speaker's perception of the relation between numerous units of an utterance. Textual function coincides with Schiffrin's (1987) belief that discourse markers are primarily regarded as 'discourse glue' and are expected to provide structure and coherence.

Andersen also points out that textual function can be presumed to be a universal feature of pragmatic markers. However, the scholar does not support such a view: *'The reason is that there are some pragmatic markers which to a very little extent (if at all) contribute to discourse structure, but whose sole purpose is to contribute to meaning of a subjective or interactional kind.'* (Andersen 2001, p. 77).

## **Conclusions to Chapter One**

We started this Chapter by highlighting some of the issues discussed in relation to discourse, discourse analysis and discourse markers. We have conducted a general overview of scholastic sources on the topic of the spoken discourse.

We examined discourse structure and its models. Eduard Hovy distinguishes semantic, interpersonal, and stylistic information that can be expressed in discourse. Despite the absence of a unique rhetorical partner for each semantic relation or interpersonal goal, Hovy believes that different semantic sequences, relations, and patterns can be marked by a single preposition.

We noted that there is no agreed terminology when it comes to discourse markers – it is true when we deal with different linguistic approaches. We defined a discourse marker as a word or a phrase that performs a role in managing the flow and structure of discourse. They are not integrated syntactically and can be omitted without affecting the sentence's grammatical correctness.

We pointed out that while some discourse markers might have meanings, others usually just perform as discourse structures. There are different discourse markers classifications and divisions by types.

Among the potential types of message that discourse markers might convey Bruce Fraser assumes basic, commentary, and parallel messages. Fraser has also distinguished between a number of types of discourse markers, the most interesting for our research being message relationship markers.

We have examined the role that position in an utterance may play on the function of a discourse marker. Non-truth conditions, interactive functions and other classifications of discourse markers have been covered in this chapter.

While discourse markers might come from different parts of speech, they still perform an essential function of aiding discourse cohesion and discourse interpretation.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **FUNCTION WORDS *REALLY, ANYWAY, ACTUALLY, IN FACT***

#### **AS DISCOURSE MARKERS**

Words *really, anyway, actually, in fact* are traditionally classified as adverbs but in opinion of modern linguists they fail to meet the features of their grammatical class. This problem becomes apparent as we take a look at these words not in isolation of dictionaries and grammar books, but in the context of discourse.

To find a practical use of theoretical information, we illustrated different functions of discourse markers *really, anyway, actually, in fact* with fictional dramatic works of Martin McDonagh. Since there can be a problem in properly sourcing and crediting non-fictional speech examples, lines in theatre scripts are the closest thing in fiction that can fulfill our needs. Martin McDonagh pays a lot of attention to accurateness of his dialogues, studying and analyzing speaking patterns of real people of different nationalities, ages and social statuses. The author tries to convey the spontaneity and freedom that is associated with improvised speech.

In this Chapter we take a closer look at words *really, anyway, actually, and in fact* firstly from a traditional grammar viewpoint, then in the context of discourse.

### **2.1. The Class of Adverbs**

First we should define an ‘adverb’. The adverb is a notional part of speech, which should refer to something in objective reality. Kaushanska (2008) defines ‘adverb’ as a part of speech which expresses some circumstances that attend an action or state; points out certain characteristic features of an action or a quality. In sentence the adverb functions as an adverbial modifier, i.e. it may modify verbs, adjectives, etc. (p. 245).

However, adverbs as a lexical class are diverse in their character and contents. Their classification and study is a complex matter, which includes the differentiation in academic definitions.

According to the studies by Quirk et al. (1985), most of the time scholars refer to ‘adverb’ and its functions while they actually regard the ‘adverb’ more as a part of an ‘adverb phrase’. Examples and research are generally dissecting the functions of the ‘adverb phrase’ using only the adverb part of it. Moreover, Quirk et al. argue that the adverb class might be regarded as a grammatical class for the words which do not fit other classes and do not possess their key characteristics.

### 2.1.1. Types of Adverbs

Three types of adverb are distinguished at the morphological level:

- a) simple adverbs (*well, just, near*);
- b) compound adverbs (*somehow, anyway, hereby*);
- c) derivational (*actually, clockwise, wrongly*).

As for the grammatical functions, Quirk et al. differentiate four groups: adjuncts, subjuncts, disjuncts, and conjuncts. Adjuncts and subjuncts are thought to be more or less integrated within the structure of the clause but the utterance would still make sense if they were omitted. Here are a few examples of adjuncts (1, 2) and subjuncts (3, 4):

- (1) We *slowly* went through the garden gates.
- (2) He repeated her name *softly*.
- (3) Mary and John have *just* arrived.
- (4) I would *kindly* wait for your response.

Disjuncts and conjuncts, on the other hand, are less tied to the content of the utterance. They rather serve as signals of the speaker’s attitude towards the facts, events and key figures of the narrative. Disjuncts can express the speaker’s comments on or authority for the accompanying clause (5, 6):

- (5) *Hopefully*, he will make it on time.
- (6) He *foolishly* jumped to the conclusions before getting acquainted with the facts.

Conjuncts help with the speaker’s expression of evaluations and judgements regarding the relation between several linguistic units (7, 8):

- (7) She wanted him to apologize, and *yet* he never did.

(8) Sam has decided to leave the house later than he planned. His date would show up an hour later, *anyway*.

As for the syntactic functions, adverbs are generally restricted to serve as a clause element adverbial (9) or, in other cases, as a premodifier of adjective and adverb (10):

(9) He *really* forgot about it.

(10) They are *quite* happy. They are *quite* happily married.

From a semantic point of view Ernst (2009) offers such subcategories for adverbs: speech act adverbs (make reference to the speech act of the clause and are often used to express the request for an honest answer), evaluative adverbs (speaker commits to the proposition associated with the adverb), modal adverbs (express mood and assign the degree of likelihood of the thought expressed), evidential adverbs (evaluate the truth of the utterance in which they appear), subject-oriented adverbs (target the subject and are restricted in interpretation), and exocomparative adverbs (reference the existence of something or someone of the same type as the argument they accompany).

Classification provided by Bonami et al. (2004) apart from Ernst's speech act, evaluative and modal adverbs also differentiates between several additional subcategories, such as connectives (firstly, secondly), agentives (generously), frames (theoretically), frequency (always, never), duration (for a while), and time (immediately) adverbs, as well as adverbs of degree (fully, completely) and manner (kindly).

### **2.1.2. Adverbs as Function Words**

While adverbs are used to make speech more precise and less misleading for the addressee, some contemporary language users would suggest cutting adverbs and adverbial clauses out in certain contexts. For example, the spell-checking aid which is installed in text-based programs such as Microsoft Word suggests deleting adverb *really* from example (9) in order to make the utterance more concise and clearer. In some regards, this proposition might be viewed as a

comment on the inability of adverbs to justify their role as notion words in the utterances.

Volkova (2010) argues that the so-called ‘adverbs’ do not refer to anything in objective reality nor do they perform a syntactic function in a sentence as we cannot even put a question to them (p. 79). Volkova treats words such as *really* and *anyway* as purely function words, supporting Schiffrin’s studies. To be more specific, Volkova (2012) classifies *really*, *anyway*, *actually*, *in fact* as contrastive concessive particles which can change the meaning of sentences in text or speech, i.e. when they are used in discourse. *Really* and *anyway* introduce a phrase or clause denoting a circumstance that might be expected to preclude the action of the main clause, but does not.

## **2.2. Contrastive Concessive Particles**

According to Volkova (2012), the group of concessive particles consists of nine language units: *anyway*, *actually*, *anyhow*, *at any rate*, *in any event*, *in any case*, *in fact*, *after all*, *really*. They are grouped on the basis of their similarity on textual level.

Rusko (2011) states that concessive particles (and particles in general) require a further research and theory development from the communicative-functional approach. Moreover, particles are viewed as important means of speech act formations in both natural and indirect uses. They are also capable of influencing the semantics of the utterances.

Concessive particles usually are vague in their semantics, have an ambiguous meaning and are quite challenging to decode and translate in other languages. The particle’s meaning largely relies on the context in which they are used. Simultaneously, Rusko comes to a conclusion that particles are the ones that are responsible for causing the definite context surrounding.

Rusko (2011) finds that one of the major functions of the particles in the utterance is to transfuse feelings, emotions, attitude to the reality, addressee, and message content. In some cases the particle’s use is connected to the speaker’s desire to express their real attitude while saving face and hiding behind the façade

of objectivity and accepted values. The particles are used in cases when the speaker wishes to influence or to guide the listeners towards a suitable conclusion without crossing the boundaries of ethics or to avoid the possible doubts.

Thus, the particles are common in discourse as they aid the actors of communication in exchanging the messages in a way that is true to the principles of politeness and eliminates all the possible threats and obstacles. Stylistically particles can introduce an emphatic element, facilitating the communication by making it more expressive and distinctive.

The pragmatics of particles, according to Apresyan (1988) is understood as a fixed attitude of the speaker to: a) a reality, b) utterance content, c) an addressee. The role of particles can also be regarded as the establishment of the subject's contact with information interpretation of the utterance. Having analyzed the typological principles and the particle's reaction to the grammatical tendencies of the utterances, Rusko comes to a conclusion that particles rather perform discussive function than the informing the communication actors about something in particular.

Rusko (2011) summarizes the following peculiarities of particles:

- 1) Particles are capable of realizing their meaning and functions solely in discourse as they act as means of binding utterances and can create more space to further discussed the aforementioned discourse topics. Particles can aid with reconstructing missing structures and omitted information.
- 2) Particles, though they are considered to be lexical items, do not denote anything and serve no lexical meaning when used in discourse. Particles are meant to refer to certain communication zones on the basis of communication task the speaker appeal to.
- 3) Particles allow the speakers to link the discourse to the real world by adding hidden semantics. They are instrumental in creating indirect speech acts giving the clues to interpret the utterance content, especially the implied, not overtly expressed one.

- 4) Particles' discourse functions are connected with discourse organization and influencing the listener psychologically. These tasks may be realized by specifying explicitly unexpressed components that result in the speakers' breaking the information boundaries (given explicitly) while using both common facts and information provided by the situation.

Volkova (2012) regards particles as meaningful units of language and as discourse markers in speech. Discourse cohesion requires the rendering of implicit information conducted by the use of particles. The information that is provided by discourse markers is not limited to conveying situational meanings, but they are also capable of telling the cognitive, expressive, social, and textual competence of the communication actors.

### **2.3. *Really* and Its Properties**

*Really* is traditionally classified as a simple adverb and according to Cambridge Dictionary can be defined as following: 1) adverb intensifying meaning similar to '*in fact*'; 2) adverb used to say that something is certain; 3) adverb confirming that something is sincere, true.

#### **2.3.1. General Characteristics of *really***

*Really* is considered to be an intensifying adverb. *Really* is placed directly in front of adjectives or adverbs to add to their meaning. Often they make the meaning of the adverb or adjective stronger, or more intense. For this reason, these words are called intensifiers. In theory, *really* is considered to be of a notional part of speech. However, it does not refer to anything in a real world nor does it perform a syntactic function. The actual use of *really* in discourse is even more far-fetched from its common perception (Volkova 2013, p.36). Let us look at the example below:

A: He really hurt my hand.

T: Look at your poor hand!

A: I know, it really hurts (McDonagh 2003, p. 18).

In the given utterances speaker A. uses *really* several times. But does it 'intensify' any adverbs or adjectives? Does the addition or the avoidance of *really*



change the strength of the fact? Actually, speaker A. uses *really* not to explain the degree of pain, but to point out that someone *did*, in fact, *hurt him*. So, the speaker must express their opinion or attitude towards the situation. The position of *really* in the utterance depends on what kind of implicit information the speaker is trying to introduce. The speaker concludes that the real state of things surprises him or contradicts his expectations of reality.

To conclude, we can surely say that *really* should be examined as a particle that frames discourse, but not as an adverb.

### **2.3.2. Functioning of *really* in Discourse**

In the article *Illocutionary Potential of the Discourse Marker 'Really'* Volkova (2013) states that 'the functions of *really* may vary from pragmatically significant to interactively expressive' and that it 'acts as an important tool in *verbalizing the communicants' intentions* and signaling various conversational strategies' (p. 37).

Estimating the message as something that contradicts the general expectations and norms that speakers share is one of the most important textual function of *really*.

*A: Little kids are gonna follow me around and they're gonna know my name and what I stood for, and they're gonna give me some of their sweets in thanks, and I'm gonna take those sweets and thank them and tell them to get home safe, and I'm gonna be happy. Not because of the sweets, I don't really like sweets, but because I'd know ... I'd know in my heart, that if I hadn't been there, not all of them would have been there* (McDonagh 2003, p. 53).

Speaker A. subverts the hearer's expectations when they mention they '*don't really like sweets*'. While this statement fails to justify the practical significance of sweets, it adds value to the following statement, highlighting the real purpose – not material but sentimental fulfillment.

In other cases *really* might be used in order to trick the listeners into thinking that the matter of the conversation is not as serious and therefore does not

require full responsibility and does not threaten the actors of communication. Of course, such a disposition of power allows the speaker to manipulate the listener:

*MD: What would you want to be speaking to me alone for anyways?*

*TH: Oh nothing terrible important really. Just I'd like you to write out and sign a little out confession for me, that's all. Just a weeny little confession, like.*

*MD: A confession to what?*

*(TH takes a skull with a large forehead-crack out of his bag.)*

*TH: A confession to the murdering be blunt instrument, or be some sort of instrument, of your late wife, Mrs Oona Margaret Dowd.*

*(McDonagh 1997, p. 45)*

In this example, TH manipulates MD by luring the hearer into the conversation. Without this trick MD would be concerned and alerted by the word 'confession' as it implies MD's connection to something immoral or possibly illegal. Here TH's utterances remain casual and suitable for a light-hearted friendly encounter, while their meaning is much more serious. Such a contrast between what is said and how it is said perplexes MD and allows TH to caught them off-guard with the reveal of a skull, implying that MD in their eyes is a prime suspect in a possible murder. And then TH confirms the implications by saying the suspicion out loud.

Gap-filler is another significant communicative function of *really*. According to Volkova (2013) 'communicative gaps appear when, for different reasons, the hearer does not know how to react to the speaker's message' (p. 38).

*M: Good for you. Shirley, is it? Why don't you do a lucky dip, Shirley, and I'll have that one?*

*S: Really? Shall I? Like a lucky dip? Alright ... (McDonagh 2015, p. 29).*

Often times *really* might determine the illocutionary force of the utterance and result in pragmatic transposition of speech acts. Consider the following example:

*MR: What was Oona's biggest fault, Mick?*

*MD: Oona didn't have big faults really. She just had little faults. Niggly things, y'know? She'd never wrap up cheese properly. Y'know, when she was finished with it. She'd just leave it lying about, letting the air get to it. The same with bread. She'd never wrap up bread properly. Y'know, like after she'd made a sandwich or the like. And she was terrible at scrambled eggs, and I don't know why, because scrambled eggs are easy to do. Oona's scrambled eggs'd come out either grey or burned.*

*MR: You don't miss her so.*

*MD: I do miss her. I mean, that scrambled egg business wasn't really a big thing. We'd just avoid having scrambled eggs, y'know?*

(McDonagh 1997, p. 44).

In both instances speaker MD uses *really* to mark the evaluation process. As the speaker lists out the imperfections of their partner, MD comes to a conclusion that their partner is not so bad after all. However, by using *really*, MD avoids making an explicit conclusion in order not to present the train of thought as a valid assessment and examination of their partner's behaviour, but rather as an irrational expression their confusion and mild annoyance in a polite way.

In some cases, the speakers might use *really* to give themselves enough time to process information and give a thought-out response:

*K: Okay, Michal, I'll do that.*

*M: Really?*

*K: Really.*

*M: Wow. Cool. That was easy. Well, y'know, in that case, there's probably a lot more of your stories you should burn too, 'cos some of 'em, and I'm not being funny or anything, but some of 'em are a bit sick, really.*

(McDonagh 2003, p. 42).

In the given utterances speaker M. is surprised by the K.'s commitment. To make sure that they heard it right and interpreted it correctly, they ask again, briefly and excluding any potential chance of misinterpretation.

Or, like in the next example, the speaker might use *really* for the interlocutor to stop and re-evaluate their statement:

*K: She'd kiss a bald donkey. And she'd still probably draw the line at Billy. Poor Billy.*

*E: A shame too.*

*K: A shame too, because Billy does have a sweet face if you ignore the rest of him.*

*E: Well he doesn't really.*

*K: He has a bit of a sweet face.*

*E: Well he doesn't really, Kate.*

*K: Or his eyes, I'm saying. They're nice enough.*

(McDonagh 1996, p. 8).

## **2.4. Anyway and Its Properties**

*Anyway* is traditionally classified as a compound adverb and according to the Cambridge Dictionary can be defined as following: 1) *anyway* signals that the speaker is not considering other facts or conditions; considered independently, without being influenced by other things (*We were planning on going there anyway, so we might as well pick you up on our way back*); 2) *anyway* is often used to change the subject, return to an earlier subject, or get to the most interesting point, and is also used to take up time so that you can decide what to say next (*Honestly, I can't remember her name right now. Anyway, I saw her as she was entering the court room*); 3) *anyway* is often used to support or explain a previous statement (*We chose coffee but the place was short on green tea anyway*).

### **2.4.1. General Characteristics of *anyway***

*Anyway* is a compound word – it consists of ‘any’ and ‘way’. In order to understand *anyway*, let us define each of its components. *Any* is considered a determiner, pronoun and defined as: 1) some, or even the smallest amount or number of; 2) one of or each of a particular type of person or thing when it is not important which.

Way is considered a noun and defined as: 1) a route, direction, or path; 2) a distance or a period of time; 3) a particular choice, opinion, belief, or action, especially from among several possibilities.

*Anyway* is a form we use in our study, but we have to mention, that it sometimes gets interchanged with *anyways* in colloquial speech. Some dictionaries consider the latter form to be a non-existent word and a mistake; others consider it to be a bastardized pronunciation of ‘anywise’. Even though there are numerous potential theories, the majority of speakers use both *anyway* and *anyways* but do not differentiate them as words that have different meanings. Some illustrative materials in this Chapter contain both forms, and we presume that *anyway* = *anyways* to facilitate already complicated and nuanced study.

In order to give a general characteristic to *anyway* we should review several theories which consider the word to be an adverb which acts according to the classic definition of the adverb. Halliday and Hasan state that *anyway* is a morphologically compound adverb as *nevertheless* or *therefore* are. Halliday and Hasan argue that *anyway* may have a diversity of meanings. First, *anyway* can have an additive meaning comparable to *and then* when it appears with the conjunction *and*. Secondly, *anyway* can have a resumptive meaning, rather, it can assume such an internal relation comparable to *to resume* or *to come back to the point*. Thirdly, *anyway* can show an adversative relation, which is contrary to the expectation. This meaning may be derived from the content, or the environment of the participants. Then, *anyway* can also have a dismissive meaning corresponding to *no matter which*. Also, *anyway* can brush the preceding sentence aside; and it can also function as a resumptive synonym to *anyhow* or *at any rate*. In conclusion, Halliday and Hasan maintain that *anyway* is used for either adversative or dismissal meaning. In the latter case, it is synonymous to *in any case*, *in either case*, and *whichever way it is*. It can also be open-ended as *in any case*, *anyhow*, *at any rate*, and *however it is* are (Halliday & Hasan 1976).

Another theory that we cover belongs to Ferrara. According to Ferrara, three types of *anyway* might be distinguished. The first and the second subtypes are

adverbial, so we are covering them in this part of the Chapter. The third one will be discussed further. The first subtype, named *Anyway-1*, is an additive adverbial and it carries the meaning of *besides*. This type of *anyway* is syntactically positioned at the end of a clause though it can also occur clause-medially. The typical sentence pattern of *Anyway-1* is the following:

*K: That's something-esque. What kind of 'esque' is it? I can't remember. I don't really go in for that 'esque' sort of stuff anyway.*

(McDonagh 2003, p. 15).

In the last utterance speaker K. expresses their disinterest in 'that sort of stuff' which justifies their difficulty remembering the exact thing they are talking about in the preceding sentence. *Anyway* can easily be substituted with *besides* without changing the meaning of the sentence.

The second subtype, named *Anyway-2*, is a dismissive *anyway* and it carries the meaning of *nonetheless*. Dismissive *anyway* usually co-occurs with a negative observation followed by *but* and a positive or neutral evaluation (Ferrara 1997).

*K: He doesn't understand these things and he's got nothing to do with these stories anyway.*

(McDonagh 2003, p. 12).

In this example the utterance contains an evaluation of a certain individual conducted by K. Presumably, K. comes to a conclusion that this person cannot be a suspect as their intellectual abilities or practical knowledge do not meet the expected bar for the criminal. In other words, with the help of *anyway* K. not only objects but completely dismisses the topic their interlocutor has initiated.

#### **2.4.2. Functioning of *anyway* in Discourse**

Unlike *really*, *anyway* as a discourse marker seems to be far more explored. We decided to look through different theories of its function and to find an according example from the discourse instances in the plays of Martin McDonagh.

Marion Owen views *anyway* as a conversational device or expression to organize discourse. Owen claims that the particle indicates some kind of boundary

though not necessarily a boundary between topics. The author claims that *anyway* has four major functions. All these functions structure conversational activities.

The first function as a closing initiation and returning to the main topic (a resumption activity) is distinguishable through its separate tone group from the rest of the utterance; and it always appears at the beginning of a sentence. In this use, *anyway* can be seen as a topic marker; it can also be seen as if *anyway* is initiating closing sequences. Therefore, *anyway* does not indicate a shift of topic boundary, but it indicates the conversational activity of closing. After uttering *anyway*, the intervening matter of the conversation is set aside, and it is seen as subordinate or inessential (Owen 1985, p. 238).

*M: There was a little toy dog?! Did it yap?*

*K: Did it what?*

*M: Did it yap?*

*K: Er ... yes. Anyway, there was a little caravan nearby...*

(McDonagh 2003, p. 32).

In the example K. indirectly expresses the desire to close the subtopic discussed as it presumably makes them uncomfortable. It seems as the first utterance by speaker M. interrupted K.'s narration. Though the way they chose to express may be abrupt and sudden, the last utterance clearly signals to the speaker M. that the previously discussed subtopic is of no interest to K. as of now.

The second use of *anyway* described by Owen is a conversational unit representing an offer to close. Because there is an offer to close, it offers the floor to other participants to introduce a new topic if desired. This use has a separate tone unit; and it appears at the start of an utterance (Owen 1985, p. 239).

*P: I will understand, but if you have forgiven me what's to keep you in Ireland? There's your sisters could take care of your mother and why should you have had the burden all these years, don't you deserve a life? And if they say no, isn't there the home in Oughterard isn't ideal but they do take good care of them, my mother before she passed, and don't they have bingo and what good to your*

*mother does that big hill do? No good. (Pause.) Anyways, M., I will leave it up to you.*

(McDonagh 1996, p. 41).

In this example speaker P. ponders and speculates upon a given topic they have brought up. Since the speaker covers all the question points and things to discuss in the given presumptive situation, they feel as if the topic is exhausted. Having left no chance for the interlocutor to add anything new or relevant, P. decides to give M. a chance to change the conversation route.

In some cases *anyway* serves as an offer to close the topic in order to avoid escalation of the conflict:

*MG: Is the radio a biteen loud there, Maureen?*

*MF: A biteen loud, is it?*

*(MF swipes angrily at the radio again, turning it off. Pause.)*

*MG: Nothing on it, anyways. An oul fella singing nonsense.*

*MF: Isn't it you wanted it set for that oul station?*

*MG: Only for Ceilidh Time and for what you call.*

*MF: It's too late to go complaining now.*

*MG: Not for nonsense did I want it set.*

*MF: (pause) It isn't nonsense anyways. Isn't it Irish?*

*MG: It sounds like nonsense to me. Why can't they just speak English like everybody?*

*MF: Why should they speak English?*

*MG: To know what they're saying.*

(McDonagh 1996, p. 8).

Here we are already in the middle of an interaction between MG and MF which comes off as passive aggressive. MF seems to be quite annoyed by MG, so MG tries to avoid the possibility of a controversy, but just cannot understand that their actions only make the matters worse. MG dismisses the need for the radio to be on and adds *anyways* as a sign to forget about it altogether. However, MF brought up that MG was the one to turn the radio in the first place. Clearly, the unvoiced



tension between the two makes her angrier and MF wishes for MG to acknowledge it. MF even mirrors MG in '*It isn't nonsense anyways*', but in this case *anyways* and general desire to sweep the conflict under the rug is turned into weapon against MG and makes it clear that her intention to avoid confrontation is the core of the conflict.

The third function of *anyway* described by Owen marks a misplaced remark on the conversation; something that would seem to be off topic. In this function, *anyway* has a separate tone unit to the rest of the sentence and it appears at the end of an utterance (Owen 1985, p. 240).

*P: You'll be going to this do tomorrow so?*

*M: I will. (Pause.) It'll be good to see Pato again anyways. I didn't even know he was home.*

(McDonagh 1996, p. 22).

The utterance that contains *anyways* could be perceived by speaker P. as unimportant reasoning since K. has already promised to go.

The fourth use of *anyway* does not have any apparent discourse function apart from setting aside some prior assertion or giving the implication that the phrase preceding *anyway* is unnecessary or irrelevant. This fourth use does not have a separate tone unit; and it appears at the end of the sentence. This use of *anyway* could be paraphrased as *even if* or *despite*. This use adds extra reasons to something that had a reason already (Owen 1985, p. 242).

*R: All you have to do is look out your window to see Ireland. And it's soon bored you'd be. 'There goes a calf.' (Pause.) I be bored anyway; I be continually bored. (Pause.) London I'm thinking of going to. Aye. Thinking of it, anyways. To work, y'know One of these days. Or else Manchester. They have a lot more drugs in Manchester. Supposedly, anyways.*

(McDonagh 1996, p. 59).

All the utterances where *anyway* is used could be easily omitted as they repeat already expressed statements. They are used to convey a much more precise

attitude of speaker R. towards the topics discussed, but they do not bring new information or complement discourse.

*M: To Boston. To Boston I'll be going. Isn't that where them two were from, the Kennedys, or was that somewhere else, now? Robert Kennedy I did prefer over Jack Kennedy. He seemed to be nicer to women. Although I haven't read up on it. (Pause.) Boston. It does have a nice ring to it. Better than England it'll be, I'm sure. Although where wouldn't be better than England? No shite I'll be cleaning there, anyways, and no names called, and Pato'll be there to have a say-so anyways if there was to be names called, but I'm sure there won't be. The Yanks do love the Irish. (Pause.).*

(McDonagh 1996, p. 55).

Speaker M seems to be caught up in their own thoughts and the improvisational and slightly incoherent train of thought serves more as an emotional outlet rather than the informational statement. And even though the utterances themselves seem to be unnecessary, the parts which include *anyways* are even more irrelevant to the topic in general but are present there to show how certain aspects of a potential experience do not obstruct M from dreaming of going to Boston, and therefore can be neglected by the listeners. Of course, such a trick does not work in this case and the desire to avoid certain obstacles only draws more attention to this emotional outburst.

After Owen's classification we might return back to Ferrara's and the third subtype of *anyway*. *Anyway-3* is the discourse marker use and it is labeled by the author as the resumptive *anyway*. This particle reconnects sentences to chunks of discourse. It supports an organizational continuity with the main topic or the main aim of the discourse. The discourse marker *anyway* is always sentence initial. Ferrara says that 'this discourse marker connects more than two sentences; it connects two levels of representation, and the resumptions can span large passages of intervening text in personal narrative' (Ferrara 1997, p. 351).

*Anyway-3* is a marker of digression. Digression is a deviation from the main topic, central theme, or purpose of a discourse. Digression is common and frequent

but not trivial. It can be either conscious or not conscious, and it can be used strategically. Thus, it appears both in planned and unplanned speech. An example of *Anyway-3* is provided below:

*T: Who's the Number One on this case, Ariel, me or you? (Pause.) Thank you. Don't listen to him. Anyway, so why do you suspect we have brought you here?*

(McDonagh 2003, p. 6).

Here T. interrupts the discussion between them and their partner in order to take the suspect by surprise by directing a question to them. This use of *anyway* is strategic and conscious, it adds carelessness. T. might be trying to make conversation seem more relaxed than it really is in order to ease the tension and make the suspect cooperate.

Ferrara's *Anyway-3* corresponds to Owen's first use of *anyway*. That is, Ferrara describes this use of *anyway* as a discourse marker. Similarly, Owen describes this use as a topic marker. Ferrara's *Anyway-3* embraces the second use described by Owen as well, the use of *anyway* offering to close the topic, and giving the other participant the chance to introduce a new topic.

We take a look at one more study conducted by Gonzalez. This theory claims that *anyway* has three primary functions as a pragmatic marker. Firstly, the most common function of *anyway* is to act as a conclusion or summing-up pragmatic device. Secondly, *anyway* can have a key role in structuring discourse by acting as a segment boundary marker (because it frames the opening of an action unit). Thirdly, *anyway* is frequently used as a resumption cue after a digression. The three primary uses of *anyway* described by Gonzalez are not any different depending on the position in the sentence, as the position in the sentence does not seem to have any important role according to the author. Moreover, the author says that there is no indication that intonation has a particularly relevant role either.

Apart from the three primary functions, *anyway* can have two secondary functions. First, *anyway* can indicate, that the information given is extremely

relevant for the interpretation of the story. Second, the speaker might introduce a personal comment or evaluation (Gonzales 2004).

## **2.5. *Actually* and Its Properties**

*Actually* is traditionally classified as an adverb and according to the Cambridge Dictionary can be defined as following: 1) *actually* can double the meaning of *really*, meaning that the speaker is pointing out certain vital facts or conditions which relate to the context or lack thereof (*It's unclear what actually happened that night*); 2) *actually* is regularly used in sentences which include information or facts that are in some way might be surprising or unexpected, defying the assumptions of the actors of communication (*I didn't like her at first, but then I actually grew to admire her!*); 3) *actually* is often used to present the information in a way more polite way when speakers express opposing opinions or correct the statements they consider to be misleading, or in order to refuse an offer without offending the addressee (*Actually, he won the regional competition, not the international one*); 4) *actually* can be used as a sentence modifier to add slight emphasis on the important fact or condition (*I don't actually remember her working there*); 5) *actually* in some cases can be synonymous with *right now* as a way to show that an action is performed at the present moment (You can see her sing, she's *actually* singing live at the stadium). Words such as *really*, *in fact*, *literally*, *very*, *indeed*, *absolutely*, *as a matter of fact*, *in reality*, *in truth*, *veritably* are considered to be closely related to *actually* as synonyms.

### **2.5.1. General Characteristics of *actually***

According to Kussmaul (1978), *actually* is counted as one of the adverbials which indicate illocutionary speech acts that are not connected to the referential meaning of a linguistic item. *Actually* can also be used in order to refer to the prior discourse, and to add new information to the current direction of the discourse or specify prior discourse by elaborating on some aspects and their meaning.

Uta Lenk (1998) comes to a conclusion that Kussmaul's study, while aiming at defining discourse marker *actually* for it to be used in further teachings of the

discourse functions, remains narrow, excluding a possibility to attribute other functions of *actually* on a global coherence scale.

*Actually* acquires a ‘strategic role’ in discourse research conducted by Tognini-Bonelli (1993). Usage of *actually* thus becomes associated with instances in which the speaker wishes their perspective to align with a common consensus, a widely acceptable outlook, etc. *Actually* can be perceived as a way to implicitly acknowledge the preceding events and statements. If the speaker wishes to contradict or to argue against the current topic in discourse, they might use *actually* with a reference to a trusted but overlooked source, making the following subversion of a generally accepted opinion more palatable and less confrontational.

Moreover, a function of *actually* as a form of self-correction, mitigation or challenge is introduced – similar to uses which qualify certain words to be viewed as discourse markers. However, Lenk (1998) points out that Tognini-Bonelli (1993) does not examine *actually* as a discourse marker nor does the scholar introduce distinctive discourse marker functions, framing the study as a revision of propositional uses of the word.

Having examined naturally occurring conversations between native and non-native English speakers, Cheng & Warren (2002) concluded that no new functions of *actually* have been found (when compared with the previous scholastic studies, for example Aijmer (1986) or Tognini-Bonelli (1993)). However, they provide a list of seven functions of *actually* which have occurred in course of their study and corresponds to the theories made by their predecessors. The first two functions are attributed to the propositional use of *actually*, and the other five are performed by *actually* when it is used as a discourse marker:

1. [*Actually*] Indicate[s] a situation exists or happened.
2. Emphasize something unexpected is true or correct.
3. Mitigate correction, rephrasing or contradiction.
4. Introduce a new topic or sub-topic.
5. Act as a filler.
6. Introduce or mitigate a point of view.

7. Imply a sense of solidarity, friendliness, and intimacy.

According to Cheng & Warren, *actually* usually gets overlooked and has been previously doubted to be a discourse marker at all. Fraser (1990), for example, was concerned whether *actually* simply serves as a signal of sequential discourse relationships. Regarding the aforementioned five listed discourse marker functions (3-7), it is worth taking a closer look at *actually* and its use in discourse.

### **2.5.2. Functioning of *actually* in Discourse**

In this part we take a closer look at the behavior of *actually* as a discourse marker. We exemplify and revise five functions, beginning with the mitigation.

Mitigate correction or contradiction can be spotted a lot when dealing with *actually* in an unrehearsed speech. Generally it indicates self-correction, a sort of on-spot cancellation of the previously started utterance:

*P: Oh, um, I kinda needed to use the bathroom, but if it's inconvenient, actually it is inconvenient, isn't it, I can see it's inconvenient, I can hold it, it's alright ...*

*R: It's the first door, down the hall.*

*P: Are you sure? I feel like I'm intruding ...*

(McDonagh 2017, p. 42).

Speaker P admits the awkwardness of the situation. However, they instantly correct themselves due to their sincerity and desire to deal with the problem as soon as possible.

*Actually* can be used in order to correct or contradict other participants of communication. This way the speaker mitigates the face-threatening act of disagreeing with others:

*M: Um, could you skip on to the end, please? This bit's a bit boring.*

*K: Well, that's a bit rude, Michal, actually.*

*M: Oh. Sorry, Katurian. (Pause.) But could you skip on to the end please?*

(McDonagh 2003, p. 32).

Speaker K remarks how M's interruptive request can be seen as rude and impolite. By implementing *actually* speaker K saves himself from being an

opponent to K, rather playing the role of a mitigator who wishes for the conversation to be respectful and thoughtful of others.

The second function deals with an introduction to a brand-new topic of conversation or opens up a divergent sub-topic:

*M: You're quite funny.*

*S: Am I? I'm not.*

*M: You are. I noticed that yesterday.*

*S: Did ya?*

*M: I suppose certain people round here, it just goes over their heads, your sense of humour.*

*S: I don't know about that! But maybe.*

*M: Oh, there's no maybe about it. It's just hard to come across as funny, isn't it, when you're surrounded by stupid thicks. I've always found, anyway. That said, although I appreciate a good sense of humour, I don't actually come across as funny myself ...*

(McDonagh 2015, p. 44).

What starts up as a compliment ends up being a trick of speaker M intended for speaker S to compliment them in return and to open a new branch of conversation which surrounds speaker M and their complementary characteristics. *Actually* serves as a subtle digression from the preceding focus of attention, which was S's sense of humor. It helps speaker M manipulate conversation without admitting that they are asking for the compliment and admiration.

*Actually* can act as a filler. While it is not particularly common to differentiate the filler function from other ones as they are usually bound in the planning area at the beginning of a speaking turn, this feature is still relevant for us to identify and exemplify.

*F: So Lowestoft is riff-raff, but you're not riff-raff?*

*M: Well, riff-raff is in the eye of the beholder, isn't it? It depends who's judging, doesn't it? If you and Harry were judging, no way am I the riff-raff, compared to you and Harry. Because you're from the north. So it depends*

*who's judging, doesn't it? If Søren Kierkegaard were judging then, yes, compared to Søren, probably I am the riff-raff. If Søren was feeling particularly judgmental that day. Or normal judgmental, I'm not sure what he was like. Have you read much Kierkegaard? Has that question ever been asked in Oldham? I haven't read much Kierkegaard, I haven't read any, I choose not to. I just like his funny name. A lot of philosophers have funny names, don't they? How'd that happen? (Pause.) Talking of riff-raff, my old friend Syd Armfield would be the king of the riff-raff. Of course he's not my friend, is he? In fact, if it's true that your daughter's gone missing, and by your face and your manner I'm assuming it is true, well, I wouldn't start pointing fingers at a bloke who, although vaguely menacing, has walked right into your pub for a drink and a chat, and a bag of peanuts, actually, which I forgot before, could I have a bag of peanuts, Alice?*

*A: No, you can't have any peanuts.*

(McDonagh 2015, p. 83).

Here speaker M goes on and rants about speaker F's presumption of being a riff-raff person, which means being unpleasant or unwanted. Speaker M is clearly dissatisfied with the question. They are capable of making arguments for themselves on the go, so they decide to irritate others by using unusual comparisons and making associations which go further and further off the previous communicative path. Speaker M allows themselves to make a pause mid-rant, which serves both as a moment to rest and to highlight the preceding rhetorical question. However, later speaker M once again finds themselves in a situation, where the speech has exhausted itself and they don't seem to come up with strong or ear-catching points. Another pause or stop can be threatening to their position of outsmarting the opponent. Using their ability to improvise, speaker M decides to close the topic abruptly and catches the listeners by surprise by seamlessly ending the utterance with a completely irrelevant request for peanuts. *Actually* acts as both a connecting device to preserve coherence, and gives a moment for the speaker to think on how exactly to finish the rant without admitting defeat or exhaustion.



Introduction or mitigation of a point of view can also be quite hard to separate from other functions as they can happen simultaneously:

*D: I didn't think you came across really good in the things you were saying. I thought you came across as a stupid-ass.*

*M: Ain't it about time you got home to your momma, Dixon?*

*D: No, it ain't time I got home to my momma. I told her I was gonna be out till twelve. Actually.*

(McDonagh 2017, p. 25)

In this example speaker D both tries to outsmart speaker M by subverting expectations and gives a response to a remark which was supposed to be insulting and rhetoric. *Actually* accentuates the point of view of speaker D who remains straight-forward and dominates the narrative.

*Actually* can function as an implication of a sense of solidarity, friendliness, and intimacy:

*A: What's your name?*

*D: Name's on my tag, man. You hard of reading?*

*A: Hard of reading, no, no. That's good, 'hard of reading'. It's kind of like 'hard of hearing', but it's actually 'hard of reading', it's like a play on words or something.*

(McDonagh 2017, p. 61)

While speaker D acts overtly hostile, speaker A tries their best to lighten up the atmosphere and to lower the tension between the actors of communication. Speaker A acts as if they are in on a joke, as if the rude remark was intended to be ironic. Speaker A saves their face and proceeds as if no feelings were hurt.

## **2.6. *In fact* and Its Properties**

Cambridge Dictionary (2021) on its site defines *in fact* as a discourse marker and prescribes the following uses: 1) to add more detailed information to the previously stated facts and conditions (*She has already completed the race. In fact, she won the bronze medal*); 2) to emphasize the truth of a statement, especially if it

may modify or subvert preconceived notions or beliefs of the addressees (*Tomatoes are in fact berries, not vegetables*).

### 2.6.1. Functioning of *in fact* in Discourse

According to Volkova (2012), *actually* and *in fact* tend to be described interchangeably due to similarities in their functioning in discourse. They cannot, however, be perceived to be synonymic, even though implicit meanings they convey tend to be closely related in certain contexts. Both *actually* and *in fact* are capable of conveying partial contradiction or correction of the previous statement on the level of discourse. They can also effectively introduce additional information relevant to the topic or theme of a communicative situation.

*A: They found her down there by the wishing well, in a little Wendy house there. She had three little piglets with her. She had plenty of food and water.*

*So did the piglets, in fact. She seems quite happy about it all, don't you, Maria?*

(McDonagh 2003, p. 63).

Here speaker A uses *in fact* as an additive component. The piglets' well-being is logically tied to and consequential from the aforementioned Wendy's state. The sentence, which contains *in fact* expresses the same idea of resource abundance, adding piglets' perspective to the picture. This interaction is important in order to establish trusting relationship between speaker A and the little girl to whom they are telling a fairy tale.

*In another example in fact is utilized for adding information and highlighting the degree of dislike towards the taste of the sweets:*

*M: Will you have a biscuit with your tea?*

*P: I will. What biscuits do you have, now?*

*M: Em, only Kimberleys.*

*P: I'll leave it so, Maureen. I do hate Kimberleys. In fact I think Kimberleys are the most horrible biscuits in the world.*

*M: The same as that, I hate Kimberleys. I only get them to torment me mother.*

(McDonagh 1996, p. 37)

*In fact*, as well as *actually*, is often used in colloquial speech when the actor of communication wishes to correct their own preceding statement, or the inaccuracy or incorrect behavior executed by their interlocutors.

*A: You did good, Jason. You did real good. But he wasn't the guy.*

*D: (Stunned) What?*

*A: There was no match to the DNA, no matches to any other crimes of this nature, to any crimes at all, in fact. And his record is clean. Maybe he was just bragging.*

(McDonagh 2017, p. 94).

Speaker A presents facts which are unexpected and shocking for speaker D. In order to persuade and further explain how wrong was speaker D, speaker A corrects themselves and adds that the person convicted was not a criminal at all. *In fact* also helps speaker A to be more persuasive and evidence-based.

## Conclusions to Chapter Two

In this Chapter, we have reviewed various authors' views on function words *really*, *anyway*, *actually*, *in fact*. Firstly, we took a closer look at adverbs and their types, and then analyzed their role as function words. Then we have concluded that *really*, *anyway*, *actually*, *in fact* come up in a number of studies dedicated to discourse markers. *Really*, *anyway*, *actually*, *in fact* are contrastive concessive particles which can change the meaning of utterances when they are used in discourse.

Discourse marker *really* functions as 1) a sign of the speaker's attitude towards information that contradicts common beliefs; 2) a gap-filler and a response to give when the speaker feels the need to think over the answer.

As for *anyway*, this discourse marker sparks more interest and possibilities for analysis, hence various studies, dedicated to this word and its functions in discourse. But in order to summarize, we might distinguish the following important roles of *anyway*: 1) *anyway* that signals of the closing of a conversational activity on the topic or in general; 2) *anyway* that offers a closure of the topic or subtopic, giving other speakers a chance to introduce a new one; 3) *anyway* that marks a misplaced remark on the conversation or something that could be considered as impolite.

Discourse marker *actually* comes up as a 'strategic' discourse marker in some studies. It can function in discourse as: 1) mitigate correction or signal of contradiction; 2) introduction of a new topic or sub-topic; 3) a filler; 4) introduction of one's point of view; 5) implementation of compassion or friendliness.

*In fact*, though often thought of as a synonym to *actually*, has its own functions and instances of usage. It can introduce partial contradiction or correction of the previous statement, as well as add new or relevant information to the preceding utterance.

We illustrated the use of the discourse markers *really, anyway, actually, in fact* with excerpts from fictional dramatic works mimicking the real-life conversational styles of people.

Once again, we have to highlight the importance of the discourse markers *really, anyway, actually, in fact* in framing and guiding discourse while helping the interlocutors understand the implicit meaning their partners are trying to convey.

## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In this Diploma Paper, we made an attempt at synthesizing work in linguistic and discourse analysis. We defined peculiarities of function words in general and the words *really*, *anyway*, *actually* and *in fact* in particular putting the linguistic studies and obtained knowledge to a practical use.

In Chapter One we defined and explored discourse, discourse analysis and discourse markers by the analysis of several linguistic studies. On the one hand, the definition of discourse cannot be final as there are different interpretations and uses of the term in linguistics as well as in other tangent sciences. On the other hand, the differences in interpretations and definitions highlight the importance and interest directed at the study of discourse. Linguists define ‘discourse’ as something ‘beyond sentence’; a unit or piece of connected speech or writing that is longer than a conventional sentence. A ‘discourse marker’ might be defined as a word or a phrase that performs a role in managing the flow and structure of discourse. We pointed out the distinction between adverbs and function words.

In Chapter Two we conducted an analysis of several theories concerning roles of function words *really*, *anyway*, *actually* and *in fact*. We paired different functions with the corresponding illustrations taken from fictional dramatic works of Martin McDonagh. The unit *really* generally functions in discourse as a sign of the speaker’s attitude towards the information that contradicts common expectations or as a gap-filler. *Anyway* usually functions as a signal of digression of the topic, an offer to introduce a new topic, the marker of a misplaced remark. *Actually* signals contradiction, introduces new topics, implements corrections. *In fact* can be used to introduce some new information as well as to present minor contradictions or corrections.

We hope that we managed to conduct a productive research and popularize discourse analysis as a modern approach of analyzing language units, especially the study of function words and discourse markers. Discourse marker is an essential piece of the puzzle we call a ‘conversation’. The proper understanding of

their roles in discourse ameliorates our abilities to interpret information and decode implicit messages.

## RÉSUMÉ

У нашому дослідженні ми зробили спробу провести лінгвістичний аналіз мовних одиниць *really*, *anyway*, *actually* та *in fact*. Ми визначили особливості цих службових слів в загальному розумінні та в конкретних випадках їх функціонування в сучасному англomовному дискурсі.

У першому розділі ми визначили та дослідили дискурс, теорію аналізу дискурсу та дискурсивні маркери, користуючись та аналізуючи кілька дослідницьких робіт з мовознавства. З одного боку, визначення дискурсу не може бути остаточним, оскільки інтерпретація та розуміння цього терміну різняться не тільки між різними галузями науки, але й в світі мовознавства. З іншого, численні спроби дослідити та визначити дискурс підкреслюють важливість та актуальність нашої теми. Мовознавці визначають дискурс як «щось за межами речення»; частина пов'язаної розмовної мови чи письма, що є довшою за звичне речення. «Дискурсивний маркер» може бути визначений як слово чи фраза, що виконує особливі функції у дискурсі, скеровуючи розмову та структуруючи її. Ми звернули увагу на проблему установлення відмінностей між прислівниками та службовими словами. Службові слова впливають на узгодженість та послідовність всередині дискурсу та допомагають правильно інтерпретувати висловлення; такі слова виконують роль дискурсивних маркерів.

У другому розділі ми проаналізували ряд лінгвістичних теорій, в яких робиться спроба визначити та класифікувати інтерактивні функції службових слів *really*, *anyway*, *actually* та *in fact*. Ми дослідили джерела та проілюстрували визначені функції на матеріалі фрагментів драматичних робіт Мартіна Макдони.

Службове слово *really* в дискурсі виконує наступні функції: індикатор ставлення мовця до інформації, що суперечить загальним очікуванням; заповнювача комунікативних лакун під час мовлення. *Any way* зазвичай застосовується як сигнал відступу від теми, пропозиції ввести нову тему, підкреслення недоречного зауваження. *Actually* сигналізує про протиріччя,



презентує нові теми, впроваджує виправлення. In fact може використовуватися для представлення нової інформації, а також для введення незначних суперечностей або виправлень під час розмови.

Дискурсивні маркери є важливими частинками пазлу, що називається «діалог». Чітке розуміння їхніх функцій у дискурсі здатне значно покращити наші здібності сприймати інформацію та розуміти підтекст мовленнєвої взаємодії.

**Ключові слова:** дискурсивний маркер, діалогічний дискурс, імпліцитний, нова інформація, прислівник, службове слово, тема розмови.

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