

МІНІСТЕРСТВО ОСВІТИ І НАУКИ УКРАЇНИ
КИЇВСЬКИЙ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ ЛІНГВІСТИЧНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ

Кафедра германської і фіно-угорської філології

імені професора Г. Г. Почепцова

Кваліфікаційна робота магістра з лінгвістики

на тему:

«НЕПРЯМІ СТРАТЕГІЇ СПІЛКУВАННЯ В СУЧАСНОМУ
АНГЛОМОВНОМУ ДІАЛОГІЧНОМУ ДИСКУРСІ»

Студентки групи МЛа 53-18
факультету германської філології
Освітньо-професійної програми
Сучасні філологічні студії (англійська
мова і друга іноземна мова): лінгвістика
та перекладознавство
за спеціальністю 035 філологія
Мусієнко Маргарити Анатоліївни

Допущений до захисту

« ____ » _____ року

*В.о. завідувача кафедри
германської і фіно-угорської
філології
імені професора Г. Г. Почепцова*

(підпис)

(ПБ)

Науковий керівник:
кандидат філологічних наук,
професор **Волкова Лідія Михайлівна**

Національна шкала _____

Кількість балів _____

Оцінка ЄКТС _____

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE
KYIV NATIONAL LINGUISTIC UNIVERSITY
Professor G.G.Pocheptsov Chair of Germanic and Finno-Ugrian Philology

Master's Qualification Paper

**INDIRECT STRATEGIES IN COMMUNICATION:
A STUDY OF MODERN ENGLISH DIALOGIC DISCOURSE**

MARHARYTA MUSIIENKO

Group MLa 53-18

Department of Germanic Philology

Research Adviser

Prof. **LIDIYA M. VOLKOVA**

PhD (Linguistics)

Kyiv 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	4
CHAPTER 1. BASIC FEATURES OF DIALOGIC DISCOURSE	7
1.1. The notion of dialogic discourse and its types.....	7
1.2. General characteristics of communication in terms of pragmatics.....	15
1.3. Basic principles of communication.....	23
Conclusions to Chapter One	28
CHAPTER 2. SPEECH ACTS IN DIALOGIC DISCOURSE	30
2.1. Speech acts theory.....	30
2.2. Indirect speech acts	37
Conclusions to Chapter Two.....	44
CHAPTER 3. FUNCTIONING OF INDIRECT STRATEGIES IN DIALOGIC DISCOURSE	45
3.1. Reasons for using indirect strategies.....	45
3.1.1. Politeness in interaction	45
3.1.2. Face Saving phenomenon	48
3.2. Function peculiarities of indirect strategies in dialogues	55
3.2.1. Rejecting strategy.....	55
3.2.2. Requesting and suggesting strategies	58
3.2.3. Joking strategy	61
3.2.4. Threatening strategy.....	63
3.2.5. Avoiding answer strategy	65
3.3. Cultural differences in using indirect strategies	68
Conclusions to Chapter Three.....	74
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS	75
RESUME	77
REFERENCE LITERATURE	79
LIST OF ILLUSTRATION MATERIALS	86

INTRODUCTION

It is clear that people are social beings and they communicate with each other every day, every hour and every minute. Even if they do not say a word and use only body language they still send some messages to others and want to receive some feedback as well. People are always willing to exchange ideas, express their feeling and receive information from others. People do not always express their intentions in a straightforward and clear way. Of course it is much simpler for the speaker and for the hearer to use only direct ways of rendering information and direct communicative strategies as it is easier to produce and to understand such utterances. However, people cannot say everything what they would like to say using simple words and keeping good relationships with others as sometimes it can hurt others.

The problem of indirectness in communication has been under consideration of linguists and psycholinguists only during the last few decades. Austin (1962), Searle (1975), Green (1996), Smith (1991), Verschueren (1985), Cutting (2002) and others have been investigating indirect speech acts and strategies in order to define and to classify them.

A great deal of modern linguistic research is focused on the facts of verbal communication taking into account the whole spectrum of internal and external factors. A broad interpretation of the discourse as a dynamic linguistic space means that along with the utterance there is perception; meaning implies knowledge, something “hidden” is added to the said. This predetermines **the novelty** of this linguistic research, which focuses on defining the role and rules of functioning of indirect strategies in discourse, and understanding indirect ways of communication in Modern English.

The object of this Paper is indirect strategies in Modern English dialogical discourse.

The subject of this Paper is functional peculiarities of indirect strategies: their communicative-pragmatic features; prerequisites, processes and consequences of their implementation in dialogic discourse.

The main aim of this Paper is to find out the main discourse and pragmatic functions of indirect strategies in modern dialogical discourse on the material of the Modern English serials and to find the differences between indirect strategies in other cultures. To achieve the aim, the following **objectives** should be fulfilled:

- 1) to define the notion of dialogical discourse;
- 2) to investigate the main features of communication and conversation;
- 3) to study the principles of communication and to investigate which ones are violated in indirect strategies;
- 4) to study speech acts and define the notion of the indirect speech act;
- 5) to present a functional classification of indirect strategies and to determine the reasons and purposes of their usage;
- 6) to study the material of Modern English serials to find out the main discourse and pragmatic functions of indirect strategies in Modern English dialogic discourse;
- 7) to investigate the differences between indirect speech strategies in different countries and cultures.

The following basic **methods** and techniques were used to solve the tasks during the research: linguistic observation and description – for the selection of linguistic facts and identification of natural signs of indirect strategies, describing them, characterizing their place in language and determining their functional peculiarities. Intentional method is used in order to reveal and analyse the speaker's intention in using indirect strategies. Methods of pragmatic interpretation of discourse, conversational, contextual as well as situational and speech act analyses are also applied in the Paper.

Theoretical significance of the Paper is manifested by the fact that its results may deepen our understanding of the pragmatic peculiarities and functions of non-literal discourses; expand the possibility of describing indirect speech acts,

outline ways of interpreting the indirect strategies in Modern English dialogical discourse.

Practical value of the Paper is the ability to apply its results to additions of the relevant sections of the theory of language communication, theoretical and practical grammars (pragmatics of discourse), stylistics, and the results may be used in the preparation of manuals, and methodological development analysis and translation of texts of different genres. The results of the Paper may help to improve the practical teaching of the language by offering a better understanding of various speech situations often related to social realities.

Materials for the investigation are abstracts from Modern English TV-episodes which present the examples of indirect strategies use in Modern English dialogical discourse. Also Czech and Korean TV serials were used to compare the use of indirect strategies in different languages.

Structurally the Paper consists of introduction, 3 chapters, conclusions to each chapter, general conclusions, resume, the list of references and the list of illustration materials.

Chapter One is concerned with the notion of discourse and dialogue, theoretical description of the main features of communication. It also deals with basic principles of communication.

Chapter Two is devoted to the analysis of speech acts, their description. Indirect speech acts were defined and described by us. Possible violations of maxims of conversation connected to the use of indirect strategies were also investigated.

Chapter Three deals with the classification of indirect strategies. Their communicative aims were investigated as well as the reasons for their occurrence were pointed out. Also, functioning of indirect strategies in different language cultures was dealt with in this Chapter.

CHAPTER 1. BASIC FEATURES OF DIALOGIC DISCOURSE

1.1. The notion of dialogic discourse and its types

Before defining the notion “dialogical discourse” it is important to dwell on the study of the etymology of the concept of “discourse”. This term comes from the French “discours” – speech, in Latin “discursus” – to wander, branch, sprawl, and spin. A prominent linguist E. Benveniste (1971) was one of the first to give the word discourse, which in the French linguistic tradition meant “speech in general, text”, a terminological definition, designating it “speech attributed to those who speak”. Subsequently, the concept of discourse was extended to all kinds of pragmatically oriented speech, which differs in its goals.

The term “discourse” is used in various meanings enabling scientists to assert the “blur” of its conceptual boundaries. In particular, the concept of discourse is associated with all forms of communication in society (communicative discourse, linguistic, verbal, non-verbal, modern discursive practices, discourse of silence), communication within separate channels (visual, auditory, tactile), manifestation of rules of communication, ways of communication the pragmatic purpose of the speakers (etiquette, abusive, didactic) (Rodman, 1992).

Discourse is also defined as the bearer of different types of information in communication: rational (rationalism, objective, subjective, truths, lies); spiritual faith, worldview, impulses, etc. (spiritual, sacred, religious, philosophical, metaphysical, Christian, Protestant, Orthodox, mythological, mythical, apocalyptic, and symbolic).

Some scholars identify the discourse with the subject of research in various sciences (sociological, political science, philology of culture, cultural, modernism, postmodernism), ethno-cultural features of communication (intercultural, multilingual, foreign culture), cultural and historical features of communication (discourse of the New Age, Renaissance). The social status, age, and gender characteristics of the communication participants are also identified with the types of discourse (political, power, Soviet, youth, feminist, labor, radical, etc).

The concept of discourse is often associated with the types and forms of speech, the principles of constructing a message, its rhetoric (monologic, dialogical, narrative, rhetorical, ironic, etc.), the characteristics of speech of an individual and groups of people (personal, unique, collectivist, authoritarian). Discourse is also considered as a functional style, a kind of speech (oral, written, scientific, fiction, business, literary), a kind of functional style, its implementation in various spheres of communication (legal, judicial, newspaper, radio discourse, cinema, theatrical) public relations, advertising, festive), as a genre of fiction (prose, lyric, dramatic).

In linguistics, the conceptual range of the term “discourse” is also broad. In his linguistic writings, T. van Dijk presents discourse as a “blurred” category (Dijk, 1981). Other scholars point to its polysemy, even seeing homonymous differences of individual meanings, since this category is used in different sciences with different meanings.

The blurry of the term “discourse” is caused by two reasons: the history of becoming when the semantic “memory” of the tokens contains the signs of its previous uses, and a certain uncertainty of the place of the concept of “discourse” in the system of existing categories and modes of expression of language.

The eminent Dutch scientist T. van Dijk proposes to distinguish between two definitions of discourse. The linguist defines discourse broadly as a communicative event that occurs between the speaker, the listener (observer, etc.) in the process of communicative action in a particular temporal, spatial, and other context. This communicative action can be spoken, written, have verbal and non-verbal components. Typical examples are daily conversation with a friend, a doctor-patient dialogue, reading a newspaper (Dijk, 1981).

In the narrower sense, discourse is understood as a text or conversation. As a rule, scholars only identify the verbal component of a communicative action and refer to it further as “text” or “conversation”. In this sense, the term discourse means the completed “product” of communicative action, or its continuing, written or spoken result, which is interpreted by the recipients

According to Dijk, discourse is also a practical, social and cultural phenomenon. Language users engaging in discourse accomplish social acts and participate in social interaction, typically so in conversation and other forms of dialogue. Such interaction is in turn embedded in various social and cultural contexts, such as informal gathering with friends or professional, institutional encounters such as parliamentary debates (Dijk 1997:2).

Despite the considerable amount of interpretations and, accordingly, approaches to the concept of “discourse”, they can be generalized to the following definition. Discourse is a type of communicative activity which is interactive and has different forms of expression (oral, written, paralinguistic). It occurs in a specific channel of communication, regulated by participants’ strategies and tactics. It is a complex synthesis of cognitive, linguistic and extra linguistic (social, mental, psychological, etc.) factors that are determined by a specific subject of communication (Batsevych 2010:13).

An analysis of approaches to the definition of the concept of discourse allows us to conclude that discourse is a written or verbal product of communicative action. Such interpretation of discourse makes it possible to view dialogue as a coherent semantic structure, possessing all the basic properties of discourse.

The broad semantic content of the term “discourse” has led to the need for the use of attribute refiners. The identification of discourse with text by some scholars makes it possible to distinguish between dialogic and monologic discourses, since if the text is dialogical (at the formal level), then the discourse will be dialogical.

A more narrow understanding of the dialogue is connected to direct spoken communication of two or more persons who are dependent on:

- different extra linguistic factors;
- speech form which defines it as a conversation of two or more persons;

- type of speech which is characterized by situationality (depending on the conditions of conversation), contextuality (conditioned by previous statements), spontaneity and low organization (unplanned character);
- functional variety of language which occurs in the process of direct communication between the interlocutors and consists of sequential alternation of stimulating and responding cues;
- exchange of phrases of two or more people, in a broad sense such answer as gesture or silence is counted as a cue as well (Pocheptsov 2000:146-147).

At the functional level, dialogue is delivered as the primordial power of language. The principle of the dialogical nature of language was formulated by V. von Humboldt: “In the first modern word of the language there is an unchanging dualism, and it itself uses the module of conditioned withdrawal and needs it” (Stubbs 2002:138).

Investigating the notion of dialogue, one of the disputed issues is the statement of the number of participants. In this matter, we bring up the point of view of Susov (2009), who is not inclined to use the term polylogue. Firstly, in the word dialogue the component “dia” does not mean “two” or “double” in any way. Rather, the reciprocity of actions and the exchange of acts of speech are emphasized. Secondly, participation in the dialogue of more than two subjects of speech implies, in normal conditions, that this communicative action is divided into several fragments which follow one another and each of them consist of one speaker and one or more hearer.

By definition of Susov, dialogue is the basic, primary form of linguistic communication, where is a change in communicative roles and there is an exchange of speech moves of communicators, minimal holistic formation is a pair of adjacent moves like greeting and the act of greeting in response, invitation and its acceptance or rejection etc. One of the moves can be non-verbal, for example the answer for a request is its fulfillment, the wordless transmission of what is being asked (Susov 2009:64).

According to Bakhtin, all units of speech communication-expression – are interconnected with dialogical relation, in which dialogical nature can be intentional and unintentional (Bakhtin 1986:488). In addition, speech activity is a contemporary participant in speech communication, so a dialogue is included to the communication of the communicative nature of language as a public representative. In other words, speech activity is a process that deals with the temporal growth of monitoring, the process of speaking and producing; using any conditions “as a language” (Guillaume 1984:166).

The characteristics of the dialogue which were stated above and the peculiarities of its structure are related to the functions of this form of language interaction.

T. Kolokoltseva defines a dialogue as a communicative interaction of two or more subjects, the material expression of which is the creation of a specific discourse consisting of a series of consecutive, interdependent statements. One of subjects can have a semi-modal character which means that it can be represented by a group of persons (Kolokoltseva 2001:15-16).

Today, a number of studies of dialogical discourse are known. Dialogical discourse is understood as the result of the joint communication activity of two or more individuals, which includes, in addition to the actual speech process, a set of extra linguistic features that provide adequate understanding of the message (Orekhova 2000:144).

Let us consider the classification and typology of dialogic discourses offered by scholar-linguists which is based on sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic, communicative-pragmatic, thematic features.

Communicative-pragmatic features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • informative dialogue; • prescriptive dialogue; • exchange of ideas for decision-making or clarification of truth;
----------------------------------	---

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dialogue aimed at establishing or regulating interpersonal relations; • vain dialogue; • emotional dialogue; • artistic dialogue; • intellectual dialogue; • dialogue-interview; • single-purpose dialogue.
Sociolinguistic features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • informative dialogue; • prescriptive dialogue; • exchange of ideas for decision-making or clarification of truth; • dialogue aimed at establishing or regulating interpersonal relations; • vain dialogue; • emotional dialogue; • artistic dialogue; • intellectual dialogue; • dialogue-interview; • single-purpose dialogue; • dialogue of equals (homogeneous); • dialogue between subordinate and supervisor (heterogeneous); • regulated (ceremonial) dialogue.
Psycholinguistic features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dialogue dispute (dissonant); • dialog-confidential explanation; • dialog-emotional conflict (quarrel); • dialogue-unison;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dialogue-monologue (self-expression).
Thematic features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • monothematic dialogue; • polithematic dialogue; • family dialogue; • state dialogue: military, diplomatic, investigative and judicial, financial, administrative, educational, scientific (cognitive), business, ritual.
Modal-communicative features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • question- responsive; • emotionally-responsive; • non-question- responsive; • prompt- responsive; • narrative- responsive.

Table 1 Classification of dialogical discourses in accordance with communicative-pragmatic, sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic, thematic, modal-communicative features

The task for sociology is observing different types of dialogue, identifying causes and effects, and describing the transformation of dialogue. As early as 1901, T. Gard (Orekhova 2000) put forward a socialized typology of dialogical discourses. He proposed to distinguish the following:

1) a dialogue between the subordinate and the supervisor as the opposed to the dialogue of equals,

2) a dialogue as a struggle and a dialogue as an exchange,

3) a regulated dialogue (for example, ceremonial) as opposed to unregulated.

T. Gard's ideas are developed by linguists of today by the scheme: "dominance-cooperation-conflict". Each concept in this triad shows a particular hierarchy of communicators. Firstly, let us consider "dominance". The questions arise from one speaker, and another submits to him in this regard. Then, "cooperation" is divided into two types: homogeneous and heterogeneous.

Homogeneous cooperation is possible with equal social roles of the interlocutors. The topic is introduced first by one communicator, then by another. Heterogeneous cooperation is characterized by unequal roles of the interlocutors. In the absence of dominance or cooperation in communication the conflict may arise (Orekhova 2000:144).

A. Soloviova defines the types of dialogues taking into account the specificity of the psychological cooperation of interlocutors, the ratio of logical and expressive moments. The classification includes such dialogical discourses: dialogue-dispute, dialogue-confidential explanation, dialogue-emotional conflict (quarrel): dialogue-unison (Kolokoltseva 2001:26-21, 103-110).

Sukhych proposes a communicative-pragmatic classification of dialogical discourses, depending on the macro intentions of communicants. He distinguishes four basic types of dialogue:

- 1) Affiliate (expressive macrointention);
- 2) Dialogue-interview (heuristic macro intention) ;
- 3) Interpretative - (coordinative macro intention);
- 4) Instrumental (regulative macro intention) (Kolokoltseva 2001:25, 14-15).

T. Kolokoltseva offers a systematic classification of dialogical discourses that belong to different functional spheres.

By features of creation we may differentiate such dialogues as *primary* (natural) and *secondary* (reproduced by artistic or other means); by the form of implementation: *oral* and *written*, by the type of communication two dialogues are contrasted *personal* (spoken, professional, scientific, business sphere) and *public* (sphere of mass communication), by the parameter formality dialogic discourses can be *informal* or *formal*; by the goal orientation dialogues can be *single-purpose* (for example, calls to the help desk) and *multi-purpose* (most discourses), *monothematic* (with a fixed theme) and *poly-thematic* (thematically unlimited) are contrasted on the discussed topic; taking into account the peculiarities of the communicative interaction the dialogues are divided into *harmonious*, *cooperative*, *dialogues-unison* (if the rules of effective speech interaction are adhered) and *non-*

harmonious/dialogue-dissonances (if violation of the rules of effective speech interaction occurs) (Kolokoltseva 2001:28-29).

As discourse is mostly intentional, controlled, purposeful human activity (Dijk 1997:8) while speaking people say only those words which were on their mind. It means that people do not speak or write just to exercise themselves. All our actions are meaningful and have a purpose. Depending on the purpose of the dialogue we may want to share some ideas, influence others in some way. Dialogical discourse embraces all these peculiarities not only of language but also of extra lingual issues which occur.

1.2. General characteristics of communication in terms of pragmatics

Communication is a complex process that requires many skills. Since the dawn of time, people used additional means of communication and transmission of information as it is almost impossible to communicate using only words. People pay a lot of attention to gestures, facial expressions, symbols. Many of ancient means of communication still exist. For example, the indigenous population of Africa uses the language of whistles, the signals of drums, gongs, etc. The “language of flowers”, common in the East, is also a means of transmitting information that in some situations is not allowed to be expressed in words. Traffic signs, lights, signaling flags, etc. – all these are means of transmitting information that complement the main means of human communication – language.

There are different ways to define “communication”. According to the World Book Dictionary (1980:420) communication is “a giving of information or news by speaking or writing”. William Rice-Johnson (2006) states that “A communication takes place when one individual, a sender, displays, transmits or otherwise directs a set of symbols to another individual, a receiver, with the aim of changing something, either something the receiver is doing (or not doing) or changing his or her world view”.

Communication refers generally to the process by which information is received by an organism or organisms. At its most basic level, communication

involves the sending and receiving information. “In communication theory this process is stated in the form of a simple model: A (message source) to N (noise interference) to B (receiver)” (Findlay 1988:33). “This message is transformed ultimately into a series of neural impulses that are sent to the muscles responsible for the actual production of speech which follows immediately” (Cairns 1976:17-18).

Verbal communication is a type of communicational activity when words are used. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that its form and content are aimed at another person who is included into the communicative process. Verbal communication can be directed at a person or a certain group (or even not have a specific addressee), but in any case it has a dialogue character and is a constant communicative act.

The act of verbal communication is a dialogue that consists of speaking and listening. The ability to speak is a long-standing subject of research. There is a special science – rhetoric which studies speaking. In addition, if a person is silent during the dialogue, it does not mean that he is listening. Listening is an active process that requires attention. However, specifying, evaluating or analyzing information during a dialogue, a person usually pays more attention to his talking than to what he is told. This is especially true in the situations of conflict communication.

In connection with the problems for the designation of communicative roles, it is advisable to choose the terms “speaker” and “addressee”, which reflect the orientation of the discursive action. It corresponds to the system of communicative priorities and does not contradict the concept of coexistence of communication models in discourse. The speaker is the maker of the utterance, the performer of the speech act, the bearer of communicative intention, who has the desire to convey, a certain propositional attitude to another communicant – the addressee. The addressee is a person or group of persons to whom the message is addressed. Taking into account personal parameters and communicative functions Pocheptsov identifies such modifications of the addressee as: quasi-addressee – inanimate

object, otherworld force, etc.; the recipient of a message which is not assigned to him; the indirect addressee is the listener to whom the statement is actually intended (Pocheptsov 2000:217).

Communication theorists typically describe interference in a variety of ways. “When discussing communication for human beings, for example, interference can be caused by actual noise or by ideological/psychological noise” (Findlay 1988: 37). “It means that the listener, B, must decode A’s message by converting the sounds into a semantic representation” (Cairns 1976:17-18). However B has his or her own biases which influence the process of decoding the message.

The speaker’s message is encoded in the form of a “phonetic representation of an utterance by means of the system of linguistic rules” with which the speaker is equipped. This encoding then becomes “a signal to the speaker’s articulatory organs, and he vocalizes an utterance of the proper phonetic shape.” This is, in turn, picked up by the hearer’s auditory organs. The speech sounds that stimulate these organs are then converted into a neural signal from which a phonetic representation equivalent to the one into which the speaker encoded his message is obtained. This representation is decoded into a representation of the same message that the speaker originally chose to convey by the hearer’s equivalent system of linguistic rules (Katz 1966:103-104). The hearer also gets the motive for an utterance; there is an exchange of remarks, what means that feedback is provided. In other words, the sender and the recipient change places, but the scheme of the communicative act remains the same. Thus, speech communication is a communication of people, understood in the broad sense of the word not only as a conversation, but as any interaction for the purpose of exchanging information (reading, writing, etc.). In accordance with this, communication is carried out in the process of speech activity of a person using verbal and non-verbal means.

“For human communicators the process of communication is viewed as a complex set of interactions transacted across a wide spectrum of cultural and situational contexts” (Findlay 1988:39).

An act of linguistic communication is successful if the attitude which the speaker expresses is identified by the hearer by means of recognizing the reflexive intention to express it. Of course, recognizing that there is such intention is not to identify the expressed specific attitude, it is to identify what is said, we can call it mutual contextual beliefs.

The emphasis on the interactive and practical nature of discourse is naturally associated with a focus on language use as spoken interaction. Most work on discourse as action focuses on conversation and dialogue, that is, on talk (Dijk 1997:4). One crucial difference between written and spoken discourse is that the first one takes place in face-to-face encounters between language users engaged in immediate interaction organized by changes of turns. That is, in talk speakers generally react to what the previous speakers has said or done. Cooperation in conversation is managed by all participants through turn-talking. In most cultures, generally speaking, only one person speaks at a time: speakers take turns, first one talking and then another (Cutting 2002:29).

The analysis of the action may depend on the perspective we take, namely that of the speaker or that of the recipient. For the speaker, awareness, consciousness, intentionality and purposes may be associated with a “real” action. For the recipient what really matters is what is said and its social consequences, that is, what is being heard and interpreted as an intentional action. That is more or less in the same way as language users assign meanings to discourses, they ascribe intentions to other people. That is why the most social discourse analysis focuses less on the speakers, and even less on their non-observable intentions, than on how discursive doings can be reasonably heard or interpreted that is inferred as actions from what is actually said, shown or displayed (Dijk 1997:9).

The classification of types of communication based on the level or context in which it is carried out is generally accepted. According to this criterion, the following types of communication are most often distinguished: mass, group and interpersonal.

Mass communication is the process of transmitting information through the use of technical means (print, cinema, television, etc.), using various kinds of professional techniques to influence large groups of people. The goal of the expected impact is to solve political or economic problems, as well as to disseminate educational ideas related, for example, to the desire to convey moral standards and values to every person.

Group communication is a type of communication process in which communication takes place between a small number of people (from 3 to 30 people) of a certain social group (territorial, professional, religious, etc.) or organization (enterprise, institution, company, bank, etc.) in order to carry out interdependent actions and solve joint problems. The totality of communication interactions can contribute to the dynamism of the structure, the cohesion of the group, its responsiveness, or, conversely, lead to the emergence and increase of conflict tension between the members of this group, and to encourage intra-group conflict.

The term “interpersonal communication” means the process of exchanging messages and their interpretation by two or more individuals who come into contact with each other. Also the communicants influence each other. Interpersonal communication is characterized by a number of features that make up its specificity as a type of communication.

The inevitability of interpersonal communication is explained by the very conditions of human being – a person as a social being could not exist without communication, which is his most important need.

The linguists discovered regularities in language use. This patterning occurs at “all levels of communication: societal, group and individual” (Saville-Troike 2003:11).

When those patterns occurs in pair they are known as ‘adjacency pairs’ (Cutting 2002:30). Ways of speaking pattern according to different factors such as categories of talk, attitudes and conceptions about language and speakers. “Communication also patterns according to particular roles and groups within a

society, such as sex, age, social status, and occupation” (Saville-Troike 2003:11). When a person says something the hearer will have a certain response and their number is limited. For instance such patterns are common: question-answer, offer-accept, blame-deny, greeting-greeting. The first part may have two responses: preferable and not preferable, for example acceptance and refusal.

Communication is not the same all the time. There are various messages and if we compare all of them we can consider the words we normally use to distinguish these various kinds of messages – tell, ask, order, question, claim, believe, hope, etc. – and go from there to both the meaning and the form (Householder 1971:80).

The functions of communication are directly related to the participants’ purposes and needs. These include such categories of functions as “expressive (conveying feelings or emotions), directive (requesting or demanding), referential (true or false propositional content), poetic (aesthetic), phatic (empathy and solidarity), and meta linguistic (reference to language itself)” (Saville-Troike 2003: 13).

For communication to operate in society language is used; at the same time communication is the main function of language. There are some more functions and all of them are connected with communication.

Communicative function means that language is the most important means of human communication, for instance, language is used for transmitting from one person to another any message for one purpose or another. Communicating with each other, people convey their thoughts, feelings and emotional experiences, act on each other, and achieve common understanding. Language gives them the opportunity to understand each other and establish joint work in all spheres of human activity, being one of the forces that ensure the existence and development of human society.

The communicative function of language plays a leading role. But language can fulfill this function due to the fact that it is subordinate to the system of human

thinking. Therefore, the exchange of information, knowledge, and experience are possible.

From this follows the second main function of language – cognitive that means that language is the most important means of obtaining new knowledge about reality. Cognitive function connects language with human mental activity.

Actual function is about creating and maintaining contact between the interlocutors (greeting, exchange of remarks about the weather, etc.). Communication takes place for the sake of communication and is mainly aimed at establishing or maintaining contact.

Often, language analysts also distinguish the function of influencing other people, for example, an order, a request, a conviction, an inducement to perform some action. In these cases, speech may not carry any information: it conveys the willful act of the speaker.

Communicative competence involves knowing not only the language code but also what to say to whom, and how to say it appropriately in any given situation. Further, “it involves the social and cultural knowledge speakers are presumed to have which enables them to use and interpret linguistic forms” (Saville-Troike 2003:18).

An act of linguistic communication is successful if the expressed attitude of the speaker is identified by the hearer by means of recognizing the reflexive intention to express it. Of course, recognizing that there is some intention is not to identify the specific attitude expressed – it is identified on the basis of what is said, together with what we call mutual contextual beliefs.

The degree of the effectiveness of interpersonal communication is determined by the results of the updating of two main socially significant functions – interaction and impact. These results depend on three basic conditions that determine the nature of verbal communication:

- a) type of communicative personalities;
- b) perception of semantic and evaluative information;
- c) targeted influence on each other.

For the effectiveness of interpersonal communication, the most optimal options for these conditions are:

- a) compatibility of partners as communicative personalities;
- b) adequate perception of semantic and evaluative information;
- c) impact through persuasion.

The compatibility of partners as communicative personalities implies compatibility in all three parameters. The presence of communication needs, even with a difference in communication settings, helps to establish contact, which is important for the initial stage of communication. Both verbal and non-verbal means can serve as a signal for contact. It is very important that their actualization be consistent with accepted social norms of speech behavior. This greatly facilitates speech interaction.

In the context of interpersonal communication, perception is primarily a complex process of receiving and processing semantic and evaluative information, a necessary condition for updating interpersonal communication. The effectiveness of interpersonal communication depends on the degree of adequacy of semantic perception, because this is associated with the correct interpretation of information, the communicative attitude of the partner and the prediction of subsequent stages of communication.

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that communication has a complex multi-tiered structure and appears in various stylistic varieties: various styles and genres, colloquial and literary language, dialects and sociolects, etc. All speech characteristics and other components of the communicative act contribute to its successful or unsuccessful implementation. Speaking with others, from the vast field of possible means of verbal communication, those means are chosen that seem most suitable for expressing thoughts in a given situation. This is a socially significant choice.

1.3. Basic principles of communication

The study of communication is characterized by an attempt to apply the most diverse theories to establish the essence and patterns of dialogic communication: the general theory of games, the theory of the language game of Wittgenstein (2010:83), the theory of speech acts by Austin (1962:126), Searle (1985:104), a theory of dialogue game. The study of communication was carried out from the standpoint of philosophy, ethics, morality, cognitive psychology, linguistics. Such an interdisciplinary approach to dialogue naturally brought positive results, but, on the other hand, prevented the development of a unified methodological approach and led researchers away from the urgent tasks of studying the fundamental question of the principles of verbal communication, which is largely determined by the principles of communicatively pragmatic constitution of dialogue.

Grice (1991) proceeds from the fact that there are a number of rules, maxims, assumptions that maintain the course of speech communication. These maxims arise on the basis of fundamental rational considerations and can be formulated as guidelines for the effective and efficient use of language in communication for cooperative purposes. Grice names four fundamental “maxims” of communication or principles as such guidelines, which underlie the effective and cooperative use of the language and form the general principle of Cooperation. “Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1991:47). For instance, when a person refuses to answer a question, he or she violates maxims of conversation. “The cooperative principle states that a speaker’s contribution to the discourse should be as informative as is required – neither more nor less” (Rodman 1992:158).

Subprinciples (maxims), following the philosopher I. Kant (2006), are called the categories of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner. These maxims establish what participants in verbal communication should do in order to conduct a

dialogue as efficiently, rationally as possible and, in cooperation, they should be expressed sincerely, relevantly and clearly, while transmitting enough information.

In natural communication, the Principle of Cooperation always interacts with the speaker's speech tactics, types of speech behavior: the speaker can act as an "aggressor", a constructive interlocutor or passively assent.

Maxim of quality, on the one hand, requires the author not to say what he does not consider true, but on the other hand, it allows the recipient to believe in the truth of the received information.

Maxim of quantity includes two tendencies. Implicative tendency means that we move towards language saving and language redundancy (explicative tendency). The explicative tendency is associated with unpreparedness, spontaneity of dialogical speech; verbalization of excess elements and cues carries an emotional expressive load. On the other hand, the implicative tendency is driven by language savings. The laconicism of dialogical remarks is natural and is explained by the situation of communication, presupposition, clearly expressed communicative attitude of the speaker.

Maxim of relation requires the speaker's speech be fit into the context, and the recipient, accordingly, expects that this expression is consistent with the context, has something to do with it. "The requirement to be relevant allow the various sentence meanings to be sensibly connected into discourse meaning, much as rules of sentence grammar allow word meanings to be sensibly and grammatically connected into sentence meaning" (Rodman 1992: 158). The anticipation principle is associated with the postulates of relation and quantity based on a person's ability in some way to predict the development of a communication situation. It manifests itself, in particular, in over-informative answers, in the case when the responder anticipates that the first question will be followed by more specific questions.

Maxim of Manner instructs the author to build his speech activity in such a way that it is understandable, "transparent" to the recipient, proceeds from the fact that it is meaningful and consistent.

What Grice suggests may sound like a perfect conversation, but no one talks this way all the time. As a matter of fact, Grice (1991) willingly admits that people should not literally follow these maxims in communication. Speakers are only guided by these principles in most normal dialogues so that the participants in the communication process realize that this orientation is necessary, even if communication supposedly goes against these principles.

Grice noted (1991: 49) that a maxim can fail to be observed in several different ways. A maxim may be just ignored, or quietly violated in which case hearers will be misled. Telling a lie, for instance, is a quiet violation of the first maxim of Quality.

Green stated that “speakers value the maxim of Quality much more highly than the other maxims – violating it amounts to a moral offense, whereas violating the others is at worst inconsiderate or rude” (Green 1996:92).

According to Grice (1991), his maxims are not arbitrary conventions, because they describe rational strategies for cooperative information exchange. In accordance with this, they should also regulate aspects of non-linguistic behavior of speakers. If a speaker cannot honor one maxim without ignoring the other one the hearer may be misled. In this situation the speaker should state explicitly or implicitly that one of the maxims is not abided.

One of the famous language analysts engaged in pragmatic research Mey (1993:54), gives in his monograph an interesting dialogue that took place between his wife and the doorman in a disco:

“D.: I need to see your ID, it’s the rule.”

“J.: But I left it back at the hotel.”

“D.: Sorry ma’am, then I can’t let you in.”

“J.: But I’m twenty – nine and the mother of four.”

“D.: Yes, and I’m the pope’s grandfather and have six kids.”

As you can see, the maxim of the quantity is clearly violated in the dialogue. The wife’s answer regarding her age and an original reaction of the watchman indicate that the reactions of the wife and the watchman are not literally answers to

questions. But despite the violation of one of the maxims on the semantic level, the reactions can be considered as cooperative ones.

In these cases, the corresponding assumptions arise called by Grice “implicatures” (Grice 1991:59). By this, Grice wants to say that at the syntactic level, communicants do not always follow these maxims, but what is said is often interpreted so that it corresponds to maxim at some level. He distinguishes conversational implicatures, which must be capable of being worked out, even if they are short-circuited and grasped intuitively, and conventional implicatures, which can only be grasped intuitively (Green 1996: 98). Conventional implicatures also differ from conversational ones in that the first does not depend crucially on assuming the speaker to be observing the Cooperative Principle.

Paul Grice (1991:45) “identified three types of general conversational implicature:

1. The speaker deliberately flouts a conversational maxim to convey an additional meaning not expressed literally.
2. The speaker’s desire to fulfill two conflicting maxims results in his or her flouting one maxim to invoke the other.
3. The speaker invokes a maxim as a basis for interpreting the utterance.”

From a linguistic point of view, interest in maxims is justified by the fact that the implicatures say more than is expressed in the content of the formulated statements. Implicatures are not semantic inferences, but conclusions that are based either on the content of what was said, or on some special rules of the cooperative nature of normal inter-human interaction (Grice 1991:59).

The second important feature of implicature is that it is not separable. This means that implicature is attached not to the linguistic form, but to the semantic content of the related information.

The third important distinguishing feature of the implicatures is their predictability. This means that for the alleged implicature, one can formulate an argument that shows how a communicant makes the corresponding inference so that the cooperation rule works.

Another feature is that “implications are non-conventional, which means that they are not part of the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions” (Grice 1991:59).

We expect every utterance in a discourse to be relevant to some participant’s goal which is at least mutually accessible, if not truly shared. Speakers assume that other speakers do what they do, say what they say, on purpose, intentionally, and for a reason (Brown & Levinson 2011:63). In other words, they assume that speech behavior, and indeed, all types of behavior that is not involuntary is goal-directed. The speaker knows the maxims for efficiently achieving goals, especially through speech. A person’s behavior will be interpreted as conforming to the maxims, even if it appears not to, because of the assumption of rationality.

Giving a general assessment of the concept of principles for organizing the dialogue of Grice, we note that although they are oriented and designed to analyze the implementation of the language, these maxims are more philosophical and ethical in nature. They do not fully meet the challenges of conversational analysis. It is important to note that they are dialectically controversial. In real communication we often resort to not direct and accurate answers to questions and reactions to what has been said, so that Grice’s implications with their distinguishing features help to decipher those meanings that are not expressed on the surface level.

Conclusions to Chapter One

Communication is perhaps the most important tool of human activity. People use it in every sphere of their lives: to study, to share information, to express feelings, to relate to others, etc. Although communication is an extremely complex notion and it can be ambiguous, the most essential and leading goal in communicating is understanding. Ineffective or misunderstood communication may lead to communication failures and accordingly may give rise to problems or embarrassment within communication process. Moreover, it possesses a number of parameters and elements.

In this Chapter we have tried to study the notion of dialogic discourse. It is used in different meanings and we consider dialogic discourse as a communicative event that occurs between the speaker, the hearer in a particular temporal, spatial, and other context. This communicative action can be spoken, written, have verbal and non-verbal components.

Investigating the notion of dialogue we figured out that there are various classifications of dialogues which take into account communicative-pragmatic, sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic, thematic and modal-communicative features.

The notion of communication is also a disputed topic and it refers generally to the process by which information is received by an individual or individuals. The basic model of communication is: “A” (message source) to “N” (noise interference) to “B” (receiver). “A” wants to exchange an idea so he or she uses words to send this information. After that this message goes through interference that can be caused by actual noise or by ideological/psychological noise. Also, a wide spectrum of cultural and situational contexts may have some effect on perceiving information. So B receives this information influenced by his or her biases and B has to decode this message which means that the obtained information may differ from the sent message.

There are a number of rules, maxims, assumptions that maintain the course of speech communication. These maxims can be formulated as guidelines for the effective and efficient use of language in communication for cooperative purposes.

Grice names four fundamental “maxims”: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner which underlie the effective and cooperative use of the language and form the general principle of Cooperation. Each speaker expects these Maxims to be followed; however it is impossible to follow all of them. When a remark violates a Maxim, the hearer will seek to construct a sequence of inferences which make it relevant to some assumed goal. This exploitation of the maxims by which utterances are used to convey more than they literally denote is called implicature.

CHAPTER 2. SPEECH ACTS IN DIALOGIC DISCOURSE

2.1. Speech acts theory

There are a fairly large number of approaches to the study of speech, speech activity. The most common of these is the study of speech in terms of the theory of speech acts.

The main feature of the theory of speech acts, which attracted linguists who were no longer satisfied with a simple statement that language is a means, an instrument, an instrument of communication. Linguists began to search for an answer to the question about what is the mechanism of using the language to achieve the diverse goals that arise in the course of social interaction of people.

In the twentieth century, it became quite widespread. The theory of speech acts considers primarily the functions of speech activity. Oxford School spokesman J. Austin synthesized action theory and speech theory. The utterances that drew Austin's attention are more likely actions, and they are not just a description of a certain situation or a message about something. He called them performatives, and the corresponding verbs – a performative verb (from lat. *performs* – act).

A classic example of performatives is the formulas for declaring war, testaments, oaths, apologies, condolences, invitations and congratulations, concluding deals and agreements.

A speech act is an action that is carried out using speech. It consists of several components (locutionary act, perlocutionary act, illocutionary act). The theory of speech acts proposed an original model of the communicative situation: along with the traditional components of communication - the speaker, the listener, the very action of speaking, it identifies the conditions, purpose and result of speech acts. The purpose of the speech act (illocutionary component) has become a new and the main object of study.

There are some differences in J. Austin's and J. Searle's approaches towards some aspects. Searle disagreed with the distinction Austin made between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

J. Searle claims that performing an illocutionary act belongs to that forms of behaviour which are governed by a set of rules: “To perform illocutionary acts is to engage in a rule-governed form of behaviour”. Such actions as asking a question or assertion of something are regulated by certain rules as well as, for example, football play. He distinguished two kinds of such rules: (1) regulative and (2) constitutive

The first set of rules regulates those forms of behaviour that are already in use. For example, etiquette rules regulate interpersonal relationships but interpersonal relationships had existed before these rules appeared. To these rules we can also refer traffic rules and regulations, dieting, and so on. Regulative rules usually have imperative form.

Constitutive rules, in their turn, cannot be separated from the activity. Thus, they do not only regulate the activity, but also create or predetermine it. For example, we cannot play football without rules which determine this new form of behavior. One can drive a car without knowing the traffic rules but one cannot drive without knowing how to start a motor. So, the activity is logically dependent on these rules (Searle 1971:40).

One of the most important issues in the theory of speech acts is related to the definition of criteria that separate speech acts from constatives (verbs that describe an action). The main sign of a speech act is the presence of an illocutionary target. One and the same sentence can express different communicative intentions (illocutionary goals) of the speaker, and these intentions describe the corresponding verbs of speech. Thus, “the main feature of a speech act is focus, what means that each speech act has a specific purpose” (Searle 1976:253).

In this regard, the concept of “speech context” becomes important. The same sentence can be pronounced in different contexts, and its content will depend on them and accordingly it will have different illocutionary goals. The communicants and pronunciation time will also differ. According to J. Searle (1976) and Vanderwecken (1990), the declaration context consists of 5 elements: the speaker,

the listener, the time, place and characteristics of all these elements. These additional features are called the pronunciation world (Searle 1985:242).

The second sign of a speech act is associated with the concept of “speech”. If a verb is not the verb in its first meaning but denotes certain acts of behavior that can be interpreted both as speech and non-speech (to give hope, to force), then it is not a speech act. In addition, if the verb is used in speech in a figurative sense or refers to inner speech, feeling, actions, then it is also not considered a speech act.

Another sign of a speech act is related to the fact that it always denotes an action, a single act. It is important that the speech act can be carried out with the help of one statement. In the language, however, there are such verbs that cannot denote single acts (talk, talk, etc.). Such verbs describe the situation of the exchange of speech acts between participants in communication.

In the theory of speech acts, a speech act is often understood only as performative (verbs with the help of which a speech act is performed). Performatives, being a kind of speech acts, have become the object of attention of many researchers.

In the classical interpretation, a speech act is performative if it is at the same time a certain action, something produced by the speaker at the time of pronouncing the utterance. One of the first signs of performative is called a formal sign. All scientists agree that the meaning of performance is acquired by the verb in a certain form, namely in the form of the first person of the present, active voice of the indicative mood. The second sign of performativity is their social conditioning. It is noted that performatives are based on social conventions, therefore, pronouncing them, the speaker assumes certain obligations.

A sentence “*I’ll explain again*” is not performative, as the speaker does not create a new social situation. For example, “*I swear*” is an oath situation for this particular person, and I explain in the example just explaining the speaker’s actions. Performative verbs must necessarily be based on some socially significant action, otherwise the statement does not reach the performative state, and stays only metatext. Such statements do not just affect the listener, but change the state

of the world. In other words, performativities must be effective in the outside world (“*I declare you husband and wife*”) or, they must comply with some socially legalized generally accepted procedure.

The third feature of performativity includes (Austin, 1962) the inapplicability of the criterion of truth to them. We can distinguish one more (fourth) sign of speech acts: success / failure.

The main conditions for success are usually considered the following. Performative utterances are important precisely from the point of view of their utterance, because the utterance of words can be the most important event in the implementation of an act (for example, betting). But sometimes this is not enough. “It is necessary that the circumstances in which the necessary words are pronounced correspond in one way or another, and in many situations it is also necessary that the speaker himself or other persons carry out some other “physical” or “mental” actions or even pronounce some kind of some words” (Austin 1962:28).

For example, if a performative is pronounced by an actor on the stage, then the real consequences of this act will be incompatible with the utterance of the same performative in life. Performative statements become “empty”, insufficient if certain conditions are not met during their implementation. On the stage, in the works of literature, the performative ceases to be a speech act, because it was not uttered in a situation of real dialogue.

According to Searle, in order to find out whether the communicative act was successful, “we only need to know what illocutionary goals the speaker intends to achieve and actually achieves in this world (the world of pronunciation), by what methods of achievement and with what intensity the propositional acts are performed, which at the same time presuppositions are made and by what psychological states and with what intensity they are expressed in this world” (Searle 1985:245).

Still, there are some further complications: J. Austin noted that there are some performative utterances which could be verbalized by using non-

performative utterances, for instance: “Yes.” – “I agree that you are right”. Therefore, Austin clarifies his definition of performative utterances, mentioning that they can be divided into those containing performative verbs (explicit performatives) and those which do not have them but they might be replaced by a “primitive utterance” (with an explicit performative verb) (Austin 1962:62-68). Moreover, he also investigates what indicators (the so-called primitive devices) are usually used in implicit performatives and lists six of them: mood, prosody, adverbs (or adverbial phrases), connecting particles, accompaniments of the utterance, and the context of the utterance (Austin 1962:73-77).

Austin considers that the illocutionary act is performed mostly in performative utterances and he tries to categorize them according to the effect of the illocutionary verbs found in their explicit form. So, he distinguishes five main classes:

Verdictives denote an exercise of judgment: estimate, value, etc.

Exercitives denote an assertion of influence or exercising of power: order, advise, warn, etc.

Commissives denote assuming of an obligation or declaring of an intention: bet, promise, etc.

Behabitives denote the adopting of an attitude: welcome, greet, thank, etc.

Expositives denote “the clarifying of reasons, arguments and communications”: ask, illustrate, accept, etc (Austin 1962:163).

There are several classifications of speech acts. One of them was proposed by G. Potcheptsov (2001:204). This classification includes “six basic speech acts: constatives, promissives, menaces, performatives, directives and questions”. Another classification of speech acts was introduced by John Searle. His speech act classification has had a great impact on linguistics. It includes “five major classes of speech acts: declarations, representatives, expressives, directives and commissives”.

J. Searle (1985) introduces the division into illocutionary and propositional components of speech act. It is obvious that some utterances do not have this

propositional component, for example exclamations such as “Vow!”, “Yeah!”, “Hurrah!” etc.

In addition, J. Searle (1985) claims that we may distinguish the propositional indicator from the illocutionary force indicator. In most of the cases, it can be assumed that the sentence has two elements (which are not necessarily separate): an element which indicates the propositional content (proposition-indicating device) and an element which indicates function (function-indicating device). In the sentence “*I promise that I will finish my project*” these devices are separate from each other, while in the sentence “*I promise to finish my project*” proposition-indicating component is not separate from function-indicating device. Function-indicating device points out the way one should perceive the proposition or which illocutionary act performs the speaker while uttering the sentence.

All of these signs determine the range of verbs related to speech acts. However, despite this, a single classification of speech acts still does not exist. Some researchers generally refuse any classification of performativities and believe that there are as many types of illocutionary utterances as there are different utterances (and even the same utterances, but under different conditions). Other researchers, however, offer their classifications of speech acts, which are based on a variety of signs and criteria. Most of them agree that the main thing for a speech act is the speaker’s intention, illocutionary goal. It is this component that becomes the main criterion for creating a typology of speech acts. The differentiation of such typologies allows us to describe in sufficient detail all types of speech acts.

The theory of speech acts received an interesting development in the works of Grice (1991), who developed the mechanism of speech implication. According to Grice, the information transmitted in a speech act is divided into two parts. What is really being said, what is said is the logical content of the utterance. For the rest of the information that can be extracted by the listener from a particular statement, Grice proposed the term “implicature” so as not to confuse this concept with implication in a logical sense. The implicatures themselves are divided into two

varieties: 1) conventional and 2) conversational or communicative implicatures. Conventional implications, not much different from what is commonly called presuppositions, are closely related to what is said (in the strict sense) in the sentence

According to Akmajian (1995) speech acts in general and illocutionary acts in particular can be performed in a variety of ways:

- a literal act if the speaker means what he or she says;
- a non-literal act if the speaker does not mean what his words mean literally;
- an indirect act if a speaker perform that act by means of performing another speech act;
- a direct act if it is not performed by means of performing any other act.

Many illocutionary acts can be successfully performed but still fail in communication. The speaker may state something but fail to communicate to the hearer for a variety of reasons: the hearer may be asleep, he may not know the language, he may not know what the words mean. For the illocutionary act to be successful in communicating the hearer must recognize the speaker's illocutionary intent – the hearer must identify what it is that the speaker is attempting to do (state, order, promise).

Let us consider the performance of literal direct acts. For example, “*I have a toothache*”, used to report a toothache; and “*What time is it?*” used to ask someone the time. These sorts of acts are the simplest for a hearer to identify because they involve the minimal amount of interference. With literal and direct acts, knowing the language takes the hearer most of the way toward recognizing what the speaker is up to.

In case with non-literal direct acts the hearer must infer that the speaker does not mean what his words mean literally, as well as infer what the speaker does mean. Typical example can be *I'd never have guessed*, used to indicate that something is obvious; *A pig wouldn't eat this food*, used to condemn the food.

David Crystal (1992:29) insists on the fact that “speech act theory is a theory where the effect of an utterance is analyzed in relationship to the speaker and hearer’s behavior”. Speech act theory attempts to explain how speakers use language to accomplish intended actions and how hearers infer intended meaning from what is said.

2.2. Indirect speech acts

People use indirect speech acts much more often than they might think they do. For example, when somebody asks “*Can you open the window?*” the speaker is not actually interested whether you can do it, his intention is to request you to open the window. In this case the utterance has two meanings: a literal meaning “*I ask you whether you can open the window*” and an indirect meaning “*I request you to open the window*” which is the main one, so the real meaning is different from the literal one. In a nutshell, what is meant is not determined by what is said.

Imagine a situation when two people are sitting at a table. Person A says, “*Fishing is out of the question.*” Person B responds, “*What about next week?*”. It seems to be a simple exchange on the surface, but when we look closer on what is being said we can see that the meaning is implied and not explicit. The statement “*Fishing is out of the question*” implies that there were plans to go fishing in the immediate future. The response made by person B (“*What about next week?*”) is not merely a straightforward question created for the potential for fishing the following week; it may also function to keep options open in ongoing discourse. In this conversation there are explicitly stated messages being sent through the statements; however, flexibility in communication is maintained through negotiating statements or questions (“*What about next week?*”). This exchange, therefore, is not a closed two-way exchange. It represents an ongoing communicative exchange between the two communicators and will most likely be negotiated through continuing discourse (Findlay 1988:43).

The first mentioning of this phenomenon can be found in J. Austin’s “How to Do Things with Words”, he describes it as follows: “one performative utterance

can be used as indirect means to perform another act” (Austin 1962:7). He also concludes that the addressee decodes the implied meaning of the utterance on the basis of the common sense knowledge.

Grice’s theory of meaning (1991) stresses that what the speaker says does not necessarily encode his or her communicative intention explicitly. Thus when a person says “the door is open” he or she may invite the hearer in or the speaker may be asking to close the door. The choice between these two meanings depends on the context and the situation where the utterance is applied.

Still, it is J. Searle who is known for introducing the theory of indirect speech acts. At the end of his article on classification of speech acts he states that “we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes and we bring changes through our utterances...often we do more than one of these in the same utterance” (Searle 1975:369). Thus, Searle assumes that there might be several illocutionary forces within the same utterance.

Understanding the motives behind the utterances is often crucial for a successful communication. When people speak indirectly, they expect their audience not to take them as meaning what they say but as meaning something else. Violation of the maxims of conversation can function to indicate that the speaker is meaning something other than what he or she says. The relationship between the surface form of an utterance and its underlying purpose isn’t always straightforward as Searle shows in his famous example:

“Can you pass the salt?”

This sentence is interrogative and so it expresses a question. Usually, the speaker’s goal in asking a question is to get an answer. But the sentence plausibly has a different purpose: it is a request, where the speaker’s goal is for the interpreter to pass the salt. This is an indirect speech act, which Searle (1975:370) defines to be “an utterance in which one speech act is performed indirectly by performing another”. With this utterance, requesting the hearer to pass the salt is

performed indirectly by performing another communicative act – asking about the hearer’s ability to pass the salt.

He argues that there are such speech acts which are performed through another kind of speech acts and which are known as indirect speech acts.

“The baby is sleeping.”

“It would be nice of you if you closed the window.”

“Can you close the window?”

“Are you still here?”

None of the utterances can be literally characterized as an assertion or a question because they all express request, therefore, presenting a challenge to J. Austin’s “form and function” theory.

J. Searle’s theory is based on the so-called conventionality thesis. According to this theory, certain illocutionary acts count as the performance of other acts by convention. There is main objection which stated connection between usage and psychological states – which provides an explanation for the distribution of post-sentential *please*. Searle stated that the communicative value of any utterance is calculated by an inference process and the implicit message which is conventionally implicated.

J. Searle assumed that indirect speech acts work because they are related to the structure of the corresponding direct speech acts; moreover, they are connected to a certain felicity condition of the speech act. For example, *“Could you open the window?”* addresses preparatory conditions, *“Are you still here?”* addresses the propositional content conditions, etc. The utterances that do not address any felicity condition, therefore, cannot be understood as an indirect speech act.

Gordon and Lakoff (1975), however, argue against this approach prioritizing conventions to the point of likening ISAs to idiomatic structures, learned as such by language users without spending time in inferencing their contextual meanings.

Gazdar (1981) and Levinson also argued that there is no literal forces that help to recognize indirect speech acts as far as any sentence has not a conventional force which can be elicited from its surface syntactic structure.

Another scholar, Sadok (1974), puts forward another theory of indirect speech acts – ambiguity thesis which presupposes that utterances may have additional meanings and therefore the standardized use of such utterances is not indirect, and thus, does not have to be extracted from the “direct form”.

Within indirect communication one illocutionary act is not performed by the way of the semantic content of the utterance but rather by means of the textually – relevant illocutions of the utterance (Culpeper, 2005).

Geis (1995) offers the following way of differentiation between direct and indirect speech acts which is based on the relations between the function and the structure of an utterance. When the relations are direct then the speech act is direct; and on the contrary, when the relations are indirect the utterance is considered indirect.

Herbert Clark (1979) in his article “Responding to Indirect Speech Acts” provides six properties of indirect speech acts:

- Multiplicity of meanings. It presupposes that while direct speech acts have only one meaning (or illocutionary force), indirect speech acts always have several meanings or illocutionary forces. For example, in uttering “*It’s cold out there*” as a direct speech act a speaker simply asserts that it is cold out there, while in uttering “*You will do the task tomorrow.*” in the context or in certain circumstances a speaker may order the hearer to do the task tomorrow or ask whether he will do it (in this case intonation plays a significant role) or even insist. Often such ambiguity is exploited for different reasons, for example, for ironic or humorous effect:

“*A: I’ll cook a dinner for you tomorrow.*”

“*B: Is that a threat or a promise?*”

- Logical priority of meanings. It follows from the previous property that an indirect speech act has multiple meanings but these meanings are not equally significant: some of them are logically prior. For example, in uttering “*Could you close the door?*” a speaker requests the hearer to close the door by asking

whether he can do it. Thus, these two meanings form a chain of meanings in which the first one is prior to the second one.

- **Rationality.** According to a number of scholars such as Gordon and Lakoff (1995), Morgan (1977), Searle (1975) and others, two meanings of the indirect speech act are logically interconnected on the rational basis. When a speaker utters "*It is cold in the room*" intending to request the hearer to close the window, there must be some shared knowledge for the hearer to understand the implied meaning. Moreover, the speaker should observe the principles of cooperative conversation (for example, this utterance must be relevant to the situation) and follow certain conventions about the use of sentences in indirect speech acts.
- **Conventionality.** As it was mentioned, in order to perform an indirect speech act successfully, one should mind certain conventions about which sentences are used for certain indirect speech acts. For example, it is particular for English language that the speaker questions the ability of the hearer to do something in order to indirectly request him to do it. This property, however, is widely criticized by a number of scholars, for example, Levinson (1983) and Gazdar (1981:74-75) contradicted this assumption using the sentence such as: "*May I remind you that you are going to be late?*". So, if we followed the idea of the conventionality, the sentence would be interpreted as a request for permission to remind, but Levinson claims that it cannot be a request as far as the speaker performs a request without the hearer's permission to do it.
- **Politeness.** One of the main reasons of using indirect speech acts instead of direct speech acts is the matter of politeness, as it helps to soften the categorical meaning of the utterance.
- **Purposefulness.** Most of what is being said is intended to have a certain effect (perlocutionary effect) on the listener. That is why, every speech act is purposeful. The intentions that the speaker has are called illocutionary intentions. The intentions of the speaker can be both manifested and latent, the

former in their turn can be subdivided into evident and inferable. (Pocheptsov 2000) The illocutionary intentions of indirect speech acts are considered to be inferable.

Still the question stays: how does the addressee recognize the intention of the speaker? Mey (1993) summarizes two ways of solving the question assumed by J. Searle: philosophical-semantic and another one based on pragmatic sense. According to the philosophical-semantic reasoning indirect speech act is viewed as a combination of two acts (primary and secondary). Searle suggests 10-step pyramid in order to describe how an addressee elicits the “right” meaning from an utterance.

The second approach consists in the assumption that the sentence meaning and the meaning intended by a speaker may differ and an utterance can be performed literally as well as non-literally: “Strictly speaking whenever we talk about what the metaphorical meaning of a word, expression, or sentence is, we are talking about what a speaker might utter it to mean, in a way that departs from what the word, expressions or sentence actually means”.

According to P. Grice and J. Searle, the implicit meaning of an utterance can always be inferred from its literal meaning. That is why an appropriate understanding of the illocutionary act involves backgrounding the direct act and foregrounding the indirect act. But according to the relevance theory developed by Sperber and Wilson (1996:113), the process of interpretation of indirect speech acts does not at all differ from the process of interpretation of direct speech acts. Furthermore, it is literal utterances that are often marked and sound less natural than utterances with an indirect meaning.

D. Schiffrin notes that the hearers are able to interpret indirect speech acts by relying upon their knowledge of speech acts, along with general principles of cooperative conversation, mutually shared factual information, and a general ability to draw inferences (Schiffrin 1994:59).

Yet another solution was offered by the scholar Jerrold Sadok (1974:197). According to his theory, “indirect speech acts are expressions based on an

idiomatic meaning added to their literal meaning”. Of course, these are not some specific idioms, but rather schemes. For example, “*Can you + verb?*” is recognized as idiomatic for commands or requests.

Conclusions to Chapter Two

In this Chapter we have tried to give as full an account of the theory of speech acts as it will be necessary for the further discussion. We have given a review of some crucial theories of speech acts, mainly the theories elaborated by John Austin (1962) and John R. Searle (1969, 1979).

The foundation of speech act theory was laid by John L. Austin, and this idea was discussed widely across different disciplines, including both linguistics and philosophy. In general, speech acts are acts of communication. To communicate is to express a certain attitude, and the type of speech act being performed corresponds to the type of the attitude being expressed.

Indirect speech acts remain the most disputable issue within the Theory, as far as it is not clear enough why people tend to use them despite the fact that they are complicated both to produce and to interpret, and how people are able to infer the meaning from the indirect speech acts and react adequately.

We have investigated and outlined the main theories and approaches to the problem of indirect speech acts as presented in the works by J. Searle (1975), D. Gordon and G. Lakoff (1975), M. Geis (1995), H. Clark (1979) and others. We have also described the main features and characteristics of indirect speech acts and provided the main approaches towards the issue of recognition of the implied meaning of the speech act. Basically, when people use one speech act while delivering another one, it is called an indirect speech act.

CHAPTER 3. FUNCTIONING OF INDIRECT STRATEGIES IN DIALOGIC DISCOURSE

3.1. Reasons for using indirect strategies

3.1.1. Politeness in interaction

Politeness became a subdiscipline of pragmatics and sociolinguistics in Western Europe and North America in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Watts 2003: 53). Before, linguists, who were concerned with politeness phenomena in language, had little or no theoretical basis before the speech act theory appeared in the 1960s. An important contributor to politeness research was Erving Goffman and his notions of face and facework. Face, as he explained in his work "Interaction Ritual" (Goffman 1967:5), "may be defined as the positive social value person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self-delineated in terms of approved social attributes-albeit an image that others may share as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a goof showing for himself." Goffman maintained that facework is the actions which are done by the face-holder to make anything he is doing consistent with face. Goffman's concepts of "face" and "ritual-order" with "the human individual as a sacred object" were adapted to politeness theory in the 1970s.

There are several different views of politeness as shown by Shahroki and Bidabidi (2013). According to Fraser, politeness is a social norm which "assumes that each society has a particular set of social norms consisting of more or less explicit rules that prescribe a certain behaviour, a state of affairs, or a way of thinking in a context" (Shahroki & Bidabadi 2013:19). This kind of politeness helps society to communicate smoothly, however, it does not provide linguistic cues of how one is supposed to talk or behave if he or she did not grow up in that environment. A more linguistic approach towards politeness was Grice's Cooperative Principle, which includes four maxims, namely of quantity (saying as much is needed and not more), quality (saying what is true), relevance (saying

what is relevant) and manner (saying it in an orderly manner) (Shahrokhi & Bidabadi 2013:20). Leech was another linguist who relied on Grice's CP while creating his own Politeness Principle where "absolute politeness" (minimizing impoliteness and maximizing politeness) and "relative politeness" (politeness which belongs to a particular culture or language community) were important. However, Leech's PP and his maxims were criticized for being too broad, too theoretical to be implemented in any active language, although the maxims could be used to explain various expressions of politeness (Shahrokhi & Bidabadi 2013: 22).

In course of the history of politeness phenomenon there were numerous theories concerning this concept. Politeness was perceived as social norm, was viewed in terms of Cooperation Principle, Face-saving strategy, was regarded as ethic and pragmatic-linguistic category as well as discourse category and was associated with tact.

The social norm view supposed that speech act can be regarded to as polite if it meets ethical norms. This approach did not receive broad recognition because it connected politeness to the speech style: the more formal situation, the higher degree of politeness.

Another approach to politeness phenomenon in terms of the conversational maxims was suggested by P. Grice (1991), R.Lakoff (1973, 2005) and J .Leech (1983). In his book "Logic and Conversation" Grice tried to formulate four maxims of communication which should be obtained by the interlocutors. He claimed that speakers are interested in effectiveness of the communication and therefore, they have to speak cooperatively, mutually accept one another, collaborate with each other and contribute to success of the conversation. These maxims differ considerably from grammatical rules: while violation of grammatical rules can prove poor knowledge of the language, violation of the maxims may imply some intention of the speaker.

The cooperative principle included four Maxims: Maxim of Quantity, Maxim of Quality, Maxim of Relation and Maxim of Manner. Each of them

consists of more specific maxims. Grice's principles form a fundamental part of any understanding of conversation as a cooperative activity. P. Grice, however, suggested that his set of maxims of conversation is not complete. He assumed that besides above-mentioned maxims there can be some of ethical, moral, social character, such as "be polite" (1975:47).

American linguist R. Lakoff (1973) tried to apply Grice's maxims to the politeness phenomenon. She was one of the first linguists who assumed that pragmatic rules are as important as grammatical and considered politeness as one of the essential features of the felicitous communication (1973: 296). R. Lakoff suggests that there are two major rules, so-called "Maxims of pragmatic competence", which aim at minimizing conflict in a n interaction. These rules are as follows:

be clear;

be polite.

According to R. Lakoff, Grice's maxims can be accumulated to the first rule ("be clear"). More than that, she notes that if people obeyed all the maxims, conversation would be totally formal and boring, thus, these rules are violated sometimes. The second rule ("be polite") includes some more specific rules:

do not impose;

give options;

make others feel good.

It should be noted that according to R. Lakoff, these two rules are sometimes incompatible. If the aim of the speaker is to deliver some information, the main attention is given to clarity. But if the speaker considers the status of the hearer, the relations, the situation, then he lays greater emphasis on politeness. She assumed that the main aim of the speaker is to make others feel comfortable and both rules are aimed at this goal, but the means are different (1973:303). According to the linguist the category of politeness is universal and is applied in every culture in the same way. This assumption gave rise to some criticism.

This theory was further developed by another famous linguist Geoffrey Leech (1983). He supported the idea that politeness is an important pragmatic factor which regulates human communication. He investigated politeness in terms of Interpersonal Rhetoric and noted that Politeness Principle supports social equality and trust friendly relationships (1983:82).

G. Leech's theory is built on six main maxims:

Tact Maxim is aimed at minimizing costs to the speaker and maximizing benefits to the hearer;

Generosity Maxim consists in maximizing the benefits for the hearer and minimizing benefits for the speaker;

Approbation Maxim lies in maximizing approval of the audience;

Modesty Maxim aims at minimizing praise of self;

Agreement Maxim aims at minimizing disagreement with the audience and maximizing agreement;

Tact and Generosity Maxims are usually applied to directive speech acts which can be softened through the use of indirect speech acts.

There are, in addition, three minor principles:

the banter Principle: this principle allows people to be polite while being superficially rude;

the irony Principle allows to be impolite while being superficially polite;

the pollyanna Principle gives an opportunity to avoid drawing attention to things "which are not mentioned in polite society".

Still the most widespread Politeness Theory was developed by the linguists P. Brown and S. Levinson in 1978. They defined politeness as a complicated socio-cultural phenomenon, a component of communicative consciousness of the members of any society.

3.1.2. Face saving phenomenon

Brown and Levinson indicate that their notion of "face" is based on Goffman's concept of face and on the English folk term and idiom "to lose face",

which means to be embarrassed or humiliated. The scholars claim that “in general, people cooperate (and assume each other’s cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerability of face” (Brown & Levinson 2011:61). For them “face” is a set of wants, not a set of values and norms imposed by members of society. It is of two types: negative and positive. The negative face refers to the want of every “competent adult member” that his actions be unimpeded and not distracted by others, whereas the positive face is about having a consistent and, of course, positive image about oneself and desiring approval from others (Brown and Levinson, 2011).

Both positive and negative faces can be threatened by face threatening acts theory (FTAs), which express verbal or non-verbal communication and one “act” can consist of several speech acts (Brown & Levinson 2011). FTAs uttered by the speaker (S) can threaten the hearer’s (H) negative face, for example orders and requests (1); suggestions, advice (2); threats, warnings, dares (3); offers (4); promises (5); compliments, expressions of envy or admiration (6); expression of strong (negative) emotions toward H, such as hatred, anger, lust (7) (Brown & Levinson 2011:65):

- (1) *“Bring me the phone, please.”*
- (2) *“Don’t waste your time and money on this scheme.”*
- (3) *“If I hear you one more time, you’ll be sent to your room.”*
- (4) *“Would you like a cup of tea?”*
- (5) *“I won’t tell anyone.”*
- (6) *“What a beautiful dress, I wish I had one.”*
- (7) *“I wish you were dead.”*

(Pretty Little Liars, seasons 1, 2)

The acts which damage H’s positive face are expressions of disapproval, criticism, contempt or ridicule, complains and reprimands, accusations, insults (8); contradictions or disagreements, challenges (9); expressions of violent emotions (10); irreverence, mention of taboo topics, including those that are inappropriate in the context (11); bringing of bad news about H, or good news (boasting) about S

(12); raising of emotional or divisive topics, such as religion, politics, etc. (13); blatant non-cooperation in an activity (14); use of address terms and other status-marked identifications in initial encounters (this might be seen as face enhancing act) (15) (Brown and Levinson 2011):

- (8) *"You're wrong on this one, you fool."*
 (9) *"Well, I've heard a completely different story."*
 (10) *"You seem so angry, you could punch a wall."*
 (11) *"Spencer: I believe abortions should be legal and accessible."
 "Mother: You mustn't talk like that in front of your sister!"*
 (12) *"The results are in and, unfortunately, you have a serious infection."*
 (13) *"I've got a pay rise!"*
 (14) *"Ms. Smith, how can I help you?"
 "I'm Mrs. Smith."*
 (Pretty Little Liars, seasons 1,2).

FTAs can also threaten S's face. The ones that offend S's negative face are expressions of thanks (16); acceptance of H's thanks or apology (17); excuses (18); acceptance of offers (19); responses to H's *faux pas* (20) (Brown & Levinson 2011: 67):

- (15) *"Thank you for helping me."*
 (16) *"Mona: You hurt my feelings."
 "Hanna: I'm sorry."
 "Mona: Apology accepted."*
 (17) *"I didn't have time for this because I was working."*
 (18) *"I can't refuse this chance, thank you for the offer."*
 (19) *"You shouldn't eat with your mouth open."*
 (20) *"I will help you... But only this time."*

(Pretty Little Liars, seasons 1,2).

The ones that offend S's positive face are apologies (21); acceptance of a compliment (22); breakdown of physical control over body (expelling gas accidentally), bodily leakage, stumbling or falling down, etc.; self-humiliation,

shuffling or cowering, acting stupid, self-contradicting; confessions, admissions of guilt or responsibility (23); emotion leakage, non-control of laughter or tears (Brown and Levinson 2011: 68):

(21) *"I'm sorry."*

(22) *"Sean: You look nice today."*

"Hanna: Thank you."

(23) *"It's my fault you didn't have a chance."*

(Pretty Little Liars, seasons 1, 2).

Face is something that can be lost, maintained or enhanced, and must be always attended to the conversation. There are certain speech acts which can threaten face and lead to breakdown of communication: "acts by their nature run contrary to the face wants of their hearer and/or the speaker" (2011:127). So, FTA can threaten the speaker's face as well as hearer's face. Moreover, there are two types of FTAs: negative and positive. The acts that threaten the positive-face want deal with lack of appreciation or approval for one's feelings, desires, actions, etc. The positive FTAs towards the speaker's face indicate that one has lost control over the situation (apologies, confessions, etc.). The FTAs that threaten the hearer's negative face obstruct the hearer's freedom of action and from imposition. If this act threatens the speaker's face they pose an offence to one's face (expressing thanks, excuses, unwilling promises, etc.) (2011:65-68).

In the course of interaction each interlocutor is interested in saving his own face and the face of his partner. For this reason, a number of different communicative strategies are used. P. Brown and R. Levinson differentiated four strategies: Bald On-Record strategy, Positive Politeness strategies, Negative Politeness strategies and Off-Record strategy. Each of these strategies is more polite than the previous one. Apart from that, linguists note that one can perform no act and maintain no goal. They call this strategy "Don't Do the FTA" that is used in such cases when the risk of losing face is extremely high. This approach is considered to be the most polite as far as the speaker does not threaten face at all, thus, the risk is absent.

If the speaker wants to do the FTA with the highest efficiency, he uses Bald On-Record strategy which is the most straightforward way of performing the act and it provides little effort to soften threats to the hearer's face. The speaker does not consider whether the act will hurt the hearer's (or speaker's) face. Let us consider some examples:

"I saw you with Toby yesterday.. What were you talking about? Are you friends?"

"What? No, he is Alison's killer! How can I be with someone like him?"

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

This is a conversation between Emily and her friend Spencer. The girls think that Toby killed their friend because all the people in their town think this way. They are receiving frightening messages, they think that he is the one who is bullying them. Emily is a friendly girl and she could not reject Toby's request and now she blames herself for being so careless. Spenser is not sure that they should blame Toby because they have no evidence. Emily is determined about Toby's character and uses bald-on record strategy in order to express her feelings towards this "mean guy".

Positive Politeness is used in the case when the speaker and the hearer are from the same social class, when their status is similar. Wardhaugh (2006) notes that Positive Politeness presupposes that the speaker treats others as friends and allies, does not impose on them and does not threaten their face. It includes offering friendship, making compliments and informal language use. Positive politeness presupposes attention to hearer's interests, needs and wants, solidarity, including both hearer and speaker in activity, offers and promises.

"I'm so upset that I couldn't join you yesterday. I hope Mona is not mad at me as I really wanted to become friends with her. Your friends are my friends, remember?"

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

"He looks like homeless criminal. I don't think that he is the right person for you, Hanna."

“You’re mistaken, he just got into complicated situation.. He can’t live with his foster parents... and he needs money so that’s why he started his business.”

“But it’s illegal!”

“He didn’t robe or kill anybody... He is helping others. Caleb is really nice and I like him.”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

This conversation occurs between Hanna and Spenser at school. Spenser does not like a new guy and she does not want her friends to have something in common with him. However, Hanna falls for Caleb and Spenser is trying to bring her round. Hanna tries to explain to her friend that she misunderstood Caleb using Positive Politeness strategy. Although she uses direct speech, her manner is still quite soft and friendly, she does not criticize Spencer severely and makes all the participants feel comfortable.

Negative Politeness strategies are used in the conversation between people from different social states, for example, between the boss and his subordinates. It helps to stress and maintain social distance between the interlocutors. Negative Politeness includes such actions as deference, apologizing and indirectness. It presupposes formality in language use, indirectness (conventional), using hedges and questions, minimum of disposition, using obviating structures (passive, nominalization), using “we” instead of “I”. As it was mentioned above, these strategies are more polite than the previous and the speaker uses a variety of strategies in order to avoid any threats to the face (Wardhaugh, 2006). Let us consider the following examples:

“I’m not sure what you think, Ashley, but I’m sure girls should visit sociologist. I think they are lying all they time. They don’t know where the truth is.”

“Do you think it should get that far? I trust my daughter...”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

This conversation occurs among the girls’ parents. They think that Spenser, Hanna, Emily and Aria are lying and they need help. Spencer’s mother thinks that

the situation is very serious and girls need help. But she still softens her words by a phrase *“I’m not sure what you think”*. She is trying to be polite and obeys social etiquette.

“Just a second.. I’ll take my jacket and we can go...”

“Think maybe we got our wires crossed about tonight. My idea was that this would be a good time for me to catch up with Hanna.”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

This conversation takes place at Hanna’s house. Her parents were divorced a couple of years ago, and her father moved to another city. Because of a car accident which Hanna caused he came to Rosewood. He invited his daughter for dinner but her mother thought that they would go all together. Ashley is ready to leave the house with Hanna but Tom stops her using indirect speech act *“Think maybe we got our wires crossed about tonight. My idea was that this would be a good time for me to catch up with Hanna”*. He manages to save Ashley’s face and his own face by softening his rejection.

Off-Record (indirect) strategies presuppose that the speaker does not impose on the hearer, thus, face is not threatened directly. Off-Record utterances are ambiguous or indirect; therefore, they often require the hearer to interpret or to decode the meaning of what has been said. The main purpose of using such a strategy is to take some pressure off. According to P. Brown and R. Levinson, the off-record strategy is “a natural extension of negative politeness (in adding an additional element of avoidance), analogous to Radcliffe-Brown’s “avoidance” relation as the relationship of extreme respect” (Brown & Levinson 2011:21). Thomas Holtgraves (2001) notes that the key characteristic of off-record politeness is ambiguity as far as there is more than one way of interpretation of the speech act. Thus, the hearer should take some pains in order to decode the message of the utterance.

Although off-record indirectness proceeds from Negative Politeness, it encodes a degree of politeness beyond that afforded by negatively polite (conventionally indirect) speech acts. Let us consider the following two examples:

“You know, I think we’re ready for some family time here... So, uh, Maya?”
(Pretty little liars, season 1).

This is a conversation between Maya (Emily’s girlfriend) and Emily’s mother. Her husband came after long time and she wants her family to spend some time together. She does not like Emily’s friend but she tries to stay polite in order not to argue with her daughter. She tries to make Maya leave their house using indirect speech act without hurting girl’s face directly. Moreover, this utterance is less categorical and obtrusive; it also contributes to success of the speech act and helps to avoid some negative consequences.

A number of linguists suggest that politeness is one of the main reasons of extensive use of indirect speech acts. They are considered to be more polite and less threatening than direct speech acts. J. Leech notes that “politeness in language increases with the use of indirectness, because indirectness can help lessen the feeling of being forced or imposed on” (Lakoff 2005:178). Indirectness gives the hearer an opportunity to choose. Some linguists claim that politeness is not the reason but means of gaining some goals. Thus, politeness helps to save the hearer’s and/or the listener’s reputation and face.

3.2. Function peculiarities of indirect strategies in dialogues

3.2.1. Rejecting strategy

One of the motifs for the use of indirect speech acts is the desire to evade a speaker’s question or not to give a direct answer. Sometimes indirect speech act can also help to ignore the question without flouting the Cooperative Principle. Often when one wants to ignore the interlocutor’s requests or offers, disagree or express his own opinion, one should be very careful in case one wants to avoid rudeness, conflicts or communicative failures. Therefore, people tend not to give direct, explicit rejections or denials, but to show reasons or excuses for it instead and therefore, they succeed in maintaining good relationships with the others without apologizing.

In order to ignore somebody's speech moves, different indirect tactics can be applied. One of the ways to reject something is to state the reason of rejection. Let us consider the following examples:

"Are you okay with veggie burgers?"

"Actually I said I'd have dinner at Spenser's"

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Aria's mother is cooking dinner and she is wondering whether Aria would like to eat vegetables burgers. Aria does not want to have dinner with her family because her parents are arguing because of her father's love affair. She declines the request indirectly stating the reason *"Actually I said I'd have dinner at Spenser's"*.

"Why don't we continue this over coffee?"

"I have a boyfriend now."

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

The example presents a conversation between Wren Kim (Melissa's ex-fiancé) and Spencer. He came to her house to apologize for the whole situation including Melissa's betraying and having an affair with Spencer. He figured out recently that he really likes Spencer but she is not alone now. In order to decline the request she states the reasons for him to leave.

The same situation can be observed in the following example:

"Can I take you home?"

"You know, I kind of promised them..."

"Look.. I know Sean took off. And I was thinking that since you guys were now over..."

"Lucas, it's really really sweet of you to offer, but Emily's kind of.. She needs me right now. And, uhm, I already told Spenser I'd go with them, so..."

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

This conversation happens after dance party. Hanna was dancing with Lucas the whole evening as "A" made her to do this. Because of her ignoring Sean he broke up with her. At the same time someone attacked Emily and she was taken to the hospital. Lucas is hoping that those dances with Hanna meant something and

he wants to start romantic relationship with her. In order not to hurt his feelings, Hanna is stating the reason why she cannot go with him, and she also softens this situation with complimenting Lucas *“it’s really really sweet of you to offer, but Emily’s kind of... She needs me right now. And, uhm, I already told Spenser I’d go with them, so..”*

“Look, I know that we haven’t talked since that night but, since we are now, do you wanna talk about homecoming? I mean, do you still wanna go? You know, with me?”

“Coach has us on a lot of two-a-days. That’s a lot of pressure. And with everything going on, I just...”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Hanna and Sean were a couple but things got complicated when Hanna got mad at him and broke his car. She wanted to get along again as they have been friends since childhood and does not want to lose him. However Sean is not sure that he wants this as well because it seems to him that Hanna changes a lot. He does not want to hurt her because he still has some feelings towards her. He uses indirect rejection and saves faces of both of them *“Coach has us on a lot of two-a-days. That’s a lot of pressure. And with everything going on, I just....”* Hanna does not feel uncomfortable because of rejection but still she understands that he just does not want to spend time with her as he used to.

“Come inside”

“I’ve done some pretty stupid things lately. I’m way over my limit.”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

This conversation occurs between Spenser and her sister’s ex-boyfriend. She and Wren fell in love when he was dating her sister but they stopped their affair as it was not fair. After Mellissa broke up with him Wren decided to continue relationship with Spenser. She is not sure that it is right to date him and after one kiss she rejects continuing by saying *“I’ve done some pretty stupid things lately. I’m way over my limit.”* As she hesitates she uses an indirect strategy because she

does not want to be rude and stop everything now. By saying this way she takes some time for thinking and after it will be fine to continue or to stop everything.

“Let’s dance...”

“I’m sure you can find somebody else to step on your feet”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Hanna offers Lucas to dance, however he is not sure about her motives. He likes her but he knows that she is dating with Sean. He decides to reject her offer but she is too precious for him to do it directly.

3.2.2. Requesting and suggesting strategies

One of the most often used ways of indirect communication is through indirect requests. They help people to make requests without being straightforward (Gordon & Lakoff, 1971, Searle, 1975). It is important to mention that J. Searle and some other linguists distinguish two types of indirect requests: conventional and conversational (or non-conventional). This idea was also developed by Bach and Harnish (1979:193) who argued that some of the indirect speech acts become standardized. Bach (1995:678) suggested that “where there is standardization, the hearer’s inference is compressed by the precedent; one does not have to go through all the steps that would be required absent standardization”. In other words, conventional or standardizes indirect speech acts are much easier to understand. Therefore, as Gibbs (1981) notes, a person reacts faster to the conventional speech acts.

“Can you tell us exactly what you spoke about with Dr. Sallivan?”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

“I would like you to tell me what happened.”

(Pretty little liars, season 1)

“Will you please come at once?”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

In English, verbs forming indirect speech acts of requesting expressed by interrogative sentences can be used in a conditional and negative form.

These request modifiers with the meaning of doubt and uncertainty are used to mitigate the request. For example:

“Please, Mrs. Marin, won’t you help us?”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Indirect speech acts of a request expressed by narrative sentences with verbs in the subjunctive mood are less categorical than their pairs with verbs in the indicative mood, and, accordingly, more polite. Similar statements are often found.

For instance:

“I would like you to tell me what happened.”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Sternberg argues that “there are four main ways of making indirect request:

- by asking about abilities;
- by stating a desire;
- by stating a future action;
- by citing reasons” (2012:423).

We are going to illustrate these four cases and try to offer more points to this classification. Let us consider some examples:

“Can you check my phone?”

“Sure. What’s wrong?”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

This is a conversation between Caleb and Emily. She knows that Caleb has an illegal business concerning different mobile applications. She wants him to help her but as they are not close enough for such requests she resorts to an indirectness strategy determined by the wish to be nice and the desire to create a friendly atmosphere.

“She and her mother baked some cookies.”

“They taste even better with milk. Do you have milk?”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

This is a fragment of the conversation between Emilie's mother and Jenna. They are offering Emily cookies. Jenna is not a friend of the family but to create a friendly atmosphere, she uses an indirect strategy as in the case of explicit refusal she will lose her face. Her request is more like a hint.

"There are things what we need to cover that we can't between classes."

"Uh, I'm home tonight."

"I will make you one of two dishes that I actually know how to cook.."

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

The next example presents a conversation between Aria and Mr. Fitz. He is an English teacher and both of them know that their romantic relationship is illegal. They are seeing each other time to time but usually it is hard for both of them to find time to spend together. Mr. Fitz suggests Aria to meet but he is not sure whether she also wants it so he uses an indirect strategy and states a future action *"I will make you one of two dishes that I actually know how to cook"*. He is softly persuading Aria by saying it this way.

"Is everything okay?"

"Yeah"

"You know where to find me."

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

This conversation happened between Hannah and her mother. The girl was sitting and crying because of braking up with her boyfriend. Her mother wants to help her somehow but she does not want to push too hard as it can be too difficult for Hanna to explain everything. Mrs. Marin is going to the bath and says: *"You know where to find me"* meaning you can come and tell me everything, I will hear you out and support you.

So, having analyzed the use of speech acts on the example of the fragments presenting a speech act of request, we came to the conclusion that a request in English can be expressed directly or indirectly by both incentive and narrative and interrogative sentences, while the scope of using indirect speech acts in realizing a

request in English are very wide, since indirect requests are less categorical and, therefore, are more polite than direct speech acts – directives.

3.2.3. Joking strategy

A joke can serve the purpose of cooperative communication in which communicants try to move away from a serious conversation, seek to reduce the distance and critically rethink current issues in a mild form. The authors of the joke are the speakers who provoked the conflict, but having a communicative initiative, they turn the conflict into a cooperative dialogue.

“Please, tell your dad we really have been trying to makes it to church, but I’ve been working on the weekends”

“Oh, yeah, no. I’ll let him know, Mrs.Marin. But it’s okay. I mean, he understands. He works on the weekends too.”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

This conversation occurs between Sean and Mrs. Marin. She and her daughter did not have a chance to attend the church the previous weekend. Sean’s father is the pastor and she does not want to have rumors about that. Sean understands it and wants to calm Mrs. Marin down by joking *“But it’s okay. I mean, he understands. He works on the weekends too.”*

“Are you sure you’re okay?”

“Yeah. My dignity broke the fall”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Aria was attracted at Spenser’s house and the girl worries a lot that it happened to her friend at her house. She is nervous a lot but Aria wants her to care less about that and tries to turn everything into a joke.

At the same time, a wicked joke serves the purpose of escalating the conflict. Cruel jokes humiliate the dignity of the interlocutor, discredit him; mockery, sarcasm, irony indicate a rude and intolerant attitude on the part of the aggressor. Most often, the object of evil humor is personal characteristics of the opponent: his

age, marital status, health, appearance, interests, hobbies, etc. – something to laugh at is prohibited by ethical standards and rules of speech etiquette.

“Such a hottie”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Alison said this to Hanna when she was nit slim. Hanna wanted to try on a beautiful dress but it did not fit her because of her weight. Here irony serves as a means of implicitly expressing aggression, indignation and a biased, dismissive attitude towards the interlocutor, and also indicates tension in communication.

Taunt is a combination of humor and aggression. This is a means of indirectly expressing negative emotions and attitudes towards an opponent, ridiculing phenomena that are valuable to the interlocutor. The object of ridicule is always a certain person, his views, activities and the results of this activity. Speech aggression in mockery is expressed not only through specific content, but also through the form – special (ironic, caustic, malicious) intonation and a particular pace (with repeated verbal repetitions, artificial pauses, deliberate, exaggerated spelling and other). In this regard, mockery is called an evaluative speech genre, although in some cases it can be likened in form to etiquette genres, for example, a compliment or a greeting

“And why did you come so early? You could have come over for coffee.”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Girls have been waiting for Garrett for almost 2 hours and when he came, they could not stay calm.

To the extreme degree of expression of irony we can refer sarcasm - especially a taunting mockery, when indignation, contempt, anger, cynicism, insult, neglect are added to laughter. Sarcastic remarks are used by communicants in the most “acute” moments of communication, when the speaker does not hide his negative attitude towards the interlocutor.

3.2.4. Threatening strategy

The full form of the threat consists of a directive and a command part (If you ... I will ...). There is no unity among linguists regarding the status of a threat as a speech act. It refers to commissions, directives, and some researchers note that the threat is at the junction between speech acts and is a separate type of an illocutionary act. From our point of view, the directive feature is much more significant, since the communicative goal of the speaker is to motivate the addressee to one or another way of behavior, and not to assume obligations.

We regard a threat as a coherent speech act in which the illocutionary function of the directive is combined with a negative emotion. Together with prompting, the speaker seeks to produce a negative impact on the emotional sphere of the addressee promising to harm him.

In accordance with the theory of speech acts, we can say that if one or two signs of the speech act-threat are expressed explicitly, and the rest are implicit, then the threat is indirect explicit, if all the signs are expressed implicitly, then this is an indirect implicit threat.

The following example falls into the category of indirect explicit threats:

“If you don’t shut up, you are the one who is getting hurt.”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

All for main characters are bullied by an anonymous person. They receive messages from “A” who manipulates their lives. It is an example of such a message:

“See how easy it was for me to get my hands around your neck?”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

One more message from “A”. Emily had a message but then she figured out that it was “A”.

Truncated threats are often a direct reaction to the speech behavior of the interlocutor; therefore, the directive part of the utterance is not expressed verbally in the speech act but is logically inferred from the communicative context.

“These comments on my paper are pretty harsh.”

“Oh, I wasn’t trying to be”

“I worked really hard on this”

“I’m sure you did, but you clearly hadn’t read all of the material.”

“I think I know enough to get a better grade than this.”

“What are you asking me to do, Noel? Change the grade? ‘Cause that’s not gonna happen.”

“Mr. Fits, you don’t want me to bring the principal into this, do you? Take another read. You may have second thoughts. I think it deserves this.”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Noel knows that Mr. Fitz is dating with his student and he uses this information to threaten him after unsuccessful to persuade him. In this example, the threat is realized through the promise of an action that is beneficial to the addressee. The category of denial serves as a means of disguising the illocutionary goal.

In the following example, the self-speaking attitude is set, and the communicative intention is masked by temporal distance:

“It’s my dad”

“Don’t answer”

“Well, I have to!”

“He I’ll try and talk you out of telling. You can’t do that to your mom. You have to tell her, Aria, before someone else does.”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Aria caught her father cheating on her mother. He saw when she was running away. A few minutes later, he started calling to talk to her about the situation, but Alison is against it. She believes that Aria should tell her mother everything, and threatens her to make such a decision. As the illustration material shows, in truncated threats, the communicative attitude from reality to the speaker often changes.

“I think it’s time we move this conversation to the police station. Maybe you’ll be more talkative there”.

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Principal's account at school was hacked. Garrett came to Caleb as a Hanna's friend and he pretended that he just wanted to ask the guy about his computer skills. However, he thinks that Caleb broke the law. Caleb does not trust the police officer and tried to avoid this talk. After that Garrett decided to threaten him. An indirect threat indicates a possible change for the addressee of the status of a witness to the status of a suspect. To mask the intent of a threat, communicants often use questions that mention an action that is harmful to the addressee. They often use modal means to mitigate the communicative intention of the speaker.

Thus, truncated indirect threats can be used in English communication, in which the directive part is derived from the communicative context, and the commissive part is expressed implicitly. They can be realized by the utterances with one communicative installation, double installation and with a change of installation. Most often there is a change in the communicative attitude. It is used to mask the illocutionary function. Threats can be realized in the form of beneficial promises, questions, advice, but at the same time they do not have a full explication of the action that causes damage. In a communicative installation on the speaker, camouflage means are used: the denial of the intention to perform an action to the detriment of the addressee, a truncated statement, temporary distance.

3.2.5. Avoiding answer strategy

The strategy of avoiding a direct answer is a way of speech behavior of the addressee that is aimed at neglecting answering a question of the interlocutor immediately, to disguise the true meaning of the response line or to completely avoid the direct answer. The reasons for this behavior can be varied: sometimes it takes time to think, sometimes the question of the interlocutor is associated with an undesirable topic for the speaker, or the speaker does not consider it necessary to show his attitude to the previous statement of the interlocutor. Very often, this strategy allows for the implementation of a diplomatic scenario of verbal interaction.

“Well, does she know you’re crushing on her?”

“She just joined, like, a week ago. We’ve barely said more than two words to each other”

(Pretty little liars, season 1)

The conversation is between Lucas and Hanna. He likes one girl but he is too shy to get acquainted with her. Hanna notices that he fell for that girl and she is wondering why he keeps silence. Lucas does not want to tell her that he is feeling not good enough for that girl.

“How bad is the mess we’re in?”

“I’ll take care of it honey”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Hanna and her mother are having troubles with money and someone stole several thousand dollars from their house. Hanna is worried because she does not want her mother to suffer because of that. Mrs. Marin calms her daughter down as she thinks that children should not worry about their parents’ problems.

The strategy of avoiding a direct answer is realized by a number of tactics, the main of which will be considered below.

One of the strategies is the desire to gain more time to think about the answer. For example:

“Oh. What is she doing?”

“What will I get from you if I tell?”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Spencer does not want to answer Toby’s call as she lied to him before. She gives her phone to Emily and asks her to tell something. Emily is disappointed and cannot think fast.

“Is everything all right?”

“Why wouldn’t it be?”

(Pretty little liars, season 1).

Emily and Spencer are changing their clothes after a swimming lesson. Emily looks upset but she does not want to demonstrate her mood to others and she cannot think of a good reason why she is upset.

The communicative moves of this tactic include repetitions, interrogations and pickups. The most common way to “slow down” a conversation is to repeat the replica of the interlocutor or part of it. The disincentive effect is created due to the fact that repetition does not carry any information and is not the answer to the question. It is also not a cross-talk due to misunderstanding. Its only function is to delay time. For example:

“Are you leaving now?”

“Leaving?”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Hanna was about to leave her house when Caleb came. She is not sure whether she wants to talk to him for a while or she should just leave.

The following tactics can be called a tactic of cutting off unwanted questions.

In the following example, an interrogative statement is uttered instead of an answer, which clearly expresses the speaker’s unfriendly attitude to the interlocutor and her unwillingness to answer the question:

“Does my sister know you smoke?”

“Does she have to know everything?”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Spencer caught her sister’s boyfriend smoking. He is not sure whether the girl will keep it a secret and he is feeling uncomfortable in this situation.

“Hanna what did you and Dr.Sullivan talk about?”

“Isn’t that supposed to be between me and her? I mean, that’s how it works right?”

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Hanna visits a psychologist who helps her to deal with this anonymous bullying. Then the doctor wrote that she figured out who is “A”. After that day no

one saw Dr. Sullivan. Hanna's mother wants to know what happened when her daughter visited the doctor the last time. However Hanna is afraid to tell someone else about "A".

The purpose of the following tactics is to request information that will determine the subsequent speech action – the answer of the interlocutor to the previous question:

"What's happened to Lucas?"

"What have you heard?"

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Hanna got into an accident with Lucas. They were sailing and the boat sank. Hanna keeps it a secret what really happened there. In this example, Hanna wants to know what exactly Mona knows as her further actions will depend on it.

The tactic of the hint is based on the mentioning of some typical situation and assuming the presence of ambiguity in the interpretation and activation of guesses from the side of the listener.

"I thought you said your mom was warming to the idea of us being a couple."

"She's... thawing"

"And your dad?"

"How fast do glaciers melt?"

(Pretty little liars, season 2).

Aria and Ezra told the parents about their relationship. Her parents were very mad at it but the couple coped that everything would be fine. In order not to speak off directly Aria is hinting that her father is far from accepting this situation.

3.3. Cultural differences in using indirect strategies

The mechanism of indirect strategies is not specific to a particular language, but at the same time, standard forms in one language do not always retain their indirect speech potential when translated into another language. So, the basic example *"Can you hand me that book?"* functions as an indirect request in

English, but its translation into Czech “*můžete mi podat tu knížku?*” sounds very strange if it functions as a request (Searle 1975:76).

Having investigated a lot of material I can state that most of speech acts in the Czech language are direct. It does not matter whether the speaker rejects, requests something. Whether it is a threat or a joke, the great majority of them are direct. Anyway, in everyday communication, each of us wants to keep our face, both the speaker and the hearer.

Let us consider the following example:

“Vy nevíte co je biomasa ?”

“Ne já sem takle blbej v tomle sem na parlamentní úrovni co je biomasa”

(Pustina).

“You don’t know what biomass is?”

“No, I’m so stupid in this here on parliamentary level what is biomass”

(Wasteland).

In this example, we see that Jan Kraus has endangered his positive face here by being deliberately self-critical, so he not evaluate positively. But he assumed the hearer would engage the implication and recognize that it was an irony. The laughter proves that he has recognized the intended meaning and it produced a comical effect. The man let this unpleasant situation happen that Jan Kraus had to cope with this situation. The first speaker forgot about saving the hearer’s face as it could have become an insult to his hidden feelings.

The following example illustrates the use of indirect strategies in order to avoid the direct answer:

“Setkání radnice je dnes, že?”

“A nenapadlo tě, že by to mohlo nějak souviset?”

“Slyšela jsi něco?”

“Víš, kolik lidí tě pohrdá?”

“Martina, prosím. Pokud chtějí někoho ublížit, budu to já. Nemusíš se starat o Pavlinku”

(Pustina).

“The town hall meeting is today, right?”

“And didn’t it occur to you that it might be connected somehow?”

“You heard something?”

“You know how many people despise you?”

“Martina, please. If they want to hurt someone, it’ll be me. You don’t have to worry about Pavlinka.”

(Wasteland).

The woman is not sure what Marnina knows so instead of answering she asks *“You heard something?”* to get more information and to decide what she should mention. This strategy of speech act has no difference in use with English language. We consider that this type can be regarded as universal.

“Víš, co se stalo v té školce mimo vesnici?”

“Jo, vaši kolegové byli tady.”

“Dříve zranil zvířata, že?”

“Myslíš psa, který ho chtěl kousnout?”

“Majitel to popsal jinak.”

“Ne, sám připustil, že pes byl agresivní. Zaútočilo také na jiné lidi.”

“Podívej, bude to prostě lepší, když se znovu nedostane. Lepší pro něj taky”

(Pustina)

“You know what happened at that daycare outside the village?”

“Yeah, Your colleagues were here, checked on the boys.”

“He’s hurt animals before, hasn’t he?”

“You mean the dog that wanted to bite him?”

“The owner described it differently.”

“No, he himself admitted that the dog was aggressive. It attacked other people, too.”

“Look, it’ll just be better if he doesn’t get away again. Better for him too”

(Wasteland).

The police officer thinks that one of the boys at school killed a sheep. That boy had hurt a dog before and he was considered to be a troubled teenager and that

he might harm others. Firstly, the officer wanted to convince the teacher so that he thought it was a teenager who did harm to the sheep. But since he did not succeed, he decided to threaten the boy.

It seems that for the Czech speakers saving their own face is more important and they care more about themselves. Politeness does not have that important role as such speech acts as in the first example are not impolite.

It dramatically differs from the Korean speech acts as Korea's social value system is based on hierarchy, which is a reflection of Confucian principles. The key to successful communication in Korea is respect for these values of Korean society. Thus, in the Korean language, there are significant differences in the models for the implementation of speech acts, depending on the social constraints inherent in the situation. For example, requests addressed to higher authorities may be formulated in less direct terms than those addressed to a person who is lower in social status.

Martin (1964) explains this by saying that expressing a request can hurt the interlocutor's feelings. When making a speech act of a request, the speaker actually requires the listener to perform a certain action in the future, thereby restricting the freedom of choice of the listener, who must independently decide on the performance of this action. Such a requirement can be burdensome for the listener and thereby jeopardize his independence and independence, therefore, in accordance with the concept of politeness, the speaker tries to reduce the degree of categorization of the statement and chooses appropriate discursive strategies, such as, for example, indirect expression of the request

By indirect speech act Martin refers to potential, missing or imaginary, rather than real speech acts. This is most relevant for the Korean language, because, as mentioned above, due to cultural specificity, it traces the intention to express the request implicitly.

“벌써 밖이 어두워졌어요”

(지금 만나러 갑니다)

“It got dark outside”

(Be with you)

The main character Soo-ah does not remember her husband so she uses very polite way of Korean language while talking to him. It was a late evening and it got dark in the room. Soo-ah did not know where the switcher is so she wanted to ask Woo-jin to turn on the light. It was awkward for woman because she was a quest and she just said *“It got dark outside”* meaning turn on the light

The influence on the expression of the request is exerted by factors that are formed at the level of the relationship between the speaker and the listener, such as: social status, degree of closeness of the relations of the communicants. So, for example, the speaker determines the degree of politeness in accordance with the specified factors, and then selects a particular language form to express this style of politeness.

“엄마 배고파요..”

“잠깐만, 내가 뭔가 사 줄게”

(지금 만나러 갑니다)

“Mom I’m hungry..”

“Wait a second, I’ll buy something”

(Be with you).

Ji-ho asks his mother to give him some food. Instead of saying directly *“give me some food”*, he says literally *“my stomach is hungry”*.

Korea is a country with a high context culture, and the construction of communication largely depends on the non-linguistic context, which is determined by the hierarchical system of Korean society. The specifics of expressing indirect speech acts in Korean are related to the system of social hierarchy and the concept of politeness. The indirect form speech acts in the South Korean discourse is used to increase the “etiquette” of the communicative act, since one of the main principles of politeness is to provide the recipient with a greater degree of freedom of reaction.

Conclusions to Chapter Three

In this Chapter we have touched upon the main problem of our investigation, i.e. indirect speech acts and their use in communication. We have made our investigation on the basis of dialogical discourse in the TV serial “Pretty Little Liars”. We have outlined the main reasons for indirect strategies use and classified the strategies into five groups: rejecting, requesting, joking, threatening and avoiding answer.

We explored the main reasons why people tend to use indirect speech acts. Politeness and self-saving as motives to use indirect way of communication is closely connected to the face theory of Ervin Goffman. A person in everyday situations tries to present himself and his activity to others in the best way possible so he or she directs and controls the appearance, manner, behavior. People care about the impression which they make. In order to save his or her face and to save face of the hearer, an interlocutor resorts to indirect strategies. According to Brown and Levinson’s theory, politeness nearly always implies indirectness. When a person wants to ask for something and to avoid an embarrassing situation because of refuse, he or she will resort to indirectness

Finally, we have investigated the difference in indirect speech act use in the Czech and Korean languages. People always try to save their own face as well as the face of their partners and indirect strategies are the main tool of politeness phenomena. That is why people apply these communication strategies no matter what language is used.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Communication is an essential tool of any human interaction and the issue of communication strategies became extremely popular nowadays. The attention is given not only to certain conditions and parameters of successful communication but also to the reasons and factors which cause different communicative failures. That is why it became one of the most debatable issues in pragmatics and especially among the linguists engaged in the Speech Act Theory. Speech acts are the basis of human communication, but only in the second half of the XX century they merited proper attention from the linguists and philosophers, such as J. Austin (1962) J. R. Searle (1969, 1979) and others.

Indirect speech acts remain the most disputable issue within the Theory as far as it is not clear enough why people tend to generate them despite the fact that they are complicated both to produce and to interpret, and how people are able to understand them. The use of indirect speech acts in discourse was studied by a number of linguists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers, including J. Searle (1975), D. Gordon and G. Lakoff (1975), M. Geis (1995), H. Clark (1979) and others.

In our research we have focused on the main factors of functioning of indirect strategies in discourse and explanation of indirect ways of communication in Modern English. We explored the main reasons why people tend to use indirect speech acts. The main reason for using indirect strategies is saving face. As everyone cares about his or her reputation in the society and what other people think people try to adapt to situation and meet other people's expectations. But when it contradicts his or her intentions, the speaker uses indirect techniques to express an expected utterance by implying hidden meaning in order to attain his or her goal. In order to avoid face-threatening situations people try to stay polite, especially with unknown people as no one knows how another person can react.

Indirect strategies are presented in various ways and they are widely used in order to achieve different goals. For example, when a person has a request and he or she wants to avoid an embarrassing situation because of reject at the same time,

he or she uses indirectness. A speaker excludes a possible conflict and even after refusal it would not be embarrassing for him or her. On the other hand, a hearer can easily refuse without feeling unpleasantly. So, by using indirect strategies a speaker can not only save his or herself but also stay polite.

Indirectness is widely used when a person wants to reject or deny something. An important feature of the speech act of refusal is that it is psychologically unpleasant for the hearer's perception. Therefore, the speaker tries to hide, disguise or supply a negative answer by using indirect strategies. There are several ways for the speaker to reach his or her goal: changing the topic of conversation; give an evasive answer, persuasion, counter offer.

Jokes can be used to prevent a conflict situation. When an interlocutor sees that a situation is heating up, a good sense of humor can smooth things over. Furthermore, people can use humor to avoid answering awkward questions. Therefore, we can state that humor is an effective strategy in order to avoid an unpleasant situation, to defuse a conflict and to change the topic of conversation.

Moreover, we have studied several techniques for avoiding a direct answer. The reasons for this behavior can be various: sometimes it takes time to think, sometimes the question of the interlocutor is associated with an undesirable topic for the speaker, or the speaker does not consider it necessary to show his attitude to the previous statement of the interlocutor.

Although indirect speech acts can cause misunderstandings due to the recipient's failure to understand the hidden, indirect meaning of the speaker, they are still used quite often for many reasons investigated in this Diploma. In addition, the analysis helped us to prove that words themselves are not so much important as the meaning which is hidden behind the words. Furthermore, the analysis showed that not only the intention of the speaker but also historic, culture and situation context are important to reach mutual understanding.

RESUME

Комунікація є найважливішим інструментом будь-якої взаємодії людей, і питання стратегій спілкування стало надзвичайно популярним у наш час. Увага приділяється не лише певним умовам та параметрам успішного спілкування, а й причинам та факторам, що спричиняють різні комунікативні порушення. Ось чому це стало одним із найбільш дискусійних питань у прагматиці та особливо серед лінгвістів, які займаються теорією мовленнєвих актів. Мовленнєві акти є основою людського спілкування, але лише у другій половині ХХ століття вони отримали належну увагу з боку лінгвістів та філософів, таких як Дж. Остін (1962) Дж. Р. Серл (1969, 1979) та інших.

Непрямі мовленнєві акти залишаються найбільш спірним питанням у ТМА, оскільки недостатньо зрозуміло, чому люди прагнуть їх використовувати, незважаючи на те, що вони складні як для створення, так і для тлумачення, і як люди здатні їх розуміти. Використання непрямих мовленнєвих актів у дискурсі вивчалось рядом лінгвістів, когнітивних вчених та філософів,

У першому Розділі ми спробували вивчити поняття діалогічного дискурсу. Він використовується в різних значеннях, і ми розглядаємо діалогічний дискурс як комунікативну подію, яка відбувається між мовцем та слухачем у певному часовому, просторовому та іншому контексті.

Поняття спілкування також є спірною темою, і воно, як правило, стосується процесу, за допомогою якого організм або організми отримують інформацію. Коли мовець хоче обмінятися ідеєю, він використовує слова для надсилання цієї інформації. Після цього це повідомлення проходить через певний фільтр, що може бути викликане фактичним шумом або ідеологічним чи психологічним шумом. Також широкий спектр культурних та ситуаційних контекстів може мати певний вплив на сприйняття інформації. Таким чином, слухач отримує цю інформацію під впливом його упередженості і має декодувати це повідомлення. Це означає, що сприйняття може відрізнитися від надісланого повідомлення.

У другому Розділі ми намагалися дати повний виклад теорії мовленнєвих актів, оскільки це потрібно для подальшого обговорення. Ми дали огляд деяких найважливіших теорій мовленнєвих актів, головним чином теорій, розроблених Джоном Остіном та Джоном Серлем.

У третьому Розділі ми торкнулися основної проблеми нашого дослідження, тобто непрямих мовленнєвих актів та стратегій і тактик та їх використання у спілкуванні. Ми провели наше дослідження на основі діалогічного дискурсу в серіалі “Pretty little liars”. Ми окреслили основні причини використання непрямих стратегій і класифікували цілі на п’ять груп: відмова, прохання, жарт, погроза та уникнення відповіді.

Ми дослідили основні причини, чому люди схильні використовувати непрямі мовленнєві акти. Ввічливість та самозбереження як мотиви використовувати непрямий спосіб спілкування тісно пов’язані з теорією обличчя Ервіна Гофмана. Людина в повсякденних ситуаціях намагається найкращим чином представити себе та свою діяльність іншим, та ми слідкуємо за нашою зовнішністю, контролюємо манеру поведінки. Людей хвилює враження, яке вони справляють. Для того, щоб врятувати своє обличчя і зберегти обличчя слухача, людина вдається до непрямих стратегій. Відповідно до теорії Браун та Левінсона ввічливість завжди передбачає опосередкованість. Коли людина хоче щось попросити і уникнути неприємної ситуації через відмову, вона використовує непрямі стратегії мовлення. Також, ми дослідили різницю в застосуванні актів непрямого мовлення в чеській та корейській мовах. Люди завжди намагаються зберегти власне обличчя, а також обличчя своїх партнерів, а непрямі стратегії - головний інструмент явища ввічливості. Ось чому люди використовують ці стратегії, незважаючи на мову, на якій вони розмовляють.

Ключові слова: непрямі стратегії спілкування, діалогічний дискурс, ввічливість, теорія обличчя, мовленнєві акти, комунікація, відмова, прохання, жарт, погроза та уникнення відповіді.

REFERENCE LITERATURE

1. Бахтин М. М. Эстетика словесного творчества / М.М. Бахтин. // Сост. С. Г. Бочаров; Текст подгот. Г.С. Бернштейн и Л.В. Дерюгина; Примеч. С. С. Аверинцева и С. Г. Бочарова. – [2-е изд.] – М.: Искусство, 1986. – 445 с.
2. Бацевич Ф.С. Нариси з лінгвістичної прагматики: [монографія] / Ф.С. Бацевич. – Львів: ПАІС, 2010. – 336 с.
3. Колокольцева Т.Н. Специфические коммуникативные единицы диалогической речи/ Т.Н. Колокольцева – Волгоград, 2001. –260 с.
4. Орехова Л.І. До питання про діалог/ Л.І. Орехова// Науковий вісник південноукраїнського державного педагогічного університету ім. К.Д. Ушинського: збірник наукових праць. – Вип. 9-10. – Одеса, 2000. – С.144.
5. Почепцов Г.Г. Коммуникативные технологии XX века Г.Г. Почепцов. – М.-К.:Реф-бук, 2000. – 146 с.
6. Сусов І.П. Лінгвістична прагматика/ І.П. Сусов – Вінниця, Нова Книга, 2009. – 272 с.
7. Akmajian, A., Richard, D., Ann, F., and Robert, H. Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication. Massachusetts: The MIP Press, 1995. – 357 p.
8. Austin J. L. How to do things with words / J.L Austin. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. – 167 p.
9. Bach K. Linguistic communication and speech acts / K. Bach, R.M. Harnish. – Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1979. – 438 p.
10. Bach K. Standardization and conventionalization / K. Bach // Linguistic and Philosophy. – 1995. – Vol. 18. – P. 677-686.
11. Beale W.H. A pragmatic theory of rhetoric / Walter H. Beale – Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1987. – 186 p.

12. Benveniste E. Subjectivity in language / Emile Benveniste // Problems in general linguistics, 1971 – P. 223-230.
13. Bonvillain N. Language, culture and communication / Nance Bonvillain – [2nd ed.] – Prentice Hall, North Carolina, 1997. – 306 p.
14. Brown P. Politeness: some universals in language usage / P. Brown, S. Levinson, C. Stephen. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. – 345 p.
15. Bühler K. Theory of language: the representational function of language / K. Bühler. – Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1990. – 508 p.
16. Byon A. S. The role of linguistic indirectness and honorifics in achieving linguistic politeness in Korean requests / Andrew Sangpil Byon // Journal of Politeness Research, 2006. – P. 247-276.
17. Cairns, H. Psycholinguistics / Cairns, H., C. Cairns. – New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976. – 252 p.
18. Clark H.H. Responding to indirect speech acts / H. H. Clark // Cognitive Psychology. – 1979. – Vol. 11. – P. 430-477.
19. Crystal D. An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Language and Languages / David Crystal. – Blackwell, 1992 – 428 p.
20. Crystal D. How Language Works: How Babies Babble, Words Change Meaning, and Languages Live or Die / David Crystal. – Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2005 – P.8-9.
21. Culpeper J. Impoliteness and the weakest link. / J. Culpeper // Journal of Politeness Research. – 2005. – Vol. 1. – P. 35-72.
22. Cutting J. Pragmatics and discourse: a resource book for students / J. Cutting. – Florence: Routledge, 2002. – 187 p.
23. De Ayala, S. P. FTAs and Erskine May: Conflicting needs? – Politeness in question time / De Ayala, S. P. // Journal of Pragmatics, 2001 – 33(2) – P. 143-169.
24. Dijk T. A. Discourse as Social Interaction / Teun Adrianus van Dijk, – SAGE, 1997. – 336 p.

25. Dijk T.A. *Studies in the pragmatics of discourse* / Teun Adrianus van Dijk – Mouton, 1981. – 331 p.
26. Duncan S. *Face-to-face interaction: research, methods and theory* / S. Duncan, D. W. Fiske. – N.Y.: Wiley, 1977. – 361 p.
27. Edmondson W. *Spoken discourse: A model for analysis* / W. Edmondson – London: Longman, 1981. – 217 p.
28. Enfield N.J. *How we talk: the inner workings of conversation* / N. J. Enfield. – N.Y.: Hachette Book Group, 2017. – 255 p.
29. Findlay M.S. *Language and communication* / Michael Shaw Findlay – ABC-CLIO in Santa Barbara, Calif, 1998. –229 p.
30. Gazdar G. *Unbounded dependencies and coordinate structure* / G. Gazdar // *Linguistic Inquiry*. – 1981. – Vol. 12. – P. 155-184.
31. Geis M. *Speech acts and Conversational International* / M. Geis. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 – 264 p.
32. Goffman E. *The presentation of self in everyday life* / E. Goffman. – London: Harmondsworth, 1978 – 173 p.
33. Goffman E. *Interaction Ritual* / E. Goffman. – New York: Doubleday. 1967. – 270 p.
34. Green G.M. *Pragmatics and natural language understanding* / Georgia M. Green – Erlbaum in Mahwah, 1996. – 186 p.
35. Grice H. P. *Studies in the way of words* / H. Paul Grice. – Cambridge Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1991 – 394 p.
36. Grice, H. P. *Further notes on logic and conversation* / H. Paul Grice. – London: Harvard University Press, 1978. – P.13-128.
37. Guillaume G. *Foundations for a Science of Language* / Gustave Guillaume – John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1984. – 175 p.
38. Habermas J. *Communication and the evolution of society* / Jurgen Habermas – Beacon Press in Boston, 1979. – 239 p.

39. Holmes J. Politeness in Intercultural Discourse and Communication / Janet Holmes // The handbook of intercultural discourse and communication, 2012. – 205 p.
40. Holmes J. An introduction to sociolinguistics (Learning about language) / J. Holmes. – [4th ed.] – N.Y.: Routledge, 2013. – 560 p.
41. Holtgraves T.M. Language as Social Action / Thomas M. Holtgraves – Routledge, 2001. – 246 p.
42. Householder F. W. Linguistic speculations / Fred W. Householder. – University Press in Cambridge, 1971. – 352 p.
43. Johnston W.R. Language: A Definition from First Principles / William Rice Johnston // Three Grand Over the Truckstop – Philica, 2006. – P.37.
44. Kant I. Kant: anthropology from a pragmatic point of view / I. Kant – Cambridge University Press, 2006. – 288p.
45. Katz J. J. The Philosophy of Language / J. J. Katz. – New York: Harper & Row, 1966. – 317 p.
46. Lakoff R. T. The logic of politeness / R.T. Lakoff // Papers from the Ninth Regional Meetings of the Chicago Linguistic society. – 1973. – P. 292-305.
47. Lakoff R.T. Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness / R. T. Lakoff, S. Ide. – John Benjamins Publishing, 2005. – 342 p.
48. Language and communication – Curtis Pub.Co. in Philadelphia, 1968. – 157 p.
49. Leech G. W. Principles of pragmatics / G. W. Leech – London: Longman, 1983. – 250 p.
50. Levinson S. C. Pragmatics / S. C. Levinson. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. – 420 p.
51. Lyons J. New horizons in linguistics / John Lyons. – Penguin in Harmondsworth, 1970. – 367 p.
52. Martin S. E. Speech levels in Japan and Korea / S. E. Martin // Language in culture and society. – New York: Harper&Row, 1964. – 328 p.

53. McCarthy M. Spoken language and applied linguistics / M. McCarthy. – UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. – 216 p.
54. Mey J. Pragmatics: An Introduction / J. Mey. – Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1993. – 284 p.
55. Miller G. A. Language and speech / G.A. Miller. – W.H.Freeman in San Francisco, 1981. – 150 p.
56. Moerman M. Talking culture: ethnography and conversation analysis / M. Moerman. – Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania Press, 1988 – 212 p.
57. Monaghan J. L. Perspectives on intercultural discourse and communication / Leila Monaghan // The Handbook of Intercultural Discourse and Communication, 2012. – P. 19-37.
58. Morgan J. L. Two types of convention in indirect speech acts / J. L. Morgan // Center for the Study of Reading Technical Report. – ERIC Clearinghouse, 1977 – №. 052. – 40 p.
59. Paulston C. B. The handbook of intercultural discourse and communication / C. B. Paulston, S. F. Kiesling, E. S. Rangel Malden. – Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. – 341 p.
60. Quirk R. Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language / Randolph Quirk. – London: Longman, 1985. – 1779 p.
61. Rodman R. An introduction to language / Robert Rodman. – [5th ed.] – Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1992. – 472 p.
62. Sack R. Language and communication / R. Sack. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. – P.80-125.
63. Sadok J. Toward a linguistic theory of speech acts / J. Sadok. – New York: Academic Press, 1974. – 168 p.
64. Saeed, J. Semantics / J. Saeed. – Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997. – 285 p.
65. Saville-Troike M. The ethnography of communication: an introduction / Muriel Saville-Troike. – [3rd ed.] – Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003. – 338 p.

66. Schiffrin D. *Approaches to Discourse* / D. Schiffrin. – Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. – 342 p.
67. Searle J. R. *A Classification of Illocutionary Acts* / John R. Searle // *Language in Society* – Cambridge University Press, 1976 – Vol. 5 – P. 1-23.
68. Searle J. R. *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* / John R. Searle – Cambridge University Press, 1985. – 218 p.
69. Searle J. R. *Indirect Speech Acts* / John R. Searle // *Pragmatics*. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. – P. 265-277.
70. Searle J. R. *The construction of social reality* / John R. Searle – London: Penguin Books, 1996. – 256 p.
71. Searle J. R. *What is a speech act?* / John R. Searle // *The Philosophy of Language*. – Oxford, 1971. – P. 39-53.
72. Searle J. R. *Indirect speech acts* / John R. Searle // *Syntax & Semantics, 3: Speech Act*, 1975. – P. 59-82.
73. Shahrokhi M. *An Overview of Politeness Theories: Current Status, Future Orientations* / M. Shahrokhi, F. S. Bidabadi // *American Journal of Linguistics*, 2013. – P.17-27.
74. Smith C. S. *Modes of discourse* / C. S. Smith // *The local structure of texts*. – Cambridge University Press, 2003. –314p.
75. Smith P.W.H. *Speech Act Theory, Discourse Structure and Indirect Speech Acts* / Peter Wilfred Hesling Smith // *PhD Thesis*, 1991. – 245 p.
76. Spence N.C.W. *Essays in linguistics* / N.C.W. Spence, W. F. Verlag. – Munchen, 1976. – 199 p.
77. Sperber D. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* / D. Sperber, D. Wilson. – Wiley, 1996. – 338 p.
78. Sternberg R. *Cognitive Psychology* / R. Sternberg. – Belmont: Wadsworth, 2012. – 610 p.
79. Stubbs E. *Wilhelm Von Humboldt's Philosophy of Language, Its Sources and Influence* / Elsinia Stubbs. – E. Mellen Press, 2002. – 332 p.

80. Stubbs M. Discourse analysis: the sociolinguistic analysis of natural language / M. Stubbs. – Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. – 284 p.
81. The World Book Dictionary / Communciation – USA, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980. – Volume one: A-K. – 2430 p.
82. Vanderveken D. Meaning and Speech Acts / Daniel Vanderveken. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 – Vol. I. – P. 174-376.
83. Verschueren J. Understanding Pragmatics / Jef Verschueren. – London: Edward Arnold, 1987 – 309p.
84. Verschueren J. What people say they do with words / Jef Verschueren: Ablex Pub. Corp. in Norwood, 1985 – 265 p.
85. Wales K. A dictionary of stylistics / K. Wales. – Pearson Education Limited. UK: Harlow, 2001. –271 p.
86. Walton D. Speech Acts and Indirect Threats in Ad Baculum Arguments / Douglas Walton. – Informal Logic, 2014. – P. 317-324
87. Watts R. J. Politeness / R. J. Watts. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. – 186 p.
88. Wittgenstein L. Philosophical Investigations / Ludwig Wittgenstein. – John Wiley & Sons, 2010. – 321 p.
89. Yule G. Pragmatics / George Yule. – OUP Oxford, 1996 –138 p.
90. Yule G. The study of language / George Yule – [5th ed.] – N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2014. – 334 p.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATION MATERIALS

1. Hulík, Š. (2016). Pustina. Czech Republic: HBO Europe.
2. King, I. M. (2010-2012). Pretty little liars. Los Angeles: Warner Horizon Television.
3. Lee, J. H. (2018). 지금 만나러 갑니다 (Be with you). South Korea: Movie Rock.