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професора О.М. Мороховського

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за освітньо-професійною програмою Сучасні філологічні студії (англійська мова і друга іноземна мова): лінгвістика та перекладознавство зі спеціальності 035 Філологія спеціалізації 035.04 Германські мови і літератури (переклад включно), перша – англійська

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Студентки групи Мла 51-18

факультету германської філології

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Тьоси Елли Валеріївни

Завідувач кафедри

англійської філології і

філософії мови імені

професора О.М. Мороховського

Науковий керівник:

Кандидат філологічних наук,

Доцент Ваховська Ольга Володимирівна

Національна шкала _____

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_____ Воробйова О.П.

(підпис)

(ПБ)

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KYIV NATIONAL LINGUISTIC UNIVERSITY
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Philosophy of Language

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LINGUISTIC MANIFESTATION OF HUMAN QUALIA IN MODERN
PSYCHIATRIC DISCOURSE
(A study of J.H. van den Berg's "A Different Existence: Principles of
Phenomenological Psychopathology")

ELLA TYOSA
Group LLE 51-18
Department of Germanic Philology
Research Adviser
OLHA VAKHOVSKA
Ph.D., Assoc. Prof.

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INTRODUCTION

Cognitive linguistics is a fairly young branch of linguistics, therefore the amount of literature on the issue of metaphorical creativity is rather limited. It results in the need to shed light on the numerous aspects of the creative utilization of metaphors in human thought processes, reflection, and systematization of any human experience.

Even though metaphors are usually regarded as stylistic devices of purely linguistic nature, the metaphor as a language and speech phenomenon corresponds to the metaphor as a cognitive mechanism. According to the conceptual metaphor theory, the whole area of human experience (target concept/domain) is reconceptualized in terms of the other abstract concepts, objects or phenomena (source concepts/domains). This mechanism often results in numerous linguistic metaphorical expressions, which represent the most expedient tool to communicate human experience, which cannot be conveyed or comprehended by any means other than the direct experience. Emotion experience can also be included in this kind of experience, and a large number of various metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors behind them are utilized to express numerous elusive shades and hues of human mental states.

The object of the study is the modern psychiatric discourse.

The subject of the study is the investigation of metaphorical expressions and conceptual metaphors behind them in modern psychiatric discourse.

The main goal of the study is to apply a cognitive linguistic analysis to prove, that direct emotion names do not give the exhaustive report on emotion experience and that metaphors are the most efficient way to convey this otherwise indescribable experience. Moreover, the study aims to investigate what conceptual metaphors are utilized for conveying the emotional experience in psychiatric discourse (based on the monograph "A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology" by Jan Hendrik van den Berg), their peculiarities and practical purposes in psychotherapy.

In order to accomplish the main goal of the study set above, the following *tasks* should be completed:

- to clarify, what the notion of a *quale* is, the ways in which human emotion experience can belong to this notion;
- to explore the notion of *emotion* from the psychological and phenomenological point of view;
- to establish the list of emotion names and emotion concepts, which is supposed to be used as a basis for the practical part of the study;
- to explore psychopathology of *agoraphobia*, *panic disorder* and existential changes of people living with these disorders;
- to explore the mechanisms of conceptualisation, the ways in which conceptual metaphors shape human thought processes and experience;
- to choose the methodology of conceptual metaphor analysis;
- to apply the methodology of conceptual metaphor analysis to the piece of modern psychiatric discourse;
- to analyse and systemise the results of the study, to advocate the idea, that metaphors are the most efficient way to convey emotion experience.
- To report on the issue of metaphorical creativity in psychiatric discourse.

The relevance of the study: since cognitive linguistics is a relatively young branch of linguistics, there isn't a large scope of data on conceptual metaphors in the variety of discourses (especially in psychiatric discourse). Moreover, the theory of conceptual metaphor, used as a basis for my study, is usually exemplified by idealised demonstrative examples, ignoring the realities of real discourses, where the metaphors can be ambiguous and overlapping. This thesis is a small contribution to the study of how the metaphors can be reshaped and modified by real psychiatric discourse. Moreover, it can also be relevant in the frame of psychotherapy, as it provides a humble contribution to the ways, in which emotion experience can be conveyed and comprehended.

Structure of the work: this master thesis consists of the introduction, 3 chapters (two theoretical and 1 practical), general conclusions, résumé, list of reference materials and appendices.

In **CHAPTER 1**, the notion of qualia from the philosophical and psychological points of view is reviewed. It also dwells upon the psychological and phenomenological towards human emotion experience as the linguistic manifestation of emotions. Finally, the notions of agoraphobia and panic disorder and some of the psychopathologies and existential changes, typical for a person with these psychiatric conditions, are analysed.

CHAPTER 2 deals with neuropsychological mechanisms of conceptualization, conceptual metaphors as a way to structure human experience, the main principles of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and its application in psychiatry and psychotherapy. Moreover, the types of conceptual metaphors and the issue of metaphorical creativity are touched upon in this part of the study.

In **CHAPTER 3**, the *practical part of the work* is implemented. Applying the method of conceptual metaphor analysis (Zhabotynska, 2011), the metaphorical expressions and conceptual metaphors from the monograph on psychopathology and phenomenology by Jan Hendrik van den Berg are detected, analysed and classified. The report on metaphorical creativity in this specific piece of psychiatric discourse is also provided in this chapter. I present the result of the analysis in the form of tables and include them in the **APPENDICES**.

Key concepts: quale, emotion experience, appraisal theory of emotion, anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, panic disorder, image-schema, concept, conceptualization, conceptual metaphor theory, metaphorical creativity.

CHAPTER ONE. EMOTION EXPERIENCE AS HUMAN QUALIA: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES

In the following section, I review: 1) the notion of human qualia from the philosophical and psychological perspectives; 2) the psychological and phenomenological approaches towards human emotion experience as well as the linguistic manifestation of emotions; 3) the notions of agoraphobia and panic disorder, psychopathologies and existential changes in these psychiatric conditions.

1.1 Human qualia from the scientific point of view

In the standard, broad sense the word *qualia* (singular *a quale*) is used to refer to the subjective conscious experience, that cannot be conveyed or comprehended by any other means other than direct experience. Most of the scientists include perceptual experience (seeing colours, hearing sounds, etc.) and bodily sensations (feeling an itch, feeling hot or dizzy) to this notion.

The question of qualia is currently the subject of the intense argument in the modern analytic philosophy of mind. In the philosophical debates concerning the mind-body problem, qualia play a significant strategic role. Chalmers (1995), Lowe (1996), Schrödinger (2001) and some other scientists are among the proponents of the theory of qualia existence, whereas some physicists, neurobiologists, and philosophers as Dennet (1991), Tye (2000), and Lewis (2004) deny it. The matter for this is the fact, that there are four ways of responding to this problem: substance dualism (which states that body and mind are made of completely different substances), reductive materialism (according to which there is only one substance in the world – the physical one, and all the mental states and events can be reduced to it), non-reductive materialism (which states that even if our mental states and events depend on the physical substance, they cannot be completely reduced to it) and eliminative materialism (according to which the mental phenomena don't even exist). Substance dualists and non-reductive

materialists, who argue that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical, appeal to a quale as a mental irreducible element of a phenomenon. On the other hand, reductive materialists and eliminativists often try to prove the ways, in which qualia can be eradicated (Sadner & Scherer, 2014).

From the abovementioned points of view, it's obvious that qualia have to do with the descriptive phenomena, which give information about the state of the world and the body. However, there is another type of qualia: the valenced qualia in emotion. Valence is a basic, invariable segment of emotional life that evolves from the mind's ability to evaluate the circumstances and states (whether something is helpful or harmful). Their main function is to orient and to guide people (Barrett, 2006).

As a two-componential entity, consisting of 1) first-order phenomenological aspect of an emotion state and 2) second-order awareness of this experience is understood under the term *emotion experience*. 'Positivity' or 'negativity' are not objective properties intrinsic to emotions. Instead, the valence is subjectively stated by the process of appealing to emotions in second-ordered awareness. It is also important for valence not to be viewed as the experience of mindless physiological urges. Conversely, it is loaded with the personal meaning and significance of the environment or events. The actual phenomenon of a particular emotion includes some element of evaluation and 'interpretation' and is closely connected with a person's motivation. That is why emotion experiences may differ among people in accordance with their perception of this experience (Charland, 2005). Consequently, it leaves an imprint on a verbal report of emotion experience and its interpretation by different people.

1.2 Human emotions from the scientific point of view, their linguistic manifestation

One of the problems that researchers face while dealing with emotion inquiries is the lack of consensus on defining the concept of 'emotion'.

The differences between psychological and phenomenological approaches partly contribute to this issue. As living in and belonging to the same world is taken for granted by most people, ‘psychological’ and ‘personal’ viewpoints on any human experience (including emotional) neglect a background sense of reality. Psychologists often take the impersonal perspective towards another person’s experience and build their judgments upon it. However, this background acceptance of the world is the object of research and exploration for a phenomenologist. Switching from an impersonal to a personal standpoint is about understanding other people’s subjectivities. Phenomenologists examine the structure of human experience rather than what the world contains or how people know what it contains (Ratcliffe, 2009).

The first suggestions on the nature of emotions from the psychological point of view were proposed by psychologist William James (1894) and physiologist Carl Lange (1885) independently. The theory which is now known as a *somatic theory* of emotion, states that emotions occur as a direct result of physiological actions or events. However, *cognitive theories* investigate how emotions influence such processes as reasoning, memory, and attention.

According to the early *appraisal theory*, which was first suggested in the 1960s, emotions were considered to be quick action responses caused by (and, therefore, secondary to) cognitive judgments of the relevance and importance of stimuli to the welfare of the organism (Lowe & Ziemke, 2011).

Nowadays, *the appraisal theory of emotion* (also known as the *Component Process Model*) defines *emotion* as an occurrence of reciprocally connected and synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organism’s subsystems as a reaction to an evaluation of external or internal stimuli as significant to the main concerns of the organism. It is a mechanism for flexible adaptation, which serves the dual function: 1) fast preparation of appropriate responses to events and 2) re-evaluation and intention communication with the purpose of response optimization (Scherer, 1987, 2001, 2005).

Table 1

Relationships between organismic subsystems and the functions and components of emotion (Scherer, 2005:698)

| Emotion function | Organismic subsystem and major substrata | Emotion component |
|---|---|--|
| Evaluation of objects and events | Information processing (CNS) | Cognitive component (appraisal) |
| System regulation | Support (CNS, NES, ANS) | Neurophysiological component (bodily symptoms) |
| Preparation and direction of action | Executive (CNS) | Motivational component (action tendencies) |
| Communication of reaction and behavioral intention | Action (SNS) | Motor expression component (facial and vocal expression) |
| Monitoring of internal state and organism–environment interaction | Monitor (CNS) | Subjective feeling component (emotional experience) |

Note: CNS = central nervous system; NES = neuro-endocrine system; ANS = autonomic nervous system; SNS = somatic nervous system.

One has to differentiate emotions from such affective phenomena as preferences, attitudes, moods, and affect dispositions. They vary in the following design features: event focus, intrinsic appraisal, transactional appraisal, synchronisation, speed of change, behavioural influence, intensity, and duration. The coordination of an organism's recourse with the purpose of response synchronization is considered to be the most salient characteristic of emotion as opposed to other affective phenomena.

Apart from the above-mentioned criteria for the discernment of emotions from the other affective phenomena, theorists also choose other features for their

definitions. It results in some ambiguity and overlap in interpretations (Frijda, 2008). Although the slight distinctions among different affect terms are important for the progress in the psychological field, they are of little relevance for my study.

The need to apply to everyday language to both theory and empirical studies of emotions creates difficulties for defining the universal central working concepts, which are required by a systematic scientific approach. Perpetual evolution of these concepts as well as inter-language, inter-cultural and inter-personal difference contributes to this issue. On the other hand, a wide range of emotion names from the common semantic categories allows seizing subtle, in-depth accuracy and specificity of emotion concepts (Scherer, 2005).

Scientists have used two main methods in processing self-reports on emotional experience: 1) the discrete emotion approach, and 2) the dimensional approach. There are some problems with analysing and interpreting a large number of different blends of emotions as well as comparing the final results across various studies, where different sets of emotion labels are used, in the first method. The dimensional approach, however, offers some alternative dimensional structures of the semantic space for emotions. This semantic space is based on the following binary oppositions: valence of emotion experience (positive or negative), arousal of organismic subsystems (calm or excited), appraisal checks for goal relevance (conduciveness or obstructiveness) and coping potential (high or low control/power) (Figure 1).

Dimensional approach offers 16 categories of emotion (Scherer, 2005:723):

- PRIDE,
- ELATION,
- HAPPINESS,
- SATISFACTION,
- RELIEF,
- HOPE
- INTEREST,
- SURPRISE,
- ANXIETY,
- SADNESS,
- BOREDOM,
- SHAME/GUILT,
- DISGUST,
- CONTEMPT,
- HOSTILITY,
- ANGER




Figure 1
 Dimensional structure of the semantic space for emotions
 (Scherer, 2005: 720)

On this basis, Scherer (2005) suggests a standard list of emotions, which is based on some empirical grounds (the reports of people on their emotions during the population survey) as well as published studies of emotion terms in different languages. Despite the immense number of synonymic expressions for emotion names, the concepts behind which are often vague and overlapping, they all can be categorized into 36 categories with their central concepts and category descriptors.

The major categories of emotion determined by their central concepts are listed below (Scherer, 2005:714-715)

- ADMIRATION/
- AWE,
- AMUSEMENT,
- ANGER,
- ANXIETY,
- BEING TOUCHED,
- BOREDOM,
- COMPASSION,
- CONTEMPT,
- CONTENTMENT,
- DESPERATION,
- DISAPPOINTMENT,
- DISGUST,
- DISSATISFCTION,
- ENVY,
- FEAR,
- FEELING,
- GRATITUDE,
- GUILT,
- HAPPINESS,
- HATRED,
- HOPE,
- HUMILITY,
- INTEREST/
- ENTHUSIASM
- IRRITATION,
- JEALOUSY,
- JOY,
- LONGING,
- LUST,
- PLEASURE/
- ENJOYMENT,
- PRIDE,
- RELAXATION/
- SERENITY,
- RELIEF,
- SADNESS,
- SHAME,
- SURPRISE,
- TENSION/STRESS.

Each category descriptor covers a number of word stems, from which the emotion names (either nouns or adjectives) can be constructed. At the same time, a central concept of each category, manifested by a category descriptor, comprise all emotion concepts associated and related to it:

- ADMIRATION/AWE
*admir**, *ador**, *awe**, *dazed*, *dazzl**, *enrapt**, *enthrall**, *fascina**, *marveli**,
*rapt**, *reveren**, *spellbound*, *wonder**, *worship**;
- AMUSEMENT
*amus**, *fun**, *humor**, *laugh**, *play**, *rollick**, *smil**;
- ANGER
anger, *angr**, *cross**, *enrag**, *furious*, *fury*, *incens**, *infuriat**, *irate*, *ire**,
*mad**, *rag**, *resent**, *temper*, *wrath**, *wrought**;
- ANXIETY

anguish, anxi*, apprehens*, diffiden*, jitter*, nervous*, trepida*, wari*, wary, worried*, worry*;*

- BEING TOUCHED

affect, mov*, touch*;*

- BOREDOM

bor, ennui, indifferen*, languor*, tedi*, wear*;*

- COMPASSION

commiser, compass*, empath*, pit*;*

- CONTEMPT

contempt, denigr*, deprec*, deris*, despi*, disdain*, scorn*;*

- CONTENTMENT

comfortabl, content*, satisf*;*

- DESPERATION

deject, desolat*, despair*, desperat*, despond*, disconsolat*, hopeless*, inconsol*;*

- DISAPPOINTMENT

comedown, disappoint, discontent*, disenchant*, disgruntl*, disillusion*, frustrat*, jilt*, letdown, resign*, sour*, thwart*;*

- DISGUST

abhor, avers*, detest*, disgust*, dislik*, disrelish, distast*, loath*, nause*, queas*, repugn*, repuls*, revolt*, sicken*;*

- DISSATISFACTION

dissatisf, unhapp*;*

- ENVY

envious, envy*;*

- FEAR

afraid, aghast*, alarm*, dread*, fear*, fright*, horr*, panic*, scare*, terror*;*

- FEELING

love, affection, fond*, love*, friend*, tender*;*

- GRATITUDE

grat, thank*;*

- GUILT

blame, contriti*, guilt*, remorse*, repent*;*

- HAPPINESS

bliss, cheer*, delect*, delight*, enchant*, enjoy*, felicit*, happ*, merr*;*

- HATRED

acrimon, hat*, rancor*;*

- HOPE

buoyan, confident*, faith*, hop*, optim*;*

- HUMILITY

devout, humility;*

- INTEREST/ENTHUSIASM

absor, alert, animat*, ardor*, attenti*, curi*, eager*, enrapt*, engross*,
enthusias*, ferv*, interes*, zeal*;*

- IRRITATION

annoy, exasperat*, grump*, indign*, irrita*, sullen*, vex*;*

- JEALOUSY

covetous, jealous*;*

- JOY

ecstat, elat*, euphor*, exalt*, exhilar*, exult*, flush*, glee*, joy*, jubil*,
overjoyed, ravish*, rejoic*;*

- LONGING

crav, daydream*, desir*, fanta*, hanker*, hark*, homesick*, long*,
nostalg*, pin*, regret*, wish*, wistf*, yearn*;*

- LUST

carnal, lust, climax, ecsta*, orgas*, sensu*, sexual*;*

- PLEASURE/ENJOYMENT

enjoy, delight*, glow*, pleas*, thrill*, zest*;*

- PRIDE

pride, proud*;*

- RELAXATION/SERENITY

ease, calm*, carefree, casual, detach*, dispassion*, equanim*, eventemper*, laid-back, peace*, placid*, poise*, relax*, seren*, tranquil*, unruffl*;*

- RELIEF

relie;*

- SADNESS

chagrin, deject*, dole*, gloom*, glum*, grie*, hopeles*, melancho*, mourn*, sad*, sorrow*, tear*, weep*;*

- SHAME

abash, asham*, crush*, disgrace*, embarras*, humili*, shame*;*

- SURPRISE

amaze, astonish*, dumbfound*, startl*, stunn*, surpris*, aback, thunderstruck, wonder*;*

- TENSION/STRESS

activ, agit*, discomfort*, distress*, strain*, stress*, tense*.*

Although it is preferable to develop a standard list of emotion categories to be able to compare and cumulate information from different fields of studies, most researchers choose to create specified lists of emotion categories to facilitate their investigations. My research, however, is based on both the abovementioned lists of emotion categories, as they provide a wide range of emotion concepts and emotion names applicable in a broad spectrum of contexts.

From the phenomenological perspective, emotions are regarded as embodied relations to the world. People do not have emotions independent of their relations and interactions with other things, people or phenomena (Fuchs, 2014). Moreover,

people embody the emotions of other people, which produce the reciprocal emotional states in the individual.

Goldie (2002) suggests that emotional experience can involve two types of feeling: *bodily feelings*, the feeling from the inside of a person's body as being a particular way or experiencing particular changes, and *feeling toward*, the feeling directed towards the object of person's emotions.

As it was mentioned before, involuntary changes in organismic subsystems can be a part of an emotional episode. But *feeling* these changes by a person may not be a part of it. Moreover, one can be wrong regarding bodily feelings – hallucinations, illusions and other kinds of mistakes are possible. Feeling towards is unreflective emotional involvement with the things, people, and phenomena outside one's body.

Ratcliffe (2005) insists on the idea, that "bodily feelings are just feelings towards". Some feelings are towards the body or its parts; others directed towards things outside the body. This fact will further clarify how bodily feelings can contribute to existential feelings (including existential changes as a part of a mental condition).

1.3 Psychopathology of anxiety disorders (agoraphobia and panic disorder), a scientific view on the emotion experience of them

Neurosis or *neurotic disorder*¹ is a term, used to describe a range of functional mental disorders as opposed to psychosis. From the 1980s on, it was eliminated from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, appearing in its second edition for the last time. In the DSM-III, neurosis was split and relabelled into specific types of *anxiety disorders* (Pietikäinen, 2007).

¹ Due to the fact that this thesis is based on the work of J.H. van den Berg "A Different Existence", which was published in 1972, I consider it to be important to give the initial term "neurotic disorder", used to describe the range of symptoms and behaviour in the monography.

Generalized anxiety disorder is characterized by excessive anxiety or apprehensive expectations towards a wide range of events, with such symptoms as being easily fatigued, having difficulties in concentration, mind-blanking restlessness, muscle tension and sleep disturbances being present for more days than not for 6 months. Moreover, some people may exhibit such physical symptoms as headaches, trembling, breathing difficulty, difficulty swallowing, numbness, sweating or vomiting.

Such types of anxiety disorders as *agoraphobia* and, as a consequence, *panic disorder* seem to be particularly relevant to my study, as van den Berg (1972) chooses a patient with the symptoms of agoraphobia as the collective example of how the principles of phenomenology (as opposed to the psychological principles) can be applied to study existential changes in people with different mental conditions.

Agoraphobia is defined by notable fear or anxiety about actual or anticipated insecurity of public spaces, with the symptoms taking place most of the time in at least two of five different situations (e.g., using public transport, being in opened or enclosed spaces, being in a crowd, being outside of the home alone, etc.). The person avoids these situations because they are believed to be difficult to escape from. However, these feared situations are not threatening realistically or due to sociocultural context. A number of scientists (Jacobson, 2004; Trigg, 2013, 2018) support the idea that agoraphobes feel restricted to a certain area of the world, where they feel comfortable and ready to function. These are usually their homes and other places that can be conditionally called home bases. A person with agoraphobia is not able to engage in communication with others and fails to function effectively in the surroundings outside these home bases.

In DSM-5 panic disorder is characterized by repeated, sudden panic attacks, wherein one panic attack must be followed by at least one month of constant concern about having more attacks, distress about the consequences of the attacks, or maladaptive behaviour (e.g., avoiding work or school activities) connected with the attacks. Such symptoms as palpitations, accelerated heart rate, sweating,

shaking, feeling of choking, chest pain, feeling dizzy, fear of losing control, fear of death develop abruptly or reach their peak during the panic attacks (Asmundson, Taylor, Smith, 2014).

Due to the different estimation criteria, it is hard to state the prevalence of anxiety disorders in the general population, although some large population-based researches demonstrate that up to 33.7% of the population are affected by anxiety disorder during their lifetime. Meyerbröcker and Powers (2015) state that the 12-month prevalence of panic disorder ranges from 1% to 3% across the United States and Europe. At the same time, the prevalence of agoraphobia is nearly 1.7% in teenagers and adults.

In terms of gender ratios, the tendency of women struggling with anxiety disorders twice more often than men is traced.

Although there is a widespread opinion, that the number of people suffering from different types of anxiety disorder increases every year for the last decades, the introduction of new classification systems in the 1980s and up to nowadays should be taken into consideration. Moreover, a heritability of anxiety disorders is approximately 30-50%, which does not contribute to the substantial changes in prevalence rates for the next decades (Bandelow & Michaelis, 2015).

Bodily feelings (including those, which are the constituent parts of emotion experience) can serve as ways of experiencing other things. They supplement one's existential background, which constructs all experience.

A number of phenomenologists emphasize that bodily feelings are inseparable from world experience, which, consequently, reflects on one's emotional experience. It was noticed by van den Berg (1972) that psychiatric patients often complain of physical insufficiencies rather than psychological symptoms. They often have to do with a person's perception of oneself in the world as a whole. Although having a mental condition is caused by the

pathological psychological experience, from the person's perspective it also means that the surrounding world changes.

From the phenomenological point of view, all subjective experiences (including anomalous ones) can be structurally arranged into minimal and higher-level self-awareness, embodiment and agency, spatiality, temporality, intentionality, and intersubjectivity (Fuchs, 2010).

In the case of agoraphobia, the anxiety connected with it can include 2 aspects: the bodily and the spatial ones.

Living with agoraphobia imposes disruptions in agency and embodiment on the person, engaging the bodily aspect of the condition. Fuchs (2013) suggests that one's body is always directed towards other bodily beings. It is attached to them from early childhood through desire, imitation, and empathy. The mutual body resonance creates *intercorporeality* and a person's body turns into the medium of *interaffectivity*. This means that other people can be constitutive of the anxiety connected with agoraphobia by either mitigating or amplifying it, giving an impetus to existential changes in *intersubjectivity*. In the case of agoraphobe's bodily experience, it is constant alertness over unfamiliar and unwanted sensations, as if they can arbitrarily appear from any source at any time. The person tries to domesticate these sensations by gaining control over the body and the surroundings by shutting their body boundaries, insulating themselves from the world. But, as it was already mentioned, all people experience interaffectivity, and all the attempts to interact with the agoraphobes are seen as an encroachment on their identity. From this perspective, the body, which fails to resist the encroachment, is seen as if it betrayed the person diagnosed with agoraphobia.

The second reason, why their own bodies create problems for people with agoraphobia is a sense of *disembodiment*. In the person's view, the body is either controllable, and thus a sense of ownership over the body remains, or, it is uncontrollable (especially in the experience of anxiety or panic) and the person no longer can recognise the body as being 'mine'. It is often presented as a certain

thing in the world rather than a centre of agentive selfhood, which also has to do with the disturbance of agency (Trigg, 2013; Gallagher & Trigg, 2016).

At the same time, living with agoraphobia includes some existential changes in a person's *spatiality*. Trigg (2018) suggests that the special structure for the agoraphobe is framed by two crucial problems: *spatial fragmentation* and the *centrality of home*.

The motives of homogeneous or empty spaces can trigger anxiety in many people with agoraphobia. That is why, in order to navigate their walk beyond the borders of their home bases, they segment the space into the manageable fragments. Each object becomes a marker of how far or near they are going to leave their home, but the mechanism beyond this is the division of the world into safe and dangerous zones.

In the non-pathological experience, "being at home" is rather a background feeling of security, which people can carry with them, despite the location of the home in a literal sense. People with agoraphobia do not consider home to be spontaneous freedom and safety in the world. It is rather a permanent and immovable location, which serves as a central orientation source. Its removal is a recurring point for agoraphobic people (Trigg, 2018).

As people's minds are embodied (which will be further elaborated in the following sections), such pathological existential changes in embodiment, agency and spatiality leave their marks on the process of conceptualization, which can lead either to the formation of the large scope of unconventional or genuinely novel conceptual metaphors, or to disability to produce and comprehend figurative senses behind the metaphors at all.

Conclusions to Chapter One

Although the existence of qualia is now in the centre of the heated debate in modern analytical philosophy of mind, a lot of philosophers and psychologists

agree, that *qualia* (singular *quale*) are the subjective conscious experience, which cannot be conveyed or understood in any other means than direct experience.

Human emotions, which are experienced subjectively by different people, are loaded with the personal meaning and significance of the events, and cannot be conveyed or comprehended in any other way than by the act of emotion experience itself, are also considered to be human qualia.

Even though the number of theories of emotion was developed by different scientists, my study is mainly based on *the appraisal theory of emotion*. According to it, *emotion* is viewed as a number of connected and synchronised changes in the organism's subsystems as a reaction to some external or internal stimuli.

Due to the fact that researches in different fields concentrate on different aims and tasks, sets of emotion categories vary drastically in order to cater to the specific needs and requirements of each study. In my research, I actively use a list of emotions developed by Scherer (2005:714-715), which consists of 36 categories of the possibly overlapping emotions with their central concepts and category descriptors.

This list of emotions is further involved in the analysis of the metaphors for psychopathological emotion experiences of people with anxiety disorders (namely agoraphobia and panic disorder). Agoraphobia is defined by fear or anxiety about actual or anticipated insecurity of public spaces e.g., using public transport, being in opened or enclosed spaces, being in a crowd, being outside of the home alone, etc.). Panic disorder is characterized by repeated, sudden panic attacks, wherein one panic attack must be followed by at least one month of constant concern about having more attacks, distress about the consequences of the attacks, or maladaptive behaviour (e.g., avoiding work or school activities) connected with the attacks.

Although having a mental condition is caused by the pathological psychological experience, it also leads to some existential changes in a person's life. In the case with agoraphobia, the person can experience:

- disembodiment (the absence of the ownership over his/her own body, when it is uncontrollable in a state of anxiety or a panic attack);
- disruptions of agency (the person perceives his/her body as a certain thing in the external world rather than a centre of agentive selfhood);
- disruptions of spatiality (spatial fragmentation (when the world is divided into 'safe' and 'dangerous' zones by the person) and the centrality of home).

From the point of view of modern cognitive linguistics, the human mind is embodied, which leads us to the conclusion that these existential changes leave indelible imprints on the process of world comprehension, conceptualization and, consequently, the metaphors the person lives by.

In this section of my study the number of tasks, set before, were completed. The notion of *a quale* and the ways in which human emotion experience can belong to this notion was clarified. I also reviewed the notion of emotion from psychological and phenomenological point of view and established the list of emotion names and emotion concepts, which is supposed to be used as a basis for the practical part of the study. Finally, I provided the information about agoraphobia and panic disorder and dwelled upon the existential changes of people with these disorders.

CHAPTER TWO. CONVEYING EMOTION EXPERIENCE THROUGH LINGUISTIC MEANS

In the following section I review 1) different points of view on the notions of ‘concept’ and ‘meaning’, the ways, 2) the ways, how the actual emotion experience can be captured and conveyed through the linguistic means, 3) the neuropsychological mechanisms of conceptualization, conceptual metaphors as a way to structure a person’s experience, 4) the application of conceptual metaphor theory in psychiatry and psychotherapy.

2.1 Emotions, emotion concepts, emotion names

According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the concepts that determine people’s thoughts do not only have to do with the intellect. They also govern people’s everyday actions in their most banal details. Everything is structured with the help of *concepts*: what people perceive, how they socialize in the world, how they communicate with other people, etc.

Up to the 1970s, the objectivist (i.e., structuralist and Chomskyan) approach to the meaning of concepts prevailed. Following this approach, meaning (conceptual content) consists of a small set of features (meaning components). They also represent semantic primitives, which help to distinguish concepts from one another minimally. They get their meaning via the capability to depict external reality without the body or brain being significantly engaged in this process, and are considered to be intrinsically meaningless abstract symbols (Lakoff, 2012).

Modern cognitive linguistics refers to the form and meaning of the word as the result of the process of *conceptual mapping*. Mapping is a mechanism involved in perception, encoding, storage decoding and use of the information (Vakhovska, 2018). Zhabotynska (2012: 181) also highlights, that "the mind maps the world (unsystematically and often in a deviant manner represents the

information about the world), and language maps the mind". Not all of the concepts can be expressed through the linguistic means (Figure 2).




Figure 2

Experiential world, the conceptual and linguistic role models and the relations between them

But any *linguistic sign* (whether it is a morpheme or the whole text) or a group of these linguistic signs can activate a fragment of some information – a *concept*. At the same time, this fragment of information is *the meaning itself: the signified*, which contains essential characteristics of a particular class of referents, *the referential (specific) meaning*, which is employed in one certain situation, or *denotative meaning*, which is actualised in a number of speech events, and *the discursive meaning*, connected with the participants and the situation of the communication (Zhabotynska, 2013).

According to Nikitin (2007), linguistic meanings of the words are complex conceptual structures, which consist of two structural components: *the intention of meaning and the implication of meaning*. In its turn, the intention of meaning represents the core of lexical meaning, whereas the implication of meaning constitutes its periphery. All thought and speech processes concerning the classification and naming of the referents are based on the intention of meaning.

At the same time, the intentional components of meaning can imply the presence or absence of the other components of reference. They form the implication of meaning, the periphery of its informational potential. In such a way, the information about the referent consists of two parts: the obligatory indispensable intentional components of the meaning and its implicational components, which are activated by the context. It should be also mentioned, that the implicational components of the lexical meaning are not necessarily true. They can be false or questionable, as they are based on true or false associations, traditionally connected with the class of things.

Lexical meanings denote complex entities, which are directly embedded into cognitive mind systems. The structure of lexical meaning is based on the logical connections spread by its intentional core, which captures the implicational features from its periphery. The structure of the intention of the meaning is composed of the logical dependencies of its semantical components (hyper-hyponymic connections). The components of the implicational meaning are also structurally arranged by their logical connections.

As modern cognitive linguistics emphasizes the importance of human mind and its individuality in the process of conceptualization of the external experiential world, mental construals are viewed as "ways of seeing", the combination of linguistic semantic structures (the meanings traditionally related to words and other linguistic units) and such cognitive processes as perspectivization, focusing and prominence performed upon them (Evans & Green, 2006).

When a particular emotion comes up to emoter's mind, it gets into his/her attention focus. Emoter's mind subjectively interprets this emotion in accordance with its individual nature, emoter's cultural and social backgrounds, and the context of the situation. Therefore, this subjective construal doesn't reflect the whole emotion experience without any deviations and distortions. This reflection is never an exact copy of the actual emotion experience. Then the emoter has to choose the name for this subjective fragment of the actual emotion experience using from the words in a language known to him/her. These names can also

capture only some salient features of the emotion concept (Figure 3). These particular features of the conceptualization process result in the conclusion that it is impossible to convey the emotion experience through its name only. Moreover, as a listener unfolds emoter's verbal report on the emotional experience, it is also impossible to comprehend, what was the experience like, relying only on the emotion name (Vakhovska, 2017). The listener's minds will probably interpret this emotion through the prism of the particular features of his/her mind and through his/her subjective experience. This is shown in the simplified diagram below (Figure 3). This is where the employment of metaphorical expressions comes in hand, helping to elaborate on the emotion experience and convey its subtle and elusive hues and undertones. Reconceptualising such abstracts entities as emotions through more concrete notions, one can get a grasp of what the emotion is like or how it feels to experience this emotion.




Figure 3
Conveying emotion experience through linguistic means
(Vakhovska, 2017:27)

2.2. Thought processes: the mechanism of conceptualization, conceptual metaphors as a way to structure human experience.

According to the theories of knowledge prior to the cognitive revolution in the mid-twentieth century, cognition was intrinsically perceptual. The fundamental hypothesis underlying perceptual symbol systems was that once a perceptual state appeared, a subset of it was separated by selective attention and stored in long-term memory.

For the last two decades, cognitive sciences are working with representational schemes, which are nonperceptual. Newer schemes suggest that cognitive and perceptual representations create independent systems, which work according to different principles. These schemes are based on the premise, that perceptual states are transduced into a new representational system and these states are described *amodally* (Barsalou, 1999).

Convergence zone theory (Damasio, 1989) refers to these representations of sensory states as to patterns of neural activation in the respective brain systems. It begins with the assumptions, that in the process of perception the feature detectors in the relevant sensory-motor areas are activated. Each modality triggers a system of feature detectors (which respond to such features as colour, orientation, movement, planar surfaces, sounds, feelings, introspective states that arise during the interaction with an entity, etc.), which results in the creation of the feature maps for each modality.

Another component of the convergence zone theory regards the storage of these sensory states, which emerge in feature maps. When a pattern in a feature map is activated, conjunctive neurons bind the pattern's feature for later use.

The perception of words in their visual, auditory and tactile (Braille) forms is represented in the respective modalities at the level of feature maps. Subsets of the conjunctive neurons connect the forms of the same word across modalities. The lexicon is distributed throughout the same brain systems that are responsible for

conceptual knowledge. Additional cross-modal convergence zones in a brain combine conjunctive neurons for word forms with conjunctive neurons for concepts (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003).

The activation of neural structures can perform the functions of perception and motor control on one side, and conceptualization, categorization, and reasoning on the other side. Neural realization of any mental construct in the human mind is the first reason for conceptual structures to be considered as embodied. The second reason lies in the fact that all the conceptual systems grow out of the bodily experience and make sense in terms of it. Thus, the concepts are significantly shaped by people's bodies and minds, especially by sensory-motor systems (Lakoff & Johnson 1999).

From the paragraphs above, it is obvious that concepts for literally embodied actions are based on their physical experience of these actions. Lakoff (2012) suggests that abstract actions and events are embodied too, although in an indirect way. It is possible via the employment of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery, which are based on bodily experience.

A lot of scholars (Deignan, 2008; Rakova, 2002; Ritchie, 2003; Clausner & Croft, 1997; Stefanowitsch, 2007; Zinken, 2007 and the others) have criticized the theory of conceptual metaphors recently, supposedly because it escapes from the study of conceptual metaphors in real discourse, the contexts in which these metaphors usually appear. From this point of view, a lot of conceptual metaphors, used to exemplify the tenets of conceptual metaphor theory, are artificially made up, so they cannot capture some important of metaphor, which can be accounted for only in real discourse. My study is, on the contrary, based on the piece of real psychiatric discourse, and I hope to explore, how the traditional conceptual metaphor theory can be adjusted and reshaped in the conditions of real discourse.

The notion of *metaphor* was first introduced by Aristotle, who considered it to be an equation, based on analogy. Classical theories, following this point of view, defined metaphor as a novel or poetic linguistic expression, where one or several words for one concept were applied outside of their conventional meaning

to describe another concept on the basis of similarity. Moreover, common everyday language and metaphorical expressions were seen as being mutually exclusive (Lakoff, 2012).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) offered the alternative point of view, where the metaphor is not the result of language manipulations, but rather the matter of reason and thought. Moreover, they argue, that language is secondary, whereas the cross-mapping process from the *target* to *source*, from the *target-domain* to *source-domain* is primary. This statement gave an impetus for the development of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT).

For cognitive linguists the notion of *conceptual metaphor* means a comprehension of one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain, which can be best depicted via the formula CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN A *is* CONCEPTUAL DOMAIN B. In this case, a conceptual domain is any understandable and consistent organization of a person's experience.

One should distinguish conceptual metaphors from *metaphorical expressions*, which are the linguistic representations (words or linguistic expressions) of the corresponding conceptual metaphors. Several metaphoric expressions can trigger the same conceptual metaphor in the human mind. For Example, the conceptual metaphor MEMORY *is* A LIGHT SOURCE can be underpinned by the following metaphorical expressions: "*Jezrael felt full of sorrow but soon it was eclipsed by the memory of dancing with Maggie, the memory of the fleetingly seen silver man-shape flashed into his mind*" (BNC), "*For a Jew, Egypt evoked bright memories of a powerful God*" (CCAЕ).

The conceptual domain, which serves as a basis for metaphorical expressions is known as *source domain*, whereas the conceptual domain, which is understood through these linguistic metaphors is called *target domain*. Therefore, the *target* of the abovementioned conceptual metaphor MEMORY *is* A LIGHT SOURCE is MEMORY, while A LIGHT SOURCE is *the source* of this metaphor. One of the key regularities, typical for conceptual metaphor theory, is that

conceptual metaphors usually use more abstract concepts as targets and more specific and material concepts as sources of a metaphor.

In some conceptual metaphors, the entire target concept can be comprehended through the entire source concept. However, in most of the metaphors only the part of the target concept is mapped onto a source concept. In this case, the notions of *metaphorical highlighting* and *metaphorical utilization* are relevant.

Metaphorical highlighting is applied to the target concept of the metaphor and is characterized by bringing into focus only some of its aspects. At the same time, the rest of the aspects, intrinsic in the target concept, remain out of the focus. In this case, *hiding* takes place. Let us compare the metaphors MEMORIES are LIVING BEINGS ("*Memories are stirring uneasily*", "*Dark memories are swarming in*", "*Memories are thrashing around inside her*") (BNC, CCAE) and MEMORY is A STAIN ("*I just can't wipe those memories out with a few grief-counselling sessions*", "*But the memory of September 12, 1986, is not so easy to rub out*", "*It couldn't erase the painful memories*") (BNC, CCAE). Regarding to the MEMORIES are LIVING BEINGS metaphor, the dynamic nature of memories is highlighted. Some chaotically evoked memories trigger the other ones, resulting in their constant dynamic movement. At the same time, the durability of the memories is in the focus of the MEMORY is A STAIN metaphor. The dynamic aspect is obviously hidden here, as is the aspect of statics and durability in the first metaphor.

Using some aspects of the source concept or domain to understand the target concept of the metaphor is typical for metaphorical utilization. Let us continue with the example of MEMORIES are LIVING BEINGS metaphor. In all of the presented metaphors ("*Memories are stirring uneasily*", "*Dark memories are swarming in*", "*Memories are thrashing around inside her*") (BNC, CCAE) the words *stirring*, *swarming in* and *thrashing around* relate to the movements typical for a living being. At the same time, living beings can also be static, perform the

actions other than moving (e.g. breathing, thinking, sleeping, etc.), relate to other living beings but all of these aspects are unutilized in the given metaphors.

However, it should be noted, that the highlighted aspects of the target and utilized aspects of the conceptual metaphor have to coincide as they are brought together through a specific set of mappings between some of the elements in the source and target domains.

The set of the sources used for the reconceptualization of one and the same target in the piece of discourse constitutes *the range of the metaphor*. The abovementioned examples illustrate, that in the conceptual metaphors MEMORIES are LIGHT SOURCES, MEMORIES are LIVING BEINGS, MEMORIES are STAINS, etc. the source concepts LIGHT SOURCES, LIVING BEINGS, STAINS constitute the range of the metaphor.

Notably, several targets can also be comprehended in terms of a single source concept. For instance, the concept of A LIGHT SOURCE can be applied not only to a memory, but to inspiration ("*The Iranian air force had two particular flashes of inspiration*" (BNC)), bravery ("*What shines out of these photographs is her bravery*" (BNC)), hatred ("*She told her a story with flashes of only half-buried hatred*" (BNC)), purpose ("*It means shining purpose*" (CCAЕ)), etc. The number of targets or target domains, which can be comprehended through the single source, is called the *scope of the metaphor*.

The variety and abundance of conceptual metaphors can be classified in several ways. First of all, they can be systemized according to their *nature*. From this point of view, all conceptual metaphors can be divided into two groups: metaphors based on *knowledge* and the ones based on *image*. In the first case, concepts as basic knowledge structures are mapped from a source to a target. In the second type of conceptual metaphors, the conceptual elements of *image-schemas* rather than basic knowledge structures are employed. Image-schemas are experiential, preconceptual structures, which are derived from human bodily movements through space, perceptual interactions, and ways to perform manipulations with objects (Hampe, 2005). Image schemas structure our abstract

concepts metaphorically. Some of the image schemas are UP-DOWN ("*Wanting to celebrate, feeling high, she came to him*" (CCAЕ)), MOTION ("*How can they leave me in here to go crazy alone?*" (CCAЕ)), FORCE ("*It's enough to drive me insane*" (CCAЕ)), etc.

At the same time, conceptual metaphors can be classified according to their *cognitive functions*. Sandström (2006) suggests the 'family tree' of different metaphor types, concentrating mainly on conventional conceptual metaphors (Figure 4).

Structural metaphors are characterized by a source domain providing rich knowledge structure for the understanding of a target domain with the help of the mapping mechanisms, for example, TIME PASSING *is* MOTION OF AN OBJECT ("*Time is flying by*", "*His Birthday is coming up on him*") and TIME *is* AN OBSERVER'S MOTION OVER A LANDSCAPE ("*We're getting close to our final exams*", "*She passed his time cheerfully*") (Kövesces, 2010b).

In *ontological metaphors*, the targets are understood through the sources represented by physical objects, for example, MEMORIES *are* EQUIPMENT ("*Part of the equipment of a good manager is the bank of memories*" (BNC)). At the same time, metaphors, with sources represented by human beings (personification metaphors) and CONTAINER-metaphors, having objects, substances, events, states, etc., organized as containers can be considered ontological as well. For example, MEMORIES *are* HUMAN BEINGS ("*Eden's painful memories tell of blessings lost*") or MEMORIES *are* CONTAINERS ("*I may wind up in memories of Sloan's childhood*" (BNC)) (Vakhovska, 2017). These metaphors provide less structuring for the targets comparing to the structural ones. If the structural metaphors present a clear structure for abstract concepts, the ontological metaphors do not specify exactly what kind of object, substance or container is meant.

Orientational metaphors have to do with basic human space orientation, such as up-down, center-periphery, inside-outside, etc. The targets in these metaphors are provided with even less structuring than in structural or ontological

metaphors. The most popular orientational metaphors are MORE *is* UP, LESS *is* DOWN, HAPPY *is* UP, UNHAPPY *is* DOWN, CONTROL *is* UP, LACK OF CONTROL *is* DOWN, RATIONAL *is* UP, IRRATIONAL *is* DOWN, etc. A lot of image-schemas of orientational metaphors are based on binary oppositions. If such metaphor sources as WHOLE, CENTER, LINK, BALANCE, IN, and FRONT are seen as positive ones, NOT WHOLE, PERIPHERY, NO LINK, IMBALANCE, OUT, and BACK are considered to be negative. For example, BAD MEMORIES are DOWN ("*October has never been kind, when postseason games **have fallen**, into a heap of **painful memories***" (CCAЕ)) or GOOD MEMORIES are UP ("*Happy memories **spring to mind** much faster than sad, scary or peaceful ones*" (CCAЕ); BAD MEMORIES are NOW WHOLE ("*Bring to mind a situation in which you felt **very angry**. **Recollect** this experience **piece by piece***" (CCAЕ) or GOOD MEMORIES are WHOLE ("*But to do it, he'd have to give up his **entire memory of Trudi's short, sweet life***" (CCAЕ)).




Figure 4

The ‘family tree’ of metaphor types (Sandström, 2006:9)

Another criterion for the classification of conceptual metaphors is their *conventionality*, the degree of their entrenchment in common use by ordinary people.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) distinguished *marginal, conventional and new conceptual metaphors* and metaphoric expressions. In a language, they are represented by *literal dead, literal live, imaginative live and imaginative novel metaphors and metaphorical expressions*. Romero and Soria (2003) processed these data and classified them in a table (Table 2). They also suggest that instead of analysing metaphorical expressions, it is advisable to analyse utterances, as the expressions taken out of context can be interpreted by a reader / listener in an absolutely different way.

Marginal metaphoric concepts or marginal metaphors are explicitly realized in the language through literal dead metaphors. They are considered to be comparatively uninteresting in the frame of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. They are scarce and less significant than conventional metaphoric concepts or conceptual metaphors realized in the form of literal or imaginative live metaphors because they do not systematically interact with other metaphorical concepts and are actualized through conventionally fixed expressions of the language.

Conventional metaphoric concepts or conceptual metaphors, which stand behind the way people think and act, are represented by literal and non-literal (imaginative) metaphors in the language. Lakoff and Johnson suggest that literal metaphors should be interpreted literally, whereas non-literal metaphors can be distinguished only in unexpected and unconventional contexts and should be interpreted metaphorically.

Finally, new metaphoric concepts or conceptual metaphors are explicitly realized with the help of imaginative novel metaphors.

Table 2

Metaphoric concepts and metaphoric expressions in Lakoff and Johnson's approach (Romero & Soria, 2003:5)

| | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Metaphoric concepts or metaphors | Metaphoric expressions or metaphors |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|

| | | | |
|---|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| Marginal metaphoric concepts / marginal metaphors | Literal metaphor | Dead metaphor | Literal dead metaphors (<i>We reached the foot of the mountain</i>) |
| Conventional metaphoric concepts / Conceptual metaphors | | Live metaphor | Literal live metaphors (<i>The foundations of my theory are sure</i>) |
| | New metaphoric concepts / new metaphors | Imaginative (nonliteral) metaphor | Imaginative live metaphors (<i>His theory has thousands of little rooms</i>) |
| Novel metaphor | | | Imaginative novel metaphors (<i>Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children most of whom fight insanely</i>) |

This metaphorical creativity represents new ways of thinking and includes the following distinct cases: 1) source induced-creativity, where novel elements of a source domain or the whole novel source domain are applied to a given target domain; 2) target-induced creativity, where elements of the target initially not included in a set of constitutive mappings are used and their matching counterparts are found in the source; 3) combination of elements inherent to both source and target in new ways; 4) context-induced creativity, where the influence of different contextual factors result in novel or unconventional metaphors (Kövecses, 2010a).

Imaginative live (unconventional) and imaginative novel (genuinely novel) metaphors happen to be the results of such strategies of metaphorical creativity as *extending, elaboration, questioning or combining*. In extending, a conventionalized linguistic expression and a conventional conceptual metaphor behind it are diversified by the usage of new linguistic means, which utilize the side of the source, which has never been used before. On the contrary to extending,

elaboration doesn't utilize the unused aspect of the source but captures the one, which is already involved in the conceptual metaphor, but from the different unconventional perspective. Questioning is often used as a particularly poetic device, as the questioning of the validity of accepted conventional metaphors lies in its core. Finally, the process of combining of several conventional metaphors and using them at the same time can be the most robust way to enhance metaphorical creativity (Kövecses, 2002).

Metaphors can also be *generic-level* or *specific-level* ones. Such conceptual metaphors as TIME *is* MONEY, LIFE *is* A JOURNEY, MEMORIES *are* EQUIPMENT, MEMORIES *are* HUMAN BEINGS provide more details, upon which the mapping process can be performed. At the same time, such metaphors as EVENTS *are* ACTIONS and GENERIC *is* SPECIFIC have extremely skeletal structure as they provide scarcity of specific details. Generic-level metaphors perform special functions, which cannot be carried out by specific-level metaphors. For example, they are applied in the process of proverb construal. In the proverb "Birds of a feather flock together", the concepts "birds", "a feather" and "flock" are specific-level ones. At the same time, on the generic level, this proverb should be interpreted in the following way: someone, who has similar interests, background or ideas, usually find common ground with each other and therefore stick together. In such a way, the proverb is facilitated by the conceptual metaphor GENERIC *is* SPECIFIC (Kövecses, 2010b).

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) analysed a lot of representative domains of human experience (e.g., time, spatial orientation, some feelings, etc.) to demonstrate that metaphorical systems structure people's understanding of all domains of their experience. These metaphorical structures blend all of the influences (bodily, perceptual, cultural, linguistic, etc.) and create the substance of people's meaningful experience.

It should be mentioned, that the physical environment (geography, landscapes, flora and fauna, a place of living, and so forth may also influence people's conceptualization of the world. Since the times, when English was moved to North America in the 17th century, a new metaphorical language was patterned by the environment completely different from the one of the British Isles.

Anette Kolodny (1984) investigated on the basis of hundreds of literary and non-literary texts, that American men had a metaphorical image of the frontier in the period from 1630 to 1860 as a virgin land to be taken. At the same time, women saw it as a garden to be cultivated. This brings up the idea, that such social factors as gender, age, ethnicity, and so forth influence the way people conceptualize the world.

Unique and prominent concepts and values that characterize a certain (sub)culture constitute the cultural context of the process of conceptualization. Moreover, major and minor historical events, which happened in society/culture, group, or directly to an individual, create a set of factors called differential memory. For example, Kopp (1995) emphasizes the importance of childhood recollections (personal memories, generic personal memories, and autobiographical facts) as the metaphor basis for adult problems and life situations. He also suggests that therapist's knowledge of the general characteristic intrinsic to various cultural and ethnical groups may influence the outcome of psychotherapy, that is why the counsellor should adjust the therapeutic strategies and procedures for clients' problems can be understood in a way, which is congruent with his/her belief system.

Finally, some concerns and interests may be typical for the whole society. The fact of having a particular trait may generate a considerable reliance on a metaphorical source domain that is comparable to this trait (Kövecses, 2010a).

Apart from the abovementioned factors, having a mental condition often causes some existential changes (disruptions of agency and embodiment, time and/or spatiality perception, etc.). It was previously mentioned in Section 2.3. This

is the reason why the conceptual metaphors, which shape a person's way of thinking and understanding of the world, may differ.

Moreover, the differences in embodied interactions between language thought and culture among the researchers, as well as the differences in their intuition about what can be considered a metaphorical expression, can leave some additional interpretive paths (Ritchie, 2003).

In my study, I apply the methodology suggested by Zhabotynska (2011) to analyse the metaphorical targets and sources, typical for psychiatric discourse, and the mapping processes between them. Applying this method, I rely on my intuition, scope of personal interests, knowledge, and social and cultural background.

The process of metaphor analysis consists of five stages. The first stage is characterized by the identification of target concepts within the discourse and then combining them into the domains within the target space. At the second stage, the analogical approach is applied to the source concepts, which are identified through their relations to the target concepts and then combined into the domains within the source space. The links between the individual targets and sources are described through the generalized formulas at the third stage of the metaphor analysis. At this stage a list of metaphorical formulas for each target should be composed, providing the possibility for calculation and evaluation of the prominence of a given formula in the particular piece of discourse. At the fourth stage, it is possible to identify the metaphorical range for each target by citing the sources connected to them. Finally, the metaphorical scope for each source is identified by specifying the targets connected to it.

2.3 Application of the theory of conceptual metaphor in psychiatry and psychotherapy

Psychotherapy as the practice of the knowledgeable and outlined application of techniques derived from established psychological principles with the intention

to correct such individual characteristics as feelings, values, attitudes, and behaviours which are considered by the therapist to be maladaptive.

Some scholars (Riikonen & Vataja, 1999) are sceptical about the difference between psychotherapeutic and everyday talk, claiming, that there is nothing unusual in the density or nature of metaphors in counselling. The majority of cognitive linguists and psychotherapists highlight the particularly high frequency and quality of the metaphors, which makes psychotherapeutic discourse an ideal context for metaphor study, in which both discursive and cognitive approaches to metaphor are highly relevant.

Within the frame of psychotherapy research, metaphors perform several crucial functions. They help to establish trustful relationships between a therapist and a patient, to conceptualize and convey abstract emotional states, and to discuss a patient's problem in a less direct and distressing way (Lyddon, Clay & Sparks, 2001). Moreover, metaphors can be useful for monitoring changes in a patient's conceptualizations and emotion states at each stage of treatment.

There are two sources of metaphors in psychotherapy, the patient and the therapist. Several approaches use client-generated metaphors to facilitate a counselling process.

The first approach, suggested by Kopp and Craw (1998) and Sims (2003), offers similar models to gain insight into a patient's conceptualizations through metaphors. Throughout the counselling, the therapist asks the patient to comment on the metaphor and then provides more details, including emotions concerning the metaphor, by asking follow-up questions. Then the therapist asks the patient either to imagine changes in the metaphor in accordance with the needs of the counsellor or to connect this metaphor with the patient's past experience or future aims.

The second approach towards metaphors as counselling facilitators was suggested by Tay (2012). He distinguished two types of metaphor engagement: correspondence processing and class inclusion. Regarding the former, it involves analysing the layering and transfer of meaning in the relationships between the symbols in the metaphor. Moreover, specific attention is paid to the associations

and characteristics of the domains in the metaphor that are not specifically applied in the metaphor. Consequently, it leads to expanding upon the metaphor. A joining of target and source domains through their core properties without expanding the metaphor is connected with the notion of class inclusion respectively. Using these conceptual frameworks can boost understanding and awareness in both patients and therapists.

These approaches result in the development of six types of client-generated metaphors. These are 1) metaphors, that represent client's image of self; 2) metaphors, that reflect client's image of others; 3) metaphors, that depict client's image of situations; 4) metaphors, that represent client's understanding of the relationship between self and self; 5) metaphors, that represent client's understanding of self and others, and 6) metaphors, that reflect client's understanding of self and situations (Kopp, 1995).

Deliberate support of the therapeutic process may also require therapist-generated metaphors. Reintroduction of the changed patient-generated metaphors to support therapeutic growth is the first approach to apply this kind of metaphors. However, the therapist's sharing of new metaphors is another way to help patients to realize thoughts, feelings, and behaviours

Hill (2009) outlines the psychotherapeutic process as the process, which includes three stages. These are exploration, insight, and action. At the first stage, the stage of exploration, it is crucial to establish the alliance between the client and the counsellor by persuading the client, that he/she is safe, heard and understood. The approach of emphatic reflection is widely used by counsellors at this point. They pay specific attention to all complex and unconventional metaphors used by clients, as they may potentially indicate, what aspects of the experience are particularly challenging, perplexing or emotionally painful.

At the insight stage, the client's awareness of his/her emotions, thoughts, behaviours and possibilities is extended. The complex and unconventional metaphors, directly connected with the goals and patterns of the client's situation, are in the focus at this point in the psychotherapeutic process. Their frequency rises

comparing with the other stages. Moreover, the counsellor can encourage the client to acquire new insights by asking him/her to transform the metaphor in order to intensify feelings, formulate the goals more clearly and recognize patterns. Kopp (1995) suggests that the metaphors can be explored as a sensual image, considering the following dimensions: 1) setting (by asking a client what he/she sees or what is going on in the associated with the metaphor image), 2) action/interaction (by asking what else is going or what the other people are doing / thinking in this metaphorical image), 3) other additional sensory modalities (by asking what else the client is smelling / tasting / touching, etc.), and 4) time (by asking a client, what happened before this image associated with the metaphor, and after it).

The information gained during the exploration and insight stages constitutes the basis for the action stage, where the focus of the counsellor and client is on the behavioural change. At this stage, the client is involved in the process of the metaphor transformation. The psychotherapist first asks the client to change the image connected with the metaphor by him/herself in any way possible. Then, the therapist shares his own change of the metaphor to the client and expects him/her to consider this change. After finishing this stage, the analysis of the parallels between the metaphor and the real world situation behind it is conducted.

The frequency, complexity, and creativity of the metaphors are usually lower at this stage than at the previous ones. If the counsellor still manages to capture a lot of unconventional or complex metaphors in the client's reports at the action stage, it is more correct and appropriate to move back to the exploration stage and to re-evaluate the existing goals, patterns and behaviours.

Even though metaphors are proved to be the ubiquitous and basic components of emotional processing and communication, there are some cautions about their usage in counseling. For example, understanding and producing metaphors may be quite challenging for people with learning disabilities, schizophrenia or autism. Thus it is recommended to take into consideration clients' cognitive abilities and abilities to evaluate reality and adjust the work with metaphors to them (Wagener, 2017).

Conclusions to Chapter Two

In Chapter 2 of my study, I reviewed two different approaches to the notions of 'concept' and 'meaning'. These are the objectivist and cognitive approaches. In the objectivist (truth-conditional approach) the conceptual content (meaning) of a lexical unit is viewed as being able to depict external reality without the body or brain engaged in this process significantly. Concepts were also considered to be objective abstract symbols, which are common for all the people. The cognitive approach to the notions of 'concept' and 'meaning' on the contrary emphasizes the subjective qualities of each individual (the architecture of the mind, the language known to a person, his/her cultural and social backgrounds, the context of the situation, etc.) in the conceptualisation process. It is viewed as a mapping process, during which some features of a source are mapped onto a target. The abovementioned subjective factors and cognitive mechanisms of perspectivization, focusing and prominence result in the fragmentary and altering nature of the conveying of the emotion concepts through linguistic means. Not all of the concepts in the human mind are verbalised. They remain in the form of pure thoughts. But even choosing the name from concept names available in a certain language, the person's mind captures only the most prominent features of the emotion concept, which, in its turn, captures the most salient aspects of the actual emotion experience. This is the reason why it is impossible to convey or comprehend what the emotion experience is like, only by using the name of the emotion concept. At the same time, the employment of metaphors in a verbal report on emotion experience gives a deeper understanding of these human qualia.

Metaphors should not be referred to as the creative linguistic phenomena only, as they also shape and structure people's thoughts. The theory of conceptual metaphor explains how one conceptual domain can be reconceptualised through another concept. More abstract concepts usually perform the role of metaphorical targets, which are comprehended employing more concrete concepts (sources), mapped onto them. The processes of metaphorical highlighting and utilization

specify, which features of the sources are utilised to comprehend the particular sides of the sources.

All the conceptual metaphors can be classified according to their nature (metaphors based on knowledge and metaphors based on image), cognitive function (structural, ontological, and orientational metaphors), degree of generality (generic-level metaphors and specific-level metaphors), and conventionality (marginal, conventional, and novel metaphors).

There are many different methods of conceptual metaphor analysis developed by linguists for different purposes. I've decided to use the method suggested by Zhabotynska (2011), as it offers a systematic algorithm for tracing links between concepts within conceptual metaphors, which perfectly meets the needs of my study.

Finally, conceptual metaphors are actively made use of in psychiatry and psychotherapy. Client- and counsellor-induced metaphors are used to build trusting relationships between a counsellor and a client, to cater for the less direct report on painful or uncomfortable personal experience, but at the same time, to communicate client's emotional states from one point of view, and to understand their nature and specific features, patterns and behaviours from the other, more clearly and efficiently.

In this chapter, some of the tasks, set above, were accomplished. I reviewed the different points of view on the notions of 'concept' and 'meaning', the ways, how the actual emotion experience can be captured and conveyed through linguistic means. Conceptual metaphors as an efficient way to structure a person's experience, their kinds and application in psychiatry and psychotherapy were also explored. Finally, the appropriate methodology of conceptual metaphor analysis, which will serve as a basis for the practical part of my work, is chosen and justified.

CHAPTER THREE. METAPHORICAL MANIFESTATION OF EMOTION EXPERIENCE IN MODERN PSYCHIATRIC DISCOURSE

In the following section, I 1) give a general overview of the methodology used to analyse the metaphors from the monograph by Jan Hendrik van den Berg "*A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology*" (1972) as an example of modern psychiatric discourse; 2) conduct the metaphor analysis, arrange the metaphors according to the relevance of their targets to this particular piece of discourse, unfold small narratives for each emotion concept, explaining the highlighted aspects of the targets and utilised sides of the sources connected to them, and systemise the results of the practical part of the study.

3.1. General overview of the methodology applied to the piece of modern psychiatric discourse

Using the methodology mentioned above, I analyse the metaphorical conceptualizations of psychopathological human emotion experience taking a number of metaphorical expressions from the monograph by Jan Hendrik van den Berg "*A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology*" into consideration. In this monograph, the metaphors of pathological emotion experience are used by a person with a mental condition with the purpose of the first-person verbal report, as well as by a psychotherapist, who takes advantage of metaphorical creativity in counselling and his reflections on the work undertaken. In such a way, there are three different perspectives of conceptual metaphor usage (metaphors used by van den Berg's client, by him as a therapist in the counselling process, and by him as the author of the monograph), which gives rise to a number of unconventional metaphors, created directly by means of extending and elaboration.

I start to analyse the metaphorical conceptualisations by reading the monograph and selecting the fragments containing emotion names. The list of

emotion names developed by Scherer (2005:714-715) and mentioned above in Section 2.2 of this study is used. Although the linguistic analysis of meanings of emotion names is not included in this study, the list of synonymic emotion names can be expanded judging from the context, in which they are used.

The fragments which contain non-metaphorical conceptualizations of emotions are excluded from the study, and the focus falls on the metaphorical ones instead.

At the second stage of the analysis, the metaphorical expressions from the selected fragments are arranged into thematic groups, which correlate with specific emotion concepts that are involved in these expressions. 18 emotion concepts, which also represent the targets, which are metaphorically conceptualized through different sources, were represented through various metaphorical expressions in the monograph *"A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology"*. These are ANXIETY, DESPERATION, DISAPPOINTMENT, DISGUST, EMOTION, FEAR, HAPPINESS, HATRED, HOPE, INTEREST/ENTHUSIASM, IRRITATION, LOVE, LUST, PLEASURE/ENJOYMENT, RELAXATION/SERENITY, SADNESS, SHAME, and TENSION/STRESS.

At the third stage of the analysis, the sources that are mapped onto each emotion concept are identified. For the monograph by van den Berg (1972), the list includes the following sources: A PHYSICAL OBJECT, A HUMAN BEING, A SUBSTANCE, A CONTAINER, CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER, A CONFINING FORCE, A CONTROLLING FORCE, A MOVING FORCE, A PLACE, PHYSICAL CONTACT, A BURDEN, AN ENEMY, A WEAPON, AN EXCHANGE OF FANTASIES, A CHILD, FIRE, A DISEASE, A COMMAND, FOOD, A RESERVOIR, A PRISON CELL, A CLOTH, A DECISION and ELECTRICITY. Altogether, there are 56 conceptual metaphors realised in 76 metaphorical expressions.

At the next stage, I establish the conceptual metaphors for each link between the target (emotion concept) and its metaphorical source. As a result of these

manipulations, the set of generalised metaphorical formulas is presented. The conceptual metaphors in this list are presented according to their iteration rate and, consequently, prominence for this particular concept. Then I dwell upon each conceptual metaphor composing a narrative, which explains which features of the source were utilized to highlight certain features of the emotion concept as the target of the conceptual metaphor. This explanation is further underpinned by the citation from the monograph, which provides the exact context of the metaphorical expression, in order to avoid ambiguity, interactions and overlapping of different emotion concepts.

At the final stage, the list of the metaphorical targets is composed. They are arranged according to the degree of their metaphORIZATION and their ranges are also cited in this list. By analogy, the concepts that are mapped onto the targets (emotion concepts) are also systemized in the form of a list of the metaphorical sources with their scopes accordingly. The targets with equal metaphORIZATION degrees and the sources with equal metaphorical potentials are arranged metaphorically.

After that, I analyse the metaphorical expressions and conceptual metaphors according to the level of their creativity. I also identify the types of creativity (source-induced (source-internal and source-external), target-induced, and context-induced sources of creativity. Context-induced metaphors sometimes lead to the emergence of rather conventional metaphors, but in most cases, they are responsible for the variations in unconventional or genuinely novel metaphors, as ‘the immediate context of discourse varies from one discourse to another, and with it the linguistic metaphors that are based on the context will also vary (Kövesces, 2010: 683).

For the identification of context-induced metaphors, I have to juxtapose the metaphors selected from the monograph with the facts from van den Berg’s biography. Interestingly, that being a phenomenologist and psychotherapist, Jan Hendrik van den Berg also juxtaposed the metaphors produced by his clients with the facts about their physical, social and cultural environments.

In my study, 56 conceptual metaphors realised in 76 metaphoric expressions are summarised in Appendix C in the form of the tables. I also state, how relevant the targets and sources are for this particular piece of psychiatric discourse by specifying the number of their appearances in the text of the monograph.

Although phenomenology of agoraphobia, panic disorder, and other psychiatric conditions definitely influences the metaphors the person with one of these conditions lives by, the primary concern of my study is to support the idea, that metaphors are the most efficient way to convey human emotions rather than to investigate in what ways psychiatric these disturbances distort or reformulate the most common conceptual metaphors. For the same reasons, I also leave the author's personal writing style out of the focus of my master thesis.

3.2. Conceptual metaphor analysis of the metaphors and metaphorical expressions from the piece of modern psychiatric discourse

In the following section, the narratives for 18 emotion concepts (ANXIETY, DESPERATION, DISAPPOINTMENT, DISGUST, EMOTION, FEAR, HAPPINESS, HATRED, HOPE, INTEREST/ENTHUSIASM, IRRITATION, LOVE, LUST, PLEASURE/ENJOYMENT, RELAXATION/SERENITY, SADNESS, SHAME, and TENSION/STRESS) are provided. Each narrative contains an explanation of the feelings a person has while experiencing a certain emotion. These are also clear examples of how emotion experience is articulated employing words, and how the qualitative side of emotion experience is communicated in metaphorical expressions and conceptual metaphors behind them. Moreover, different kinds of metaphor creativity typical for the metaphors mentioned in the monograph are revised and elaborated on.

All emotion concepts are classified and dwelled upon in the order of their prominence for the monograph (van den Berg, 1972). The conceptual metaphors reflected in more linguistic expression take higher positions in the lists, whereas the metaphors conveyed by only one linguistic expression take lower positions in

the lists. The concepts, which are equally prominent in this piece of psychiatric discourse, are arranged in alphabetical order.

Emotion concept 1. LOVE

Love (n) "strong affection for another arising out of kinship or personal ties; attraction based on sexual desire: affection and tenderness felt by lovers; affection based on admiration, benevolence, or common interests; warm attachment, enthusiasm, or devotion" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

LOVE is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a physical object /LOVE/, which the emoter has physical contact with and can be joined to ("*There must be a connection with her (immature) love which, though returned, will not lead to matrimony*"). /LOVE/ can also suddenly emerge from the specific features of other people ("*Love springs from peculiarities that can be found only in the loved person*"). The emoter can possibly find /LOVE/ in some enigmatic place /SOUL/, where the connection between the heart and the brain takes place. However, /LOVE/ cannot be literally found in these organs ("*Dissecting these organs [the heart and the brain], one never finds thoughts, desires or memories; never fear, hope, love or hate*").

LOVE is A CHILD. The emoter views /LOVE/ as a child, who is cherished, nourished and receives emoter's undivided attention ("*His love is a copy of the love gone wrong that he fostered for one of the persons of his childhood*"). /LOVE/ is not as calm and thoughtful as the emoter, psychotherapist and the society he lives in expect it to be, but rather childish, foolish and naïve ("*There must be a connection with her (immature) love which, though returned, will not lead to matrimony*").

LOVE is A HUMAN BEING. There is a human being /LOVE/, which follows the emoter and stays by his side; it doesn't leave him alone ("*Love is all nonsense –*

although he admits that this nonsense *does not leave him alone*"). At the same time, the eyesight (which can be the reconceptualization of /UNDERSTANDING/ or /BELIEF/) of this /LOVE/ can fail it, so that the reasons for this /LOVE/ to exist or the consequences of the /LOVE'S/ actions are unseen (*"Their fathers beat them often and cruelly, their mothers were either heartless or suffered from **blind love**"*).

LOVE is A CONTAINER. There is an empty container /LOVE/, where the emoter and his loved one fall to together (*"So is the enamored person inclined to interpret much of what happened between him and his girl before they **fell in love**, in favor of his love"*).

LOVE is A DISEASE. The emoter feels pain and discomfort from a disease /LOVE/ (*"The patients mention sad circumstances: their fathers beat them often and cruelly, their mothers were either heartless or **suffered from blind love**"*).

LOVE is AN EXCHANGE OF FANTASIES. The emoter sees /FANTASIES/ as colourless physical objects. For him, /LOVE/ is a process of /AN EXCHANGE OF FANTASIES/ (*"With approval, he cited the definition of French moralist Chamfort, that love is nothing but "the contact of two epidermi and **the exchange of two pale fantasies**"*).

LOVE is PHYSICAL CONTACT. For the emoter, /LOVE/ is just a tactile feeling from the contact of two human bodies (*With approval, he cited the definition of French moralist Chamfort, that **love is nothing but "the contact of two epidermi and the exchange of two pale fantasies"***).

Emotion concept 2. EMOTION

emotion (n) "a conscious mental reaction (such as anger or fear) subjectively experienced as strong feeling usually directed toward a specific object and typically accompanied by physiological and behavioural changes in the body; a state of feeling" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

EMOTION is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a physical object /EMOTION/, which the emoter has in his possession ("*He had had the feeling that the houses he passed were about to fall on him*"). All the /PEOPLE/ are potential places and the emoter can physically move this /EMOTION/ from one place to another, from one /PERSON/ to another ("*Does he, himself, not often become the person to whom the patient transfers his emotions?*"). At the same time, this /EMOTION/ can be easily lost ("*He is losing his sense of equilibrium*"). Emoter's /UNCONSCIOUS/ is some place, where /EMOTIONS/ emerge from time to time, but unlike the other /EMOTIONS/, these /EMOTIONS/ cannot be joined to any /PERSON/ or another /OBJECT/ ("*One can presume that the unconscious is the area within which objectless emotions do occur, so that there an affect can be separated from its original object*").

EMOTION is A HUMAN BEING. The emoter views a /NEGATIVE EMOTION/ as a human being, which doesn't leave him alone and is always by his side ("*One must realize that there is no acceptable theory to explain how an abnormal mood, a mental disturbance, that is, something within the patient, could leave him*"). This /EMOTION/ in its turn can also feel troubled or nervous ("*But he measures his nervousness by the agitated feelings in his breast*").

EMOTION is CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER. There is a container /EMOTER'S BODY/, which is filled with a certain content /EMOTION/. ("*One must realize that there is no acceptable theory to explain how an abnormal mood, a mental disturbance, that is, something within the patient, could leave him*"). At the same time, for /EMOTER'S BODY/ not to be overfilled with /EMOTION/, the emoter has to find the outlet /WAY TO RELEASE/ the /EMOTION/, so that /EMOTION/ can escape the /EMOTER'S BODY/ ("*Well, after all, he has to find some outlet for his pent-up emotions*").

EMOTION is A CONTAINER. There is a container /EMOTION/, in which certain content /EMOTER'S PAST / can appear in case some task is not fulfilled ("*As long as this task is not fulfilled, the past will appear in the sense of the unfulfilled task*").

Emotion concept 3. HATRED

hatred (n) "extreme dislike or disgust; ill will or resentment that is usually mutual: prejudiced hostility or animosity" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

HATRED is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a physical object /HATRED/, which can be physically taken away from one person (in the monograph, emoter's mother) and given to other people ("*This is the adopted train of thought: the patient transfers his hatred from mother to other women*"). This /HATRED/ is also physically joined to its object /A PERSON/, but there is a possibility to separate them ("*This construction presupposes that an effect, in this case **hatred**, can be disconnected from its object*"). However, sometimes the emoter fails to take the /HATRED/ and the /PERSON/ connected to it apart ("*He cannot **separate his hatred from his mother, the object of this hatred***"). The emoter can possibly find /HATRED/ in some enigmatic place /SOUL/, where the connection between the heart and the brain takes place. However, /HATRED/ cannot be literally found in these organs ("*Dissecting these organs [the heart and the brain], **one never finds thoughts, desires or memories; never fear, hope, love or hate***").

HATRED is A BURDEN. The emoter was previously repressed by another person and now has a capacity to place weight of /HATRED/ on his enemy, but he decides not to weight this person with this burden /HATRED/. On the other hand, the enemy as the emoter feels freed from /HATRED/ ("*The prisoner of those days can relieve the enemy of the odium of hostility*").

HATRED is A CONTAINER. There is an empty container /HATRED/, getting into which the emoter starts to repeat his previous communication patterns with his closest relatives ("*In his **hatred**, for example, he shows characteristics of his earlier contact with his father, his mother, his brother, or his sister*").

HATRED is a HUMAN BEING. The emoter views /HATRED/ as a human being looking in the direction of something or someone. At the same time, the eyesight of this /HATRED/ fails /TO SEE/ (reconceptualized /TO UNDERSTAND/) the reasons for and consequences of this /HATRED/ ("*Even "blind hatred" is directed – blindly – at something or anything*").

HATRED is RED COLOUR/PAINT. There is a surface /EMOTER'S BODY/, which can be covered with the red colour or paint /HATRED/ ("*One becomes pale with fright or red with hatred or annoyance*").

HATRED is A WEAPON. The emoter views /HATRED/ as a weapon and directs it against certain things or people in order to harm them ("*No one can claim having hated without having directed his hatred against something or someone*").

Emotion concept 4. INTEREST / ENTUSIASM

interest (n) a feeling that accompanies or causes special attention to something or someone (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

enthusiasm (n) strong excitement of feeling (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a physical object /INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM/, which belongs to the emoter and is located in the specific place /HEART/ within the emoter ("*His mother may have his best interest at heart, but he still has to resist her, for if he should react to her questions, he would feel himself small and would probably cry*"). On one hand, the emoter has control over /INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM/ and can turn it in any direction he chooses ("*We leave the relationship of present and past and direct our attention towards the significance of the future*"). In addition to the possibility for this /INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM/ to be turned in the needed direction, it can also be moved (dragged or pulled) towards /A PERSON/ or other objects /CONTRADICTIONS/ ("*She decides to go into the city and hopes to attract the*

*attention of the boys she will see", "It is true that not every psychiatric patient draws attention to all four of these contradictions"). As a physical object, /INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM/ can be given to other people /QUESTIONS/ ("To do this, we **give attention** to the following questions").*

INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM is A CONTAINER. There is a container /INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM/, which is filled with /EMOTER'S UNCONSCIOUS/, but this /UNCONSCIOUS/ escapes the /INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM/ (*"Is not the unconscious, by definition, that which **escapes attention?**"*).

INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM is A CONTROLLING FORCE. There are such forces as /AMBITION/ and /SELF-INTEREST/, which control society and people within it. /AMBITION/ and /SELF-INTEREST/ are completely sizeable (tangible) for people within this society (*"If it's true from a sound point of view that **society is controlled by ambition and self-interest**, just as **obvious** is the evidence of true friendship and love"*).

INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM is A PLACE. The emoter sees some matters and questions as /PEOPLE/, who came to the place /INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM/ only after he recovers from the illness (*"That these periods have not disappeared completely becomes apparent when the patient gets better: he begins to speak of **matters that did not come to his attention** during his illness"*).

Emotion concept 5. FEAR

fear (n) "an unpleasant often strong emotion caused by anticipation or awareness of danger; anxious concern; reason for alarm" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

FEAR is A CONFINING FORCE. The emoter is restricted by some confining force /FEAR/, which doesn't allow him to leave the boundaries of his house and drags him back to the safe place (his room) or creates resistance so that the

emoter can't physically move any further than the area of the house ("*Fear had compelled him to return to his room, and he would certainly have run if he had not been seized by such palpitations that he could only go step by step*", "*It was more unreal than the direct, incorrect observation which was so frightening that it drove him back to his room*").

FEAR is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a physical object /FEAR/, which the emoter can possibly find in some enigmatic place /SOUL/, where the connection between the heart and the brain takes place. However, /FEAR/ cannot be literally found in these organs ("*Dissecting these organs [the heart and the brain], one never finds thoughts, desires or memories; never fear, hope, love or hate*"). /FEAR/ can also physically appear from the past, overshadowing or even substituting the /MEMORIES/ of some previous events ("*The terror alone emerged from the past, and the fear and the possibility of a precipice*").

FEAR is WHITE COLOUR / BLEACH. There is a surface /EMOTER'S BODY/, which whitens with bleach /FEAR / ("*One becomes pale with fright or red with hatred or annoyance*").

FEAR is AN ENEMY. There is an emoter's enemy /FEAR/, who defeats the emoter in a battle /NEUROTIC EPISODE/. The emoter loses control over the situation and needs other people to help. They save her from /FEAR/ taking her back to the safe place /HOUSE/ ("*Overcome by terror, she was taken back to the house of her friends and was let alone with the husband*").

Emotion concept 6. LUST

lust (n) "usually intense or unbridled sexual desire" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

LUST is A COMMAND. In emoter's view, the /CONTEXT OF LIFE/ is a /COMMANDER / AUTHORITARIAN/, who gives /COMMANDS/ to the

emoter ("*How much passion is within us is not dictated by a gland but by a context of life*").

LUST is CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER. There is a container /EMOTER'S BODY/, which is filled with /LUST/ ("*How much passion is within us is not dictated by a gland but by a context of life*"). /LUST/ can also be discharged into the other containers /MATERIAL OBJECTS/ in order to appropriate them ("*For objects are foreign to us; they are outside our body and can only, to certain extent, be incorporated when our desire, our lust or libido is discharged into them*").

LUST is A HUMAN BEING. There is a human being /LUST/, which is born permanently lives in the house /EMOTER'S BODY/ ("*The origin of every pursuit and desire, therefore, resides within the individual, <...> within the cells of his sexual glands*").

LUST is A MOVING FORCE. There is some moving force /LUST/, which moves the emoter in a certain direction with the significant force. ("*He who desires is being pushed, not pulled*").

Emotion concept 7. SHAME

shame (n) "a painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt, shortcoming, or impropriety; a condition of humiliating disgrace or disrepute" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

SHAME is CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER. The emoter has some containers /EMOTER'S BLOOD VESSELS/, which are filled not only with blood, but with /SHAME/, /IMPULSIVENESS/ and /AGGRESSION/. /EMOTER's BLOOD VESSELS/ set limits to /SHAME/ and /IMPULSIVENESS/. At the same time, /AGGRESSION/ splashes against the walls of /EMOTER'S BLOOD VESSELS/ ("*These vessels' walls have something*

to do with the *limits of shame and impulsiveness, walls against which aggression collides*").

SHAME is A CLOTH. There is a piece of fabric /SHAME/, which covers emoter's body completely, leaving no space for any other /FEELING/. This /SHAME/ hampers emoter's movements, making him feel uncomfortable and awkward ("*Shame is, as Madame Guyon expressed it, that which envelops the body like clothes*").

SHAME is A HUMAN BEING. There is a house /EMOTER'S BODY/, in which the walls are the /SURFACE OF THE BODY/. /EMOTER'S BODY/ is permanently inhabited by a human being /SHAME/ ("*Shame resides in the walls of the body*").

SHAME is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a physical object /SHAME/, which the emoter has physical contact with and can be joined to ("*There must be a connection with her (immature) love which, though returned, will not lead to matrimony. With her feelings of shame*").

SHAME is A SUBSTANCE. There is a certain surface /EMOTER'S FACE/, which can be covered with different substances /EMOTIONS/. /SHAME/ is erased from /EMOTER'S FACE/ so that there's no trace of it anymore ("*He recovers, he unbends, he looks at the other person with no trace of embarrassment on his face and he starts on his defence*").

Emotion concept 8. HOPE

hope (n) "desire accompanied by expectation of or belief in fulfilment" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

HOPE is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. The emoter can possibly find a physical object /HOPE/ in some enigmatic place /SOUL/, where the connection between the heart and the brain takes place. However, /HOPE/ cannot be literally found in these organs ("*Dissecting these organs [the heart and the brain], one never finds*

thoughts, desires or memories; never fear, hope, love or hate"). This /HOPE/ is in a stable position or too large and heavy because the emoter cannot move or disturb it ("*He has an unshakable faith in everyday observation of objects, of the body, of the people around him and of time*").

HOPE is A CONTAINER. There is a container /HOPE/, where the emoter can act in a certain way and perform some actions ("*The patient behaves in good faith*").

Emotion concept 9. TENSION / STRESS

tension (n) "inner striving, unrest, or imbalance often with physiological indication of emotion" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

stress (n) "one of bodily or mental tension resulting from factors that tend to alter an existent equilibrium" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

TENSION / STRESS is A CONTAINER. There is a container /TENSION / STRESS/, where certain contents /EMOTER'S STIVINGS/ and /EMOTER'S DESIRES/ emerge ("*...all the forces, strivings and desires originate in this tension*").

TENSION / STRESS is ELECTRICITY. Emoter's glands are the sources of electricity /TENSION/, which charge the battery /EMOTER'S BODY/ ("*They [glands] charge the body with a tension*").

TENSION / STRESS is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a place /EMOTER'S BODY/, in which there is a physical object /TENSION/. When the emoter relaxes the muscles in his body physically, he removes this /TENSION/ (as well as /AGGRESSION/) from /EMOTER'S BODY/ ("*The person who relaxes every muscle, who removes every tension from his body, cannot be aggressive*").

Emotion concept 10. RELAXATION / SERENITY

relaxation (n) "abatement or relief from bodily or mental work, effort, application, etc. " (RDT).

serenity (n) "the state of being calm, peaceful, or tranquil; unruffled" (RDT).

RELAXATION / SERENITY is CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER. There is a container / EMOTER'S BODY/, which is filled with /RELAXATION / SERENITY/ ("*As soon as he arrived home, he felt a delicious **restfulness in his body***"). This /RELAXATION / SERENITY/ may leak out of /EMOTER'S BODY/ through the holes /MEMORIES ABOUT NORMAL HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS/, that's why the emote has to avoid them ("*To **retain his tranquility**, he has to avoid anything that might remind him of normal human relationships*").

RELAXATION / SERENITY is FOOD. There is some food /RELAXATION / SERENITY/, which the emote likes and finds tasty and flavourful ("*As soon as he arrived home, he felt a **delicious restfulness in his body***").

Emotion concept 11. PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT

pleasure (n) "enjoyment or satisfaction derived from what is to one's liking; gratification; delight" (RDT).

enjoyment (n) "the action or state of enjoying" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT is CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER. There is a container /EMOTER'S BODY/, filled with /RELAXATION / SERENITY/ and /PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT/. After being irritated by his parents, this /PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT / disappears from /EMOTER'S BODY/ ("*He felt a delicious restfulness in his body, but this **pleasant feeling disappeared** in a few hours because he was increasingly irritated by his parent's behaviour*").

PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT is A CONTAINER. There is a container /PLEASURE / ENTHUSIASM/, inside of which the emoter can find himself (*"He is enthusiastic about what he has seen, and **in his delight**, he writes, "I wish you were here! "*).

PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a physical object /PLEASURE / ENTHUSIASM/, which the emoter receives from the people, who discuss subjects concerning the values of life (*"people, who discuss <...> subjects concerning the values of life, certainly **give him moments of pleasure**"*).

Emotion concept 12. SADNESS

sadness (n) "affected with or expressive of grief or unhappiness" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

SADNESS is A PRISON CELL. /SADNESS/ is a prison cell, in which the emoter is imprisoned and cannot get out of it (*"Whereas we are able to rid ourselves of the spell of a depressive landscape, the patient is unable **to liberate himself from his gloomy scenery**"*).

SADNESS is A RESERVOIR. There is an overfilled reservoir /SADNESS/, in which /EMOTER'S GOOD EXPECTATIONS/ are drowned (*"All the expectations, so good, so true, are **drowned in his lamentation** that the future does nothing but leer at him"*).

SADNESS is A SPELL. The emoter is under the influence of a spell /SADNESS/, and, if in the good health, can easily get rid of it. At the same time, the patient remains under the influence of this /SPELL/ (*"Whereas **we are able to rid ourselves of the spell of a depressive landscape**, the patient is unable to liberate himself from his gloomy scenery"*).

Emotion concept 13. DISAPPOINTMENT

disappointment (n) "the state of being to defeated in the fulfilment of hopes, plans, etc.; the state of being frustrated" (RDT).

DISAPPOINTMENT is A CONTAINER. There is a container /DISAPPOINTMENT/, where the emoter can find herself ("*Does the **mother**, who is in dismay, strokes the arm of her sick child, believe that she is touching a jail which contains her child?* ")

DISAPPOINTMENT is a PHYSICAL OBJECT. There is a physical object /DISAPPOINTMENT/, which the emoter can physically see with his eyes ("*What **I** was really seeing was something like **disappointment** about the fact that my friend would not come or about the loneliness of my evening*").

Emotion concept 14. DISGUST

disgust (n) "marked aversion, loathing or repugnance aroused by something highly distasteful" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

DISGUST is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. The emoter has a physical object /DISGUST/, which he brings with him while performing some actions ("*The swimmer who enters the water **with an aversion** to it will have a historical reason*").

DISGUST is A SUBSTANCE. The emoter has a certain amount of some substance /DISGUST/, which he brings with him while performing some actions ("*It is striking **with how much aversion** the patient speaks of his past*").

Emotion concept 15. IRRITATION

irritation (n) 'the state of being angered, provoked or annoyed' (RDT).

IRRITATION is FIRE. There is a container /EMOTER/, which is burned by fire /IRRITATION/ from the inside ("*He was increasingly irritated by his parent's behaviour. Heat flamed high inside him and he had to restrain himself not to slap her [his mother] face*").

IRRITATION is RED COLOUR/PAINT. There is a surface /EMOTER'S BODY/, which can be covered with the red colour or paint /IRRITATION/ ("*One becomes pale with fright or red with hatred or annoyance*").

Emotion concept 16. ANXIETY

anxiety (n) "apprehensive uneasiness or nervousness usually over an impending or anticipated ill; mentally distressing concern or interest; a strong desire sometimes mixed with doubt, fear, or uneasiness" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

ANXIETY is A PHYSICAL OBJECT. The emoter has a physical object /ANXIETY/ in his possession. He can physically measure the size of this object /DEGREE OF ANXIETY/. He can place and then find this object /ANXIETY/ in the region of his heart ("*But he measures his nervousness by the agitated feelings in his breast, by the pressure on his throat and by the shaking of his fingers, his hands and his whole body*". "*He locates his anxiety in the region of his heart*").

Emotion concept 17. DESPERATION

desperation (n) "loss of hope and surrender to despair; a state of hopelessness leading to rashness" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

DESPERATION is A BURDEN. Some human beings /RECOLLECTIONS OF THE PAST/ made the emoter weight his parents with the burden

/DESPERATION/ (*"Recollections of the past made him want to tax his parents with his misery in the meanest terms"*).

Emotion concept 18. HAPPINESS

happiness (n) "the quality or state of being delighted, pleased or glad, as over a particular thing" (RDT).

HAPPINESS is A DECISION. There are some human beings /EMOTER'S PAST AND PRESENT IMPRESSIONS/, which make the decision about /HAPPINESS/ (*"The factors determining the future <...> are decided <...> by yesterday's impressions, by childhood impressions and by partial impressions of the present. There is nothing else available <...> there is nothing else to decide future happiness and disaster"*).

While analysing the metaphorical expressions and conceptual metaphors behind them from the monograph by Jan Hendrik van den Berg *"A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology"* (1972), I was relying on my personal interests, background knowledge, and intuition. I do not claim that all of my interpretations are objectively and exhaustively true, nor do I think that all people can relate to them to the same extent. On the contrary, I do believe, that there are multiple possible interpretations, which reflect the other sides of these conceptual metaphors invisible for me yet.

To my knowledge, the monograph contains 56 conceptual metaphors, 37 of which are the instances of completely conventional conceptualisations, and only 19 of which are relatively unconventional ones. There are no genuinely novel metaphorical expression and conceptual metaphors in this piece of psychiatric discourse.

Out of 19 unconventional conceptualizations, there are 8 examples of source-internal cases of creativity. They include such creative strategies as elaboration and extending and employ the source-internal components, which haven't been used, to reconceptualise the target (Kövecses, 2005). These are IRRITATION is RED COLOUR/PAINT, IRRITATION is FIRE, FEAR is WHITE COLOUR/BLEACH, FEAR is AN ENEMY, HATRED is RED COLOUR/PAINT, SADNESS is A RESERVOIR, SADNESS is A PRISON CELL, TENSION / STRESS is ELECTRICITY. As the specific-level conceptual metaphors, they represent the extensions of their generic-level equivalents.

At the same time, there are 11 cases of source-external creativity. Each example of source-external creativity engages new, additional source domains for the target in the process of conceptualisation (Kövecses, 2005). The instances from the monograph are HAPPINESS is A DECISION, DESPERATION is A BURDEN, SADNESS is A SPELL, RELAXATION / SERENITY is FOOD, SHAME is A CLOTH, LUST is A COMMAND, HATRED is A WEAPON, HATRED is A BURDEN, LOVE is AN EXCHANGE OF FANTASIES, LOVE is PHYSICAL CONTACT, LOVE is A DISEASE, LOVE is A CHILD.

Another form of metaphorical creativity, which has been left aside from the systematic exploration in the cognitive linguistic literature, is context-induced metaphors. Such factors as a person's physical, social, cultural environment, personal interests and preferences, mental state, and the context of a linguistic situation itself contribute to the process of production of unconventional and genuinely novel metaphors (Kövecses, 2005).

Some of the abovementioned metaphors from the monograph *"A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology"* (1972) may be connected with van den Berg's biography. Before devoting his life to psychopathology and phenomenology, Jan Hendrik van den Berg received his Primary School teacher diploma, which may be reflected in several metaphoric expressions, which represent the conceptual metaphor LOVE is A CHILD. He also pays specific attention to the issue of child upbringing and childhood relationships

with other people as one of the factors contributing to development of a mental disorder.

10 years later, he received his Medical School diploma, showing large interest to medicine. This fact may also be reflected in the detailed explanations of how a person with agoraphobia experiences the state of disembodiment, which is realised in physical symptoms rather than psychological ones. It is also presented in the metaphorical expressions representing the metaphor LOVE is A DISEASE.

Finally, his early works were written under the influence of the revolution in thought and culture brought by Sigmund Freud. Although he wasn't impressed by Freudian views on child development, religion, and some defence mechanisms (i.e., sublimation), their traces are still notable in his addressing the issues of his patients' upbringing, family relationships and their attitudes towards the opposite sex. They are also reflected in the conceptual metaphors LUST is A MOVING FORCE or LUST is A COMMAND and using Freudian terminology to refer to the concept of LUST.

Conclusions to Chapter Three

In Chapter 3 the application of the chosen methodology for conceptual metaphor analysis resulted in the detection of and elaboration on 76 metaphorical expressions and 56 conceptual metaphors behind them. I provided my subjective interpretation to each conceptual metaphor, underpinning the narrative with the citations from the text.

The conducted analysis revealed that genuinely novel metaphors are basically not used are really scarce in psychiatric discourse.

The ratio of comparatively unconventional metaphors is also rather low. They constitute only 34% (19 out of 56) of all the selected metaphors. Almost 58% of the unconventional metaphors are represented by source-external cases of metaphorical creativity, which means that the metaphorical creativity is achieved by reconceptualising the conventional targets through new, additional sources.

42% of metaphors are represented by source-external way of creativity, which means that, in this case, it is achieved by expanding and elaboration of the conventional sources. There are no instances of target-induced creativity in this piece of psychiatric discourse.

Some of the metaphors (LOVE is A CHILD, LOVE is A DISEASE, LUST is A COMMAND, etc.) are context-induced, employing the author's personal experience, social and cultural background.

Conventional metaphors constitute the main bulk of the metaphors in "*A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology*" (1972). These data reflect the general tendency for psychiatric discourse, where conventional metaphorical conceptualisations are heavily used. At the same time, even conventional metaphors, deeply entrenched in the patient's and psychotherapist's language, give the deeply comprehensible report on the pathological emotion experience. They can also provide a fertile ground for the rise of unconventional and genuinely novel metaphors by employing such creative strategies as extending, elaboration, questioning or combining. In my study, I, nevertheless, didn't manage to capture the cases of target-induced metaphors, and such strategies of metaphorical creativity as questioning and combining.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In my thesis, I used the tenets of cognitive linguistics (namely, the theory of conceptual metaphor) to analyse the role of metaphors in conveying and comprehension of emotion experience in the context of psychiatric discourse. In my study, I made an attempt to demonstrate, that emotion names as linguistic representations of emotion concepts cannot convey all subtleties and nuances of emotion concepts. Moreover, emotion concepts do not capture actual emotion experiences identically either, as they are also the results of subjective and selective conceptual mapping processes. Subsequently, emoters have to use different, more complex and tangible means to communicate their emotion experience more efficiently and accurately.

Conceptual metaphors employed in psychiatric discourse give access to the ways, in which the human mind perceives, renders and structures pathological emotion experience. They are often used as therapeutic tools in counselling to get the insight on the person's mental state, to modify his/her patterns of thinking, and as a result, to change the pathological emotional occurrences and maladaptive behaviours.

In my study, they are represented mostly by conventional (37) and some unconventional (19) metaphors. Their targets are ANXIETY, DESPERATION, DISAPPOINTMENT, DISGUST, EMOTION, FEAR, HAPPINESS, HATRED, HOPE, INTEREST/ENTHUSIASM, IRRITATION, LOVE, LUST, PLEASURE/ENJOYMENT, RELAXATION/SERENITY, SADNESS, SHAME, and TENSION/STRESS. Physical, social and cultural background, personal interests and knowledge, mental state of the emoter shaped the system of corresponding sources: A PHYSICAL OBJECT, A HUMAN BEING, A SUBSTANCE, A CONTAINER, CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER, A CONFINING FORCE, A CONTROLLING FORCE, A MOVING FORCE, A PLACE, PHYSICAL CONTACT, A BURDEN, AN ENEMY, A WEAPON, AN EXCHANGE OF FANTASIES, A CHILD, FIRE, A DISEASE, A COMMAND,

FOOD, A RESERVOIR, A PRISON CELL, A CLOTH, A DECISION and ELECTRICITY.

The metaphors in psychiatric discourse are ambiguous and complicated. In the monograph by van den Berg (1972), the conventional metaphors prevail over the unconventional or novel ones. The relative unconventionality of the metaphors in this piece of psychiatric discourse is connected with them being context-induced. This fact results in the introduction of some unconventional metaphorical targets and sources, as well as developing atypical mapping patterns.

Nevertheless, this monograph constitutes only a small part of the massive scope of literature in this field, which allows me to continue my investigations in the fields of cognitive linguistics, psychiatry and psychotherapy, and creativity studies in prospect. In my further inquiries I plan to concentrate on the issue of conceptual metaphor usage and metaphorical creativity in regard to specific mental conditions (schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder, etc.), including the comparison of the manifestations of specific emotion concepts, in order to explore the tendencies and patterns of thought structuring through the conceptual metaphors employment.

RÉSUMÉ

In this master thesis, the tenets of the theory of conceptual metaphor are applied to study the ways of communicating human qualia (in particular emotion experience) through linguistic means. As the names of emotion concepts cannot convey all the aspects of emotion experience, the usage of metaphorical expressions and conceptual metaphors of different degrees of novelty partially allows revealing the elusive hues of emotion experience, imperceptible in any other way.

The analysis of cognitive metaphors is based on the monograph by Dutch psychiatrist Jan Hendrik van den Berg "A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology" (1972), who successfully managed to apply the principles of phenomenology to study the pathological emotion experience of people with mental conditions. The analysis itself is conducted by applying the methodology of big data analysis developed by Zhabotynska S.A. (2011).

In the first and second chapters of this study, the theoretical foundation for the further analysis of the metaphorical excerpts from the text is provided. They include the information about the nature of emotion experience, psychopathology of anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, mechanisms of conceptualisation of the world by the human mind, conceptualisations of emotions and their names, tenets of the theory of cognitive metaphor and ways to work with metaphors in psychiatric and psychotherapeutic fields.

The third chapter of the thesis contains the practical application of the above-mentioned methodology for the analysis of the selected metaphorical material, its interpretation and systematisation. In this chapter, the remarks on the matter of metaphorical creativity and its strategies applied in the text of the monograph are also given.

Key concepts: emotion experience, anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, panic disorder, concept, conceptualization, conceptual metaphor theory, metaphorical creativity.

RÉSUMÉ

У цій магістерській роботі задіюються підвалини теорії когнітивної метафори для дослідження способів передачі суб'єктивного емоційного досвіду лінгвістичними засобами. Оскільки назви емоційних концептів не передають усі аспекти емоційного досвіду, використання метафоричних виразів та когнітивних метафор різного ступеню новизни дозволяє частково відобразити без цього невловимі відтінки емоційного досвіду.

Аналіз когнітивних метафор здійснюється на основі монографії голландського психіатра Яна Хендріка ван ден Берга "A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology" (1972), який успішно застосовував методи феноменології для дослідження патологічного емоційного досвіду у людей із різними психічними розладами. Власне аналіз проводиться за методологією для аналізу множинних даних, розробленою Світланою Анатоліївною Жаботинською (2011).

У першому та другому розділах цієї роботи наведена теоретична база для подальшого аналізу метафоричних вибірок із тексту монографії. Вона охоплює відомості про природу емоційного досвіду як такого, психопатологію тривожного та панічного розладів, агорафобію, механізми концептуалізації світу людським розумом, концептуалізацію емоцій та їх назв, засади теорії когнітивної метафори та способи роботи із метафорами у галузі психіатрії та психотерапії.

Третій розділ роботи містить практичне застосування вищезазначеної методології для аналізу відібраного метафоричного матеріалу, його інтерпретації та систематизації. У цьому розділі також наданий коментар з приводу стратегій метафоричної креативності та наявності застосування цих стратегій у тексті монографії.

Ключові поняття: емоційний досвід, тривожний та панічний розлади особистості, агорафобія, концепт, концептуалізація, теорія когнітивної метафори, метафорична креативність.

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LEXICOGRAPHICAL SOURCES

RDT. Roget's 21st Century Dictionary and Thesaurus. <http://www.dictionary.com>,
<http://www.thesaurus.com>.

CDE. Cambridge Dictionary of English. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org>.

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. <http://www.merriam-webster.com>.

Other

BNC. British National Corpus. <https://www.english-corpora.org/bnc/>

CCAE. The Corpus of Contemporary American English. <https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/>

APPENDICES

Appendix A




Figure A

Dimensional structure of the semantic space for emotions

(Scherer, 2005: 720)

Appendix B

Emotion names for conceptual categories of emotion in English (Scherer, 2005: 714-5)

- ADMIRATION/AWE
*admir**, *ador**, *awe**, *dazed*,
*dazzl**, *enrapt**, *enthrall**,
*fascina**, *marveli**, *rapt**,
*reveren**, *spellbound*, *wonder**,
*worship**;
- AMUSEMENT
*amus**, *fun**, *humor**, *laugh**,
*play**, *rollick**, *smil**;
- ANGER
anger, *anгр**, *cross**, *enrag**,
furious, *fury*, *incens**, *infuriat**,
irate, *ire**, *mad**, *rag**, *resent**,
temper, *wrath**, *wrought**;
- ANXIETY
*anguish**, *anxi**, *apprehens**,
*diffiden**, *jitter**, *nervous**,
*trepida**, *wari**, *wary*, *worried**,
*worry**;
- BEING TOUCHED
*affect**, *mov**, *touch**;
- BOREDOM
*bor**, *ennui*, *indifferen**,
*languor**, *tedi**, *wear**;
- COMPASSION
*commiser**, *compass**, *empath**,
*pit**;
- CONTEMPT
*contempt**, *denigr**, *deprec**,
*deris**, *despi**, *disdain**, *scorn**;
- GUILT
*blame**, *contriti**, *guilt**, *remorse**,
- CONTENTMENT
*comfortabl**, *content**, *satisf**;
- DESPERATION
*deject**, *desolat**, *despair**,
*desperat**, *despond**,
*disconsolat**, *hopeless**,
*inconsol**;
- DISAPPOINTMENT
comedown, *disappoint**,
*discontent**, *disenchant**,
*disgruntl**, *disillusion**, *frustrat**,
*jilt**, *letdown*, *resign**, *sour**,
*thwart**;
- DISGUST
*abhor**, *avers**, *detest**, *disgust**,
*dislik**, *disrelish*, *distast**, *loath**,
*nause**, *queas**, *repugn**, *repuls**,
*revolt**, *sicken**;
- DISSATISFACTION
*dissatisf**, *unhapp**;
- ENVY
*envious**, *envy**;
- FEAR
*afraid**, *aghast**, *alarm**, *dread**,
*fear**, *fright**, *horr**, *panic**,
*scare**, *terror**;
- FEELING
love, *affection**, *fond**, *love**,
*friend**, *tender**;
- GRATITUDE
*grat**, *thank**;
- PLEASURE/ENJOYMENT
*enjoy**, *delight**, *glow**, *pleas**,

*repent**;

- HAPPINESS

bliss, cheer*, delect*, delight*,
enchant*, enjoy*, felicit*, happ*,
merr**;

- HATRED

acrimon, hat*, rancor**;

- HOPE

buoyan, confident*, faith*, hop*,
optim**;

- HUMILITY

devout, humility*;

- INTEREST/ENTHUSIASM

absor, alert, animat*, ardor*,
attenti*, curi*, eager*, enrapt*,
engross*, enthusias*, ferv*,
interes*, zeal**;

- IRRITATION

annoy, exasperat*, grump*,
indign*, irrita*, sullen*, vex**;

- JEALOUSY

covetous, jealous**;

- JOY

ecstat, elat*, euphor*, exalt*,
exhilar*, exult*, flush*, glee*, joy*,
jubil*, overjoyed, ravish*, rejoic**;

- LONGING

crav, daydream*, desir*, fanta*,
hanker*, hark*, homesick*, long*,
nostalg*, pin*, regret*, wish*,
wistf*, yearn**;

- LUST

carnal, lust, climax, ecsta*,
orgas*, sensu*, sexual**;

thrill, zest**;

- PRIDE

pride, proud**;

- RELAXATION/SERENITY

ease, calm*, carefree,
casual, detach*, dispassion*,
equanim*, eventemper*, laid-
back, peace*, placid*, poise*,
relax*, seren*, tranquil*,
unruffl**;

- RELIEF

*relie**;

- SADNESS

chagrin, deject*, dole*,
gloom*, glum*, grie*, hopeless*,
melancho*, mourn*, sad*,
sorrow*, tear*, weep**;

- SHAME

abash, asham*, crush*,
disgrace*, embarrass*, humili*,
shame**;

- SURPRISE

amaze, astonish*, dumbfound*,
startl*, stunn*, surpris*, aback,
thunderstruck, wonder**;

- TENSION/STRESS

activ, agit*, discomfort*,
distress*, strain*, stress*,
tense**.

Appendix C

Metaphorical conceptualizations of emotion experience in the van den Berg, J.H. (1972) *A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology*

[56 conceptual metaphors, 76 metaphorical expressions]

I. Metaphorical ranges

Target 1. LOVE

[7 conceptual metaphors, 10 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|---------|---|
| LOVE is | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [3 metaphorical expressions] |
| | A CHILD [2 metaphorical expressions] |
| | HUMAN BEING [1 metaphorical expressions] |
| | A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A DISEASE [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | AN EXCHANGE OF FANTASIES [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | PHYSICAL CONTACT [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 2. EMOTION

[4 conceptual metaphors, 9 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|------------|--|
| EMOTION is | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [4 metaphorical expressions] |
| | A HUMAN BEING [2 metaphorical expressions] |
| | CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER [2 metaphorical expressions] |
| | A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 3. HATRED

[6 conceptual metaphors, 9 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|-----------|---|
| HATRED is | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [4 metaphorical expressions] |
| | A BURDEN [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A HUMAN BEING [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | RED COLOUR / PAINT [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A WEAPON |

| | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| | [1 metaphorical expression] |
|--|-----------------------------|

Target 4. INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM

[4 conceptual metaphors, 7 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM is | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [4 metaphorical expressions] |
| | A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A CONTROLLING FORCE [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A PLACE [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 5. FEAR

[4 conceptual metaphors, 6 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|---------|--|
| FEAR is | A CONFINING FORCE [2 metaphoric expressions] |
| | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [2 metaphoric expressions] |
| | WHITE COLOUR / BLEACH [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | AN ENEMY [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 6. LUST

[4 conceptual metaphors, 5 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|---------|---|
| LUST is | A COMMAND [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A HUMAN BEING [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A MOVING FORCE [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 7. SHAME

[5 conceptual metaphors, 5 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|----------|---|
| SHAME is | CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A CLOTH [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A HUMAN BEING [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A SUBSTANCE [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 8. HOPE

[2 conceptual metaphors, 3 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|---------|---|
| HOPE is | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [2 metaphorical expressions] |
| | A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 9. TENSION / STRESS

[3 conceptual metaphors, 3 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| TENSION / STRESS is | A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | ELECTRICITY [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 10. RELAXATION / SERENITY

[2 conceptual metaphors, 3 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| RELAXATION / SERENITY | CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | FOOD [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 11. PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT

[3 conceptual metaphors, 3 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT is | CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 12. SADNESS

[3 conceptual metaphors, 3 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|------------|--|
| SADNESS is | A PRISON CELL [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A RESERVOIR [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A SPELL [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 13. DISAPPOINTMENT

[2 conceptual metaphors, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| DISAPPOINTMENT is | A CONTAINER [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 14. DISGUST

[2 conceptual metaphors, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|------------|--|
| DISGUST is | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | A SUBSTANCE [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 15. IRRITATION

[2 conceptual metaphors, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|---------------|---|
| IRRITATION is | FIRE [1 metaphorical expression] |
| | RED COLOUR / PAINT [1 metaphorical expression] |

Target 16. ANXIETY

[1 conceptual metaphor, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|------------|--|
| ANXIETY is | A PHYSICAL OBJECT [2 metaphorical expression] |
|------------|--|

Target 17. DESPERATION

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|----------------|---|
| DESPERATION is | A BURDEN [1 metaphorical expression] |
|----------------|---|

Target 18. HAPPINESS

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|--------------|---|
| HAPPINESS is | A DECISION [1 metaphorical expression] |
|--------------|---|

II. Metaphorical scopes

Source 1. A PHYSICAL OBJECT

[12 conceptual metaphors, 26 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| EMOTION [4 metaphorical expressions] | is A PHYSICAL OBJECT |
| HATRED [4 metaphorical expressions] | |
| INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM [4 metaphorical expressions] | |
| LOVE [3 metaphorical expressions] | |
| FEAR [2 metaphorical expressions] | |
| HOPE [2 metaphorical expressions] | |
| ANXIETY [2 metaphorical expressions] | |
| SHAME [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| TENSION / STRESS | |

| | |
|---|--|
| [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| DISAPPOINTMENT [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| DISGUST [1 metaphorical expression] | |

Source 2. A CONTAINER

[8 conceptual metaphors, 8 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|--|----------------|
| DISAPPOINTMENT [1 metaphorical expression] | is A CONTAINER |
| EMOTION [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| HATRED [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| HOPE [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| LOVE [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT | |

| | |
|---|--|
| [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| TENSION / STRESS [1 metaphorical expression] | |

Source 3. CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER

[5 conceptual metaphors, 6 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|--|----------------------------------|
| EMOTION [2 metaphorical expressions] | is CONTENT INSIDE A CONTAINER |
| LUST [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| RELAXATION / SERENITY [1 metaphorical expression] | |
| SHAME [1 metaphorical expression] | |

Source 4. A HUMAN BEING

[5 conceptual metaphors, 5 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|--|------------------|
| EMOTION [1 metaphorical expression] | is A HUMAN BEING |
| HATRED [1 metaphorical expression] | |

| | |
|---|--|
| <p style="text-align: center;">LOVE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[1 metaphorical expression]</p> | |
| <p style="text-align: center;">LUST</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[1 metaphorical expression]</p> | |
| <p style="text-align: center;">SHAME</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[1 metaphorical expression]</p> | |

Source 5. BURDEN

[2 conceptual metaphors, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|---|--------------------|
| <p style="text-align: center;">DESPERATION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[1 metaphorical expression]</p> | <p>is a BURDEN</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">HATRED</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[1 metaphorical expression]</p> | |

Source 6. REDCOLOUR / PAINT

[2 conceptual metaphors, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| <p style="text-align: center;">HATRED</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[1 metaphorical expression]</p> | <p>is a RED COLOUR / PAINT</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">IRRITATION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[1 metaphorical expression]</p> | |

Source 7. SUBSTANCE

[2 conceptual metaphors, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|----------------|--|
| <p>DISGUST</p> | |
|----------------|--|

| | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|
| [1 metaphorical expression] | is a SUBSTANCE |
| SHAME [1 metaphorical expression] | |

Source 8.A CHILD

[1 conceptual metaphor, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|-------------------------------------|------------|
| LOVE [2 metaphorical expression] | is A CHILD |
|-------------------------------------|------------|

Source 9.A CLOTH

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|--------------------------------------|------------|
| SHAME [1 metaphorical expression] | is A CLOTH |
|--------------------------------------|------------|

Source 10.A COMMAND

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|
| LUST [1 metaphorical expression] | is A COMMAND |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|

Source 11.A CONFINING FORCE

[1 conceptual metaphor, 2 metaphorical expressions]

| | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|
| LOVE [2 metaphorical expressions] | is A CONFINING FORCE |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|

Source 12.A CONTROLLING FORCE

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|--|------------------------|
| INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM [1 metaphorical expression] | is A CONTROLLING FORCE |
|--|------------------------|

Source 13.A DECISION

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|--|---------------|
| HAPPINESS [1 metaphorical expression] | is A DECISION |
|--|---------------|

Source 14.A DISEASE

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|
| LOVE [1 metaphorical expression] | is A DISEASE |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|

Source 14. ELECTRICITY

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|---|----------------|
| TENSION / STRESS [1 metaphorical expression] | is ELECTRICITY |
|---|----------------|

Source 15. ENEMY

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|-------------------------------------|----------|
| FEAR [1 metaphorical expression] | is ENEMY |
|-------------------------------------|----------|

Source 16. EXCHANGE OF FANTASIES

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|------|--------------------------|
| LOVE | is EXCHANGE OF FANTASIES |
|------|--------------------------|

| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| [1 metaphorical expression] | |
|-----------------------------|--|

Source 16. FIRE

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|---|---------|
| IRRITATION [1 metaphorical expression] | is FIRE |
|---|---------|

Source 16. FOOD

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|---|---------|
| PLEASURE / ENJOYMENT [1 metaphorical expression] | is FOOD |
|---|---------|

Source 17. A MOVING FORCE

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| LUST [1 metaphorical expression] | is A MOVING FORCE |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|

Source 18. PHYSICAL CONTACT

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|
| LOVE [1 metaphorical expression] | is PHYSICAL CONTACT |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|

Source 19. A PLACE

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|--|------------|
| INTEREST / ENTHUSIASM [1 metaphorical expression] | is A PLACE |
|--|------------|

Source 20. A PRISON CELL

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|--|------------------|
| SADNESS [1 metaphorical expression] | is A PRISON CELL |
|--|------------------|

Source 21. A RESERVOIR

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|--|----------------|
| SADNESS [1 metaphorical expression] | is A RESERVOIR |
|--|----------------|

Source 22. A SPELL

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|--|------------|
| SADNESS [1 metaphorical expression] | is A SPELL |
|--|------------|

Source 22. WHITE COLOUR / BLEACH

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| FEAR [1 metaphorical expression] | is WHITE COLOUR / BLEACH |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|

Source 23. A WEAPON

[1 conceptual metaphor, 1 metaphorical expression]

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| HATRED [1 metaphorical expression] | is A WEAPON |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|